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ABSTRACT 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to provide an account of metaphor comprehension 
that applies to the full spectrum of metaphorical utterances. I take the relevance-theoretic 
account of communication, and its entailed theory of metaphor, to provide a good 
account of how many metaphorical expressions are comprehended, in particular 
lexical/phrasal cases. However, I maintain the need for a different processing route to 
account for instances of metaphor interpretation in which the literal meaning of the 
metaphorical utterance is more keenly felt and experienced by the interpreter. As I 
demonstrate, this applies to cases of extended and/or creative metaphorical utterances.   
The additional processing route described, referred to as the ‘metaphorical/imaginary 
world’ route, is argued to be complementary to the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept 
account and is, therefore, framed against the backdrop of RT’s general theory of 
communication. In order to incorporate the perspective-shifting and imagistic effects that 
I show to be derived during ‘metaphorical world’ comprehension, I suggest enriching the 
relevance-theoretic notion of ‘encyclopaedic entry’ to encompass affective and imagistic 
content. This work takes its cue from recent research in the field of embodied simulation.  
In my attempt to offer support for the existence of the metaphorical world mode of 
understanding, I present two empirical investigations designed to test its claims. In 
addition, I provide extensive analysis of metaphorical expressions that occur in the 
context of psychotherapeutic discourse. I argue that this unique communicative context 
lends itself to the metaphorical world processing route in so much as it creates a reflective 
space that invites both client and therapist to deeply consider and sustain the literal 
meanings of their metaphorical expressions. While my main goal is to inform pragmatic 
theories of metaphor comprehension, this endeavour also serves therapeutic ends, by 
informing the theoretical underpinnings concerning the use of metaphor in 
psychotherapy.  
Keywords: metaphor, figurative language, pragmatics, Relevance Theory, Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, psychotherapy, embodiment 
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Preface 
 
This thesis is chiefly concerned with the pragmatic phenomenon that is metaphor. 
Essentially, metaphor is a use of language through which speakers ‘say’ one thing and 
mean another. As philosophers Marga Reimer and Elisabeth Camp say, it is ‘a figure of 
speech in which one thing is represented (or spoken of) as something else’ (Reimer & 
Camp, 2006: 846). Consider the examples below: 
 
1. Cigarettes are ticking time bombs. 
2. Their relationship was a mug of watery fruit tea – comforting, yet unexciting. 
3. Chris’ soul was an intricately complex crystal.  
4. My wife is a volcano. 
5. I’m totally inundated at work, standing at the foot of a laundry chute. 
  
In example (1) cigarettes are spoken of as being ‘ticking time bombs’ (not merely as being 
like them), in (2) a relationship is said to be ‘watery fruit tea’, in (3) a soul is ‘crystal’, etc. 
Of course, speakers do not intend their audience to interpret their utterance literally (and 
it is an open question exactly what role the ‘literally encoded’ meaning plays in the 
comprehension process). That is, someone who utters (4) does not intend to 
communicate the blatantly false proposition that he is married to a hole in the earth’s 
crust that spews out red-hot lava at unpredictable moments in time. Instead, the speaker 
intends to communicate that his wife’s behaviour is hurtful, that she is emotionally 
volatile, uncontrollable, dangerous, etc. Similarly, in uttering (5), the speaker does not 
mean that he or she is quite literally standing at the bottom of a laundry chute, rather the 
speaker feels as if she is at the bottom of a laundry chute in the sense of being suffocated 
by a constant barrage of incoming information and tasks. My objective in this thesis is to 
find an account of metaphor comprehension that can explain how interpreters derive the 
intended meanings of these and other metaphorical expressions (many of them more 
complex and/or extended than these ones). 
Self-proclaimed metaphor ‘designer’ Michael Erard notes how it is useful to have a 
metaphor for metaphor. Erard’s metaphor is rather long, but for me at least, it is highly 
apt, and has the advantage of encompassing a great deal of what interests me about 
metaphor. For Erard, a metaphor is a room and this is how it works: 
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The windows and doors frame a view toward the reality outside. Put the windows 
high, people will only see the trees. Put them low, they see the grass. Put the 
window on the south side, they’ll see the sun. Sometimes the room can be empty. 
Sometimes the views from the room are a bit forced. Or perhaps they’re new and 
uncomfortable. In those situations, you have to direct people’s attention. You have 
to give them furniture to sit on that makes your architectural choices unavoidable. 
[…] maybe the best metaphor needs no furniture. […] what often happens when 
you introduce people to this new metaphor is that they’ll complain about the 
furniture colour or the window trim, or praise you for something minor, such as 
the window sashes. The danger is that they’ll discard the enterprise before they’ve 
looked out the window – which, in most cases, offers a view onto the outside that’s 
unfamiliar. 
(Erard, 2015) 
 
Erard is a linguist, author and former researcher at FrameWorks Institute, a national 
think-tank in America, which strives to resolve social issues by reframing debates, often 
through metaphor. The effects of metaphor that he touches on, e.g. its ability to invoke 
new ways of seeing and thus of thinking, will be critical to this thesis. 
Metaphor bears many interesting similarities to other forms of figurative 
expression, such as simile, juxtaposition, analogy, allegory and symbol, to name but a few. 
While linguists, philosophers and psychologists have been at great pains over the years to 
distinguish these different phenomena, the distinct characteristics of each will not be a 
central issue in this thesis. Still, philosopher Ted Cohen provides a succinct and useful 
characterisation of the principal differences between some of these forms of figurative 
language: 
 
In a metaphor A is said to be B, in a simile A is said to be like B, in an analogy A is 
said to stand to C as B stands to D (and in some cases C and D are the same, as in 
“God is to me as my father is to me,” and there may be cases in which A and B are 
the same), while in allegory, typically, only B is mentioned and it is left to the reader 
to understand that B stands for, or represents, or “allegorizes” A.  
(Cohen, 2008: 10) 
 
Like Erard and Cohen, I have long been ‘enchanted’ by figurative language. Primed 
perhaps by early exposure to Aesop’s Fables, in which lessons of moral importance are 
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imparted through allegory, and later to Hinduism, where deep philosophical truths are 
couched in symbolism. While my primary goal is to find a fully adequate account of 
metaphorical language interpretation, I will at different points throughout this thesis 
widen my interest to include other forms of figurative expression when they seem to be 
operating similarly to metaphor. However, I hasten to add that doing so is not intended to 
deny the many interesting, and important, differences between these divergent forms of 
figurative expression.  
While metaphor used to be thought of as a purely decorative device, a special 
rhetorical flourish if you will, it is increasingly recognised as a pervasive feature of even 
the most pedestrian exchanges and one that affects the meaning conveyed and the 
cognitive effects achieved. Of course, the effects of many commonplace metaphors are 
rather banal, for example, ‘Mary is an angel’ or ‘their marriage was a bloody battle’. Yet, 
other metaphors are quite striking and appear to possess some power over their audience, 
power to move and inspire. It is these productive or ‘generative’ metaphors, as Schön 
(1993) calls them, and their cognitive and affective effects which I am endlessly fascinated 
by. It is these metaphors, and their productive power in psychotherapy, that constitute a 
primary focus of this thesis. 
I came to psychotherapy quite by accident. I myself am not what self-proclaimed 
metaphor ‘designer’ Michael Erard would call ‘reflexively metaphorical’; that is, 
metaphorical expression does not flow freely through my veins. And yet, during 
emotionally charged moments of inner conflict and confusion, or when trying to explain 
complex, unfamiliar ideas to my students, I found my metaphorical reflexivity notably 
improved. These experiences inspired me to consider the nature of metaphorical 
expression and, over time, to reflect on how our affective experiences often move us to 
use language figuratively.   
It was consideration of the affective domain that led me to examine the field of 
psychotherapy, and, much to my surprise, I found a wealth of literature concerning the 
use of figurative language in this context. I was confronted by opposing positions on how 
to treat clients’ metaphoric utterances, how therapists ought to work with metaphor, and, 
most interesting to me, lengthy discussion about the psychotherapeutic effects of working 
with metaphor. As a pragmaticist, I began to wonder what pragmatic theories of 
metaphor interpretation might gain from the unique perspective of psychotherapists. 
What could we learn from the treatment of metaphor in psychotherapy, and could the 
attested effects of metaphor in this domain illuminate current theoretical debates within 
pragmatics? 
	 14 
The thesis proceeds as follows: in chapter 1, I evaluate two accounts of metaphor 
processing: Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Relevance Theory, arguing ultimately in 
favour of the latter as an account of metaphor interpretation. In Chapter 2, I focus my 
attention on instances of metaphor whose effects, I argue, do not lend themselves to the 
relevance-theoretic account outlined in chapter 1. As such, I discuss a number of 
alternative approaches to metaphor interpretation, in which the literal meaning of the 
expression in question plays a more dominant role in the interpretation process. Chapter 
3 introduces the domain of psychotherapy, explores divergent practices within the field, 
and makes a number of suggestions concerning the special nature of this communicative 
context. Chapter 4 considers the role of metaphor in psychotherapy, where I note that 
figurative language often ‘close[s] the gap in people’s ability to grasp something, or 
speed[s] up what they’re already on track to see’ (Erard, 2015). Chapter 5 presents two 
empirical investigations designed to test the claim that there are two routes to metaphor 
comprehension, which give rise to distinct effects. Although the results of these 
experiments are inconclusive and do not directly support the dual processing view of 
metaphor within RT, they are most informative in terms of suggesting avenues for further 
research. Lastly, in chapters 6 and 7, I describe recent work on ‘embodied cognition’ and 
‘multimodal concepts’, and suggest that the explanatory power of the interpretation route 
described in chapter 2 can and should be enhanced by enriching the relevance-theoretic 
account of concepts so as to incorporate more affective and imagistic content.  
Some of the metaphorical expressions discussed in this thesis are constructed from 
my own imagination (such as those in examples (1) to (5) of this preface), while others are 
taken from existing literature, in philosophy, pragmatics and psychotherapy. Many 
examples from pragmatics and philosophy have been fabricated by academics and as 
such, the most that can be said of them is that they represent possible uses of language. In 
contrast, examples from psychotherapy literature come, for the most part, from 
transcripts of psychotherapy sessions, and are therefore, real-world instances of language 
use. 
While discourse analysts have long been interested in psychotherapeutic talk, this is 
not a domain that anyone in the relevance-theoretic community has investigated up until 
this point. Similarly, RT has remained relatively disengaged from the increasingly large 
range of work on embodied cognition and its role in communication. A major 
accomplishment of this thesis lies in making a first step towards integrating these 
disassociated literatures. One conclusion that derives from this union is that 
psychotherapeutic practice can be used to inform theories of metaphor comprehension, 
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such as the relevance-theoretic account. On the basis of metaphor’s treatment and use in 
psychotherapy, I argue in favour of an additional account of metaphor processing, one 
that complements the standard relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account. At the same 
time, I suggest that the relevance-theoretic account makes sense of certain idiosyncratic 
features of psychotherapeutic communication, thus the feedback works in both 
directions. After setting up a dialogue between Relevance Theory and embodied 
cognition, I suggest that notions and data from the latter may, and indeed should, be 
incorporated into the former. While the intricacies of this move are yet to be worked out 
fully, this thesis marks the first stage of that potentially important development for 
Relevance Theory. The chief conclusions that one may derive from this thesis can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
(i) Relevance Theory, and its entailed account of metaphor comprehension, 
benefits from analysis of psychotherapeutic talk, and more applied 
domains generally.   
(ii) In the same way that Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been fruitfully 
applied to psychotherapy, Relevance Theory too can be used to explain 
certain unique characteristics of psychotherapeutic talk.  
(iii) The relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account of metaphor 
comprehension is not the only processing route at interpreters’ disposal; 
different contexts and linguistic forms may call for, and induce, different 
modes of interpretation. 
(iv) Different processing routes may be characterised by different effects (as 
the results from an exploratory memory questionnaire conducted as part 
of this work suggest, see chapter 5).  
(v) Relevance Theory ought to take heed of the work in embodied cognition 
and to assess whether and how imagistic and affective effects of 
metaphors can be incorporated into its theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 1 · Cognitive accounts of metaphor comprehension 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last century, the study of metaphor has undergone dramatic development. 
While the traditional belief that metaphor is a special, deviant form of language 
dominated opinion for many years, it is now almost universally accepted that metaphor is 
a ubiquitous and ‘normal’ feature of everyday discourse. In large part, the widespread 
acceptance of this view can be credited to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s influential 
‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory’ (henceforth CMT). According to Lakoff and Johnson, 
metaphor is pervasive in language since it is pervasive in thought; cognition itself is 
deemed to be metaphorical. In other words, linguistic metaphors are considered to be a 
natural consequence of underlying metaphorical thought; they are surface reflections of 
conceptual mappings between different cognitive domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) shares the assumption that metaphor is a normal and 
natural phenomenon; however, the grounds for this position are wholly different from 
those of CMT. For relevance theorists, metaphor is a loose use of language that arises 
naturally in communication, sometimes as a result of our attempt to communicate 
complex and vague thoughts (Sperber & Wilson, 2008; Wilson & Carston, 2007) and at 
other times, as an economical mode of expression that serves to effectively communicate 
a speaker’s intended meaning in a succinct manner. This fundamental difference in the 
two positions might seem to primarily speak to the pressures that affect production of 
metaphorical utterances, but both theories also offer an account of how metaphorical 
uses of language are interpreted. Given the main focus of this thesis, which is to find a 
satisfactory account of metaphor comprehension, I am chiefly concerned with each 
theory’s account of metaphor comprehension/interpretation. 
In part, the motivation to consider CMT stems from my interest in 
psychotherapeutic discourse. Exploration of this domain reveals that many writers in the 
field of psychotherapy ground their use of metaphor on the notion of metaphorical 
cognition. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the theoretical adequacy of CMT is never challenged in 
the therapy context. This has led me to consider the extent to which the use of metaphor 
in psychotherapy relies on the assumption that thought/conceptualisation (and not just 
linguistic expression of thought) is metaphorical; in other words, my first question is 
whether it is necessary to subscribe to metaphorical cognition (and conceptual mappings) 
in order to support the use of metaphor in psychotherapy? Secondly, I have wondered 
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how subscribing to metaphorical cognition influences the use of metaphor in the therapy 
context; that is to say, what effects, if any, would not subscribing to the view that 
cognition is metaphorical have on psychotherapeutic practices involving the use of verbal 
metaphor? I have considered whether the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor could 
fulfil the same function that CMT does, in terms of validating and informing the use of 
metaphorical language in psychotherapy. Lastly, I have been interested in whether the 
unquestioning faith in metaphorical cognition from writers in the field of psychotherapy, 
who take this notion in a general sense (largely unaware of CMT’s theoretical 
underpinnings and implications), is warranted by the theory itself – it is this more 
theoretical question that will be principally addressed in this chapter. 
I begin this chapter by presenting the basic tenets of CMT, followed by the various 
criticisms lodged against the theory and the evidence used to counter those criticisms. 
Subsequently, I outline the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor comprehension, 
highlighting points of contrast with CMT along the way. In section 1.5, I consider 
whether and how the two accounts might be fruitfully combined. Here I take my lead 
from relevance theorist Deirdre Wilson and conceptual metaphor theorists Ray Gibbs 
and Markus Tendahl who have recently noted the complementary perspectives that each 
theory provides (Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006, 2011; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Wilson, 2011). 
Throughout, I consider what both CMT and RT offer to the study and use of metaphor in 
psychotherapy. Ultimately, I suggest that RT provides a better account of how 
metaphorical utterances are interpreted, but this is not intended to diminish the valuable 
insights afforded by CMT. In the chapter that follows, however, I will argue that neither 
CMT nor standard RT provides a psychologically plausible description of metaphor 
interpretation that can be applied to all metaphorical utterances; I pave the way for this 
argument towards the end of this chapter.  
 
1.2 CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
 
1.2.1 AN OUTLINE OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
 
At the heart of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is the claim that metaphor is a fundamental 
part of human thought; ‘our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think 
and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 3). The basis 
of metaphorical cognition is a system of conceptual mappings between cognitive 
domains. According to proponents of the theory, people construct many concepts by 
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mapping abstract conceptual domains onto their knowledge of concrete domains. It is 
claimed that abstract concepts, for example LIFE, TIME and ARGUMENTS1, cannot be 
thought of without reference to some other, more concrete entity. CMT proponents 
believe that we structure these abstract concepts by projecting more concrete domains of 
thought onto them (for example journeys, money and wars respectively). In other words, 
we conceptualise life in terms of a journey, time in terms of money and arguments in 
terms of wars. These metaphorical conceptualisations are referred to as conceptual 
metaphors (LIFE IS A JOURNEY, TIME IS MONEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR). In CMT terms, LIFE, 
TIME and ARGUMENT are the target domains, and JOURNEY, MONEY and WAR the source 
domains. These, and many other, conceptual metaphors are stored in long-term memory 
and are said to motivate and constrain our use of language. Verbal metaphors are, 
therefore, considered as mere by-products, or surface reflections, of conceptual 
metaphors. See below some examples of linguistic expressions and the conceptual 
metaphors from which they are derived:  
 
1. LIFE IS A JOURNEY 
I’ve come so far, but now I’m at a crossroads and don’t know which way to 
turn. 
I’ve reached a turning point and feel completely lost. 
I wish someone would show me the right way to go. 
2. TIME IS MONEY 
I’ve invested so much time in this relationship and I’m worried it’s going to be 
wasted.  
I missed my train and it cost me over an hour. 
3. LESS IS DOWN; MORE IS UP 
My salary is still incredibly low, even though my client load is on the rise.  
Our rent keeps going up, if it gets any higher I’ll have to move out. 
 
According to CMT, domain mappings involve setting up systematic correspondences 
between the elements of the respective domains. Therefore, our knowledge of a source 
domain such as WAR, structures the more abstract domain of thought, ARGUMENT, via the 
conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. Lakoff notes that metaphorical mappings 
‘preserve the cognitive typology (that is, the image-schematic structure) of the source 
																																																								
1 Following common linguistic practice, small caps are used to represent concepts. 
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domain’ (1993: 214)2; this is referred to as the ‘invariance hypothesis’.3 As such, we regard 
individuals in an argument as opponents in a battle who can gain or lose ground, win or 
lose, attack with force, be defeated, shoot each other down, etc. An example of a verbal 
metaphor which reflects this conceptual metaphor is, ‘he’s attacking me with harsh words 
all the time; I’m too exhausted to defend myself against his verbal abuse so I just let him 
win’. 
In their later works, Lakoff and Johnson make the additional claim that the mind is 
inherently embodied.  
 
This is not just the innocuous and obvious claim that we need a body to reason; 
rather, it is the striking claim that the very structure of reason itself comes from the 
details of our embodiment. The same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow 
us to perceive and move around, also create our conceptual systems and modes of 
reason.  
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 4) 
 
Lakoff and Johnson noted that the source domains of many conceptual metaphors are 
derived from recurrent patterns of sensory-motor experiences (i.e. image schemas). They 
subsequently suggested that the system of conceptual metaphors consists of a set of 
primary conceptual metaphors, which are grounded in our shared bodily experience of 
the world, and more complex secondary conceptual metaphors, which are composed of 
simpler primary metaphors combined with general knowledge. An example of a 
secondary complex metaphor is THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS; this conceptual metaphor gives 
rise to expressions such as ‘his theory is lacking foundations, it seems to be built on shaky 
ground’. Purportedly, this complex metaphor is built from two primary metaphors, 
ORGANISATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT, both of 
which clearly have a basis in our bodily experience, plus some general knowledge (for 																																																								
2 The term ‘image schemata’ was originally coined by Mark Johnson (1987) and is loosely defined 
as recurring dynamic patterns of our perceptual interactions, or as Hampe says, they are 
‘schematic gestalts which capture the structural contours of sensory-motor experience’ (2005: 1).  
3 The invariance hypothesis speaks to an objection raised by critics of CMT. Murphy (1996), for 
example, questions how individuals are able to make so few erroneous inferences about the 
applicability of source domain properties to the abstract concepts they are mapped to. If 
knowledge of abstract concepts were entirely parasitic on knowledge of more concrete domains, 
one would expect that a conceptual metaphor like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS would result in 
‘stairwells’ and ‘hallways’ (i.e. entities from the source domain) being attributed to theories (the 
target domain). According to Gibbs (2011a), the invariance hypothesis accounts for why these 
errors do not occur: because it is only the image-schematic structure of the source domain that is 
mapped to the abstract concept. 
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instance, that component parts of a theory may have to be revised (like structural parts of 
a building), or that theories are often overturned and replaced by other theories (just as 
buildings are often destroyed and replaced with new constructions) etc.).4  
After analysing systematic patterns of linguistic expression, conceptual metaphor 
theorist Joseph Grady (1997) compiled an extensive list of primary metaphors which he 
claimed were grounded in shared bodily experience, for example, MORE IS UP, LESS IS 
DOWN, HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN, IMPORTANT IS BIG, AFFECTION IS WARMTH, INTIMACY IS 
CLOSENESS, KNOWING IS SEEING, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. The primary metaphors 
HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN give rise to expressions such as ‘my spirits rose’, ‘I’m feeling 
down’, ‘I fell into depression’, and ‘thinking about her gives me a lift’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980: 16). According to conceptual metaphor theorists, these primary metaphors are 
born out of the associative connections between positive and negative experiences and 
being physically upright or down. Likewise, KNOWING IS SEEING comes from the 
correlated experience of knowing something as a result of seeing it and PURPOSES ARE 
DESTINATIONS from the experience of realising one’s intention or purpose when reaching 
a destination, for example, when I intend to go on holiday, I fulfil that purpose when I 
reach the place that I’m visiting.5 
Perhaps the most fundamental claim of CMT, certainly the most relevant for this 
chapter, is the idea that we use metaphorical language because much of our thought is 
constituted by conceptual metaphors. It is important to note the far-reaching 
consequences of this assertion. Not only do conceptual metaphors influence the way in 
which we speak, but they also impact on, and indeed govern, the way that we think (since 
they constitute thought) and so too the way that we behave. In this sense, conceptual 
metaphors are metaphors that ‘we live by’.6 To further illustrate: from the pervasive 
conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY it follows that we think of time in terms of money 
(which we know is a valuable and limited resource) and therefore, we talk of wasting, 																																																								
4 There is significant discussion amongst CM theorists concerning the universality of conceptual 
metaphors. Although the bodily basis of primary metaphors implies their universal status, 
contrasted with secondary conceptual metaphors, which one might assume to be culture-specific, 
research calls into question this strict demarcation. It is now more common for CM theorists to 
describe primary conceptual metaphors as particularly widespread and possibly universal (as 
opposed to definitely universal). For further detail see Evans, 2013, Kövecses, 2005 and Yu, 2003, 
2008.  
5  A more recent proposal within CMT is that metaphorical mappings consist of neural 
connections that bind sensory-motor information to abstract thought. Seen in this light, target 
domains are construed in terms of source domains as a result of neural links between the two 
domains (for further detail see Lakoff, 2008). 
6 ‘Metaphors we live by’ is the title of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work in which they first 
introduced Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
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saving, spending, borrowing and investing time. Support for the claim that this conceptual 
metaphor impacts on more than just our language use comes from considerations of our 
behaviour and the way in which we treat time. For instance, in most western societies at 
least, we are paid by the hour (as opposed to being paid by the task). Take therapy as a 
fitting example, we do not pay therapists a fixed amount of money for ‘completing the 
job’ of making us feel better, rather we pay them by the amount of time that they spend 
with us, typically fifty minutes. For conceptual metaphor theorists, this behaviour is the 
result of the conceptually entrenched metaphor TIME IS MONEY. According to CMT, our 
actions and behaviour are directly influenced by thought (that is, by our concepts); to put 
it differently, thought foretells behaviour. Since language is a reflection of thought, it 
follows that like thought, the language that a speaker uses may be a predictor of how that 
individual will behave. This aspect of CMT, which we may call the ‘language to behaviour’ 
connection, will be most relevant when considering the appeal of CMT to 
psychotherapists.  
In order to compare and contrast CMT with the relevance-theoretic account of 
metaphorical language, it is necessary to spell out CMT’s claims concerning language 
comprehension. Yet, this is no simple task. Many cognitive linguists themselves recognise 
the vague and vastly underspecified claims that CMT makes with regards to metaphorical 
language comprehension (Gibbs, 2011a; Gibbs, 2013a; Gibbs & Ferreira, 2011; Gibbs & 
Perlman, 2006). The broad claim is that conceptual metaphors are automatically accessed 
during language use and, more specifically, that we ‘apply’ our knowledge of conceptual 
metaphors when making sense of language. Given this claim, research has, unsurprisingly, 
tended to focus on demonstrating that people access conceptual metaphors during 
interpretation (Gibbs & Nascimento, 1996; Gibbs, 2013b). Any evidence to this effect, 
some of which will be evaluated in the following section, has been taken as support for the 
theory overall, and for the role of conceptual metaphors during interpretation. However, 
while research might indicate that conceptual metaphors are accessed during 
comprehension, this evidence alone cannot explain how they are deployed in the 
comprehension procedure; for example, it is possible that activation of conceptual 
metaphors is a mere by-product (or even a result) of the interpretation process, and not 
integral to the process itself. Critically, CMT does not explain how accessing conceptual 
metaphors enables us to derive our interlocutor’s intended meaning. CMT has been 
widely criticised on this basis, that is, for its lack of an explicit account of metaphor 
understanding. At the more fundamental level, CMT’s implications for theories of 
conceptual structure have also been questioned and, therefore, the very existence of 
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conceptual metaphors has been called into question.7 In the following section, I briefly 
explore some of the criticisms lodged against CMT, together with the evidence used in 
attempts to counter these criticisms.   
 
1.2.2 CRITICISMS OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY 
 
Much of the evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphors has been derived from 
analyses of patterns of linguistic expressions, such as those described in the preceding 
section: ‘primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our 
ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 4). These 
analyses and so-called evidence have been the main source of scepticism on the part of 
psychologists and philosophers. As McGlone notes, ‘Lakoff’s claim that metaphors 
transcend their linguistic manifestations to influence conceptual structure rests solely on 
these manifestations’ (McGlone, 2006: 115). To illustrate, according to CMT we know 
that people think about life in terms of journeys because of the systematic use of journey-
oriented terminology to talk about life. The same answer applies to the question of why 
people think about life in terms of journeys, because they use journey-orientated 
terminology to talk about life. Evidently, CMT cannot account for why conceptual 
metaphors exist, nor how we know that they do, without calling on linguistic 
manifestations. An important issue here is whether these linguistic manifestations could 
be explained without assuming an underlying conceptual metaphor; according to the RT 
account to be discussed in section 1.3, they can.  
McGlone (2001) draws our attention to the difficulties of using linguistic 
expressions to infer conceptual structure by reminding us of the Whorfian hypothesis 
and linguistic relativity. Simply put, the principle of linguistic relativity states that thought 
is shaped and determined by language (Whorf, 1956). Whorf famously proposed that 
language provides the means by which we perceive and act in the world, and, therefore, 
that speakers of different languages think about the world differently and, as a result, act 
differently in objectively similar situations. As with CMT, Whorf’s hypothesis was initially 
based on linguistic evidence, in Whorf’s case, on anecdotal observations of linguistic 
diversity. For example, Whorf claimed that Inuit speakers have many more ‘snow 
descriptors’ in their language than English, and that as a result, they think about snow 
differently from English speakers. As outlined in the preceding paragraph, CMT likewise 																																																								
7 Arguments against CMT that are built on the theory’s flawed implications for conceptual 
structure will be addressed in chapter 7.  
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relies on and uses linguistic evidence to substantiate claims about conceptual structure: 
on the basis of linguistic expressions, conceptual metaphors are posited. This line of 
reasoning, however, has been shown to be deficient and the strong, deterministic version 
of the Whorfian hypothesis has thus long been abandoned. McGlone supports the 
abandonment of the strong Whorfian hypothesis by citing evidence that Inuit speakers do 
not in fact think about snow differently from English speakers. However, this evidence 
does not serve McGlone’s purpose, for it has been revealed that, contrary to Whorf’s 
original observation, English has just as many expressions for snow as Inuit does (Pullum, 
1989). Therefore, the lack of discordant thought between the two cultures may indeed, as 
Whorf claimed, be a reflection of their language (a reflection that each language has an 
equal number of terms to describe snow).  
Studies from psychologist Eleanor Rosch, on the other hand, do support the 
rejection of Whorf’s deterministic claims. Rosch (1973) compared performances between 
Dani speakers (an agricultural community in New Guinea) and English speakers on a 
number of colour related tasks. Unlike English, which has many colour terms, Dani has 
only two: ‘mili’ (to refer to cool, dark colours) and ‘mola’ (to refer to warm, bright 
colours). Rosch found that Dani speakers were just as competent as English speakers 
when it came to recall of made-up colour words, and furthermore, that both groups of 
speakers found it easier to recall words associated with basic colours (e.g. red), compared 
to unusual colours (e.g. magenta). This evidence shows that Dani speakers’ limited 
vocabulary for colour terms does not affect their ability to perceive colour. Relevant to 
linguistic relativity, it shows that linguistic diversity does not necessarily indicate 
conceptual diversity. Rosch’s work demonstrates the pitfalls of using linguistic evidence 
as an indication of cognition; such external material cannot reliably be used to judge the 
internal substance of the mind. Hence, McGlone’s plea is that CM theorists should 
validate their claims regarding the conceptual system with evidence that is independent 
of linguistic expressions. 
While the strong, deterministic version of linguistic relativity has, as stated, long 
been abandoned, there are a plethora of studies in favour of its weaker claims: that 
language influences, but does not determine, thought processes (note, not necessarily the 
content of thought itself). For example, the linguistic system in Mandarin represents time 
along a vertical dimension (e.g. the past is up and the future is down), whereas English 
describes time along a horizontal dimension (e.g. the future is forward (to the right), the 
past is back (to the left)). Boroditsky (2001) found that these differences in spatial terms 
ensured that Mandarin speakers were better able, i.e. faster, to verify that March came 
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before April when they had just been presented with objects on a vertical axis as opposed 
to a horizontal axis (the reverse was true for English speakers). Moreover, when English 
speakers learnt Mandarin terms for time, their performance on the aforementioned task 
revealed the same bias as Mandarin speakers. This work indicates that language can play 
an important role in shaping our behaviour, as reflected by subjects’ performance on 
cognitive tasks.8  That this is the case may be an indication that language reflects 
underlying conceptual structure. However, the findings cited thus far in no way point 
exclusively to such a claim (and therefore, cannot be taken as support for CMT). 
Language may influence cognitive capacities, but conceptual structure, which is the fabric 
of the mind, may be symbolically represented and not, as CMT claims, determined by 
language (this idea will be explored at length in chapter 6).  
An additional criticism of CMT relates to the lack of criteria for identifying and 
classifying conceptual metaphors. For example, how can one be sure that the expressions 
‘he defended his position’ and ‘he attacked my argument’ are derived from the conceptual 
metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, as opposed to ARGUMENT IS CHESS or ARGUMENT IS 
BOXING? (See Vervaeke and Kennedy, 1996 and Ritchie, 2003 for further discussion). 
Furthermore, what constitutes sufficient systematicity amongst linguistic expressions to 
justify positing the existence of a conceptual metaphor? The answer is that it appears to 
be arbitrary, with no logical justification for specifying the adequacy of any number of 
expressions; a family of fifty related expressions would seem to be a lot, but how does one 
determine whether or not it is enough?9 The root of the problem is the circularity of 
reasoning in CMT. One initially analyses verbal expressions in order to infer conceptual 
metaphors, but then, in order to verify the existence of these conceptual metaphors, one 
returns to language. As Gibbs and Perlman rightly note, ‘independent, non-linguistic 
evidence is needed to break open the language-to-thought-to-language circle’ (2006: 215). 																																																								
8 For further evidence in support of a weak version of Whorf’s hypothesis, see Gumperz and 
Levinson, 1996, and for a review of research in the field of linguistic relativity, see Boroditsky, 
2003. 
9 Many scholars have applied CMT to analyses of large corpora and in so doing have stipulated 
conceptual metaphors. For example, in her analysis of the endangered Low Saxon dialect 
Westmünsterländisch, Piirainen (2012) proposed the existence of many culturally specific 
conceptual metaphors, for instance STUPIDITY IS AN (INHERITED) PROPERTY OF AN ANIMAL 
(instantiated by the idiomatic expression, ‘the goat had bitten him’ which means ‘he is stupid’). 
While Lakoff and Johnson may not have intended their theory to be applied in such a manner, and 
may not endorse the claim that these expressions reflect conceptual metaphors, there is nothing 
intrinsic to the theory that can disconfirm Piirainen’s claims. Since there is no formal criterion for 
identifying conceptual metaphors on the basis of linguistic expressions, there is nothing to prevent 
all manner of arbitrary stipulations. (For a review of Endangered Metaphors, the book in which 
Piirainen’s paper appears, and further argument against positing a number of conceptual 
metaphors on the basis of systematicity of verbal expressions, see Needham-Didsbury, 2013). 
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Keysar and Bly (1995) likewise stress the need for non-linguistic evidence of 
conceptual metaphors by demonstrating the inescapable problem of hindsight bias. In a 
series of experiments, participants examined a set of existing (albeit unfamiliar) idioms, 
which were embedded in one of three scenarios; these scenarios biased the participants’ 
interpretation, to the original meaning of the idiom, to a reversal of the original meaning, 
or to an unrelated meaning. For example, the idiom ‘the goose hangs high’ was embedded 
in a scenario that either (i) suggested its original meaning (things are looking good, 
everything is rosy), (ii) suggested the reversal of the idiom’s original meaning (the end has 
come, failure) or, (iii) suggested an unrelated meaning of the idiom (something is very 
loud). In the first experiment, after participants had ‘learned’ the meanings of the 
unfamiliar idioms, by reading stories in which they were embedded, they were asked to 
take the perspective of an uninformed individual, thereby suppressing their prior 
exposure to the idioms in context. Participants were then given the same idioms 
embedded in scenarios that did not bias their interpretation towards any of the meanings 
(original, reversed or unrelated) and were subsequently asked to indicate the meaning of 
the idiom by choosing from the original, reversed or unrelated meanings. In addition, 
they were required to rate the confidence with which they had made their judgments, on 
a 15-point scale. In the second experiment, participants were again biased towards either 
the original meaning of the idiom or the reversed meaning of the idiom. Subsequently, 
they read the unfamiliar idiom, together with its original meaning and reversed meaning, 
and were instructed to evaluate the extent to which each meaning ‘made sense’. Keysar 
and Bly found that once participants had learned a meaning of the unfamiliar idiom, 
during the first phase of the first experiment, they struggled to consider the possibility 
that someone might interpret the idiom in a different way. Therefore, participants 
attributed to an uninformed person the meaning of the idiom that they themselves had 
learned initially. The results of the second experiment corroborated these findings and 
indicated that the ‘learned’ meaning was always rated as more sensible than the unlearned 
meaning.  
The authors note that their results pose a problem for CMT. If, as Lakoff claims, 
‘there are independently existing elements of the conceptual system that link the idiom to 
its meaning’ (Lakoff, 1987: 449), one would expect that the original meanings of the 
idioms in Keysar and Bly’s experiment would make sense, even when they were not used 
during the learning phase. That is, one would expect that the original meaning of the 
idiom ‘the goose hangs high’ (the positive meaning) would always be readily 
comprehensible and judged as a sensible reading, since the linguistic expression is derived 
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from the underlying primary conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP. McGlone (2007) makes 
additional use of Keysar and Bly’s results by pointing out how CM theorists’ reasoning 
suffers the same faulty post-hoc rationalisation process observed in these experiments. In 
CMT, intuitions concerning an idiom’s meaning are assumed to reflect the way in which 
these meanings are represented in semantic memory. Yet, the assumption that our 
intuitions about the meaning of idioms directly reflect meaning representations in 
semantic memory cannot be evaluated without calling on these very intuitions. As Keysar 
and Bly demonstrate, these intuitions cannot be trusted, for the act of generating an 
intuitive theory about an idiom’s meaning can blind us to alternative possibilities that 
may be more accurate. Once again, the dangers of using linguistic evidence and intuition 
to uphold the claims of CMT are patent, and the importance of non-linguistic evidence is 
once more highlighted as essential in order to support the theory. 
Addressing the need for non-linguistic evidence, Gibbs (2011a) cites a range of 
social psychology studies, which he believes support the existence of conceptual 
metaphors. To give one example, Meier and Robinson (2004, cited in Gibbs, 2011a) found 
that subjects were faster to recognise a positive word when it was presented in a high 
vertical position on the screen than when it was presented in a low vertical position, and 
vice versa for negative words. Gibbs suggests that performance on these non-verbal tasks 
can be taken as support for the idea that people conceive of GOOD and BAD along a 
vertical dimension, as is suggested by CMT. Participants’ performance on this task, and a 
range of others, is certainly consistent with the conceptual metaphors GOOD IS UP/BAD IS 
DOWN and is, furthermore, indicative of people activating conceptual metaphors when 
thinking. The question remains, however, are conceptual metaphors recruited in the 
processes of on-line comprehension of metaphorical language? And, if they are, how do 
they contribute to the comprehension procedure? In what follows, I focus on the evidence 
brought to bear on these two questions. 
Evidence used to support the claim that conceptual metaphors play a role in 
metaphorical language comprehension comes primarily from psycholinguistic studies. 
For example, it has been found that participants are quicker to process, i.e. to read, 
metaphors whose meaning is motivated by a conceptual metaphor that has already been 
activated during prior discourse than those whose meaning is not supported in this way. 
In other words, people are faster to comprehend a metaphor that is consistent with 
previously computed conceptual metaphors and slower to comprehend a metaphor that 
is derived from a distinct conceptual mapping from that which has already been 
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processed (Gentner, Imai & Boroditsky, 2002; Langston, 2002; Pfaff, Gibbs & Johnson, 
1997; cited in Gibbs, 2011a).  
In Pfaff, Gibbs and Johnson’s (1997) study, participants first read metaphorical 
vignettes derived from conceptual metaphors, and subsequently read euphemistic 
expressions (the target sentences). For example, they would read a vignette that was 
consistent with the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, followed by an expression 
that employed a term consistent with that conceptual metaphor, for example ‘they 
decided it would be better if they moved on’. In order to rule out the possibility that their 
results merely reflected standard semantic priming, the authors also tested euphemistic 
expressions that were semantically related to the vignettes, but inconsistent with the 
conceptual metaphors from which those vignettes were derived (e.g. ‘they decided it 
would be better if they switched trains’).10 They found that semantic relatedness did not 
affect subjects’ reading of the target, euphemistic expressions while conceptual 
metaphors did. On this basis, the authors concluded that it was the consistency of the 
underlying conceptual metaphors, which must have been activated, that enabled 
participants to read the euphemistic terms quicker.11 While these studies demonstrate a 
facilitative effect that is consistent with the claim that conceptual metaphors affect on-
line processing of verbal metaphors, the exact role of conceptual metaphors in the 
comprehension procedure remains unclear. 
The reliability of the aforementioned experiments is, furthermore, called into 
question by studies that allege to have found the opposite effect. McGlone (1996), for 
example, found that when participants were asked to paraphrase the metaphor ‘Dr 
Moreland’s lecture was a three-course meal for the mind’, which the author supposed was 
a reflection of the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD, participants rarely cited 
potential correspondences between ideas and food. Instead, participants focused on the 
‘high quantity and/or quality aspects of three-course meals that can be attributed to 
lectures’ (McGlone, 2007: 117). In addition, it was found that when asked to construct 
metaphors with a comparable meaning to ‘Dr Moreland’s lecture was a three-course meal 																																																								
10 According to the authors, this sentence is ‘inconsistent with at least one of the mappings 
between love and junctions – specifically, the mapping of end states. […] for the familiar-
consistent ending (moved on), the end state reflects a possible ending for a journey: moving on, or 
starting a new journey. In contrast, switching trains is usually done at some point during a journey, 
not at the end’ (Pfaff, Gibbs & Johnson, 1997: 74).  
11 It is possible that the euphemistic expression ‘they decided it would be better if they moved on’ 
is easier to comprehend than the expression ‘they decided it would be better if they switched 
trains’, simply because it is more familiar (as opposed to because the former is consistent with the 
conceptual metaphor that underlies the preceding vignette, as Pfaff, Gibbs and Johnson (1997) 
suggest). 
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for the mind’, participants tended to generate metaphors such as ‘Dr Moreland’s lecture 
was a truckload of information’, as opposed to ‘Dr Moreland’s lecture was a steak for the 
intellect’, thus showing no evidence that they had activated the conceptual metaphor 
IDEAS ARE FOOD (McGlone, 1996). Likewise, participants did not rate the latter expression 
regarding steak as more similar to the three-course meal metaphor than expressions such 
as ‘Dr Moreland’s lecture was a goldmine’. Finally, comprehension of the original 
metaphor was not enhanced by prior exposure to metaphors from the food domain, such 
as ‘the book was a snack’. Comprehension was, however, facilitated by metaphors that 
made use of stereotypical properties of the vehicle, for example, metaphors that drew on 
ideas of something being large in quantity, or of good quality, variety, etc. (e.g. that book 
was a goldmine). McGlone concludes from these seemingly robust results that people do 
not retrieve conceptual metaphors when interpreting nominal metaphors. He suggests 
instead that people infer the attributive categories that these metaphors imply (the 
attributive category implied by the metaphor vehicle in ‘Dr Moreland’s lecture was a 
three-course meal for the mind’ being ‘high quality/quantity/variety’). 
Gibbs finds fault with McGlone’s study on the basis that paraphrasing novel 
metaphors is notoriously difficult and, therefore, unlikely to reliably indicate the presence 
of conceptual metaphors (Gibbs, 2011a). What’s more, Gibbs claims that some of the 
metaphors used in McGlone’s study might not be motivated by single conceptual 
metaphors as McGlone suggests and, therefore, that the absence of a facilitative effect 
does not pose a threat to CMT, since it is not predicted by CMT. Gibbs suggests that the 
metaphor ‘Dr Moreland’s lecture was a three-course meal for the mind’ is an example of 
what Gibbs calls an ‘XYZ metaphor’, i.e. one that does not follow the standard X is Y 
form, but rather X is the Y for Z. In such metaphors, comprehension is said to involve 
bringing X and Z (‘Dr Moreland’s lecture’ and ‘the mind’) together in a conceptual 
domain that is metaphorically understood in terms of some conceptual domain 
containing Y (‘three-course meal’); in other words, the metaphor is understood as X is to 
Z as Y is to some unmentioned element W (for further discussion of XYZ metaphors, see 
Turner, 1991 and Okonski and Gibbs, 2010). According to Gibbs, CMT does not predict 
that ‘three-course meal for the mind’ activates the source domain FOOD (since the 
metaphor is not seen as an instantiation of the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD). 
Gibbs proposes that ‘XYZ metaphors’ may be produced and understood through complex 
conceptual blending processes, which he does not go into (Gibbs, 2011a, see Fauconnier 
and Turner, 2002). While this may be a valid criticism of McGlone’s study, it points to a 
disadvantage of CMT in general, by highlighting the theory’s inability to provide an 
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account of metaphorical language comprehension that can be applied to the full range of 
metaphorical expressions. In addition, it highlights the difficulty that one experiences 
when retrospectively tracing verbal metaphors to conceptual metaphors and the 
somewhat arbitrary nature of this act. 
While Gibbs is a staunch supporter of CMT, he raises several highly significant 
questions concerning the involvement of conceptual metaphors in metaphorical language 
comprehension. He rightly asks:  
 
Does one initially access the complete conceptual metaphor from memory and 
then apply it to infer the metaphoric meaning of an expression? Second, if the 
conceptual metaphor is accessed prior to interpretation of expression, does it come 
with a package of detailed meaning entailments of what the expression means?; or, 
must people compute source-to-target domain mappings online to determine 
which entailments of the conceptual metaphor are applied to the meaning of 
utterance?  
(Gibbs, 2011a: 550)  
 
Both of these questions, neither of which has been answered, come with equally 
important sub-questions. If hearers do initially access the complete conceptual metaphor, 
how do they apply it when inferring the metaphorical meaning of an expression? 
Secondly, if people compute source-to-target domain mappings on-line, what are the 
mechanisms that enable them to do this, that is, how do they derive the ‘right’ 
entailments? Even if one were to answer Gibbs’ questions, CMT evidently remains in dire 
need of a complementary pragmatic theory, which can explain how a speaker’s intended 
meaning is derived in context.    
Gibbs poses a final question, worthy of note: ‘do conceptual metaphors arise as 
products of understanding and are, therefore, not necessary to create an initial 
understanding of a metaphorical expression?’ (idem). Gibbs himself concedes that there 
are ‘no empirical studies that provide exact answers to these questions’ (idem). However, 
this final question in particular is in vital need of being addressed, for it seems to be the 
crux of the problem with positing CMT as a model of metaphorical language 
comprehension. If conceptual metaphors are not necessary to derive an interpretation of a 
metaphorically used expression, then we are left without an account of how hearers do 
derive metaphorical meaning. As stated earlier, it is not clear if activation of conceptual 
metaphors represents actual purposeful use of conceptual metaphors. It is highly plausible 
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that conceptual metaphors are not being meaningfully recruited during the 
comprehension procedure, and, therefore, it is possible that they are not integral to the 
comprehension procedure at all.  
An even more fundamental challenge to CMT is to show that conceptual 
metaphors really exist. That is, to show that abstract concepts are truly structured 
metaphorically and stored as such (for arguments to the contrary see Murphy, 1996, 
1997;12 this material will be discussed in chapter 7, where I consider new developments 
within CMT, which suggest that embodied simulation (of literal meaning) plays a role in 
language interpretation. This view is founded on a multi-modal view of cognition (i.e. a 
sensori-motor view), which will be discussed in chapter 6 and distinguished from the 
amodal view). 
The aforementioned findings, which Gibbs takes to be consistent with the existence 
of conceptual metaphors, are in fact equally consistent with the idea of ‘conceptual 
metaphors’ being no more than standardised analogies that arise in communication. 
Vega-Moreno elaborates on this possibility: 
 
What cognitive linguists refer to as conceptual metaphors are not really metaphors 
at all. Many are simply more or less standardised analogies (or similes) which 
people may exploit in conversation and which readers may construct or retrieve 
from memory in understanding a novel metaphor, a text or a poem. 
(Vega-Moreno, 2007: 139) 
 
Vega-Moreno’s claims do not exclude the possibility that analogies, for example, between 
life and journeys, are stored in long term memory and used during the interpretation of 
metaphorical expressions. However, she does reject the claim that these analogies 
structure our thoughts and that they are essential to the interpretation process. Vega-
Moreno’s claims are grounded in Relevance Theory, which provides an account of how all 
utterances, including metaphorically intended ones, are comprehended. After the next 
section in which I consider how and why CMT appeals to psychotherapists wishing to 
utilise metaphors in their practice, I will present a detailed explication of Relevance 
																																																								
12 The notion that metaphorically structured concepts are stored in the mind raises the question: 
how and where are they stored? Unlike encyclopaedic information, conceptual metaphors are 
patently false (time is not synonymous with money, just as feeling happy is not the same as being 
physically high up, nor sadness the same as being physically low down). Encyclopaedic information 
and conceptual metaphors must, therefore, be conceptually distinguished somehow. I return to 
this issue, of how and where conceptual metaphors are stored, in chapter 7, section 7.5. 
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Theory, which is the main pragmatic account investigated in this thesis and which will be 
the focus of my empirical investigation (see chapter 5).  
Before exploring how CMT relates to psychotherapy and contrasts with the 
relevance-theoretic account of metaphorical language, let us briefly reflect on the 
definition of metaphor that falls out of CMT. Notice how the notion of conceptual 
metaphors alters the common conception of what is metaphorical. Under Lakoff and 
Johnson’s theory, many utterances that are typically considered to be literal uses of 
language are re-classified as metaphorical uses of language, because they reflect 
conceptual mappings. While most people have no difficulty in recognising that the 
utterance ‘Mary is an angel’ is a metaphorical use of language, the same cannot be said of 
an utterance such as ‘let’s spend more time together’. Without some prior knowledge of 
CMT, it is unlikely that such an utterance, ‘let’s spend more time together’, or ‘I wasted 
the whole of this week’, would be considered as metaphorical. However, for Lakoff and 
Johnson, as illustrated above, these utterances are indeed metaphorical since they are 
underpinned by the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY. That CMT widens the scope of 
what is considered to be metaphorical will be relevant to our discussion of 
psychotherapeutic approaches to metaphorical language in chapter 4 (and will also be a 
point of comparison with RT, see section 1.4).  
 
1.2.3 CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
It is not difficult to understand how and why the notion of underlying metaphorical 
thought as proposed in Conceptual Metaphor Theory has appealed to psychotherapists. 
As we shall see in chapter 3, many psychotherapists’ primary concern is to uncover 
clients’ deep-rooted assumptions or beliefs, beliefs which the client is unaware of, yet 
which are affecting their behaviour in potentially maladaptive ways. The idea that there 
are conceptual metaphors that govern our speech and our behaviour implies that paying 
close attention to utterances has the potential to reveal fundamental assumptions, which 
may be affecting an individual in ways that they are not aware of. Since these fundamental 
assumptions or conceptual metaphors may be at the root of the client’s maladaptive 
thoughts and behaviour, it is evidently in the therapist’s interest to uncover them, if they 
do indeed exist. That attention to language has the power to reveal the structure of one’s 
conceptual system is unarguably appealing to psychotherapists and ties in with the 
intuitions of many, that our utterances are a reflection of our unconscious conceptions. 
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Any theory that advocates and supports attention to language as a way of revealing 
unconscious thoughts is thus very much in line with psychotherapeutic principles. 
As will be discussed at length in chapter 3, a basic cornerstone of certain 
psychotherapeutic practices, most notably of cognitive behavioural therapy, is to ‘teach’ 
clients how to see the world differently, to think and behave differently, in part by 
changing the way that the individual talks about the world. The idea that such an 
enterprise is viable is often ascribed to CMT. Nevertheless, the claim that language shapes 
thought is not inherent to the theory itself. On the contrary, according to CMT, thought 
shapes language, and thus it follows that our use of language is a reflection of our thought; 
yet, language does not necessarily have the power to change that from which it is derived.  
The misattribution to CMT of the notion that language affects thought appears to 
stem from confusion in relation to the linguistic relativity research cited in section 1.2.2. 
As discussed, research in linguistic relativity has revealed that language shapes our 
behaviour and may influence our cognitive capacities; for example, by affecting our 
perceptual abilities. It follows from this work, as psychotherapists argue, that language 
affects the thoughts, beliefs and conceptions that we have. However, this claim is not 
derived from CMT, which asserts that language reflects the components of thoughts and 
beliefs (i.e. that language reflects underlying concepts). Recall the ‘language to behaviour’ 
connection: language may be a useful predictor of thoughts and behaviour; but 
consciously changing language will not necessarily alter conceptual structure (at least, not 
according to CMT). If CMT is right, that conceptual mappings (revealed by language) are 
fundamental (driven by our own physicality) and unavoidable, it should be very difficult, 
arguably impossible, to change many assumptions and to alter conceptual structure. I 
emphasise that, contrary to their beliefs, psychotherapists whose practices are based on 
the assumption that thoughts are shaped through language do not find direct support for 
their approach in CMT. However, that is not to say that such practice is unsupported. 
Linguistic relativity research does not support CMT, but it does demonstrate that 
language has the power to alter our thoughts and behaviour, as psychotherapists would 
have it. 
 
1.3 RELEVANCE THEORY 
 
1.3.1 AN OUTLINE OF RELEVANCE THEORY 
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Unlike Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which deals exclusively with metaphorical 
language, Relevance Theory sets out to provide an all-encompassing account of 
(ostensive) communication. RT is derived from Grice’s theory of communication (or 
‘conversational logic’), which attributes a fundamental role to the recognition of speaker 
intentions during utterance interpretation (Grice, 1989). Prior to Grice, it was widely 
assumed that successful communication was based on a code model. According to this 
model, when a speaker wishes to convey a certain message, they produce a signal 
associated with that message in their code (that is, they produce an utterance). Upon 
receiving this signal, the recipient (i.e. the hearer) decodes the signal using their identical 
copy of the code, which they have at their disposal. In contrast to the code model of 
communication, Grice argues that, in addition to the decoding of the explicit content of 
an utterance (i.e. ‘what is said’), successful communication depends on the ability to 
recognise the intentions of the speaker. 
 
One of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, 
indeed, rational, behaviour. 
(Grice, 1989: 28) 
 
RT inherits this fundamental assumption from Grice. As an inferential model of 
communication based on Gricean pragmatics, RT maintains that utterances (like all 
ostensive stimuli) provide pieces of evidence about a speaker’s communicative (or 
‘meaning’) intention. A second key point of agreement between Grice and RT is their 
shared claim that hearers have particular, and warranted, expectations concerning the 
quality of utterances addressed to them. For Grice, speakers observe a ‘Co-operative 
Principle’ when talking: 
 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged.  
(ibid: 26)  
 
It is this principle that entitles hearers to have various expectations concerning the 
quality of utterances, for example, that an utterance be truthful, informative and 
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relevant.13 RT, as will be explained, maintains that hearers have a single expectation: that 
an utterance will satisfy a particular level and kind of relevance. 
Underlying RT is the basic assumption that human cognition quite generally is 
geared to the maximisation of relevance (this is known as the ‘Cognitive Principle of 
Relevance’). The idea is that perception, memory and inference are all oriented towards 
processing what is most relevant in the current context and to doing so in the most cost 
effective way. The notion of relevance is operationalised in terms of a balance between 
cognitive effects and processing effort. Essentially, an input is relevant when it interacts 
with a set of contextual assumptions to generate (positive) cognitive effects (to be defined 
below). Newly presented information is irrelevant if and when it does not yield any 
(positive) cognitive effects in the context. Other things being equal, the greater the 
(positive) cognitive effects, the greater the relevance, and the greater the processing effort, 
the lower the relevance. To illustrate, imagine that you ask your colleague “is it 6 o’clock 
yet?” In answer to this question, your colleague may respond by answering either “yes” or 
“no”, or they may respond by passing you their watch, on which the time is displayed. 
Both responses will provide you with the answer that you need, that it is either is or isn’t 6 
o’clock. However, the latter response of passing you the watch will require more 
processing effort than processing the simple utterance, “yes” or “no”. In relevance-
theoretic terms, the second response of passing the watch is less relevant than the “yes” or 
“no” response.14 
Given the centrality of cognitive effects and processing effort to the RT account, 
both constructs are explicitly defined. A positive cognitive effect is one that ‘contributes 
positively to the fulfilment of cognitive functions or goals’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 265), 
for example, one that provides new true information, or that strengthens existing true 
assumptions, or contradicts and eliminates a previously held false assumption. A 
paradigmatic kind of cognitive effect, widely discussed within the RT framework, is a 
‘contextual implication’. Contextual implications are ‘deducible from input and context 
together, but from neither input nor context alone’ (Wilson & Carston, 2007: 24), they are 
																																																								
13 The Cooperative Principle subsumes a set of four maxims, which hearers expect that speakers 
will obey: maxims of quality (e.g. truthfulness), quantity (informativeness), relation (relevance) and 
manner (e.g. brevity and orderliness). In Grice’s account, the assumption that speakers obey the 
Cooperative Principle and maxims provides hearers with a strategy for deriving conversational 
implicatures (see Grice, 1989: 26-35 for further detail). 
14 However, there could be additional effects that a speaker wants to achieve by showing the 
addressee her watch in which case the extra effort required may be warranted. For a more detailed 
description of Relevance Theory’s key features, see Blakemore (1992) and Clark (2013), the latter 
of which provides a definitive account of recent developments within RT. 
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‘a synthesis of old and new information, a result of interaction between the two’ (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1995: 108). Sperber and Wilson (1995) further clarify: 
 
A set of assumptions P contextually implies an assumption Q in the context C if 
and only if 
(i) the union of P and C non-trivially implies Q, 
(ii) P does not non-trivially imply Q, and 
(iii) C does not non-trivially imply Q. 
(ibid: 107-108) 
 
A non-trivial implication is defined as follows: 
 
A set of assumptions P logically and non-trivially implies an assumption Q if and 
only if, when P is the set of initial theses in a derivation involving only elimination 
rules, Q belongs to the set of final theses. 
(ibid: 97) 
 
While non-trivial implications (e.g. the implication from ‘P’ and ‘If P then Q’ to ‘Q’) are 
directly, and automatically, computed, trivial implications (e.g. the implication from ‘P’ to 
‘P or Q’), which are in a sense less natural, are not.15 Contextual implications may be 
communicatively intended (in relevance-theoretic terms, an intended contextual 
implication is an ‘implicature’) or they may be unintended. Take the following exchange, 
for example: 
 
4. Nick: Have you ever been to see a psychic? 
Laura: I don’t like con artists. 
 
The proposition expressed by Laura’s utterance (which in relevance-theoretic terms is 
referred to as the ‘explicature’), is that she does not like con artists, while the (main) 
implicature of the utterance (the intended contextual implication) is that Laura has never 
been to see a psychic.16 Some unintended contextual implications that Nick could derive 																																																								
15 For the importance of ‘elimination’ rules (as opposed to ‘introduction’ rules) in an account of 
spontaneous human inference, see Sperber and Wilson (1995: 95-97). 
16 According to Relevance Theory implicatures come in varying degrees of strength. At one end of 
the spectrum are very strong implicatures, which must be retrieved for the hearer to reach a 
satisfactory interpretation. The derivation of weak implicatures, in contrast, may only marginally 
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from Laura’s utterance are that she is cynical, not very spiritual, perhaps not very open-
minded about possibilities such as life after death, or if Nick himself does not believe in 
the work of psychics, he might derive from her utterance the implications that she is 
clever, and the sort of person that he could be friends with. Processing effort, against 
which cognitive effects are offset, is defined as ‘the effort which a cognitive system must 
expend in order to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of incoming information’ 
(Carston, 2002: 379), where a satisfactory interpretation is one which meets expectations 
of relevance (to be discussed further below). There are many different factors that can 
affect processing effort, for example, in the case of an utterance, how recently the word, 
speech sounds or syntactic construction, etc. has been used, its frequency of use, its 
complexity; concepts which have been used more recently and/or more often will require 
less processing effort.  
RT maintains that utterances create an expectation of relevance in the hearer, a 
presumption that the utterance is at least relevant enough to warrant the attention that 
the speaker is calling for and as relevant as the speaker is able and willing to make it. This 
idea is encapsulated in the Communicative Principle of Relevance which states, ‘every act 
of inferential communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance’ 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 270; Clark, 2013: 108). Optimal relevance is defined as follows: 
 
(i) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s 
effort to process it.  
(ii) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator’s abilities and preferences.  
(idem) 
 
The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure that follows from this principle is the 
following: 
  
Follow a path of least effort in looking for cognitive effects:  
§ Test interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility; 
§ Stop when you have enough contextual implications (and/or other effects) to 																																																																																																																																																													
increase the relevance of an utterance. Clark (2013: 237) explains how ‘the degree of strength of an 
individual implicature depends on how much evidence the speaker provides that she intends to 
convey it’. The weakest implicatures shade off into unintended contextual implications. Since 
these weak implicatures are not strongly communicated by a speaker, the responsibility for their 
derivation lies more with the hearer. For more detailed discussion see Clark (2013: 235-238). 
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satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance. 
 
An important mechanism internal to RT pragmatics is what is known as ‘mutual parallel 
adjustment’. According to this process, hearers recover and process the content of the 
utterance, the context in which it appears and its cognitive effects in parallel, which 
enables them to adjust both explicit and implicit meaning in arriving at an inferentially 
sound interpretation. ‘The process may involve several backwards and forwards 
adjustments of content before an equilibrium is achieved which meets the system’s 
current “expectations” of relevance’ (Carston, 2002: 143).17 In relevance-theoretic terms, 
the outcome of the comprehension procedure is a set of explicatures and implicatures (a 
set of propositional conceptual representations). The former term refers to 
communicated assumptions that are developed from the logical form (or semantic 
representation) encoded by the utterance, while implicatures are derived solely on the 
basis of pragmatic inference. The operation of these mechanisms will be demonstrated in 
the next section, which focuses on the modulation of encoded concepts, including those 
that are used metaphorically. 
 
1.3.2 LEXICAL PRAGMATICS AND THE RELEVANCE-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR 
INTERPRETATION 
 
The account of metaphor comprehension within RT is based on work in the field of 
lexical pragmatics which seeks to explain how linguistically specified word meanings are 
modified in context. Content words like nouns, verbs and adjectives are taken to encode 
concepts, each of which has a logical entry, an encyclopaedic entry and a lexical entry. 
Broadly speaking, the logical entry (given in the form of inference rules) registers essential 
properties of the concept (for example, that cats are animals). The encyclopaedic entry 
captures general and contingent knowledge about the denotation of the concept (for 
example, that cats are furry). The lexical entry consists of information about the natural-
language counterpart of the concept. The encyclopaedic information, in particular, plays 
a key role in the lexical pragmatic account, to be outlined herein.  
According to RT, lexically encoded concepts are adjusted in the process of deriving 
the proposition explicitly communicated, which is attributed to the speaker. When a 
concept undergoes such adjustment it results in an ad hoc or occasion-specific concept, 																																																								
17 For a more detailed description of pragmatic processes, in particular, the key mechanism of 
mutual parallel adjustment, see Carston (2002: 323-334) and Wilson and Sperber (2004).  
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whose denotation may be broader than the encoded concept in some respects or 
narrower in some respects, or both. In the case of broadening, ‘a more general sense’ of 
the word is communicated (Wilson, 2004: 344), while narrowing gives ‘a more specific 
sense than the encoded one’ (Wilson & Carston, 2007: 232). Consider the following: 
 
5. I was so close to having a drink last week.  
6. Mary has a ton of work to do. 
 
Example (5) is an instance of narrowing, in which the word drink is used to refer to a 
more specific sense of the word (i.e. alcoholic drink) than the lexically encoded word (i.e. 
liquid). Conversely, in order to derive the intended meaning of the hyperbolic expression 
in (6), it is necessary to adjust the encoded concept in such a way that the linguistically 
specified denotation of the word ton is broadened or loosened to mean that Mary has a 
lot of work to do, rather than an amount that weighs 2000 pounds. According to RT, the 
pragmatic process of lexical adjustment, that results in narrowing and/or broadening, 
applies spontaneously and automatically to fine-tune the interpretation of almost every 
word. The process is relevance-driven and results from the mutual adjustment of explicit 
content, contextual assumptions and cognitive effects.  
For example, imagine that a speaker utters (5) at an Alcoholics Anonymous 
meeting. In order to understand the utterance, which is underspecified by the logical 
form, the recipients must derive the speaker’s intended meaning: that she was close to 
consuming an alcoholic drink last week. The recipient(s) of this utterance are first and 
foremost driven by the expectation that the utterance will be optimally relevant to them 
in the context in which they are situated. This expectation of relevance gives rise to 
hypothesized contextual implications that shape the audience’s construction of the ad hoc 
concept, by backwards inference. Since it is mutually manifest to both speaker and 
recipient(s) that everyone in the room is endeavouring to resist alcohol, interpretive 
hypotheses concerning general liquids would not provide sufficient cognitive effects and 
are, therefore, not warranted. By narrowing the concept of ‘drink’ to denote ‘alcoholic 
drink’, the hearers’ expectations of relevance are satisfied, which in turn halts the 
consideration of alternative interpretive hypotheses (in order to conserve processing 
effort). Similarly, imagine that (6) is uttered by Sarah’s flat-mate in response to her 
suggestion: ‘let’s have a party on Saturday’. Though Sarah’s sister is called Mary, the 
expectation that her flat-mate’s utterance will be relevant to her own utterance guides 
Sarah’s comprehension process and guarantees that she interprets Mary as referring to 
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their flat-mate and not to her sister (who she would never invite to a party). On the basis 
of the assumption that having a lot of work to do leads to a lack of time for social 
activities and also, a need for a peaceful home environment in order not to be distracted, 
Sarah successfully interprets her flat-mate’s utterance as implicating: our flat-mate Mary 
has a lot of work to do and therefore, it is not a good idea to have a party on Saturday. 
On the RT account, metaphor is considered to be a case of loose use of language, 
that is, a case of broadening. Sperber and Wilson (1995, 2008) claim that there is a 
continuum of cases, which ranges from strictly literal uses of language to approximations, 
category extensions, hyperboles and, at the more radical end of the spectrum, to 
metaphors. The RT account of metaphor is considered to be ‘deflationary’ in the sense 
that no special processing mechanism is posited for metaphor. As for all uses of language, 
one simply follows the relevance-oriented path, in forming and testing hypotheses in 
order of their accessibility, stopping when expectations of relevance are satisfied. As 
Wilson and Carston (2007: 29) write: 
 
We suggested […] that ‘approximation’, ‘hyperbole’, ‘metaphor’ are not distinct 
theoretical kinds, requiring different interpretive mechanisms, but merely occupy 
different points on a continuum of degrees of broadening. 
 
To illustrate, consider the metaphorical utterance below: 
 
7. My mother is an angel. 
 
According to RT, the hearer first decodes the utterance, included in which is the lexical 
meaning of the word angel (i.e. the encoded concept ANGEL). This encoded concept is a 
clue to the speaker’s intended meaning and it serves the purpose of activating a range of 
information associated with the concept. This includes the logical property of the concept 
(e.g. an angel is a supernatural being) and a number of encyclopaedic properties (e.g. an 
angel is kind, innocent, beautiful, ethereal, delicate, pure etc.). The discourse context will 
affect the levels of activation of these encyclopaedic properties; therefore, in a situation in 
which the mother is being accused of a crime, properties related to character are likely to 
receive higher degrees of activation than those related to appearance. During the 
interpretation process, the logical property or definitive element of the encoded concept 
(supernatural being) is dropped from the metaphorical interpretation, which causes the 
encoded concept to become broadened, resulting in the ad hoc concept ANGEL*. The 
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concept is broadened in the sense that its denotation includes non-supernatural beings, 
such as the speaker’s mother. In other words, some content-constitutive features 
associated with the encoded concept (e.g. not human) are not included in the ad hoc 
concept, while some encyclopaedic properties of the encoded concept are included in the 
ad hoc concept (e.g. good, innocent). The ad hoc concept is claimed to contribute to the 
proposition explicitly communicated and, thus, to the asserted content of the utterance 
(its truth-conditional content).18 Any poetic effects evoked by the metaphor are construed 
in terms of a mass of weakly manifest implicatures and strengthenings, shading off into 
cognitive effects that do not fall under the speaker’s communicative intention (see 
Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 2008 and, for more developed discussion of poetic effects, 
Pilkington, 2000). 
It important to note that the metaphorical interpretation, as with all lexical 
adjustments, contributes to the proposition explicitly communicated, i.e. the 
pragmatically modulated ad hoc concept is part of the proposition expressed. The 
propositional content of the metaphor in (7) is consequently: ‘my mother is an ANGEL*’. 
This aspect of RT is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it represents a significant 
departure from Gricean accounts of metaphor such as that proposed by Searle (1979), 
which maintain that figurative interpretations contribute only to the implicit content of 
an utterance (its implicatures). According to these models, the explicit content of an 
utterance is limited to what is linguistically encoded, together with disambiguation of 
homonyms and reference assignment (‘what is said’). In contrast and as previously stated, 
RT maintains that explicatures and implicatures are the result of the same inferential 
process and differ solely in terms of the type of representation on which the pragmatic 
processes operate. Explicatures are constrained by the logical form of an utterance, 
whereas implicatures are inferentially derived. 19  As we will see, the idea that the 																																																								
18 Sperber, Wilson and Carston are not alone in their suggestion that interpreting metaphorical 
expressions involves on-line construction of occasion-specific concepts. Glucksberg and Keysar’s 
class inclusion account of metaphor likewise claims that comprehension of metaphors involves 
constructing an appropriate ad hoc superordinate category of the metaphor vehicle. On the class 
inclusion account, the metaphor vehicle provides the properties to be attributed to the topic, while 
the metaphor topic provides the dimensions to be attributed (for further detail see Glucksberg, 
2001; Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg, McGlone and Manfredi, 1997; McGlone and 
Manfredi, 2001).  
19 This is a reflex of much deeper differences between RT and the Gricean account of metaphor, 
according to which metaphorical utterances involve blatant violation (or flouting) of a maxim of 
truthfulness. On Grice’s account, the intended meaning of a metaphor is derived from, and 
following, the recognition that a violation of a maxim has occurred. In contrast, the RT account, 
which has no maxim of truthfulness, involves no flouting of pragmatic principles, since it is not 
possible to violate the communicative principle of relevance. Therefore, the pragmatically 
modulated ad hoc concept may feature in the explicit content of the utterance. 
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metaphorical interpretation contributes to the proposition explicitly communicated is 
also an important point of contrast with theories of metaphorical language processing to 
be described in chapter 2.  
While Sperber and Wilson initially claimed that metaphor was a simple, albeit 
often extreme, instance of broadening, more recent research within the relevance-
theoretic community has modified this view of metaphor as continuous with other loose 
uses. Wilson and Carston (2007) noted that, unlike hyperbole and approximation, 
metaphors may involve both broadening and narrowing; a single word may thus express 
an ad hoc concept whose denotation is narrower than that of the lexically encoded 
concept in some respects and broader in others. While the authors did not assert that 
such bi-directional lexical adjustment was a defining feature of metaphor, Carston and 
Wearing (2011) have since done so. They argue that metaphor always and inevitably 
involves a narrowing as well as a broadening of the lexically encoded concept:  
 
So while the denotation of the ad hoc concept communicated by a hyperbolic use is 
simply more inclusive than that of the original lexical concept, the denotation of 
the ad hoc concept derived on a metaphorical use either merely overlaps with the 
denotation of the encoded concept or is entirely disjoint from it.  
(ibid: 293) 
 
Before looking at the two distinct types of metaphorical adjustment mentioned by 
Carston and Wearing (one in which the ad hoc concept overlaps with the encoded 
concept and one in which the ad hoc concept is disjoint from the encoded concept), let us 
briefly consider an example (of the overlapping kind): 
 
8. My thesis is a marathon. 
 
The ad hoc concept MARATHON* picks out a category of activities with particular 
characteristics, roughly paraphraseable as ‘long, psychologically demanding and 
emotionally exhausting’ (Carston & Wearing, 2011: 293). The key point is that this will 
not only include instances of PhD thesis-writing, but it will also include many actual 
marathons, as well as other activities, such as the process of undergoing psychodynamic 
therapy, for instance. While the ad hoc concept includes many actual marathons (i.e. the 
ad hoc concept overlaps with the encoded one), it will not include marathons run without 
any psychological/emotional stress (by extremely fit athletes, for instance). Therefore, the 
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word ‘marathon’ is both narrowed and broadened. The same can in fact be said of the ad 
hoc concept ANGEL* (from example (7)), which is not only broadened, but also narrowed 
so as not to include fallen or avenging angels like Lucifer. Despite Carston and Wearing’s 
proposal of interpretive discontinuity between hyperbole and metaphor, the relevance-
theoretic account of metaphor comprehension remains a unified theory of figurative 
language in the sense that all figurative interpretations are the result of the same lexical 
adjustment procedure, which results from the parallel adjustment of explicit and implicit 
content and is driven by the search for an optimally relevant interpretation. That this is 
the case is relevant to the forthcoming comparisons between RT and CMT. 
As posited by Carston and Wearing (2011), and first and foremost by Carston 
(2002), there are two distinct cases of metaphorical concept adjustment. Either, the ad 
hoc concept and the encoded concept overlap, or they are disjoint from one other. The 
metaphors hitherto discussed, ‘my mother is an angel’ and ‘my thesis is a marathon’, 
belong to the category of metaphor in which the encoded concept and ad hoc concept 
overlap. Recall that what is communicated by the utterance ‘my thesis is a marathon’ is 
that the speaker’s thesis is a psychologically demanding and emotionally exhausting 
activity. These are both properties that a ‘literal’ marathon often has, and therefore, the 
ad hoc concept MARATHON* includes in its denotation actual marathons (but not all 
marathons, i.e. not marathons that are run effortlessly). Likewise, the crucial properties of 
the predicate in the metaphor ‘my mother is an angel’, properties such as kind and 
innocent, are found in the encyclopaedic entry of the lexically encoded concept. 
Therefore, while the ad hoc concept ANGEL* does not contain the logical property of the 
encoded concept, it does contain features that overlap with the encyclopaedic entry of 
this concept. 
Carston (2002: 350-352) and Wilson and Carston (2008) discuss a number of 
metaphorical utterances in which the properties of the encoded concept cannot be 
predicated of the topic, i.e. examples which belong to the category of metaphors where 
the encoded concept and the ad hoc concept are disjoint. Consider: 
 
9. Robert is a bulldozer. 
10. Sally is a block of ice. 
 
The properties which are communicated as pertaining to Robert, in example (9), are that 
he is unyielding, insensitive, pushy and, potentially, unaware of the feelings of others. 
Needless to say, these are not properties that feature in the encyclopaedic entry for the 
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concept BULLDOZER, since only sentient beings, and not machines, can possess these 
characteristics. Likewise, example (10) communicates that Sally lacks emotional warmth 
and normal human responsiveness. Again, these properties are not included in the 
encyclopaedic entry for BLOCKS OF ICE. These properties are referred to in the literature 
as ‘emergent properties’, which are ‘neither standardly associated with the individual 
constituents of the utterance in isolation nor derivable by standard rules of semantic 
composition’ (Wilson & Carston, 2008: 1). Carston notes that these examples pose a 
threat to the explanatory value of the RT account of metaphor interpretation, since, 
according to RT, the communicated content of a metaphorical expression is recovered via 
the encyclopaedic entries of the concepts, BULLDOZER and BLOCKS OF ICE: 
 
It is difficult to see how any encyclopaedic sorting process can, by itself at least, 
effect the transition from the property BULLDOZER, which is literally inapplicable to 
Robert, to a set of attributes that may well be true of him, because none of those 
attributes are found in the encyclopaedic entry of BULLDOZER. 
(Carston, 2002: 350) 
 
Carston subsequently poses the question: ‘how is the move from the lexically encoded 
concept to the ad hoc concept effected in these fundamental category-crossing cases?’ 
(ibid: 354). This question is not definitively answered, but some speculative suggestions 
for further consideration are proposed. 
In a recent paper, Catherine Wearing (2014) offers a solution to the emergent 
property issue by suggesting that categorization accounts of metaphor, such as Relevance 
Theory, can and should incorporate an analogical reasoning mechanism into their 
interpretation heuristic. As Wearing notes, analogical processes rely on structural 
features that obtain in both domains (i.e. in the metaphor’s topic and vehicle). This is 
contrasted with the ad hoc concept construction procedure, which is built on the search 
for specific properties of the vehicle’s encyclopaedic entry that hold in the metaphor’s 
topic also. According to Wearing, the search for an analogy between the metaphor’s topic 
and vehicle (e.g. between Robert and bulldozer or Sally and ice) may effectively 
foreground the necessary properties of the metaphor vehicle, thereby solving the 
emergent property problem.   
 
An analogy brings properties of each domain which do not apply in the other 
domain into alignment under relations or properties which do apply in both 
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domains. 
(Wearing, 2014: 95) 
 
To illustrate, consider the following example (taken from Wearing, 2014), which 
describes an actor’s performance in a play: 
 
The gold standard performance comes from McDiarmid. Vocally, he is spell-
binding, giving lines dexterous topspin and unexpected bursts of power. 
(ibid: 90) 
 
‘Topspin’ is a sports term, which in tennis refers to the practice of dropping one’s racquet 
under the ball and then in a swift motion, brushing the racquet upwards, such that the 
ball spins (i.e. rotates forward) as it moves through the air, bouncing high when it reaches 
the receiver. Needless to say, these properties of ‘topspin’ cannot be literally predicated of 
an actor speaking lines in a play; ‘an actor’s lines don’t “spin forward” toward the hearer, 
or “bounce high” when they “land” on the hearer’s ear’ (idem). According to Wearing, the 
analogy between the tennis ball spinning towards the receiver and the actor’s lines 
reverberating towards the audience brings them into alignment (thereby providing the 
basis for the intended ad hoc concept) under more abstract properties, for example, 
having forceful impact.   
 
It doesn’t matter that an actor’s lines can’t literally spin […] it is enough that the 
delivery of those lines be recognized as analogous to the motion of a ball laden with 
topspin on the basis of a shared literally applicable property [i.e. forceful impact]. 
(ibid: 95) 
 
Wearing supposes that the more effortful process of searching for an analogy is triggered 
during the interpretation of novel metaphors or category-crossing metaphors, where the 
resulting ad hoc concept is typically disjoint from the encoded concept. For these 
metaphors, the fruitlessness of the standard relevance-theoretic process (of accessing 
encyclopaedic properties of the metaphor vehicle) prompts the search for an analogy, 
which effectively ‘assemble[s] the resources on which that [ad hoc concept] construction 
can draw’ (ibid: 99). Wearing’s account presumes that the standard RT process of 
encyclopaedic search is engaged by default, and it is only when this process fails to yield 
an appropriate figurative interpretation from its search through the encyclopaedic entry 
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of the metaphor vehicle (e.g. ‘topspin’) that the move to accessing more structural 
relations by way of analogical reasoning is instigated. Typically, analogical processes are 
triggered by the failure of the search for relevant encyclopaedic properties, but it also 
seems plausible that, in some situations, there is a top-down, potentially conscious, 
decision to treat a metaphor analogically (when expectations of relevance are not satisfied 
by the first most accessible interpretive hypothesis).   
In her 2002 book, Carston raises the emergent property problem and looks to the 
CMT approach for a possible solution. She speculates that conceptual metaphors, or pre-
existing metaphorical schemes, as she calls them, may play a role in our comprehension 
of metaphorical expressions of the type discussed above (where the lexically encoded 
concept is wholly distinct from the communicatively intended concept). As we saw in 
section 1.2, CMT claims that our conceptual system is made up of conceptual metaphors, 
many of which map psychological phenomena to physical phenomena, for example 
PEOPLE ARE MACHINES and PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCE IS PHYSICAL FORCE. It is possible that 
such conceptual metaphors enable us to understand character traits (such as obstinacy 
and insensitivity) in terms of physical objects (like bulldozers), by mapping the 
psychological traits to the physical traits of machines. Carston suggests that if our 
conceptual system does include such metaphorical schemes, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
suggest, then part of the role of a concept’s encyclopaedic information would be to 
provide the connection with the appropriate metaphorical scheme. I return to this area of 
enquiry in chapter 7, where I propose an amendment to the RT notion of the 
encyclopaedic entry. I argue for an enriched conception of encyclopaedic information, 
which encompasses modality-specific (sensori-perceptual and motor) information. My 
revision of the encyclopaedic entry provides hearers with affective and imagistic content 
(non-propositional content). I believe that this amendment may go some way in enabling 
people to derive the intended meanings of (9) and (10), if we suppose, as Carston (2002: 
356) conjectures, that conceptual representations (e.g. Robert is obstinate, inconsiderate 
of other people’s views etc.) can be derived from scrutiny of a mental image of Robert as a 
bulldozer.20  
 
1.3.3 RELEVANCE THEORY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
																																																								
20 For an alternative attempt to resolve the emergent property problem, using a purely inferential 
account, see Wilson and Carston (2008) and Vega Moreno (2007: 100-112). 
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Considering how the relevance-theoretic approach to communication and, more 
specifically, its account of metaphor might relate to psychotherapeutic principles and 
practice is a new, so far unexplored, domain of enquiry. Though researchers in 
psychotherapy have limited their exploration of linguistic theories of metaphor to CMT, 
it is not difficult to see how RT can also be fruitfully applied to psychotherapy and used to 
validate psychotherapists’ attention to metaphor and language in general. According to 
RT, the use of metaphor is frequently prompted by our attempt to communicate complex 
and vague thoughts. The theory quite generally supposes that the encoded meaning of a 
linguistic expression used in an utterance underdetermines the proposition that is 
explicitly communicated. The pragmatic process of interpretation is first and foremost a 
matter of grasping the thoughts that a speaker intends to communicate. RT’s focus on the 
derivation of communicatively intended meaning is relevant to psychotherapy in that, 
parallel to CMT, it supports the claim that every act of communication is a window into a 
speaker’s mind and, furthermore, an invitation to derive an intended meaning. I am not 
suggesting that psychotherapy needs, or is looking for, a theoretical basis to its attention 
to language, but merely that RT can perform the same function as CMT in this regard.  
To directly compare CMT’s and RT’s relation to psychotherapy: CMT implies that 
attention to language reveals the underlying fabric and structure of a speaker’s thought, 
whereas RT implies that attention to and engagement with language reveals a speaker’s 
intended meaning. While RT makes a weaker claim, the same general message comes 
from the two theories; that is, it is worth paying attention to the language your 
interlocutor employs if you want to understand him or her. While this might seem like a 
trivial message, it is relevant to the practice of psychotherapy, given its dependence on 
talking and interpretation of that talk, and thus, is worthy of mention in this context of 
this thesis.  
Although the same general message derives from CMT and RT, CMT might seem 
better suited to the psychotherapist’s desire to uncover clients’ unconscious thoughts as 
its focus is less on a speaker’s intended meaning and more on what the language 
employed may reveal about the speaker’s mind. In other words, according to CMT, 
focusing on the specific expressions a speaker/client employs may expose content 
(assumptions) that goes beyond that which is intended, i.e. it may detect unintended, yet 
revealing, underlying assumptions. For RT, in contrast, as a pragmatic theory, the 
emphasis is on intended content and contextual implications, that is, the recovery of what 
the speaker wants to convey, so hearers following the RT comprehension procedure are 
less likely to gain insight into the interlocutor’s unconscious conceptions. Although RT 
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may be less apt in terms of application to psychotherapy, this chapter has revealed 
significant theoretical shortcomings that pertain to CMT; most notably, the lack of 
concrete evidence in support of the posited connection between language and thought. 
While it may suit psychotherapists to appeal to CMT in order to validate their attention 
to language, in particular its metaphorical aspects, as a means of uncovering unconscious 
thought, those aware of the specifics of CMT will be unlikely to support this misplaced 
appeal and application of theory.   
Relevance Theory’s more general Cognitive Principle of Relevance, which is not 
limited to the recovery of intended meanings, has interesting applications to 
psychotherapy. Recall that, according to RT’s Cognitive Principle of Relevance, human 
cognition is at all times geared towards the maximisation of relevance; in other words, 
‘the goal of human cognition is to derive as many cognitive effects as possible for as little 
effort as possible’ (Clark, 2013: 32). This principle goes beyond pragmatics, i.e. beyond 
what is communicatively intended, and enables interpreters to calibrate their 
expectations of relevance at different levels, in line with their abilities and preferences. As 
will be discussed in chapter 3, psychotherapists bring their own theoretical apparatus to 
the communicative domain; this theoretical apparatus derived from psychotherapy 
training governs how therapists monitor their environment for relevant stimuli. I believe 
that the Cognitive Principle of Relevance neatly explains how, and why, psychotherapists’ 
analyses and interpretations often go beyond clients’ communicatively intended content 
– since psychotherapists find relevance (cognitive effects) in utterances that goes far 
beyond what the speaker intends. The distinctive quality of psychotherapeutic 
communication, and the way in which psychotherapists’ attention is often directed to 
non-communicatively intended content, will be explored in greater detail in chapter 3, 
section 3.5. 
To summarise, CMT informs psychotherapeutic practice by validating the 
connection between language and thought and advocating close scrutiny of the individual 
clients’ linguistic choices as revealing of underlying (possibly unconscious) assumptions.  
However, it is not clear that CMT’s claims, with respect to metaphor constituting abstract 
thought are at all well founded. In addition, CMT is unable to explain how deeply 
embodied conceptual metaphors, which underpin clients’ language and behaviour, may 
be productively altered. RT is less aligned to psychotherapeutic principles in terms of 
uncovering speakers’ unconscious assumptions, though it does validate psychotherapists’ 
attention to language and to metaphor, by maintaining that every utterance is an 
invitation to derive an intended meaning. Furthermore, RT’s general Cognitive Principle 
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of Relevance is applicable to the way in which psychotherapists look beyond clients’ 
intended meaning and find their own relevance often in unintended content. In the 
following section, I consider additional theoretical differences between RT and CMT and, 
in section 1.5, I look at how the two accounts may complement each other.   
 
1.4 RELEVANCE THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY COMPARED 
 
As I have continually stressed throughout this chapter, the principal difference between 
RT and CMT lies in each theory’s claims concerning the origin of metaphor. For 
conceptual metaphor theorists, metaphor originates in thought and is part of the 
fundamental nature of our conceptual system’s makeup. For relevance theorists, on the 
other hand, metaphor originates in communication and is the natural consequence of 
using language loosely, so leaving much to the recipient’s pragmatic capacities, in order to 
convey our thoughts. For the latter camp, thoughts communicated by metaphorical 
language need not themselves be metaphorical and verbal metaphorical expressions are 
not taken to be a reflection of any pre-existing conceptual mapping (Wilson, 2011). 
An additional contrast between CMT and RT concerns the literal/non-literal 
distinction. On the RT account, metaphor simply lies at one end of a literal-non-literal 
continuum. Sperber and Wilson (2008: 84) themselves say:  
 
We see metaphors as simply a range of cases at one end of a continuum that 
includes literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations. In our view, metaphorical 
interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as these other interpretations. 
There is no mechanism specific to metaphor, no interesting generalisation that 
applies only to them. 
 
As Carston (2012: 486) points out, this stance could not be more different from that of 
conceptual metaphor theorists for whom there is necessarily a ‘sharp literal/metaphorical 
distinction, which applies to both thought and language’. While metaphor is taken to be a 
natural phenomenon, pervasive in language and thought, it nevertheless occupies a 
unique position in conceptualisation. Verbal metaphors reflect mappings between 
conceptual domains, while such loose uses as hyperbole and approximation, which are 
seemingly and unsurprisingly not of interest to conceptual metaphor theorists, do not. 
A final point of comparison between CMT and RT, and one that is also noted by 
Carston (2012), pertains to each theory’s view of the relationship between metaphor and 
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simile. RT’s take on simile is clear and entailed by the theory’s account of metaphorical 
meaning. Essentially, metaphor is wholly distinct from simile, since the ad hoc concept 
account cannot apply to the latter. In other words, when interpreting the simile ‘my 
mother is like an angel’, the simile vehicle ‘angel’ is treated literally. To explain, recall that, 
when interpreting the corresponding metaphorical utterance ‘my mother is an angel’, the 
metaphorical vehicle ANGEL is pragmatically adjusted to ANGEL*, an ad hoc concept whose 
denotation includes my mother (i.e. my mother is a member of the category picked out by 
the ad hoc concept ANGEL*). It is for this reason that the ad hoc concept account does not 
apply to similes. It would be odd to say ‘my mother is like an ANGEL*’ since my mother 
belongs to the category of ANGEL*.  In other words, any given entity that is a member of a 
category cannot sensibly be said to be like that category. An apple is not like a fruit, it is a 
fruit; a tiger is not like an animal, it is an animal. In interpreting a simile such as ‘his idea 
was like a diamond’, therefore, the lexically encoded concept DIAMOND is preserved rather 
than adjusted and there is a pragmatic process of inferring implicatures concerning the 
ways in which an idea may resemble a diamond. RT’s concept adjustment account thus 
clearly distinguishes the processing of simile and metaphor, and applies only to the latter 
form of figurative expression. CMT, in contrast, suggests no such distinction between 
metaphors and their corresponding similes.  
Carston (2012: 487) points out that the metaphor/simile distinction seems to be 
viewed by conceptual metaphor theorists as no more than a ‘superficial difference in 
linguistic form with little interpretive import’. Consequently, CM theorists may view the 
metaphor ‘Bill is a bulldozer’ and its corresponding simile ‘Bill is like a bulldozer’ as 
minimally different linguistic manifestations of the PEOPLE ARE MACHINES conceptual 
metaphor. However, there is good reason, in the form of empirical evidence, to suggest 
that this is not the case and that, in fact, the difference in linguistic form between 
metaphors and similes effects a different interpretive process also (see Glucksberg and 
Haught, 2006), with metaphors giving rise to significantly more emergent properties than 
their corresponding similes.21  
The aim of this section was not so much to criticise CMT as to contrast it with RT. 
In the section that follows, I briefly consider some recent proposals from scholars invested 
																																																								
21 Carston (2012: 487), furthermore, points out that many verbal metaphors discussed in CMT are 
not easily recast as similes (e.g. ‘she is in danger’ and ‘she looked at him coldly’). Also, that many 
similes stipulate a single salient resemblance between source and target domains (e.g. ‘he followed 
her around like a puppy’), while the mapping between domains in metaphorical uses of language is 
usually more open-ended. 
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in each theory, which suggest that the two accounts may be mutually beneficial and 
amenable to amalgamation.  
 
1.5 RELEVANCE THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY: 
COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES? 
 
In a detailed paper, Tendahl and Gibbs (2008) set out many interesting points of 
comparison between conceptual metaphor theorists’ account of metaphor, and that 
depicted by Relevance Theory. The authors suggest a hybrid theory of metaphor, which 
integrates the two frameworks and which, they believe, provides a more comprehensive 
account of both metaphor production and metaphor interpretation. Tendahl and Gibbs 
hold on to the core of CMT by maintaining the cognitive origin of cross-domain 
mappings (i.e. the existence of conceptual metaphors). How conceptual metaphors 
contribute to metaphor comprehension, however, is set within RT’s pragmatic 
framework, such that conceptual metaphors are said to ‘constrain the on-going 
maximization of cognitive effects and minimisation of cognitive effort’ (ibid: 1859). They, 
furthermore, state that: 
 
People [may] infer LIFE IS A JOURNEY as a consequence of understanding optimally 
relevant metaphorical meanings, and not as a precondition to understanding a 
metaphorical utterance. 
(ibid: 1860) 
 
Tendahl and Gibbs suppose that conceptual metaphors ‘may become strongly manifest if 
either the source domain or the target domain has been activated’ (ibid: 1859), and 
suggest that this will subsequently affect the process of mutual parallel adjustment by 
altering the accessibility of contextual assumptions and implications. Tendahl and Gibbs 
assert that ‘a domain may be activated, if a salient element of the domain has been 
activated’ (idem).  
Wilson (2011) gives credit to CMT by recognising the significant contribution that 
the theory has made to the field of metaphor research – most notably, with respect to 
highlighting the striking systematicity of many metaphorical expressions. However, she 
rejects CMT’s claim that families of related linguistic metaphors are the result of 
metaphorical cognition. As outlined in section 1.3.2, the lexical pragmatic process of ad 
hoc concept construction is conceived of as an occasion-specific matter, so it may be a 
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‘one-off affair’, but, equally, it may catch on and recur within a community, leading 
ultimately to new lexicalised senses of words. Wilson suggests that repeated encounters 
with linguistic metaphors that link two conceptual domains (and therefore, that result in 
similar ad hoc concepts) may give rise to ‘stabilised’ ad hoc concepts, that is, additional 
lexicalised senses of the encoded concept. She suggests that, in such instances, the 
recurring activation of two conceptual domains may result in systematic cross-domain 
mappings of the type suggested by CMT. Crucially for her, the origin of these mappings is 
communication.  
Vega Moreno (2007) makes a similar claim to Wilson, grounding her proposal in 
the relevance-theoretic notion of processing effort. She claims that activating cross-
domain correspondences, which may have been stored in long-term memory due to 
repeated exposure to linguistic metaphors linking two conceptual domains, may ‘narrow 
the search space’ during the interpretation procedure, and may, therefore, help to 
conserve processing effort (and, therefore, to maximise relevance). Recall that the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic detailed in section 1.3.1 proposes that 
hearers follows a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects, considering 
interpretations in order of accessibility. Automatic activation of cross-domain 
correspondences may contribute to the comprehension procedure by directing hearers 
along this path, suggesting highly accessible and fruitful interpretations.22  
The account endorsed by Vega Moreno (2007) and Wilson (2011) concedes that 
cross-domain correspondences (for example, between time and money) may contribute 
to our production of metaphorical expressions. Just as argued in CMT, cross-domain 
correspondences may govern and affect our choice of expression – a claim that is made 
manifest by the multitude of metaphors that, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) brought to 
light, display remarkable systematicity. Likewise, relevance theorists Vega Moreno and 
Wilson grant that cross-domain mappings may play a significant role in the interpretation 
of metaphorical expressions, by facilitating comprehension of metaphors that are based 
on the same conceptual activation patterns. Where RT and CMT continue to disagree (as 
is evidenced by Gibbs and Tendahl, 2011 and Tendahl and Gibbs, 2008), however, is on 
the fundamental origin of these ‘cross-domain’ correspondences. According to RT, the 
systematicity of metaphorical expressions is derived from cross-domain correspondences 
that arise in communication (through repeated exposure to linguistic metaphors that 
associate two conceptual domains). Although Gibbs and Tendahl do not reject this 																																																								
22 Effectively, this is Tendahl and Gibbs’ (2008) suggestion; except that Tendahl and Gibbs 
maintain the cognitive origin of conceptual metaphors. 
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possibility, they maintain that cross-domain correspondences may also arise for purely 
cognitive reasons.  
 
There is no reason to assume that the underlying motivation for verbal metaphor 
has to be either (a) embodied/cognitive or (b) social/communicative. Embodied and 
linguistic experience may both [my emphasis] continually contribute to the 
emergence of different verbal metaphors. 
(Gibbs & Tendahl, 2011: 603) 
 
Gibbs and Tendahl are right in that adopting RT’s claim that linguistic metaphors are 
communicatively motivated need not entail rejection of the claim that verbal metaphors 
may also be cognitively motivated (in different situations). However, if one wishes to hold 
onto both accounts of metaphor, it is necessary to find conclusive evidence for both 
proposals. That linguistic metaphors may be motivated by embodied conceptual 
metaphors will be discussed at length, and ultimately rejected, in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has explored two accounts of metaphor comprehension, which until 
recently were kept entirely apart from one another. I hope to have demonstrated the 
limitations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, at least as an account of how metaphorical 
language is interpreted, and to have established Relevance Theory as a viable account of 
how metaphorically used expressions are comprehended in real time. I hasten to add that 
my endorsement of the relevance-theoretic framework is in no way intended to detract 
from the valuable insights afforded by CMT. Through its systematic analysis of patterns 
of linguistic metaphors, CMT reveals the extent to which metaphor abounds and is 
embedded in the conventional meaning of our everyday language; for this, all scholars of 
metaphor owe Lakoff and Johnson a large debt of gratitude. Psychotherapy too, and, in 
particular, specialised approaches to psychotherapeutic use of metaphor, are indebted to 
CMT. Without the detailed work of cognitive metaphor theorists, and the widespread 
acknowledgement of metaphor that resulted from this research, it is unlikely that some of 
the uses of metaphor in psychotherapy to be discussed in chapter 4 would have 
developed. Still, while psychotherapy may be indebted to CMT, I have shown that, in fact, 
it need not be wedded to the fundamental theoretical claims of CMT, which in reality do 
not support the psychotherapeutic aim of altering entrenched assumptions. RT’s 
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pragmatic account of utterance interpretation may be less suited to explaining how 
hidden (unintended) assumptions are uncovered, but its more general Cognitive Principle 
of Relevance accords well with the fact that psychotherapists’ attention is so often focused 
on what may be unintentionally revealed by a client’s choice of words (as a result of their 
training, this is where psychotherapists expect to find most relevance). 
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that, while I take RT to offer a superior 
account of metaphor processing to CMT, I, nonetheless, do not believe that it can be 
applied to the full spectrum of metaphorical utterances. In the next chapter, I look at 
instances of metaphor interpretation in which the literal meaning of the metaphorical 
utterance seems to play a more sustained role and is more keenly felt and experienced by 
the interpreter than in the cases discussed so far. For these metaphorical expressions, I 
support an alternative model of processing to the ad hoc concept account, albeit one that 
is developed within the general relevance-theoretic framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 54 
Chapter 2 · ‘Metaphorical worlds’, literal meaning and extended 
metaphor  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The relevance-theoretic approach to metaphor in terms of loose use and ad hoc concepts 
provides an elegant account of the comprehension of many metaphorical expressions, in 
particular lexical/phrasal cases. Nevertheless, in the present chapter, I advocate the need 
for a distinct account of the interpretation of certain metaphors, one in which the literal 
meaning of the metaphorical utterance is more deeply processed and more keenly 
experienced by the interpreter. The alternative processing route to be characterised in 
this chapter applies principally to cases of extended and/or creative metaphorical 
utterances, whose poetic effects are often markedly rich and evocative.  
My discussion of an alternative mode of metaphor processing contributes to the 
primary objective of this thesis – to provide an account of metaphor comprehension that 
can be applied to the full spectrum of metaphorical utterances. In addition, and as will be 
demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4, the alternative account of metaphor processing is 
highly relevant to the exploration of psychotherapeutic discourse. I will argue that this 
unique communicative context lends itself to an alternative processing route, in so much 
as psychotherapy creates a reflective space that invites, and rewards, both client and 
therapist to deeply consider and sustain the literal meanings of their metaphorical 
expressions (a characteristic feature of the processing route to be outlined herein).  
While the chief focus of this thesis concerns metaphor comprehension, I am 
additionally interested in metaphor production. In chapter 1, I presented two hypotheses 
concerning production of metaphorical language. CMT, on the one hand, asserts that 
verbal metaphors are the result of underlying metaphorical cognition. RT, on the other 
hand, maintains that verbal metaphors arise for communicative purposes and may be 
either a result of our attempt to communicate ‘economically’, or a reflection of our 
attempt to communicate complex and vague thoughts, for which literal language may be 
inadequate. In this chapter, I delve deeper into the forces that govern metaphorical 
language production and suggest a more fine-grained picture of the inadequacy of literal 
language. This work is of particular relevance to our discussion of psychotherapeutic 
discourse and to observations made by writers in the field of psychotherapy, who note the 
prevalence of metaphorical language in this domain (Pollio et al., 1977).  
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I begin this chapter by motivating the case for an additional account of 
metaphorical language interpretation that can complement the relevance-theoretic 
account outlined in chapter 1. This motivation arises from instances of metaphorical 
language whose interpretation, and cognitive effects, do not appear to be fully accounted 
for by RT’s ad hoc concept account. After highlighting the discordancy between these 
instances of metaphorical expression and the ad hoc concept account, I suggest a number 
of alternative accounts of metaphor processing, which assign a more central role to the 
literal meaning of the metaphorical utterance in the interpretation process. I shall argue 
that these theories provide a more realistic picture of how, in certain contexts, non-literal 
utterances are processed. I hope to demonstrate that pursuing the deep, reflective 
comprehension process suggested by these theories yields an altogether different 
interpretation from that which results from the ad hoc concept construction route and is 
more in line with our intuitions about the interpretations that are, in fact, derived. That 
these different, complementary, routes of metaphor processing give rise to different 
cognitive effects will be relevant to our discussion of the functions of metaphor use in 
psychotherapy (see chapter 4, section 4.3). 
 
2.2 TWO ROUTES TO METAPHOR COMPREHENSION: CARSTON (2010) 
 
Consider the following examples of metaphorical language: 
 
1. Martin is a pig. 
2. Cigarettes are time bombs. 
3. Happiness is the death of ambition. 
4. The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there. 
(L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between, 1953: 1) 
5. Falling apart, if you can be with it fully, will be the seat of your harmonious 
mind. 
(Buddhist teacher, attested) 
6. The fact that your relationship had enough of a vacuum in it that I could slip 
into your thoughts and take up residence in your head might reveal 
something to you. 
(Personal communication, attested) 
7. Loving does not at first mean merging, surrendering, and uniting with 
another person (for what would a union be of two people who are unclarified, 
	 56 
unfinished, and still incoherent?), it is a high inducement for the individual to 
ripen, to become something in himself, to become world, to become world in 
himself for the sake of another person; it is a great, demanding claim on him, 
something that chooses him and calls him to vast distances.  
(Rainer Maria Rilke, Letters to a Young Poet) 
8. Hope is the thing with feathers 
That perches in the soul 
And sings the tune – without the words, 
And never stops at all, 
 
And sweetest in the gale is heard; 
And sore must be the storm 
That could abash the little bird 
That kept so many warm. 
 
I’ve heard it in the chilliest land,  
And on the strangest sea; 
Yet, never, in extremity, 
It asked a crumb of me. 
(Emily Dickinson, Hope) 
9. Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player  
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage  
And then is heard no more: it is a tale  
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,  
Signifying nothing. 
(Shakespeare, Macbeth, V.v. 24-30) 
 
Carston (2010) presents a similar range of metaphors, which she uses to highlight the 
incredibly varied nature of metaphorical expression. As she points out, metaphors may 
differ greatly with respect to their conventionality/familiarity, on the one hand, and their 
complexity/creativity, on the other; evidently, the examples in (1) and (2) are on the more 
familiar end of the spectrum, while (6) and (7) are more creative and novel, and (8) and 
(9) more poetic and literary. In addition, Carston observes how the imagistic content of a 
metaphor may play a more or less dominant role in certain cases than in others; the 
extended metaphors in (8) and (9), for example, give rise to particularly vivid images, (4) 
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less so. Example (6) overtly attempts to reveal a different side of a situation and, in so 
doing, manifests an air of persuasion. For me personally, (7) has a deeply affective 
content, which induces subtle bodily sensations. This range of metaphorical language also 
serves to illustrate how metaphors may differ in terms of the definitiveness of their 
propositional content. As Carston demonstrates, metaphors with a more definite 
propositional content lend themselves to being described as informative, and may inspire 
either agreement or disagreement from interpreters. For example, it is conceivable that 
an interpreter, perhaps a friend’s of Martin’s, might object to (1) and insist that in fact, 
Martin is a very tidy and house-proud person, he just doesn’t have a lot of time to clean at 
the moment. For metaphors with a less definite propositional content, on the other hand, 
such as (8) and (9), it is almost inapt, and indeed potentially impossible, to agree or 
disagree with the propositional content of the expressions. For these metaphors, it seems 
more appropriate to assess the extent to which the metaphor is apt and/or insightful.  
On the basis of these observations, Carston draws a loose distinction between 
metaphors that are ‘ordinary’ and metaphors that are ‘literary’; a distinction that she notes 
is by no means clear-cut or absolute, as there are differences in processing/interpretation 
across individuals and contexts. Belonging to the category of ‘ordinary’ metaphors, are the 
conversational, conventional, single-word cases with definite propositional content, while 
the more ‘carefully crafted, extended and developed’ metaphors, which are highly 
imagistic, belong to the category of ‘literary’ metaphors (Carston, 2010: 297). Carston 
suggests that these two different kinds of metaphor call for two different routes of 
interpretation: there is the relevance-theoretic ‘quick, local, on-line meaning adjustment 
process’ (idem) outlined in chapter 1 and, in addition, a slower, more reflective process in 
which the literal meaning of the metaphorically used expression plays a more central and 
sustained role.23 In what follows, I outline this alternative, more reflective process, 
highlighting points of contrast with the RT account of ad hoc concept construction along 
the way. 																																																								
23 It is important to note that Carston (2010) is by no means the only advocate of different 
processing routes for metaphor. Two additional theories stand out in this regard, most notably 
Bowdle and Gentner’s ‘Career of Metaphor’ hypothesis (1999, 2005) and Steen’s theory of 
‘deliberate metaphor’ (2008, 2011a). Bowdle and Gentner propose a distinction between novel and 
conventional metaphors, suggesting that the former are processed as comparisons (i.e. implicit 
similes) and the latter either as comparisons or as categorisations. The career of metaphor 
hypothesis predicts that as a metaphor becomes more conventional ‘there is a shift in mode of 
processing from comparison to categorization’ (1999: 92). According to Steen, it is deliberate 
metaphors that are processed via comparison, while non-deliberate metaphors are processed via 
categorisation. For Steen, a deliberate metaphor is one that is intended to direct the addressee’s 
attention to the source domain (e.g. ‘football is war’).  
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In order to comprehend Carston’s proposal, let us take one further example, which 
illustrates her theory most neatly.  
 
10. Depression, in Karla’s experience, was a dull, inert thing – a toad that 
squatted wetly on your head until it finally gathered the energy to slither off. 
The unhappiness she had been living with for the last ten days was a quite 
different creature. It was frantic and aggressive. It had fists and fangs and 
hobnailed boots. It didn’t sit, it assailed. It hurt her. In the mornings, it 
slapped her so hard in the face that she reeled as she walked to the bathroom. 
(Zoe Heller, The Believers, p. 263, cited in Carston, 2010: 309) 
 
According to the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept construction account of metaphor 
outlined in chapter 1, interpreters would replace each of the literal lexical meanings, e.g. 
TOAD, CREATURE, FISTS, FANGS, etc. with pragmatically constructed ad hoc concepts, 
TOAD*, CREATURE*, FISTS*, FANGS*, etc. However, Carston points out that this seems an 
extreme, and potentially unnecessary, expenditure of effort for insufficient cognitive 
reward. The linguistically encoded concepts are closely related to each other and 
therefore, as psycholinguistic experiments demonstrate (Giora, 1999), semantic priming 
of a mutually reinforcing sort will ensure high activation of the literal meaning.24 Carston 
thus proposes that interpreters entertain the internally consistent literal meaning and the 
imagery that it evokes as a whole and metarepresent it as descriptive of an imaginary 
world. This results in a representation of the literal interpretation of the entire passage, in 
this case of Karla’s unhappiness as a vicious and violent animal contrasted with 
depression as a slimy sluggish creature. In order to derive the meaning intended by the 
writer, the literally false conceptual representations together with its accompanying 
imagery, which make up the imaginary world, are framed or metarepresented (hence kept 
apart from factual belief representations) and subjected as a whole to more attentive and 
reflective inferential processes. Thus, from the patently false representations of 
depression as a sluggish toad and grief, in contrast, as a vicious animal, we derive 
implications that accord with our expectations of relevance, and which, therefore, can be 
integrated with our existing beliefs about the kind of negative mental states that humans 
have. For example, that grief is powerful, that it can make one feel dominated, violated 
and even out of control. In relevance-theoretic terms, the outcome of this alternative 																																																								
24 Empirical support for Carston’s proposal will be discussed in chapter 5, prior to my own 
empirical investigation (see section 5.2 for further detail). 
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processing route is an interpretation that consists of an array of implicatures concerning 
the mental and physical anguish that Karla is experiencing.25 
Carston suggests that this processing route, which I shall refer to as the 
alternative/imaginary world construction/processing route, is resorted to when the literal 
language of the metaphor vehicles is so highly activated that it overwhelms the process of 
ad hoc concept formation. In such instances, conceptual adjustment becomes a more 
effortful process than maintaining the literal meaning as a whole, since the literal 
meanings of the metaphorically used expressions, which have been semantically primed 
and reinforced, are so much more accessible than the metaphorical ad hoc concepts. It is 
the high activation and accessibility of literal meanings that, for Carston, results in the 
process of ad hoc concept formation being overpowered. When this occurs, the literal 
meaning ‘wins out’ for a period of time, leading hearers to derive a global metaphorical 
meaning, via a process which is off-line in the sense that the communicatively intended 
meaning is not recovered on a word-by-word first pass basis.   
In order to comprehend the distinctive features of Carston’s alternative imaginary 
world processing route, it is useful to make a direct comparison with the ad hoc concept 
route. On the ad hoc concept account, the literal meaning of a metaphorical expression 
merely provides access to the materials for constructing an intended ad hoc concept 
(which ultimately replaces the literal meaning). The ad hoc concept is rapidly formed in 
an on-line local process and contributes to the proposition explicitly communicated (that 
is, to the explicature). On the alternative account, on the other hand, the literal meaning 
does more than remain idly in the background – it is maintained, developed and 
represented as material for a reflective pragmatic process that extracts from it relevant 
implications (implicatures) that are taken to comprise the metaphor’s meaning. Unlike 
interpretations derived via the ad hoc concept route, there is no explicature 
communicated or recovered on the alternative processing route, since the speaker (or 
writer) does not endorse the literal meaning (the imaginary world) as a representation of 
the actual world. In further contrast to the ad hoc concept account, the metaphorical 																																																								
25 Recall that according to Relevance Theory, metaphor and simile are clearly distinguished – it is 
only the former that involves ad hoc concept construction, while similes are interpreted literally 
(see chapter 1, section 1.4). Notice how Carston’s account of imaginary world construction 
effectively brings metaphor and simile closer together (since the account entails literal 
interpretation of metaphors). It is, therefore, possible that the previously attested differences 
between metaphor and simile may evaporate in the case of extended forms of figurative 
expression. In other words, it is possible that in extended forms of figurative expression the 
presence of ‘like’ or ‘as’ (i.e. the presence of simile markers) will have little effect on the 
interpretation process (for further discussion see Carston and Wearing, 2011: 296-304 and 306-
307). 
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meaning derived via the alternative route consists of an array of weakly implicated 
propositions that emerge gradually.  
It is important to note that ‘gradual emergence’ of implicatures (which constitute 
the intended meaning of the metaphor) does not entail that interpreters refrain from 
deriving figurative interpretations as they are presented with metaphorical uses of 
language. In others words, it is not the case that a hearer or reader has to suppress or stall 
the derivation of metaphorical meanings until he/she is no longer in receipt of 
metaphorical language (i.e. implicatures are continually derived throughout processing). 
What sets the alternative imaginary world processing route apart from the ad hoc concept 
construction route is that these metaphorical meanings are not derived as or from ad hoc 
concepts, but rather from the literal meaning and accompanying imagery of the 
metaphorically used expressions.  
As I have outlined, Carston (2010) suggests that the imaginary world construction 
route is often triggered when the activation level of the literal meaning is so high as to 
make the derivation of metaphorical ad hoc concepts too costly. Needless to say, this is 
often the case with poetic and/or extended metaphors (such as those in (8), (9) and (10)), 
where there is a high level of internal coherence in the literal meanings of the extended 
metaphorical passages. Recall Emily Dickinson’s poem Hope in (8), which is made up of a 
number of semantically related metaphor vehicles: feathers, sings, bird, perch, crumb, etc. 
which gives the literal meaning (and accompanying imagery) a sense of coherence. As a 
consequence of the high degree of semantic coherence, the literal meaning in extended 
metaphors is almost always highly activated and, as a result, these metaphors are the 
classic candidates for interpretation via the imaginary world route.  
Still, Carston suggests that a number of other factors may provoke the shift to the 
imaginary world style of processing, and that it is not solely a matter of accessibility of 
literal meaning. She suggests that more novel, complex or creative metaphors may 
likewise induce the interpreter to engage in a more attentive style of interpretive process, 
such as the imaginary world construction route. In addition, individual differences may 
govern interpreters’ processing strategies; intuitively, those with a reflective disposition or 
literary inclination will be more naturally inclined towards Carston’s alternative 
processing route compared to those who have little interest in the rich and wide-reaching 
connotations of metaphorical expressions. Similarly, the communicative context may 
affect interpreters’ choice of processing route.26 On one occasion, in one context, an 																																																								
26 My use of the word ‘choice’ here is not intended to imply that interpreters necessarily make 
conscious decisions concerning how to comprehend metaphors. 
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individual may interpret metaphorical language by constructing ad hoc concepts; 
however, on another occasion, in a different context, that same individual may proceed 
along the imaginary world reflective route (theoretically, this could happen for the very 
same metaphor). This idea is consistent with the general approach of many psychologists, 
who maintain that there is a significant role for context in figurative language 
comprehension models and who resist interpretation procedures which specify delimited 
inputs (products) and outputs (processes) (Gibbs 1993, 1994).27 
Before considering how Carston’s alternative route compares to a number of other 
approaches to metaphor interpretation, I want to briefly acknowledge an apparent 
paradox concerning processing effort that presents itself in my description of the theory. 
On the one hand, it is asserted that construction of multiple ad hoc concepts requires an 
unnecessary expenditure of processing effort, and may overwhelm the process of ad hoc 
concept construction, thereby tipping the reader or hearer to switch to the alternative 
imaginary world processing route. On the other hand, it is implied that the alternative, 
imaginary world route is more demanding in terms of effort than the standard inferential 
processes engaged during ad hoc concept construction. To resolve the apparent paradox, 
I stress that while the effort of the imaginary world route may be greater, it is importantly 
different in kind from the effort that is invested during ad hoc concept construction, and 
consequently, it gives rise to distinct effects (which outweigh and reward the expenditure 
of effort). That this is the case should be evident given the different outcomes of each 
processing route. While ad hoc concept construction is in many cases a sufficient 
mechanism by which to derive meaning, following this path for a metaphor of the 
extended variety inevitably leads to a loss of meaning derivable from the whole developed 
metaphor, relative to the imaginary world construction route (that considers and 
scrutinizes a wider range of associates of the metaphor’s global literal meaning).  
To illustrate, consider the following analogy: imagine that you are stood at the foot 
of a mountain; in this scenario you are faced with two options. Either you can walk 
directly up the mountain, in which case you will most likely reach its summit rather 
quickly and will no doubt expend a great deal of physical effort as you climb; your other 
option is to zigzag your way to the summit. Although the second option may not require 
as much strength as the first, it is no less demanding in terms of effort, since the overall 
trek will likely take many more days. If reaching the summit is your main objective, you 																																																								
27 In chapters 3 and 4, I further explore the effect of communicative context and more specifically, 
hypothesise that the idiosyncratic nature of psychotherapeutic discourse may, in some situations, 
both reward and invite interpreters to engage a style of processing much akin to that depicted by 
Carston’s imaginary world construction route (see chapter 4, section 4.4 for further detail). 
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might prefer to scale the face of the mountain and to get the arduous, lengthy slog out of 
the way as quickly as possible. Yet, there is considerable argument for taking the lengthier 
route, especially if your objective is not solely focused on reaching the summit. On the 
more time-consuming zigzag journey, you will undoubtedly stand to take in more jaw-
dropping views, be privy to sights of hidden valleys not visible from the summit, trickling 
waterfalls etc. Not only will this route leave you better acquainted with the surrounding 
region of the mountain, but you will also become better acquainted with the mountain 
itself (you will get to know it better, as a result of traversing more of it). This in turn may 
foster a different appreciation of the mountain, which may likewise, foster a different 
appreciation of the view from the summit. In a metaphorical sense at least, the view from 
the summit when it is reached via this zigzag route will be altogether different, certainly 
the experience of reaching and being at the summit will be different. Carston’s two 
processing routes are much like this: if you construct multiple ad hoc concepts, you will 
progress swiftly from one metaphorical expression to the next and will succeed in 
deriving sufficient meaning of each expression; if you construct imaginary worlds, on the 
other hand, you will be rewarded with much more profound effects, deriving a ‘fuller’ 
meaning of the expressions. That is to say, maintaining and metarepresenting the literal 
meaning of metaphorically used expressions, confronting and scrutinizing that meaning, 
promises deeper insight, an improved view from the top of the mountain, as it were. To 
explicate the analogy, the experience one has on reaching the summit is the outcome of 
the interpretation process, and the mountain itself is the literal meaning, which has to be 
processed in order to reach that summit and derive the interpretation of the metaphor. 
Consider how the two routes of interpretation, ad hoc concept construction and 
imaginary world construction, yield different effects in the case of the extended metaphor 
in example (10). Recall that in this example Karla’s depression is described as a dull, inert 
thing, a toad that squats on her head, while Karla’s unhappiness is depicted as an 
aggressive and frantic creature that slaps her hard in the face. If one interprets this 
metaphor via ad hoc concept construction, then the literal meaning of ‘toad’ and its 
accompanying imagery is quickly replaced with a pragmatically modulated ad hoc 
concept, TOAD*. Deriving ad hoc concepts immediately for each metaphorically used 
word as it is encountered leads to an overall loss of meaning, relative to the imaginary 
world construction, since the literal meaning of each metaphorically used word is swiftly 
replaced with a more abstract concept. When one engages the imaginary world 
interpretation route, the literal meanings of metaphorically used words are sustained and, 
therefore, their accompanying imagery is held in the mind of the interpreter. As a result, 
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the interpreter has the opportunity to access more literal associates of each 
metaphorically used word and to construct more fine-grained images. Simply put, 
sustaining the literal meanings of metaphorically used expressions gives those meanings 
time to be scrutinised, and consequently, a wider range of information associated with 
that expression is attended to. It is this protracted scrutiny of literal meaning and 
accompanying imagery that fosters more insightful interpretations and a richer yield of 
weak implicatures that emerge gradually (as opposed to instantaneously, as is the case 
with ad hoc concept construction). 
In the following section, I consider an approach to metaphor interpretation that 
exhibits interesting similarities to Carston’s imaginary world construction route. Like 
Carston’s, this account grants an important role in the interpretation procedure to the 
literal meaning of the metaphorically used language and displays particular interest in the 
rich, affective power of metaphor. The account in question is that of philosopher Samuel 
Levin (1976, 1988). As well as providing an account of metaphor comprehension, Levin 
makes a number of hypotheses concerning the motivations behind metaphor production. 
I begin the next section by sketching Levin’s claims concerning metaphorical language 
production, which I see as motivating his account of metaphorical language 
interpretation.  
 
2.3 METAPHORICAL WORLD CONSTRUCTION: LEVIN (1976, 1988) 
 
The fundamental motivation of Levin’s account of metaphor was to do justice to the way 
in which writers of the Romantic movement use language to express their transcendent 
views of the world, their depictions of nature as a living, breathing entity. His account of 
metaphor was primarily intended to explain the way in which metaphor was used by 
William Wordsworth and other Romantic poets. His theory bears noteworthy similarities 
to Carston’s account of metaphor, and in addition, has many interesting implications for 
what goes on in the development of sustained metaphors during psychotherapy.  
According to Levin, metaphors arise at a time in which speakers are ‘conceiving of’ 
certain thoughts, thereby generating ‘conceptions’; this is to be distinguished from 
‘conceiving’ something which gives rise to ‘concepts’. In the former process, that is, in 
conceiving of something, say x, (an object or state of affairs), we ‘prepare a mental space 
into which that x might be placed’ (Levin, 1988: 69). Thus, rather than having a clear 
image of x as we would if it had been conceived, we simply allow for the possibility of 
producing an image. Flying horses and golden mountains, according to Levin, can be 
	 64 
conceived since although neither exists ‘the elements out of which they are composed are 
physical characteristics, and those elements can be combined’ (ibid: 70). Trees weeping 
and seas laughing, on the other hand, cannot be conceived. Instead, we have to conceive 
of such ‘objects’, thereby delineating an area in our minds where such concepts, of a tree 
weeping or the sea laughing, would fit. However, we do not, and cannot, fill that area 
(mental space) with a concept; instead we fill it with a conception. This idea might seem 
initially unintuitive since metaphors are typically thought of as arising from concrete and 
vivid images. Nevertheless, Levin goes on to suggest that in focusing on the ‘unfilled area’ 
we project schemas and these schemas are taken to be an implicit, or at least potential, 
representation of the object or state of affairs in question. A conception is thus defined by 
Levin as ‘the schema of a possible concept’ (ibid: 67).28 
Levin suggests that since metaphors (or as he calls them ‘semantically deviant 
expressions’) express conceptions, ‘the state of affairs thereby conceived of will in some 
sense lie beyond conventional notions of how the world is constituted’ (ibid: xii). 
Interpreting Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1961), Levin notes the philosopher’s resignation 
with regard to explicating ‘what we cannot speak about’ (Levin, 1988: 7), that which ‘we 
must pass over in silence’ (idem); on matters of importance, i.e. anything that ‘counts’, 
Wittgenstein preaches silence, for such matters, he believes, lie beyond our power of 
expression. Following Wittegnstein, Levin asserts that there are things that we have 
awareness of, but which we cannot express in language. Levin describes these things, 
rather beautifully, as ‘intimations, promptings of the spirit which enter our consciousness 
even if they do not crystallise into conceptual constructions. They are ‘thoughts’ that […] 
lie too deep for words’ (ibid: 134); Levin hereby partially echoes Wordsworth’s ‘thoughts 
that do often lie too deep for tears’. It is these thoughts that Levin sees as inspiring 
metaphoric conceptions and giving rise to metaphorical utterances where, he claims, the 
language is metaphorical in the sense that it is ‘strangulated, twisted and decentered from 
its normal mode of expression’ (idem). For Levin, conceptions are expressed as metaphors 
because they represent unconventional thoughts. In this respect, Levin follows a long line 
of philosophers and psychologists who see language as an ‘[in]efficient mechanism’ (ibid: 
138). This view, often referred to as the ‘inexpressibility hypothesis’ (Ortony, 1975), will 
be discussed at various points throughout this thesis. In section 2.5 of this chapter, I 
consider how the claim that metaphor arises from a fundamental inadequacy of literal 																																																								
28  Philosopher Andrew Woodfield (1991: 566) offers a perceptive analogy of conception 
construction: ‘constructing a conception is cooking a meal. The chef selects ingredients from a 
store and combines them as he cooks. The resulting dish is freshly prepared […] they often draw 
upon old beliefs, but they do not usually draw upon prearranged constellations of beliefs’.  
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language relates to both Lakoff and Johnson’s and Sperber and Wilson’s views of 
metaphor as seen in the previous chapter, and in section 2.6, how it may cast light on the 
use of metaphorical language in the context of psychotherapy.  
Speaking in greater depth about the sort of conceptions that give rise to 
metaphorical utterances, Levin directly acknowledges affective experiences as archetypal 
examples of thoughts that ‘lie too deep for words’. Due to the complex nature of these 
experiences, Levin claims that ordinary language is ill-suited to their expression and can 
at best ‘approximate to such expression by means of deviant sentences’ (ibid: xiii). He 
describes these conceptions as being of a profound and difficult nature, and interestingly, 
relates them to conceptions that come about in academic science. To compare, he notes 
how both sorts of conceptions involve conceiving of states of affairs previously un-
thought of. In this sense, Levin says, metaphorical utterances not only involve 
conceptions which lie beyond conventional notions of how the world is constituted, but 
perhaps as a result, they also involve the creation of ‘new knowledge’ (ibid: 91).29 
While it might seem that metaphors arise primarily at times when people are 
grappling with foreign thoughts and ideas (an interesting claim when thinking of 
psychotherapy), it is important to note that this is not always the case. As mentioned at 
the beginning of this section, Levin leant heavily on literary texts when explicating his 
theory, and in particular, on the work of the Romantic poet William Wordsworth. In 
Levin’s view, the poet uses metaphorical language because of the inadequacy of literal 
language and the complex, novel nature of his/her conceptions. Levin spoke of poets 
being in a state of mind that he terms ‘the conceptual sublime’ (ibid: 206); a state which, 
for Wordsworth, was evoked by his thoughts on the natural world and which involved 
seeing nature as very much alive (see Levin, 1988: 220-237 for further detail). One must 
not forget, however, that the language of any writer, and indeed any speaker, may in fact 
reflect a conscious, potentially stylistic choice. It is, therefore, plausible that only 
spontaneous metaphors arise due to puzzling conceptions and the shortcomings of literal 
language. In production theories, therefore, a distinction should be made between, on the 
one hand, metaphors that are uttered instinctively, those whose ‘metaphoricity’ we are 
not aware of, and, on the other hand, metaphors that are engineered more consciously 
with some other purpose in mind – be that stylistic, economy of expression or persuasive 
(the economic and persuasive functions of metaphor will be discussed in chapter 4, 
																																																								
29 The discussion of Elisabeth Camp’s work on imaginative perspectives in section 2.4 will further 
explore the notion of ‘new knowledge’ and insight as a feature of metaphorical conceptions and a 
consequence of metaphor interpretations. 
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section 4.2).30, 31 For the poet, the conception and its affective nature are spontaneous and 
immediate, though the process of finding expression for that conception may be a 
conscious and potentially laboured struggle.  
Addressing the issue of how hearers, or readers, interpret metaphorical language, 
Levin proposes an account which, up to a point, is quite similar to that of Carston (2010). 
Prominent theories of metaphor comprehension in pragmatics and psychology (for 
example Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Glucksberg, 2001) suggest that when faced with a 
metaphorical expression we adjust the meaning of the language used, thereby making it 
fit to our fixed conception of the world (an objective external reality). Roughly speaking, 
this is the stance adopted by the ad hoc concept account of metaphorical language: one 
takes the metaphorically used vehicle and adjusts, or pragmatically modulates, it so that it 
can be applied to the metaphor’s topic. Levin’s account, in contrast, claims that we leave 
the metaphorically used language intact and instead we modify our conception of the 
world.32 Like Carston, who invokes a similar notion of imaginary world construction, 
Levin suggests that interpreting metaphorical language entails constructing an alternative 
reality (a metaphoric world), in which the literal meaning of the metaphorically used 
expression pertains. He describes this world as being construed by conceiving of the state 
of affairs that the expression, in its literal sense, depicts and as such, it is a world that 
transgresses conditions that pertain in the ‘real’ world. For Levin, ‘the crediting of 
possibility to the state of affairs represents the meaning of the sentence’ (Levin, 1988: 59). 																																																								
30 This idea mirrors that of Gerard Steen (2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013) who hypothesises two 
distinct classes of metaphorical expression: deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors (these can be 
seen as reflecting non-spontaneous and spontaneous metaphors, respectively). Steen claims that 
the ‘deliberateness’ of a metaphor affects the recipient’s processing. Loosely speaking, non-
deliberate metaphors are not processed as metaphors as such, while deliberate metaphors are. I 
believe that Steen’s theory of deliberate metaphor touches on an interesting and valid distinction, 
one that reveals itself as most pertinent when considering Conceptual Metaphor Theory, which 
gives little attention to the differences between wholly dead metaphors (which are surely non-
deliberate) and metaphors which are very much alive (and potentially, more deliberate). However, 
whilst I endorse the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor (a distinction 
that I would not be inclined to assert as clear-cut), I do not hereby endorse Steen’s stronger claims 
with respect to metaphor processing. For arguments both for and against Steen’s theory of 
deliberate metaphor processing see Gibbs, 2011b, forthcoming a, forthcoming b and Steen, 
forthcoming.  
31  In chapter 3, section 3.5, I return to the topic of spontaneous and non-spontaneous 
communication, and consider how psychotherapy often invites the speaker to engage in the 
former type of expression. Needless to say, it is highly problematic to assess whether a metaphor 
has been uttered spontaneously (non-deliberately) or non-spontaneously (deliberately); such 
assessments rely on a speaker’s post-hoc intuitions, which as we saw in chapter 1 section 1.2.2 are 
rarely unbiased. 
32 Davies (1982: 81-82) sums up this distinction rather nicely in saying that on the standard 
account of metaphor, ‘metaphorical language is interpretatively construed downwards to fit the 
world’, whereas on Levin’s account ‘the world is imaginatively construed upwards to fit the 
metaphorical language’. 
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Drawing out the finer details of his theory, Levin goes on to describe what happens 
in the mind of the interpreter when he/she undergoes conceptual construal of 
metaphorical language (that is, the interpreter endeavours to mentally construe a world 
which the language taken literally seems to describe). Levin expands on the notion of 
metaphoric world construction using the example metaphor, ‘the trees are weeping’. He 
clarifies that conceiving of the state of affairs that this metaphor depicts does not involve 
imagining that the trees are shedding their leaves or exuding sap (which might constitute 
modifying the language to fit our conception of the real world). Rather, we imagine that 
the trees are experiencing emotion (a state of affairs that may be impossible in the real 
world, yet wholly conceivable in the alternative reality of the metaphoric world). Levin 
points out that in our attempt to mentally participate in the metaphoric world 
constructed by the speaker we, the audience, are doomed to failure. Evidently, we cannot 
produce a definite understanding of trees literally weeping, yet the ‘interpretive 
imperative impels or urges the process on to completion’ (ibid: 21). For Levin, though our 
efforts are ultimately doomed, it is the effort, the process of conception construction, 
which constitutes interpretation.  
Speaking further about ‘metaphoric worlds’, Levin claims that their construction is 
contingent on the ‘raw materials’ afforded to us by the natural world, which we register 
via our senses. Through our conceptual and imaginative faculties we may ‘combine, alter, 
modify, […] rearrange and transmute’ these materials (ibid: 63), and in so doing, produce 
our own personal ontologies (that is, our own unique alternative realities). In these acts of 
combining and rearrangement we are said to enjoy ‘wide latitude’ (idem). Levin draws on 
the work of philosopher David Hume, who notes that ‘to form monsters, and join 
incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to 
conceive the most natural and familiar objects’ (Hume, 1966: 16, cited in Levin, 1988: 63, 
footnote 3). In citing this quote, Levin leads us to consider whether it truly costs our 
imaginative faculties no greater pain to form metaphoric conceptions than it does to 
conceive the raw materials of our world. Though both speaker and hearer engage in 
metaphoric conception construction, it seems that it is only the speaker for whom this 
process involves no greater cost than conceiving ‘the most natural and familiar objects’. 
For the spontaneous speaker, the metaphoric world arises naturally and with ease, it is 
simply a reflection of their vision and their attempt to communicate a conception for 
which literal language is ill-suited. The interpreter, on the other hand, who sits on the 
receiving end of someone else’s metaphorical conception, is likely to have to work quite 
hard to grasp the metaphoric world (and recall, according to Levin, their efforts will 
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always fail). For the recipient of a metaphorical expression, therefore, joining incongruous 
shapes and forming monsters (i.e. constructing metaphoric worlds) may cost the 
imagination a great deal. This idea mirrors Carston’s (2010) imaginary world construction 
process, which as discussed, involves more attentive pragmatic processes than simple ad 
hoc concept construction. Seen in the relevance-theoretic light, the additional processing 
effort that one must expend in order to construct metaphoric or imaginary worlds is 
offset by the additional cognitive effects that one stands to gain.  
It should be clear from the exposition presented thus far that Levin’s account of 
metaphor interpretation is a consequence of his views on metaphorical language 
production. For Levin, it is essential that interpreters, be they readers or hearers, 
entertain the literal meaning of the metaphorically used expression. According to him, 
adjusting language so that it fits one’s existing model of the world declines the invitation 
to partake in the unique internal world of the interlocutor (be it the writer in his/her 
conceptually sublime state, or the speaker in his/her alternate reality). Engaging with the 
literal meaning of the metaphorically used language is the only way that one stands to 
gain insight into the interlocutor’s world (which their utterance is an attempt to depict 
and which Levin takes to be the objective of interpretation). Speaking in relation to our 
understanding of poetry, Levin claims that ‘as long as we perceive the poet’s descriptions 
as metaphors, our suspension of disbelief is not total and we do not share fully in the 
poet’s vision’ (Levin, 1976: 159). We must, therefore, interpret metaphorical utterances as 
we do literal ones, that is, we must take them to be genuine and honest productions that 
are intended to express exactly what it is that they literally describe. In so doing, the 
recipient of Wordsworth’s poetry attempts to participate in the poet’s state of sublimity.  
 
To conceive of a world in which nature is ‘alive’, in which a community of spirit 
exists between ourselves and the objects of nature.  
(Levin, 1988: 236) 
 
This idea rests on Levin’s fundamental belief about metaphor production: metaphors are 
not ‘designed’, their production reflects the personal and sometimes novel way that the 
metaphor creator is experiencing the world, conceiving of something. As interpreters, we 
must release ourselves from conventional ontologies and allow our vision of reality to be 
infused with that of another, if we seek to gain insight into how our interlocutor’s world is 
ordered and thereby, expand our own world-view. Levin further motivates metaphoric 
world construction by stating that ‘to conceive of a river as loving, of nature as breathing, 
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opens up for us a world different from the ordinary world of our senses and cognitions’ 
(idem). 
Levin’s idea that metaphors are derived from personal metaphoric worlds gives a 
nod to the widespread observation that metaphors cannot be paraphrased in literal terms, 
without significant loss of content. As Black says: 
 
The relevant weakness of the literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely 
prolix or boringly explicit; it fails to be a translation because it fails to give the 
insight that the metaphor did.  
(Black, 1962: 46)  
 
We cannot learn anything from a literal paraphrase, or derive any significant insight from 
it, since it does not tell us anything about the reality that the speaker was immersed in 
when uttering his or her metaphor. As the famous Italian poet Pablo Neruda says to 
Mario Ruoppolo in Il Postino:  
 
“I can’t tell you in words different from those I’ve used. When you explain it, poetry 
becomes banal. Better than any explanation, is the experience of feelings that 
poetry can reveal to a nature open enough to understand it”. 
 
Levin’s interpretation process of constructing a metaphorical world potentially ‘opens’ the 
reader’s nature to a new, perhaps profound, sensory and emotional experience. Any 
attempt to paraphrase a poetic or creative metaphor will inevitably miss the point of the 
original metaphor, which is to provoke feelings and insight.33 
Elaborating on his claim that a metaphorical expression depicts a reality for its 
maker, Levin writes, ‘for us, not having accompanied the poet on his sojourn and thus not 
having experienced the direct vision of this other reality, the descriptions are metaphors’ 
(Levin, 1976: 159). What he means is that metaphorical expressions are metaphoric only 
for the audience, and not for the speaker or writer who has generated the metaphorical 
expression. This idea reinforces Levin’s claim that for the metaphor ‘creator’ the 																																																								
33 Later in the film, Mario attempts to explain his experience of one of Pablo’s metaphors. Mario 
struggles to express this experience until eventually, he locks onto a spontaneous figurative 
expression: “I felt like a boat tossing around on those words”. When Pablo points out that Mario 
has generated a metaphor, Mario professes that it does not count, since he had not meant to. Yet, 
as Pablo says, “meaning to is not important, images arise spontaneously”. Mario and Pablo’s 
exchange echoes Levin’s sentiments: that (a) metaphors cannot be paraphrased in literal terms, 
and that (b) the most poetic and interesting metaphors arise spontaneously, not from concretised 
concepts, but from conceptions. 
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metaphorical expression reflects the reality (or truth) of their felt experience; as such, as 
far as his/her mental conception goes, the use of language is not metaphorical (it is simply 
how he/she experiences it). Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that the 
speaker may be aware that in giving her experience linguistic expression she is not using 
language literally and therefore, that the utterance will be metaphorical for the receiver. 34   
 
2.4 IMAGINATIVE PERSPECTIVES: CAMP (2008, 2009) 
 
Elisabeth Camp’s work on metaphor is relevant to this chapter for a number of 
compelling reasons. Firstly, like Carston and Levin, Camp places strong emphasis on the 
importance of retaining the literal meaning of metaphorically used expressions during 
interpretation. Her claims, therefore, exhibit interesting points of comparison to 
Carston’s and Levin’s, and thereby enable us to draw out the finer details of each 
theorist’s claims, so that we might understand them more fully. Secondly, Camp is chiefly 
concerned with the distinctive and insightful effects of metaphor and, therefore, her work 
is highly relevant to the subject of psychotherapy, and more specifically, to the analysis of 
the functions of metaphor in psychotherapy (one of which is to ‘bring about change’ by 
inspiring shifts in perspective, see chapter 4, section 4.2). For these reasons, this section is 
dedicated to a presentation of Camp’s work. 
Although Camp’s approach to metaphor interpretation places strong emphasis on 
the literal meanings of metaphorically used expressions, the role of literal meaning in the 
interpretation process she describes is notably distinct from the role of literal meaning 
ascribed by Levin. For Camp, the literal meaning of a metaphor provides the ‘perspective’ 
for generating the intended meaning, while for Levin, the intended meaning simply is the 
literal meaning of the metaphorical expression. By providing the ‘perspective’ for 
generating the intended meaning, the literal meaning of the metaphorically used 
expression effectively serves as the ‘lens’ through which we view the metaphor topic. In 
other words, the literal meaning plays a ‘structural role’ in the interpretation process, 
thereby helping us to frame our understanding of the metaphor topic. To further clarify 
her position, Camp contrasts her proposal to the ad hoc concept account of metaphor 																																																								
34 That metaphorical expressions are metaphorical for the receiver implies an agreement with 
Davies’ (1982: 78-79) point, that ‘metaphorically affirming that q in thought’ (where q refers to a 
speaker’s world view) is not believing that q. In other words, in constructing a metaphoric world 
the recipient of the metaphorical expression does not come to believe in the truth of the 
metaphoric world, as perhaps the speaker did to some extent. As image theorist Reimer says: ‘it is 
possible to see A as B, without simultaneously seeing (or believing) that A can be seen as B’ 
(Reimer, 2008: 2-3). 
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outlined in the previous chapter, in which the literal meaning simply acts as a ‘skeleton’ 
for generating the speaker meaning (Camp, 2008: 4).  
To illustrate Camp’s proposals, let us re-consider the conventional metaphorical 
utterance discussed in chapter 1 and repeated below: 
 
11. My mother is an angel. 
 
Camp distinguishes her account from the contextualist theory (advocated by Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995), in which she says the encoded meaning of ANGEL serves as a ‘springboard 
for constructing a further, extended meaning’ (ibid: 16), i.e. a springboard for 
constructing the intended meaning (which meshes with our existing conception of the 
world). For Camp in contrast, the encoded concept ANGEL serves as a perspective (a 
frame or lens) for thinking about the metaphor topic, ‘my mother’.35  
To use the metaphor vehicle’s encoded meaning as a springboard or skeleton for 
constructing the speaker’s intended meaning is to use the encoded meaning somewhat 
generally. In doing so, one does not invest close attention to the encoded meaning. 
Instead one takes properties of the encoded meaning that are available fairly immediately, 
and quickly replaces the encoded meaning with a pragmatically derived sense (i.e. an ad 
hoc concept) – ‘springing’ from the literally encoded meaning to the pragmatically 
derived meaning. To use the encoded meaning as a perspective for constructing speaker 
meaning, on the other hand, is to commit significantly more attentive resources to the 
metaphor vehicle’s encoded meaning during the interpretation process. Doing so entails 
activating more features of the encoded meaning, as a result of using it continually (as 
opposed to more temporarily, as one does when using it as a springboard – where the 
encoded meaning is ultimately, and fairly swiftly, discarded). When the encoded meaning 
of a metaphor vehicle provides the perspective for thinking about the metaphor topic, 
speaker meaning emerges from the vehicle’s encoded meaning as a result of, in some 
sense, ‘sticking with’ the encoded meaning. The distinction between using the encoded 
meaning as a springboard and using it as a perspective is much like the distinction 
between reaching a mountain summit by traversing the face of a mountain and reaching 
it by zigzagging the mountain. Using a metaphor vehicle’s encoded meaning as a 
perspective is like zigzagging the mountain, one becomes better acquainted with the 
encoded meaning, taking more of it into the interpretation process. In other words, when 																																																								
35  Camp’s position on the way in which a metaphorical use of language affects the final 
interpretation is that it does not contribute to explicit content (explicature), but is entirely 
registered at the level of implicature (see Camp, 2006a). 
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the semantically encoded meaning serves as a perspective (as Camp claims), then that 
meaning contributes to our interpretation in a more significant sense than when the 
encoded meaning is being used as a springboard or skeleton (as is the case on the ad hoc 
concept construction account).  
There are some philosophers, such as Kendall Walton and David Hills, who have 
likened metaphorical use of language to the act of pretending. To a certain extent it is 
fitting to describe metaphor as a mode of pretence, especially for those who agree with 
the (Gricean) view that metaphor involves saying one thing while meaning another, as 
Camp does. However, Camp argues against the pretence view of metaphor. It is 
interesting to explore her arguments on this matter, for they serve to clarify her position 
on the role of the literal, encoded meaning in the interpretation of metaphorical language 
and thereby, also serve to facilitate comparison between herself, Carston and Levin. 
For contemporary philosophers Walton (1993) and Hills (1997), metaphor 
interpretation is conceived of as a form of imaginative activity, which itself is a form of 
mental pretence. Metaphor ‘implies or suggests or introduces or calls to mind a (possible) 
game of make-believe’ (Walton, 1993: 46), and within this game the literal assertion of the 
metaphorical sentence is true. On this account, the real world objects mentioned in any 
metaphorical assertion are said to be props in the game of make-believe. To illustrate, 
take the canonical example discussed in chapter 1: 
 
12. Bill is a bulldozer.  
 
According to Walton, in uttering this sentence a speaker intends her audience to 
recognise that Bill is a prop in a game of pretence, a game in which the literal assertion of 
(12) is true (the underlying assumption being that Bill possesses certain features that 
make him an appropriate prop). For Walton, by realising that Bill can be used as a prop in 
the game of pretence the interpreter is facilitated to generate a new perspective. 
Embracing this idea, Hills likewise maintains that ‘in saying that ‘Juliet is the sun’, Romeo 
pretends that she just plain is exactly that’ (Hills, 1997: 147). Camp rejects any account of 
metaphor as a form of pretence and argues that metaphor calls for a particular ‘species’ of 
imaginative activity, which is importantly distinct from the imaginative act of pretence.  
Camp sees the difference between metaphor and pretence as rooted in ‘the 
interpretive direction of fit’ (Camp, 2009: 113), by which she refers to whether the 
interpretation involves the subject or topic being fitted to the predicate or vice versa. In 
pretence, the subject is ‘fitted’ to the predicate (i.e. the predicate is the focus, e.g. 
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pretending to be a bulldozer); in metaphor interpretation, the predicate is ‘fitted’ to the 
subject (i.e. the subject is the main focus, e.g. Bill in example (12)). Consider the example 
below, uttered by a female academic colleague: 
 
13. I am Christopher Columbus. 
 
If I were to interpret (13) by way of pretence, I would need to imaginatively transform my 
colleague into Christopher Columbus. This transformation would involve erasing 
properties of my colleague that do not exist in Columbus and endowing her with 
properties that he does possess, ones that perhaps my colleague lacks. For example, I 
would represent her as a Roman Catholic male, of Genoese nationality (thereby ‘erasing’ 
or dropping her actual properties of being female and British). Metaphorical 
interpretation, on the other hand, does not entail entertaining any imaginative alteration 
of the speaker who claims to be Christopher Columbus. Instead, Camp proposes that it 
entails using Columbus as a ‘lens’ (ibid: 112), or perspective, through which to 
reconfigure my existing understanding of the speaker. This reconfiguration involves 
matching salient characteristics of Columbus to those that she possesses or resembles in 
some way. Thus, a metaphorical interpretation of (13) might highlight the speaker’s 
disposition for intrepid exploration, and her longing to be at the forefront of pioneering 
discoveries. According to Camp, the more features that are matched, between Columbus 
and my colleague, the greater the emotional valence of the metaphor, or, one could say, 
the more apt and effective it is, so the more it resonates.36 
According to Camp, an additional distinction between metaphorical construal and 
pretence is to be found in the ‘twofoldness’ or ‘doubleness’ of metaphor (Camp, 2009: 
113). During metaphor interpretation, we maintain dual attention on the focal subject 
(Bill, my colleague), and on the frame (bulldozers, Columbus), recognising that subject 
and frame are distinct entities. In pretence, in contrast, our awareness of the subject and 
frame as distinct entities is if you like somewhat suppressed (at the least, it is not 
foregrounded). Our dual attention to both subject and frame during metaphor 
interpretation does not appear to weaken the effect of the metaphor; on the contrary, it is 																																																								
36 Camp (2009), furthermore, rejects the notion that metaphor evokes a game of pretence on the 
grounds that if P is true, and we know it to be true, then we cannot pretend that P. Metaphor 
interpretation is more complex than pretending, since not all metaphors are literally false or 
trivially true (consider, Jesus was a carpenter and no man is an island). If the interpretive process 
of metaphor were simply to pretend that the literal meaning of the metaphorically used expression 
were true, then there would be no imaginative work to undertake in instances of metaphor that are 
neither literally false nor trivially true. See Camp (2009: 110) for more detailed discussion.  
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the imaginative interaction between the two may that is largely responsible for the 
richness of interpretation. As Camp notes, the dual attention aspect of metaphor 
interpretation is similar to the experience of viewing a picture, where ‘simultaneous 
attention to what is represented and to the representation itself, to the object and to the 
medium’, is required (Wollheim, 1980: 213, cited in Camp, 2009: 113). Camp describes 
the subject and frame as being ‘united into a single cognitive state, of thinking of the one 
entity through our conception or characterisation of the other’ (idem); she refers to this 
cognitive state as an instance of ‘aspectual thought’ (see Camp, 2003). This, she notes, 
reflects the ‘seeing X as Y’ aspect of metaphor, which, for many philosophers, is deemed 
to be a distinctive characteristic of metaphor (see Camp, 2006b; Davidson, 1978; Reimer, 
2008; Stern, 2000 for accounts of metaphor that emphasise the ‘seeing as’ aspect of 
metaphor). 
The distinction between metaphor and pretence can be summed up in simple 
terms: with pretence, a real world object or situation X serves as a prop for imagining 
something else Y, while in the case of metaphor construal, Y acts as a tool for 
understanding X as it really is. Pretence endows X with the exact properties that are 
possessed by Y, whereas metaphor highlights properties of X which are similar in some 
significant respect to Y’s important properties.  
In her efforts to highlight the rich, perspective shifting effects of metaphor (non-
propositional effects), and to draw our attention to metaphor’s persuasive force, Camp 
constructs a number of detailed contexts in which she embeds a metaphorical expression. 
Imagine the following scenario (which is similar to one that Camp sets up in her 2008 
paper): Francesca has spent five years working on her PhD, an endeavour which has 
entailed agonising nights riddled with self-doubt and a constant sense of guilt whenever 
she allowed her thoughts to stray to anything but her research. Her final year of study has 
been characterised by a manic rush to meet the thesis submission deadline, to the 
detriment of her mental and physical health. Finally, Francesca has gained her doctorate 
and it is time for her celebratory dinner, to be held at St. Andrews University in Scotland 
after her PhD viva exam, an occasion that marks the completion of a lifetime achievement 
that she never thought she could fulfill. It is this dinner that her husband, whom she lives 
with in London, tells her he cannot attend due to a conflicting engagement. Focusing on 
the fact that getting to St. Andrews and attending the dinner will be expensive, especially 
considering that it will only last a few hours, he has decided not to attend. So it goes 
ahead without him. Now, imagine that a year later Francesca’s husband decides to run a 
marathon, a goal that he has had in mind to achieve just once in his lifetime. Naturally, he 
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has undergone extensive, grueling training and is looking forward to having all those who 
have supported him being there at the finishing line. Due to a long-standing 
commitment, his wife Francesca tells him that she will not be present at the finishing line. 
When her husband tries to reason that she should cancel her plans, Francesca, in a 
passive-aggressive tone, utters the metaphorical expression: ‘That post-viva dinner was 
my finishing line’. Camp argues that this metaphor (or rather her example of it) has the 
ability to change the hearer’s thinking in a way that a literal statement could not. It 
elegantly, and persuasively, highlights elements of the post-viva dinner that may perhaps 
have been known to Francesca’s husband, but which were not in the foreground for him 
during his decision-making process. For example, upon hearing Francesca’s metaphorical 
remark, he would most likely come to realise that completing the PhD (symbolised by the 
dinner) was the end of a physically and mentally exhausting process, and that, like the 
finishing line of his marathon, the dinner marked the most important celebration of her 
achievement. Such insight, Camp argues, could not be achieved with any corresponding 
literal remark. A metaphor, she claims, extends our cognitive capacities by ‘suggest[ing] 
avenues for further investigation, [and] by presenting important features of the framing 
characterization that are as yet unmatched by features in the focal topic’ (Camp, 2009: 
125). Like many features of metaphor discussed in this chapter, the perspective-shifting 
effects of metaphor are of particular relevance in the context of psychotherapy and will be 
discussed in this chapter, section 2.6, and in chapter 4, section 4.2.4. 
 
2.5 CARSTON, LEVIN AND CAMP COMPARED 
 
In this section, I consider the parallels and differences between the accounts discussed 
thus far (namely Carston’s, Levin’s and Camp’s). In addition, I explore where these 
theories stand in relation to the relevance-theoretic account (in terms of ad hoc concepts) 
outlined in the previous chapter and to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, from which they 
are all notably distinct. Let us first consider the extent to which each theorist advocates 
full suspension of ‘fact-based beliefs’ during the interpretation of metaphorically used 
expressions. For Camp, it seems that full suspension of real world beliefs only occurs 
during pretence, and not so much during metaphor interpretation. Levin, in contrast, 
seems to suggest that metaphorical utterances invite interpreters to fully suspend their 
sense of reality, and to engage in a process similar to Camp’s description of pretence. Yet, 
as already noted, Levin also claims that ‘the effort to achieve interpretive consummation 
[during metaphor interpretation] is doomed, ultimately, to failure’ (Levin, 1988: 24). This 
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would suggest that, in fact, Levin does not think that an interpreter loses all sense of 
ordinary reality whilst constructing metaphoric worlds, for as he suggests, we are 
incapable of doing so. Though a metaphorical utterance reflects the reality of the felt 
experience for the speaker, and is thus not perceived as metaphorical for them, it is 
metaphorical for the receiver and, therefore, ordinary reality remains present throughout 
interpretation (on this matter, Levin and Camp are in agreement). Where Levin and 
Camp seem to diverge is with respect to their attitude towards this fact: for Levin it is 
regrettable, while for Camp it is fine. To clarify, neither Levin nor Camp suggests that 
hearers are capable of fully suspending ordinary factual world knowledge during 
metaphor interpretation. However, Levin is undeniably eager that interpreters make 
every possible effort to do so, in order to attain the full meaning of metaphorical 
expressions (and experience the metaphorical world of the speaker/writer; Camp makes 
no such appeal. 
Carston’s view concerning the suspension of ordinary factual world beliefs during 
metaphor interpretation is nicely clear-cut. As outlined in section 2.2, built into the 
imaginary world framework is a final (albeit overlapping) stage of interpretation, during 
which time the representations of the imaginary world are subjected to relevance-based 
inferential processing, in order that the hearer may draw implications that can be applied 
to the familiar world in which we all live. This final stage of processing openly 
acknowledges that while hearers may attempt suspension of reality for a time (and that it 
is worth their doing so), there is an inevitable final stage of interpretation that involves re-
emerging from the imaginary world back into the real world. This final stage of 
processing is central to Carston’s account and is derived from the view that the primary 
objective of interpretation is to infer contextual implications that can be integrated with 
real world assumptions (a fundamental aspect of the Relevance Theory pragmatic 
account). Recall that the outcome of the comprehension process for Carston is an array of 
weakly communicated implicatures whose derivation depends on contextual assumptions 
drawn from existing beliefs.37  
Levin is markedly less interested in such ‘ordinary’ implications and is altogether 
more focused on how the careful reader might partake in a poet’s unique vision and in 																																																								
37 One way of thinking about the difference between Carston, Levin and Camp, with respect to 
suspension of fact-based beliefs, concerns the role of metarepresentation in each account. Both 
Levin and Carston’s theories involve metarepresentation – the literal meanings of metaphorically 
used expressions are, kept apart from ordinary factual world knowledge, albeit only temporarily on 
Carston’s account. Pretence likewise involves metarepresentation. In contrast, using a metaphor’s 
literal meaning as a perspective or lens, i.e. Camp’s account, does not seem to involve 
metarepresentation. Thanks to Robyn Carston for suggesting this interesting distinction. 
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some sense, ‘lose themselves’ to banal daily reality whilst doing so. His theory is 
essentially an account of how readers may grasp and experience the same sensations and 
visions as the Romantic poets; this is the insight that Levin’s account is designed to reveal. 
Needless to say, integrating the metaphorical meaning with ordinary factual beliefs about 
the world is much less relevant to this practice than it is to Carston’s relevance-based 
account. I do not wish to suggest that Levin would deny the inevitability and necessity of 
the interpreter accepting banal factual beliefs. However, it is of less use and interest to 
Levin’s interpreter, whose goal is to share in a poet’s unique insight, which is derived from 
a metaphoric world. The contrast here, much like that between Levin and Camp, does not 
so much depict contention between Carston’s and Levin’s views, as highlight differences 
in their attentional focus.  
The different interests of Carston and Levin can be summed up by noting the 
difference between what it means for an interpreter to construct a metaphoric world, and 
what it means for the interpreter to metarepresent the literal content of metaphorically 
used expressions. ‘Metarepresenting the conceptual representation which comprises the 
literal meaning’ of a metaphor is to hold that meaning ‘for a further process’ (Carston, 
2010: 307, footnote 17). Constructing a metaphoric world is to take much more seriously 
the literal meaning of the metaphorical expression – it is not to take that meaning as 
‘descriptive/factual itself’ (idem), but it is to take that meaning as representative of 
something real and true for the speaker or writer of the metaphor. The metaphoric world, 
for Levin, therefore constitutes the ultimate goal or end of interpretation, while for 
Carston, it is a means (albeit a rich and interesting experience in itself) to the ultimate 
goal or end of relating it to the actual world.  
In addition to highlighting the divergent intentions of Carston and Levin, I believe 
that the clarity of Carston’s position concerning suspension of fact-based beliefs, and 
what happens when one re-emerges into the ordinary world, speaks to the coherence of 
Carston’s account in general. As she continually emphasises, the output of the imaginary 
world processing route is a set of weakly communicated implicatures. As I have just 
stated, the output on Levin’s account is a metaphoric world that depicts, as best as 
possible, the world constructed or experienced by the metaphor creator. Yet, it is not 
entirely clear what the metaphoric world consists of for the interpreter. For example, is it 
a set of images; is there any propositional content? This question indicates an interesting 
point of comparison between Sperber and Wilson (1995), Carston (2010), Levin (1988) 
and Camp (2008) – namely, each theory’s divergent predictions concerning whether, and 
to what extent, metaphors have cognitive content. Or, to put it another way, the extent to 
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which each theory agrees with Donald Davidson’s non-cognitivist claim that metaphors 
do not mean anything beyond their literal meaning.38  
The relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account of metaphor strongly opposes 
Davidson’s central thesis. It argues that metaphor interpretation results in an explicitly 
communicated propositional content that is intended by the speaker, although there may 
be some indeterminacy in its content (some differences between the ad hoc concepts 
derived by different interpreters). While RT emphasises the rich and evocative effects that 
metaphor may bring to mind, it holds that these effects can be inferentially derived 
(Wilson & Carston, 2008). As Sperber and Wilson put it:  
 
What look like non-propositional effects associated with the expression of 
attitudes, feelings and states of mind can be approached in terms of weak 
implicature […] if you look at these apparently affective effects through the 
microscope of relevance theory, you see a wide array of minute cognitive effects. 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 222-224, cited in Carston, 2010: 311) 
 
This statement stands in direct opposition to Davidson’s claim that ‘much of what we are 
caused to notice [in metaphor] is not propositional in character’ (Davidson, 1978: 46). 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world processing route adopts a more middle ground, granting 
that ‘in some cases [of metaphor interpretation] the most powerful and memorable effects 
do not fall within the m-intended or communicated content’ (Carston, 2010: 317). By this 
statement, Carston partially endorses the image theorist’s camp, recognising that not 
everything that metaphors call to mind can be represented propositionally. In particular, 
Carston notes the unlikelihood that imagistic effects, which are central to the imaginary 
world route, are propositional. Camp likewise also abandons the commitment to 
exhaustive propositionality that characterises Relevance Theory, stating that ‘perspectives 
can’t be cashed out in propositional terms’ (Camp, 2008: 14). However, like Carston, 
Camp retains the core of the propositional theorist’s view in maintaining that many 
conversational uses of metaphor make truth-evaluable claims and assert determinate 
propositional content. For Camp, a metaphor’s propositional content is central to the 
metaphor’s meaning, while non-propositional features of the metaphor (derived through 
aspectual thought) lie outside metaphorical meaning per se. What Camp and Carston thus 
share is a serious engagement with Davidson’s image theory, not nearly full endorsement 																																																								
38 Here Davidson uses the term ‘mean’ to refer to truth-conditional propositional content. That is, 
we do not ‘mean’ images of affective states. 
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of his claims, but a more appreciative recognition than that granted by most proposition 
theorists. 
In comparing Levin’s account to that of Davidson, the significant parallels seem, at 
least initially, to create an esoteric deception. Given Davidson’s claim that ‘metaphors 
mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation mean, and nothing more’ 
(Davidson, 1978: 32), it might appear that the two philosophers are wholly aligned. 
However, Levin discusses Davidson’s work in some detail and highlights the respects in 
which his own theory is distinct from it. Levin writes that, while for Davidson the 
interpretation of metaphor grows out of the literal meaning, for Levin the meaning of 
metaphor is an interpretation of the literal meaning (Levin, 1988: 17). What he appears to 
be suggesting in this subtle distinction is that on his account, the interpretation of a 
metaphorical expression is to some extent a construal of the expression’s literal meaning. 
For Davidson, on the other hand, the meaning of the metaphorically used expression is 
the expression’s literal (encoded) meaning and the interpretation, i.e. that which is 
brought to mind, may be quite remote from the literal meaning (images and associations). 
Davidson emphasises that ‘the common error is to fasten on the contents of the thoughts 
a metaphor provokes and to read these contents into the metaphor itself’ (Davidson, 
1978: 45). This quote highlights the divergent objectives of Davidson and Levin. Levin’s 
account is chiefly concerned with specifying the thoughts provoked by metaphor, i.e. the 
allusive quality of metaphor, which he does by suggesting that these thoughts are derived 
from a process of metaphoric world creation, which involves generating conceptions of 
what the metaphor creator was conceiving of when he/she employed the metaphorically 
used expression. Davidson’s objective, in contrast, is chiefly a rejection of proposition 
theories and the view that metaphor has a cognitive content (in addition to its literal 
content). As Rorty (1987: 290) says, according to Davidson, ‘metaphors do not (literally) 
tell us anything [beyond their literal meaning], but they do make us notice things [...] they 
do not have cognitive content, but they are responsible for a lot of cognitions’. Unlike 
Levin, Davidson does not strive to account for the cognitions that metaphor is 
responsible for; that is, Davidson does not concern himself with what metaphor calls to 
our attention and how metaphor calls to our attention that which it does. Davidson’s 
central thesis is that what is called to our attention when interpreting metaphor is some 
non-propositional content. It is not the case, therefore, that Levin necessarily disagrees 
with Davidson’s central thesis, rather that his focus and interests are wholly different.  
A point on which every account discussed in this chapter is unanimously agreed 
relates to the origin of metaphor. Sperber and Wilson (1995), Carston (2010), Levin 
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(1988) and Camp (2008) are united in their belief that verbal metaphors are not a 
reflection of underlying conceptual structure, as Conceptual Metaphor Theory claims 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Levin explicitly notes the discordancy between his view of 
metaphor and that of CMT. As explained in section 2.3, Levin asserts that metaphorical 
language is not metaphorical for the creator of the metaphor (in the sense that it 
represents their reality, an aspect of their thinking or experience). On first parse, this 
stance might appear to endorse Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of metaphorical cognition – 
that metaphorical utterances reflect the fundamental nature of speakers’ cognition and 
that it is only the recipient who must engage in a cognitive mapping process in order to 
comprehend the metaphor in question. Perhaps it is already obvious just how different 
this claim is to that of Levin. For Levin, metaphorical expressions (which are not 
metaphorical for their maker) arise from conceptions. Critically, and in fundamental 
contrast to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphorical expressions do not arise from concepts, let 
alone from metaphorical concepts.  
Recall the difference between concepts and conceptions: the former are ‘clear and 
distinct representations, the products of conceiving’, whereas the latter are ‘mental 
schemas, the product of conceiving of’ (Levin, 1988: 6). Conceptions are idiosyncratic and 
changeable, unlike concepts, which are relatively stable components of thought. As Rey 
(2010: 222) says, ‘concepts are what remain stable across variability in conceptions’. Levin 
does not make any claim to the effect that any concept is metaphorically structured (a 
central claim of Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory); for him, verbal 
metaphors reflect conceptions (and not concepts).39   
A further point of contrast between CMT and Levin’s account of metaphor (in fact 
all accounts of metaphor outlined in this chapter) is found in the respective theories’ 
account of metaphor comprehension/interpretation. As we saw in chapter 1, it follows 
from CMT that comprehension of metaphorical expressions involves activating cross-
domain mappings (conceptual metaphors). This is fundamentally different from taking 
the metaphorical expression literally. For Levin, interpreting metaphorical language 
literally involves ‘project[ing] novel conceptions, whose realisations would entail the 
actualisation of metaphoric worlds’ (ibid: 12); it does not involve accessing cross-domain 
mappings.   																																																								
39 Levin’s account of metaphor may be considered congruent with Conceptual Metaphor Theory, 
in that for Levin the metaphor maker actually conceives of his experience in the terms of the literal 
language he or she uses. Therefore, while metaphors are not deemed to reflect fundamental 
domain mappings, their construction may, in some sense, be cognitively motivated. For Camp 
(2008), Carston (2010) and Sperber and Wilson (2008), in contrast, metaphor always arises for 
communicative purposes.  
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A genuine disparity between Carston and Camp, and to some extent between 
Carston and Levin, lies in Carston’s maintained confidence in an additional process of 
metaphor comprehension distinct from and complementary to her ‘imaginary world’ 
account (namely, the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account). While Camp concedes 
that different metaphorical expressions give rise to strikingly different effects, she 
maintains that these effects are manifestations of the same process. Carston, in contrast, 
suggests that the different effects derived from metaphor may reflect two different 
processes: imaginary world construction and ad hoc concept construction (both of which 
are grounded in Relevance Theory). That interpreters have the alternative imaginary 
world processing route at their disposal does not entail that they will always choose to 
utilise this approach. Indeed, Carston believes that many conversational uses of 
metaphors found in everyday discourse, which often give rise to less vivid readings and a 
more determinate content, are processed via the construction of ad hoc concepts. Where 
Levin stands with respect to metaphor interpretation involving one or more processes is 
somewhat ambiguous. Although he does not explicitly acknowledge distinct processing 
routes separate from his own, it seems reasonable to assume that he would not exclude 
the possibility of their existence and the notion that more conventional everyday 
metaphors, in which he simply has less interest, are processed differently to more poetic 
uses of metaphor. 
Carston’s approach of proposing two separate processing routes has the advantage 
of being in line with the intuition that the metaphors ‘Martin is a pig’ and ‘Hope is the 
thing with feathers that perches on the soul’ truly engage different cognitive mechanisms. 
Recall that according to Camp, comprehension of both metaphors involves aspectual 
thought, such that ‘pig’ provides a lens for restructuring ‘Martin’ and ‘thing with feathers 
that perches on the soul’ restructures ‘hope’. There is, undoubtedly, a certain complexity 
in maintaining two processing accounts and a difficulty in specifying exactly how the two 
accounts (ad hoc concept construction and imaginary world construction) interact and 
what triggers the use of one rather than the other.  As I tried to show in section 2.2, there 
is a multitude of factors that may lead to the adoption of one processing route rather than 
the other: for example, the relative conventionality versus novelty of the metaphor, the 
discourse context (conversational vs literary), etc. It is quite possible that on some 
occasions, a hearer begins by interpreting metaphorically used language via ad hoc 
concept formation, and then, switches to metarepresenting the literal meaning as a whole. 
Equally, it is plausible that a hearer may begin by attempting to construct an imaginary 
world, and then, perhaps as a result of finding the process overly effortful or simply 
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uninteresting, switches to the construction of ad hoc concepts from the metaphor 
vehicles instead. The interaction between the ad hoc concept route and the imaginary 
world route is, therefore, quite complex. It is unlikely that one could ever discern the 
point at which each process, ad hoc concept formation and imaginary world construction, 
begins and ends, although some cases seem relatively clear: ‘John is a pig’ versus the 
passage above from Shakespeare’s ‘Macbeth’.  
To conclude this section, consider the interesting (apparent) paradox concerning 
literal meaning that presents itself in this chapter. On the one hand, it is widely suggested 
by linguists and philosophers that we employ language metaphorically because literal 
language is inadequate (Carston, 2002; Ortony, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1995); indeed, 
this is the very foundation of Levin’s theory. On the other hand, it is claimed by at least 
some of the advocates of the theories discussed in this chapter that hearers comprehend 
metaphorically used language by interpreting it literally.  
Consider the following figurative utterance from a client in psychotherapy: ‘bipolar 
illness is like being a balloon. Sometimes the balloon is so full of air that it is about to 
burst, and sometimes there’s no air in the balloon at all, it’s limp and not pretty’ (Kopp, 
1995: 29).40 The client could have attempted to express her feelings literally, using 
language which coincides with the world in which we exist. For example, she could have 
said ‘I have bipolar illness. This means that sometimes I have too much energy and do 
crazy things, and sometimes I have none at all and can hardly move, and it is 
unpredictable how I will feel from day to day’. While such an utterance is probably 
literally true, it is very limited in depicting the emotional state of the speaker as she 
experiences (and suffers) it. The point to note here (which resolves the apparent paradox) 
is the complete lack of correspondence between this literally intended utterance and the 
literal meaning of the speaker’s actual metaphorical utterance (which is all about the 
properties of a balloon). What I hope to make clear by this point is that a focus on the 
literal interpretation of a metaphor does not consist in translating the metaphor into 
something that can be said to be true of the external world. Instead, literal interpretation 
of metaphors amounts to building imaginative worlds, worlds which defy impressions of 
‘literality’, worlds in which an illness is conceived of as a balloon, has the rubbery texture 
and other properties of balloons, can be inflated and deflated, etc. and is as vulnerable and 
unpredictable as a balloon is when pushed to its limits. On Carston’s account, taking the 																																																								
40 Notice that this figurative expression initially appears in comparison, i.e. simile, form, and only 
later switches to categorical form. As noted in section 2.2, footnote 24, the differences between 
similes and metaphors on the imaginary world account are negligible, since both involve literal 
interpretation. 
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metaphorically used language literally takes place within a metarepresentational frame 
and is only a temporary stage in the comprehension process. Ultimately, implicatures that 
are literally applicable to the metaphor topic (e.g. bipolar illness) are inferred, and 
although the whole literal (imagined) scenario plays an important role in constructing the 
final interpretation, it is not a component of that interpretation.  
 
2.6 APPLYING CARSTON, LEVIN AND CAMP TO PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
In their united focus on the rich, often perspective-shifting and insight-giving effects of 
metaphorical language, Carston (2010), Levin (1976, 1988) and Camp (2008, 2009) 
encourage us to relate their theories to the use of metaphor in psychotherapy – where 
metaphor is notably widespread, particularly among clients, and where its effects are 
highly valued. In this section, I highlight how certain aspects of the theories discussed in 
this chapter may be fruitfully applied to psychotherapy and, to some extent, may be used 
to inform psychotherapy practice (to be discussed at length in chapter 4). Broadly 
speaking, the psychotherapy related insights I derive from Carston, Levin and Camp fall 
into two categories: firstly, they shed light on why psychotherapy appears to be such 
fertile ground for generating metaphorical language; secondly, they validate the 
psychotherapeutic practice of taking seriously those metaphorical utterances that are 
generated by clients (practice which will be explored in detail, and demonstrated with 
examples from transcripts, in chapter 4, section 4.3). 
The pragmatic theories of metaphor interpretation hitherto outlined all validate 
psychotherapeutic practice, in which the literal meaning of metaphorical utterances is 
deeply scrutinised; yet, they do so in subtly different ways. For Carston (2010), the 
recommendation that the literal meaning of a metaphor be sustained comes from her 
assertion that considered scrutiny of literal meaning leads to reflective processing that 
derives a wide array of weakly communicated implicatures. This idea hints at the 
potential power of metaphor to unearth, not just a focused, determinate meaning (that 
can be rejected and denied), but also a meaning that is more wide-reaching in scope (and 
thus, in its ability to inform the interpreter in a multitude of ways); this effect, as we shall 
see, is particularly sought after by clients and therapists. Essentially this aspect of 
Carston’s theory points to metaphor’s ability to widen our cognitive capacities and our 
ability to think about situations from a more flexible, less rigid viewpoint. For clients in 
psychotherapy, who may have become trapped in a maladaptive world-view that they 
cannot see out of, this is invaluable. Therapists, therefore, who wish that their clients 
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release the shackles of their maladaptive thoughts, may find it useful to offer metaphorical 
ways of expressing those thoughts thus broadening the range of directions and 
connections available to the client’s mental processes. If the therapist can construct a 
suitably reflective space that guarantees careful consideration of the metaphor (in other 
words, if he/she can push her client to engage in Carston’s imaginary world construction 
route), then any metaphorical offering may reveal a wealth of material for the interpreter, 
a wealth of derived implicatures. This material may then be productively analysed for 
insight into the client’s beliefs and state of mind, an understanding of self that both client 
and therapist must attain in order for therapeutic change to occur. Sustaining the literal 
meaning of metaphorical language may thus ‘set in motion a self-reflective process, by 
which, metaphorically speaking, brains come to understand themselves’ (Pribram, 1990: 
79).  
An additional aspect of Carston’s theory that speaks to the use of metaphor in 
psychotherapy comes from her focus on the role of imagery in the interpretation process. 
Carston claims that the imagery that accompanies the literal meaning of the metaphor 
plays an important role in the interpretation process and remains prevalent throughout. 
When combined with research that has demonstrated the memorability (as well as the 
rich density) of images (see Paivio 1983, to be discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3.4), this 
theoretical point becomes relevant for psychotherapy, as it increases the likelihood that 
any insights yielded during interpretation stay with the client beyond therapy. Imaginary 
world interpretation may be a way to promote this.  
For Camp (2008, 2009), the recommendation that metaphorical language be 
deliberately recruited in psychotherapy is to be found in her attention to the perspective-
shifting effects of such language. As we saw earlier in the story of Francesca, the recent 
PhD graduate, and her husband, it is not until Francesca’s husband hears the 
metaphorical utterance ‘that post viva dinner was my finishing line’, that his 
understanding of the situation changes; according to Camp, aspectual thought goes far 
beyond the invitation to engage in a simple process of comparison. It follows that 
introducing non-literal uses of language may help clients to reveal their personal 
perspectives to therapists, and may be a means by which a therapist may induce a change 
in perspective for their client. Camp says, metaphor ‘provide[s] hints of the truth which 
we could not envision if we relied only on the machinery of formal inference’ (Camp, 
2009: 128), echoing Thomas Kuhn’s sentiments that ‘you don’t see something until you 
have the right metaphor to perceive it’ (Kuhn, 1970: 48). 
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The relevance of Levin’s (1988) theory to psychotherapy, and to practice that 
recommends serious consideration of metaphors, comes from his claim that the literal 
meaning depicts a reality (often a profoundly significant one) for the creator of the 
metaphor. If, and/or when, this is the case, it is evidently essential to take the content of 
the metaphorically used expression seriously (that is, to treat it as an interpreter following 
Levin or Carston’s processing routes would), in order to grasp the full meaning behind 
the metaphorically used expression. To interpret the metaphor in any other way, for 
Levin, signals denial, or lack of interest in the speaker’s experience from which the 
metaphorical expression is derived. If a client in psychotherapy makes use of 
metaphorical language, therefore, application of Levin’s theory recommends that the 
therapist demonstrate respect for that utterance by taking it to be an accurate reflection 
of the speaker’s inner experience (a reflection of some alternate reality that the client is 
experiencing). On this basis, it would be advised that the therapist’s response to 
metaphorical language be one that displays engagement with the literal meaning of the 
metaphor, perhaps working with the client to extend/develop the metaphorical 
conception. As will be outlined in the next chapter, it is essential that a therapist conveys 
their commitment to their client, in order that the client feels ‘seen’ by the therapist, and 
senses that the therapist is invested in their case (see chapter 3, section 3.4, for discussion 
on how the relationship between client and therapist affects the outcome of therapy).   
The theories outlined in this chapter, Levin’s in particular, shed light on 
observations from writers in the field of psychotherapy that report the ‘rich and 
disturbingly imaginative metaphoric articulations’ generated by clients (Pollio et al., 1977: 
104). As outlined, Levin’s account of metaphor production focuses on the ineffable 
quality of experiences and feelings, and the inadequacy of literally used language to 
capture experiences of profound depth and complexity. While I do not believe that 
metaphor always arises due to the inadequacy of literal expression, I agree that this may 
sometimes (perhaps often) be the case. In psychotherapy, where feelings are the focal 
point of discussion, it is intuitive that the inadequacy of literal expression will often be the 
driving force of metaphor production. That this may be the case gives theoretical support 
to the observation that psychotherapy is fertile ground for metaphor, and explains why, in 
some situations, it may be so. 
So far, I have presented a rather one-sided argument, one that supports the use of 
metaphor in psychotherapy in general and the serious consideration of the literal 
meaning of metaphorical utterances. However, it cannot be denied that Camp’s theory 
hints at a certain danger inherent in the employment of metaphorical language in this 
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context. Her focus on the perspective shifting effects and emotive, persuasive force of 
metaphor serves to highlight the blinding force of metaphor – a force that has not gone 
unnoticed by psychotherapists (see chapter 4, section 4.4.2). As Moran notes, ‘part of the 
dangerous power of a strong metaphor is its control over one’s thinking at a level beneath 
that of deliberation or volition’; full interpretation of a metaphor ‘can make any 
subsequent denial of the point it makes seem feeble or disingenuous’ (Moran, 1989: 90). 
This idea is reminiscent of Carston’s observation, that in having a less definite 
propositional content, some metaphors are less apt to be denied or rejected. Needless to 
say, no therapist wishes to operate at a level that is beneath volition, nor to inspire a 
perspective that cannot be seen or questioned.  
 
Metaphors create insight. But they also distort. They have strengths. But they also 
have limitations. In creating ways of seeing, they tend to create ways of not seeing. 
(Morgan, 2006: 338) 
 
The above quote underlines the importance of generating metaphors with care and 
presents a note of caution to any psychotherapist.  
Still, Camp and indeed many psychotherapists do not allow the potency of 
metaphor to impede their use of this valuable and inevitable mode of expression. Rightly 
so, it would seem, since research has shown that our interpretations are always 
emotionally charged to some extent, whether the interpretation comes from 
metaphorically construed language or not (see Greene et al., 2007; Haidt, 2001; Nichols & 
Knobe, 2007). As Camp (2009: 128) says, while metaphor is no substitute for rational 
thought, ‘when we are otherwise groping in the dark’ it can provide valuable aid: 
 
If we insist upon confining ourselves to scrupulously rational modes of thought and 
discussion, then this may well have the effect of granting inappropriate influence to 
pre-existing biases – especially given that these biases have been demonstrated to 
persist even after having been rationally acknowledged to be illegitimate. Against 
this, harnessing the power of imagination to reconfigure our thoughts by more 
intuitive means may enable us to counteract these biases in a more thoroughgoing 
way. 
(idem) 
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
I began this chapter by motivating an alternative account of metaphor interpretation that 
could apply to instances of more extended, creative and/or poetic uses of metaphorical 
expression – for which I suggested the ad hoc concept account was not well suited. In 
presenting some alternative frameworks that ascribe a more prominent role to the literal 
meaning of metaphorically used expressions during the interpretation process than the 
standard RT account does, I hope to have demonstrated the rewards that one stands to 
gain from engaging an alternative processing route.  
There is much to offer from all of the accounts discussed in this chapter, both in 
terms of elucidating the interesting effects of metaphor and in terms of their application 
to psychotherapy. In comparing and contrasting each theory, I have tried to arrive at a 
richer understanding of each account of metaphor. It must be said, however, that I am 
chiefly drawn to Carston’s imaginary world construction route as a pragmatic theory of 
interpretation; primarily, I am drawn to the way in which it is pitched as complementary 
to the ad hoc concept account. There seems no reason, to me, to do away with the latter 
account – for not only does it offer an elegant approach to the continuous nature of loose 
uses of language, but also it explains how we are able to process relatively simple or banal 
metaphors with total ease. The ad hoc concept account is, furthermore, capable of 
explaining how repeated exposure to common metaphors may lead a metaphorically used 
word to take on a new lexicalised sense, in order that it might be processed with even 
greater ease. It feels unfair to the interpreter to insist that all metaphors be 
comprehended via imaginary or metaphoric world construction; likewise, it is ill fitting to 
suggest that all metaphors may induce aspectual thought and dramatic shifts in 
perspective. Highly conventionalised metaphors like ‘Martin is a pig’ and ‘Mary is a lion’ 
do just as well to be comprehended via the construction of ad hoc concepts. Given my 
theoretical leaning towards Relevance Theory, I henceforth focus on Carston’s 
pragmatically oriented account of metaphor interpretation, while bearing in mind the 
insights afforded by Levin and Camp. 
In the final section of this chapter, I presented a number of ways in which the 
‘alternative’ frameworks of metaphor interpretation might be applied to 
psychotherapeutic discourse. I tentatively suggested that in this domain, interpreters of 
metaphor often do better to proceed via imaginary world construction. In addition, I 
hinted that the idiosyncratic nature of the psychotherapy context might naturally push 
interpreters (clients and therapists) to process metaphors via this alternative route. In the 
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next chapter, I delve deeper into the psychotherapeutic domain, teasing apart the ways in 
which it is both distinct from and similar to everyday discourse contexts; in chapter 4, I 
return to metaphor with a richer understanding of how psychotherapeutic discourse may 
inform pragmatic theory, and vice versa.  
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Chapter 3 · Psychotherapy: a special communicative context 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The next two chapters are dedicated to the presentation of psychotherapeutic discourse. 
Primarily, I am interested in what pragmatic theory stands to gain from an exploration of 
communication in this domain, specifically how the use of metaphor in psychotherapy 
may inform theories of metaphor comprehension. In so doing, I expand on the rich 
potential inherent in metaphorical language interpretation in terms of cognitive effects; 
potential, which I believe is best accounted for by Carston’s imaginary world processing 
route. To date, research on the use of metaphor in psychotherapy has been almost 
exclusively used to inform therapeutic practice. The direction of inquiry in this thesis, 
using psychotherapy to inform comprehension theories, thus represents a new 
contribution to the field of pragmatics. At the same time, it is my hope that this research 
will also serve therapeutic ends, and at the least will inform the theoretical underpinnings 
concerning the use of metaphor in psychotherapy. However, this goal is more speculative 
in nature and of secondary importance to the thesis as a whole.  
I begin this chapter with an introduction to psychotherapy, reviewing the diverse 
treatment methods within the field and surveying empirical research designed to evaluate 
the factors that influence ‘success’ in therapy. Understanding of these factors is essential 
in order to comprehend the ways in which metaphor may contribute to distinct 
psychotherapeutic objectives (to be discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3). In the final 
section of this chapter, I focus on communication in psychotherapy, noting the ways in 
which it is distinct from the everyday discourse which pragmatic theories are usually built 
to explain. At various points throughout this chapter, and the next, I will call upon my 
own experience of psychotherapy and, where relevant, will share personal details of these 
experiences.  
 
3.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE DOMAIN OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
It is estimated by the Word Health Organisation that one in four people experience a 
diagnosable mental health problem at some point in life and a staggering 450 million 
people worldwide are currently suffering with such difficulties. Psychotherapy essentially 
provides a safe and confidential space in which to discuss these problems. The primary 
mode of treatment is communication between therapist and client, and for this reason it 
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is often referred to as the ‘talking cure’41. It is defined in more detail by Meltzoff and 
Kornreich (1970: 4) as: 
 
The informed and planful application of techniques derived from established 
psychological principles [...] with the intention of assisting individuals to modify 
such personal characteristics as feelings, values, attitudes, and behaviours which are 
judged by the therapist to be maladaptive or maladjustive.  
 
This notion of ‘modifying feelings’ is apt, in that the ultimate goal of psychotherapy is 
often for the client to become more content with their situation and more at ease with 
their feelings. Meltzoff and Kornreich’s implication that it is the therapist’s judgment 
regarding what is maladaptive that counts, however, feels somewhat ill fitting. I would 
argue that it is just as much the clients’ experience of their own feelings and their ability 
or inability to cope with these feelings that drives the therapeutic process.  
While the basic course of treatment in psychotherapy consists of talking by the 
client, the relationship between the client and therapist plays a critical role in the process. 
The quality of this relationship not only facilitates their communication with each other, 
but also fosters an understanding of him/herself that the client may then apply to his or 
her examination of other relationships (with family members, friends, colleagues, 
strangers etc.), which may be affecting the client’s state of mind. Establishing an effective 
therapeutic relationship is thus of paramount importance in using psychotherapy as a 
means of resolving emotional distress. As we shall see, different approaches to 
psychotherapy work with the therapeutic relationship in a number of different ways. A 
review of practices, also called ‘modalities’, and distinguishing differences between them 
constitutes the next section. Psychotherapeutic methods tend to fall into one of the 
following three categories: psychoanalytical and psychodynamic therapies, cognitive and 
behavioural therapies, and humanistic therapies. I shall focus on dominant practices 
within these categories.  
 
3.3 OVERVIEW OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRACTICES 
 
3.3.1 PSYCHOANALYTICAL AND PSYCHODYNAMIC THERAPIES 
 																																																								
41 This expression was originally coined by Anna O. who was a patient of Dr Josef Breuer, a friend 
and colleague of Freud’s (see Breuer and Freud, 2000 for further information). Note how 
psychotherapy’s reliance on talking contrasts with a reliance on medication or physical therapy.    
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Psychoanalytical and psychodynamic therapies stem from Sigmund Freud’s seminal work, 
developed in the late 19th century. Broadly speaking, these therapies subscribe to the idea 
that our behaviour and feelings are affected by our unconscious drives and are deeply 
rooted in our childhood experiences. According to Freud, aspects of ourselves that we 
find unacceptable become banished into our unconscious mind, leaving only the 
‘acceptable’ to consciousness. Defence mechanisms such as denial, displacement and 
suppression assist this process of banishment, thereby easing anxiety associated with the 
unacceptable thoughts or feelings. However, these unacceptable feelings may be triggered 
and come to the surface later in life, influencing our thoughts and behaviours and causing 
inner conflicts which may make life very difficult and may motivate us to begin a course 
of therapy. 
For Freud, the two principle forces governing our actions are the opposing drives of 
life and death. The life instinct, known as Eros or libido, is associated with hunger, thirst 
and sex and is referred to as the ‘pleasure principle’. Conversely, the death instinct 
(sometimes called Thanatos) is associated with aggression (Freud, 1920). Freud proposed 
his theory of psychosexual development, in which he asserted that our individual 
personalities are shaped in early childhood and determined by other people’s responses to 
our motivational drives of life and death. For example, according to Freud, if a caregiver 
fails to adequately gratify our basic needs, for instance by ignoring our cries for food 
during infancy, we may later become greedy or impatient in our adult life.  
An additional cornerstone of Freud’s work was his structural model of the mind, 
according to which there are different psychic levels. He suggests that the human psyche 
comprises three parts: id, ego and super-ego (Freud, 1923).42 The id is the hedonistic 
component of mind with which we are all born and which operates on the pleasure 
principle; the id seeks immediate gratification with no consideration of reality, 
consequences or other people. This component of the psyche exists within the 
unconscious mind. The super-ego, on the other hand, roughly corresponds to our 
conscience. It is our moral component of mind, also largely based in the unconscious, 
which tells us what is right or wrong. This aspect of mind develops later in life and is the 
product of standards and restraints exerted upon us by our caregivers (for example, 
parental figures and teachers). The ego, which is part of the conscious mind, can be 
thought of as the rational mediator caught in between two, imperative, and often 
																																																								
42 Freud revised his theories several times. In earlier formulations of the psyche, Freud argued for 
conscious and unconscious levels, later suggesting the existence of conscious, preconscious and 
subconscious realms (see Freud, 1900 for further details).  
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competing, figures – id and super-ego. Conflict arises between the desires of the id and 
the strictures of the super-ego and it is the ego’s job to negotiate these battles.  
If the id becomes too strong, basic desires and self-gratification pervade the 
individual’s life, leading to selfish and thoughtless behaviour. Conversely, if the super-ego 
becomes too strong, the individual is governed by a rigid code of ethics, which results in 
an overly judgmental character that is unforgiving of oneself and of others. For happy, 
contented people, the ego is said to be the strongest component of mind. A strong ego 
assesses the reality of every situation and manages to satisfy the instinctual needs of the 
id, whilst keeping the super-ego happy. 
Psychoanalysis, psychoanalytical therapy and psychodynamic therapy are all based 
on these theories.43 Psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical therapy are generally viewed as 
the more intense modes of treatment, distinguished from other therapies in terms of the 
delivery time frame. Both therapies represent a long-term investment, which involves 
high frequency of sessions over a long period of time. Psychodynamic therapy in contrast, 
while often open-ended and relatively long-term, focuses more on immediate problems 
and speedier solutions. The techniques across practices include dream analysis, free 
association and therapeutic transference. Since the notion of transference will be of 
relevance to the discussion of communication and metaphor in psychotherapy in section 
3.5 of this chapter and 4.2 of the next, it is worth going into some detail on this 
theoretical construct. 
Although the notion of transference may not be familiar to those outside of 
psychotherapy, it is claimed to be a phenomenon that pervades even the most pedestrian 
of exchanges and interactions. In the context of psychotherapy, transference may be 
loosely defined as:  
 
The conscious and unconscious responses – both affective and cognitive – of the 
patient to the therapist.44 
(Maroda, 1991: 66) 
 																																																								
43 Jungian therapy or analysis also stems from the work of Freud, though it is based on the theories 
of founder, Carl Jung. Jung believed in a larger ‘collective’ unconscious that consists of archetypes, 
that is, innate cross-cultural projections which are common to all humanity (for further detail see 
Jung, 1964). 
44 It may seem somewhat excessive that all responses, even innocuous remarks about the weather, 
be considered as aspects of transference. However, this is truly the intended definition of the term. 
This idea merely reflects the belief that at some basic level all responses, no matter how banal, are 
a reflection of an individual’s personality and may, therefore, be interesting in the context of 
psychotherapy. 
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These responses are said to be manifestations of clients projecting feelings that they have 
experienced in previous significant relationships onto the therapist; it is ‘the tidal wave of 
the past that washes over the present’ (Stolorow et al., 1995: 28). Looking beyond the 
relationship between client and therapist, transference can simply be seen as any 
repetition of relational patterns (i.e. any response that is grounded in the past). 
Countertransference, in the context of psychotherapy, refers to the therapist’s feelings 
and responses towards the client. While such feelings were historically seen as an obstacle 
to the therapeutic process, representing the therapist’s own unresolved conflicts 
transferred onto the client, countertransference is increasingly viewed as a useful tool in 
therapy (see Heimann, 1950, for discussion). Although transference and 
countertransference may be commonplace, relatively simple phenomena, how they come 
into play and are utilised in the context of psychotherapy is undeniably complex. As 
Maroda (1991: 66) says, the unfolding of transferences and countertransferences (client 
responses and therapist responses) and the interplay between those responses and ‘the 
manner in which they are (or are not) addressed – by either or both parties – leads to an 
intricate psychological dance between patient and therapist’. 
To give a brief example of transference and countertransference, consider a client 
whose relationships, she reports, all end in abandonment. Maroda (2010) explains how 
this established ‘relational pattern’ permeates the relationship between client and 
therapist, such that the client both expects and in a sense primes the therapist to abandon 
her. By criticising and disappointing the therapist, expressing hopelessness and lack of 
gratitude, the client unconsciously creates a situation in which the therapist is left 
struggling to remain engaged in the relationship. Maroda conjectures that,  
 
If the therapist has struggled with abandonment herself, she may be too quick to 
reject and distance from these troubled clients, or may guiltily overcompensate by 
absorbing blow after blow without wincing.  
(ibid: 34) 
 
It should be evident from this example how both parties, client and therapist, are in a 
sense conditioned by their past and, if you like, primed to respond in accordance with 
their established ways of being. Needless to say, the therapist has undergone extensive 
training in order to master the art of handling transference and countertransference. 
Freud characterised psychoanalysis as an archaeological dig into the unconscious 
which consists in ‘tracing back one psychical structure to another which preceded it in 
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time and out of which it developed’ (Freud, 1913: 183); this tracing back refers directly to 
the work of transference interpretation. Some believe that transference functions for 
defence purposes, while others view it as an attempt to resume a developmental process 
that stalled in infancy. Stolorow and colleagues reject the notion of transference as an act 
of regression, displacement, projection and distortion, suggesting instead that it is an 
instance of organising activity. They conceive of transference not as a biologically rooted 
compulsion to repeat the past, ‘but rather as the expression of a universal psychological 
striving to organise experience and construct meanings’ (Stolorow et al., 1995: 37). For 
many psychoanalysts, the purpose of analysis is to enable the client to know and see 
themselves as others do (see Hirsch and Roth, 1995; Sullivan, 1953, cited in Maroda, 
2010); psychoanalysis works with transference on the assumption that it directly 
facilitates this goal. Through recognition and exploration of the dynamics in the 
relationship between the client and therapist, it is hoped that clients will reach an 
understanding of their feelings and motivating assumptions, thereby resolving conflicts 
with figures from early childhood.  
The way in which psychotherapists handle transference (sometimes called 
transference communications, transference contents or transference projections) varies 
enormously. Deciding when to make a transference interpretation is always a complex 
matter, which requires great sensitivity. Wiener (2009) demonstrates this point most 
effectively in her chapter, ‘working in and working with transference’, which looks at a 
number of case studies and debates within the field. Transference interpretation is 
effectively an instance of the analyst articulating his or her reading or understanding of 
transference (her reading of how the past is affecting the present dynamic between client 
and therapist). To illustrate, imagine that a client who is learning to play the keyboard in 
his spare time mentions to his therapist that his keyboard has a recording device attached 
to it. As a result, he tells his therapist, he can listen to recordings of his own music and 
can thereby self-assess his progress. He explains that this recording device means that he 
has no need for a music teacher. The analyst in this situation may choose to offer a 
transference interpretation, commenting that in talking about his lack of need for a music 
teacher he, the client, is letting her know that he is capable of looking after himself and 
does not need her, or any analyst (Wiener, 2009: 52). The timing of this interpretation, 
and whether the client is ready to hear it (or whether it will fall on deaf ears so to speak) is 
evidently a delicate issue, which requires great skill. Yet, for many psychotherapists and 
psychoanalysts, working with transference is where the bulk of therapeutic change takes 
place. In my own experience of psychotherapy, I certainly found this to be the case. By 
	 95 
piecing together parts of my childhood and analysing my relationships with my parents, 
my therapist was able to offer timely, and highly insightful, transference interpretations. 
These enabled me to see that many of my routine, and seemingly insignificant, reactions 
(to her and to others) are conditioned responses, rooted in much earlier experiences. I 
came to understand why spending money on therapy provokes such conflicting feelings 
in me, why simple things like allowing someone to carry my bag or to pay for a meal are 
likewise deeply uncomfortable experiences, and why I find it difficult to let anyone worry 
about me. Transference interpretations helped me to understand these aspects of my 
personality and, for reasons still unknown to me, this proved to be incredibly liberating 
and calming. I believe that knowing and understanding oneself fosters acceptance of self, 
which in turn facilitates a sense of peace. 
 
3.3.2 COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIOURAL THERAPIES 
 
The range of approaches which rely on cognitive and behavioural theories includes: 
cognitive therapy, behavioural therapy, cognitive analytic therapy, cognitive behavioural 
therapy, acceptance and commitment therapy, and dialectical behavioural therapy. A 
selection of these therapies will be outlined below. 45  Cognitive and behavioural 
approaches are distinguished from psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies on a 
number of different dimensions; those with the most relevant implications for the way in 
which metaphor is utilised in therapy will be highlighted.  
Behavioural therapy is based on the simple premise that our actions are 
conditioned responses to past experience (as opposed to products of unconscious urges, 
as maintained by psychodynamic therapies). The behavioural approach subscribes to the 
belief that since behaviour is conditioned, or learned, it can be re-conditioned (Pavlov, 
1897; Skinner, 1948, 1971). This type of therapy is particularly attractive to clients 
wishing to change concrete aspects of their behaviour such as phobias or addictions. 																																																								
45 Due to space constraints, my discussion of modalities in this section is restricted to cognitive and 
behavioural therapies. However, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) is noteworthy in the 
context of this thesis given its attention to metaphorical language. ACT is grounded in Relational 
Frame Theory (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes and Roche, 2001) and believes that the root of human 
suffering is psychological inflexibility, which it is claimed, arises from our everyday language and 
conceptions. ACT endeavours to change clients’ relationships with their internal experiences 
(their thoughts and feelings), by employing a number of ‘experiential practices’, one of which is the 
use of metaphorical language. ACT holds that metaphors act as ‘experiential triggers’ as a result of 
their emotional and perceptual qualities. Metaphors are thus thought to assist clients in 
reconnecting to their environment, fostering awareness of bodily experiences, which ACT sees as 
key to increasing cognitive flexibility. For a comprehensive overview of ACT and a guidebook for 
how to use metaphor, see Stoddard and Afari (2014). 
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Cognitive therapy, on the other hand, focuses on a client’s thoughts and the manner in 
which those thoughts are affecting their behaviour (Beck, 1972). The underlying 
assumption of cognitive therapy is that scrutiny of thoughts can lead to more flexible 
and/or more positive modes of thinking which in turn will affect a person’s feelings 
towards their own thoughts.  
As one might expect, cognitive behavioural therapy (henceforth CBT) combines 
cognitive therapy and behavioural therapy into a unified method of treatment, which 
emphasises the mutually reinforcing nature of thoughts and behaviour. The practice 
relies on three core assumptions: 
 
i. Cognitive activity affects behaviour.  
ii. Cognitive activity may be monitored and altered. 
iii. Desired behaviour change may be effected through cognitive change. 
(Dobson, 2001: 4) 
 
According to cognitive behavioural therapists, changing the way we think and behave has 
the power to change how we feel about the world. When we recognise the two-way 
relationship between thoughts and behaviour and link this recognition to a view of 
thoughts and behaviour as both being flexible, we become empowered to make positive 
changes in our life. By highlighting the idea that problems are not necessarily a direct 
reflection of reality, CBT aims to assist clients in realising that their issues are not 
necessarily a result of a certain external situation, but rather a matter of their perception 
of that situation. In this sense, clients are often said to be ‘the architects of their 
misfortune’ (ibid: 28). The logic is as follows: if one has constructed his or her own 
misfortune, one has the ability to tear down that construction.  
The first step of CBT is invariably the identification and recognition of automatic, 
negative thought patterns and negative behaviour. The client examines these negative 
patterns and is recommended practical exercises to be completed both inside and outside 
the therapy room. These exercises are designed to equip the client with the skills needed 
to recognise and cope with negative habits. CBT therapist Carol Vivyan specifies twelve 
unhelpful thinking habits: mental filter, judgments, mind-reading, emotional reasoning, 
prediction, mountains and molehills, compare and despair, catastrophising, critical self, 
black and white thinking, shoulds and musts, and, lastly, unhelpful memories (2009: 27). 
Mind-reading refers to the habit of assuming that we know what others are thinking, 
usually about us, while ‘shoulds and musts’ involve putting pressure on ourselves, thereby 
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setting up unrealistic expectations. Vivyan suggests that once an individual learns to 
identify his or her thinking style, they develop the ability to notice how these unhelpful 
thinking habits are colouring their view of the world. Noticing unhelpful styles of 
thinking is particularly useful in bringing about therapeutic change given that such habits 
often signal the onset of a distressing situation; indeed, they may be the catalyst for 
distress. Through practical exercises one can challenge unhelpful habits, thereby 
distancing oneself from negative thoughts. In time, the exercises become so 
commonplace and routine that they are no longer needed, having brought about real 
change in thinking and behaviour. 
The beauty of these exercises is best illustrated with some working examples. Take, 
for instance, the simple ‘automatic thoughts’ diary exercise, where one makes a daily 
record of upsetting or challenging situations. For example, one might record having a 
fight with a bus driver, or having a sense of despondency at the gym. After documenting 
these experiences, the client is then required to identify the automatic thoughts that 
accompanied the events. For the client who felt despondent whilst at the gym, some 
associated thoughts might be: ‘I’ll never get fit’, ‘there’s no point in trying’ or ‘I can’t do 
anything’. The next step is to isolate the physical and emotional responses to these 
automatic thoughts; for example, eating ice-cream, crying, getting tense, feeling hopeless 
and frustrated. The client is then challenged to find the ‘cognitive distortion’ or unhelpful 
thinking habit that has resulted in the recorded automatic thoughts and responses. For 
example, catastrophising – imagining that the worst possible thing will happen, i.e. 
because I did not have a good experience in the gym today I’ll never have a good 
experience in the gym. Or comparing – seeing only the positive aspects in others and 
comparing ourselves negatively against them, e.g. everyone else in the gym is finding this 
easy, they’re all infinitely better than I am. This basic exercise compels the client to 
address their negative thought patterns, having highlighted the detrimental effects that 
they are enacting. Sometimes simply recording upsetting events and bringing them to the 
forefront of one’s mind is enough to bring about positive change. At other times, a client 
may need to go one step further and replace the automatic negative thoughts with a more 
rational response. For example, ‘I did not have a good experience at the gym today, but 
that is not to say that I won’t have a good experience if I go tomorrow’. Cognitive 
behavioural therapists believe that engaging in this kind of structured activity on a daily 
basis will ultimately alter our cognition and, in the meantime, will enable us to cope with 
our negative thoughts better. 
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Another simple exercise prescribed in CBT is ‘the worst case scenario’ technique 
(Reivich & Shatté, 2002). This exercise involves first identifying a felt adversity. Using an 
example from my own experience as a client in group CBT, I once reported: 
 
I thought I’d understood this theory, but I’ve realised that I don’t have an in depth 
handle on it at all.  
 
The next step was to generate the worst-case beliefs that descended from that adversity, 
for example: 
 
(i) I will have to do more reading. 
(ii) I will lose lots of time. 
(iii) I will never be able to submit my thesis on time. 
(iv) I’ll fail my doctorate. 
(v) I’ll never find my way in life. 
 
The subsequent step was to assess how likely those beliefs are based solely on the specific 
current adversity: 
 
(i) I will have to do more reading. 100%  
(ii) I will lose lots of time. 80% 
(iii) I will never be able to submit my thesis on time. 40% 
(iv) I’ll fail my doctorate. 0% 
(v) I’ll never find my way in life. 0% 
 
After working out the likelihood of the worst-case beliefs, the client then generates the 
best-case belief, which crucially must be as fantastical as the worst-case beliefs (here one 
adds a level of humour to the exercise). For example, best-case scenario for the adversity 
described above: 
 
I will end up failing my doctorate, which will mean I can read for fun again and I 
can go away travelling, where I’ll meet the Dalai Lama who will show me my way in 
life. 
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Having taken a step back from the adversity, the next stage is to rationally identify the 
most likely outcomes of the original situation and to come up with some solutions for 
working with the adversity going forward. My most likely outcome was that I would have 
to do more reading, but that I could make that time up elsewhere. If I continued to not 
understand the theory after more reading, I would be comforted by the knowledge that I 
had worked hard and would have the option to speak to my supervisor about my 
difficulties. As for solutions: read more and reschedule workload. This final step, solution 
finding, stops the process of unhelpful thinking, and has the advantage of focusing the 
client on the present.  
It is evident that the cognitive behavioural approach contrasts with psychodynamic 
methods in a number of interesting ways. CBT is primarily a solution-focused, goal-
orientated mode of treatment, which necessitates proactive engagement from clients. 
Psychodynamic therapies, on the other hand, are more open-ended, with the goals being 
altogether less concrete and clearly defined. While CBT may involve some looking back 
over the past, sessions are primarily rooted in the present, focused on the here and now, 
and looking forward to the future.  Psychodynamic approaches, on the other hand, require 
a substantial amount of looking back over the past. CBT may be delivered on a one-to-one 
basis, like psychodynamic therapy, though group work is also common. Treatment tends 
to last between six weeks and six months, significantly less time than is typical with 
psychodynamic therapy. 
A natural consequence of these differences between psychodynamic approaches and 
CBT is a difference in the relationship between the client and the therapist. Cognitive 
behavioural therapists tend to talk more than in other therapies, ‘perhaps as much as 50% 
of the time in the early stages’ (Westbrook et al., 2011: 24). This active participation from 
the therapist is symptomatic of the therapist’s role, which is analogous to a sports coach. 
Coaching can be defined as ‘the art of facilitating the performance, learning and 
development of another’ (Downey, 1999: 15). The CBT coach teaches skills and makes 
sure their athlete, i.e. the client, works out; but, in contrast to a sports coach, the ultimate 
goal in CBT is for the client to become his or her own coach. One can see here just how 
focused and goal driven the treatment is, unlike psychodynamic therapy which is focused 
more broadly on achieving insight (self-understanding). CBT does not openly engage in 
transference interpretation (examining the client-therapist relationship as a means of 
treatment).  
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3.3.3 HUMANISTIC THERAPIES 
 
Within the humanistic movement, there are a variety of different approaches, which 
include: Gestalt therapy, person-centred therapy, psychosynthesis, Transactional Analysis 
and existential therapy. These modalities share an emphasis on self-development and 
growth, and like CBT, they maintain a focus on the here and now. Clients are given a 
weighty role and are regarded as the governors of change. They are encouraged to take 
responsibility for their own thoughts and behaviour and to help them do so, humanistic 
therapists foster clients’ acknowledgement of their own strengths, facilitating the 
recognition that we all have free will. Humanistic therapies maintain a positive view of 
human nature and support an egalitarian position in which the therapeutic relationship is 
a joint collaboration between two equal parties.  
Gestalt therapy was conceived by Fritz Perls in the 1940s and is guided by its 
experiential underpinnings (Perls, 1947; Perls, Hefferline & Goodman, 1951). The goal of 
Gestalt therapy is to foster self-awareness through phenomenological exploration, as 
opposed to interpretation. Therefore, one focuses on what is happening in the present 
moment, in terms of thoughts, feelings, sensations and actions, as opposed to dwelling on 
what has been, what was, what might be, could be or should be (notice the contrast with 
psychoanalytical therapies). This phenomenological feature of Gestalt therapy is often 
referred to as a distinction between process and content, or between the how and the 
what; Gestalt works with the how over the what, the process over the content.  
The principle behind cultivating awareness through phenomenological exploration 
is to reduce the effects of bias. This idea is neatly explained by Buddhist philosophy and 
mindfulness meditation practice, which, like Gestalt therapy, advocates full engagement 
with each present moment (i.e. being present in both body and mind, cultivating what is 
known as ‘wise attention’) and surrendering to what takes place (i.e. not seeking to 
control the present, and metaphorically speaking, to bend it to your will). Buddhism, and 
so too Gestalt therapy, promotes a shift from trying to control the process through 
continuous interpretation, to surrendering to the process and merely noticing what 
happens when we do so. This ‘noticing’ is largely constituted by an awareness of bodily 
sensations and perceptions (Burgs, 2012). 
Gestalt theory, which guides the practice of Gestalt therapy, is based on a number 
of additional constructs and methods (see Brownell, 2010). As in almost all forms of 
therapy, the dialogue and relationship between the client and the therapist is a critical 
aspect of treatment. The therapeutic relationship in this modality is characterised as 
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open, empathic and supportive. The therapist is committed to trusting in the process and 
to practicing inclusion with authentic presence thereby accepting the client as they are 
(Yontef, 2005).  
In order to engage with the client in a meaningful way, a Gestalt therapist may 
suggest more creative methods and forms of expression to be collaboratively embarked 
upon. A common method of treatment is the exploration of dreams. In contrast to 
psychoanalysts who view dreams as disguised fulfilments of repressed wishes and compel 
their clients to recall dreams and submit them to interpretation, the Gestalt therapist 
employs an altogether different methodology. As part of their imaginative approach, 
Gestalt therapists are more likely to ask their clients to re-create their dream by role-
playing as people or objects from the dream. Whilst doing so, the therapist may actively 
stimulate the client’s state of presence by asking ‘what are you aware of now?’   
Two additional examples of creative ‘experiments’ used in Gestalt therapy are the 
two-chair and empty-chair dialogue techniques. The two-chair dialogue method is 
applicable when a client expresses an intra-personal split, for example by stating ‘I despise 
myself for being so insecure’; these splits are defined as ‘in-therapy statements of conflict’ 
(Greenberg, 1980: 143). The client is invited to imagine the two different parts of him or 
herself, in this case the ‘self-despising part’ and the ‘insecure part’, in different chairs and 
to communicate to and from these different parts. Empty-chair dialogue is when clients 
engage in an imaginary conversation with a significant figure in their life, in order to 
settle unresolved issues. These ‘potent form(s) of intervention’ (Orlinksy et al., 2004: 323) 
are designed to deepen the client’s level of experiencing and emotion processing, 
facilitating the client to vividly experience his or her inner feelings.  
Due to space constraints and the desire to move onto a more focused exploration of 
communication in psychotherapy, I shall not elaborate in great detail on the intricacies of 
other humanistic therapies. As is suggested by its name, existential therapy is based on 
the work of existential philosophers such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (May, 1969; 
Tillich, 1952; Yalom, 1980) and person-centred therapy on notions of the individual’s self-
worth and unique values (Rogers, 1951, 1959). Psychosynthesis is grounded in 
psychiatrist Roberto Assagioli’s theory, which incorporates a more spiritual view of 
humanity (Assagioli, 2000), and Transactional Analysis is based on Eric Berne’s theory 
that we have three ego states: parent, adult and child that affect the manner in which we 
communicate (Berne, 1964). As previously stated, these therapies share an emphasis on 
the present moment and the client’s ability to draw on his or her inner resources to effect 
self-development. 
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3.3.4 A COMPARISON OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC APPROACHES 
 
It is interesting to consider the lines along which the three aforementioned schools of 
psychotherapeutic practice diverge. The most significant contrast to me concerns their 
views on how to achieve positive therapeutic change in clients. According to CBT, 
therapeutic change is brought about by becoming aware of negative thought patterns and 
is a natural consequence of education and learning. For humanistic approaches, change 
occurs through empathy and the therapist’s non-judgmental, non-critical attitude, which 
is believed to enable the client to reach their inherent potential, accessing new 
perspectives. Psychoanalytical and psychodynamic therapies, in contrast, maintain that 
change is the result of uncovering repressed feelings, which when brought to 
consciousness enable insight and understanding.  
There exists a common thread among these approaches in that therapeutic change 
involves adoption of a new perspective on the part of the client. However, while a parallel 
outcome of change prevails across different practices, the methods by which one reaches 
that outcome are markedly dissimilar. CBT and, to a lesser extent, psychodynamic 
therapies, operate a ‘directed’ approach. In CBT, growth is taught by the therapist 
(through practical exercises), while in psychodynamic therapy it is offered (by way of 
interpretation from the therapist). In humanistic approaches, on the other hand, growth 
is self-directed and even therapist interpretation is resisted. Instead, clients engaged in 
humanistic therapies are encouraged to unearth the solutions that exist within them. 
These distinct methods for effecting change are indicative of a fundamental difference 
between humanistic therapies and other practices. While the outcome of therapeutic 
change may be insight and understanding, this is not the goal of humanistic practices. 
The real objective of humanistic therapy is self-actualisation, that is, for the client to 
reach their maximum potential.  
I anticipate that different therapeutic approaches will influence the therapist’s view 
on, and use of, metaphorical language (see section 4.2 in the subsequent chapter for 
elaboration and suggestions). To date, research on metaphorical language in 
psychotherapy has largely focused on its ability to contribute to positive therapeutic 
outcomes, and as such has neglected this interesting area of comparative study. 
Exploration of how theoretical orientation influences the use of metaphorical language 
thus represents new research territory. Given the primary research objective in this thesis, 
my analysis of how different psychotherapeutic practices use metaphorical language will 
be with a view to informing existing pragmatic theories of metaphor. For example, I will 
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suggest that therapists’ use of metaphor in psychodynamic and humanistic therapies 
reflects an invitation to engage in deep processing of the type suggested by Carston’s 
imaginary world construction route, with its emphasis on the literal meaning of a 
metaphor, while comprehension of metaphors deployed by cognitive behavioural 
therapists is better suited to the ad hoc concept construction route.  
 
3.3.5 A FINAL NOTE ON THERAPEUTIC PRACTICES 
 
Before evaluating the literature concerning factors that bring about therapeutic ‘success’ 
and productive change in clients, it is important to note that the broad categories of 
therapeutic orientation hitherto discussed do not exhaust the field.  Many other methods 
of treatment exist, among which, the increasingly popular integrative approach is 
particularly noteworthy.  
Essentially, an integrative framework entails a commitment to integrating different 
approaches together, thereby creating a new approach. This way of working is not to be 
confused with eclecticism, which uses different approaches in their original form. To 
clarify, an eclectic therapist may use CBT techniques and then, when he or she deems it 
appropriate, may switch to an alternative method of treatment. Fear and Woolfe describe 
‘hodgepodge’ eclecticism as ‘a bit of this, a bit of that and give it a stir’ (2000: 332).46 The 
integrative therapist, on the other hand, creates his or her own model of therapy that is 
based on a philosophy that, at its core, does not consider any one approach to be superior 
to another. In this respect, integrative practice contrasts with purist perspectives, which 
embrace one theoretical framework to the exclusion of all others.  
In 1996 a mere 21% of therapists listed on the British Association for Counselling 
website identified themselves as integrationist. By 2008 this figure had sharply risen and 
was estimated to be between 30% and 50%, based on randomly chosen regions across the 
UK (Lapworth & Sills, 2010). The ideals of the integrative approach are nicely captured by 
Fear and Woolfe’s analogy to visions of reality. They describe the integrative therapist as 
one who perceives the world from an ironic perspective (as opposed to a romantic, tragic 
or comic perspective). The ironic framework is characterised by: 
 
A readiness to seek out internal contradictions, ambiguities and paradoxes […] 
aiming at detachment, keeping things in perspective, taking nothing for granted, 																																																								
46 The authors grant that this (rather negative) view of eclecticism does not pertain to more mature 
forms of eclectic practice. 
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and readily spotting the antithesis to any thesis so as to reduce the claim of that 
thesis upon us. 
(Shafer, 1976: 50-1, as cited in Fear & Woolfe, 2000: 336)  
 
Given the individualistic, wide-open nature of the integrative approach, it is difficult to 
assess how the integrative orientation bears on the use of metaphorical language in 
therapy. Nevertheless, the role of metaphor in integrative approaches remains a 
worthwhile topic of future research.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore how the process of integrative 
therapy is itself conceptualised and whether its distinct practices are reflected in different 
metaphorical conceptualisations to those exhibited by other modalities. Tay suggests that 
the process of therapy is metaphorically structured as a journey and that the therapist is 
conceptualised as the guide who selects the appropriate destination (see Tay, 2010, for 
further discussion). While the process of therapy will likely be conceptualised as a journey 
irrespective of the therapist’s orientation, it is possible that there are subtle differences in 
the way the journey metaphor is developed across modalities. For example, cognitive 
behavioural therapy may be thought of as a guided journey, one that is led by a well-
seasoned traveller, in contrast to psychodynamic therapy which may be conceptualised as 
more of a solo pilgrimage, and humanistic therapy, a collective expedition that one 
embarks on with a trusty companion. 
 
3.4 KEY MARKERS OF ‘SUCCESS’ IN THERAPY 
 
Before investigating the special nature of psychotherapeutic discourse and the ways in 
which metaphorical language may advance the process of therapy (chapter 4, section 4.3), 
I first reflect on more general factors that govern therapeutic success. Given their 
opposing perspectives on the goals of psychotherapy and the process by which change 
occurs, what determines a positive therapeutic outcome will inevitably be disputed by 
psychotherapists of different orientations. As discussed in section 3.3.3, the goal of 
humanistic approaches is self-actualisation and change is said to occur through the 
empathic attitude of the therapist (when felt by the client), whereas the object of 
psychodynamic practice is insight and consequent change, a result of making the 
unconscious conscious. Humanistic practices, therefore, will naturally prize the 
cultivation of a supportive relationship between therapist and client, while 
	 105 
psychodynamic approaches are more likely to value the outcome of specific techniques, 
such as transference interpretations. 
While a plethora of studies have found evidence of theoretical orientation and 
client and therapist factors affecting the therapeutic outcome, contemporary research 
emphasises the relationship between the client and therapist as the key determiner of 
success. Long before this recent ‘relational turn’, Carl Rogers (the founder of person-
centered therapy) set out six core conditions, which he maintained were both necessary 
and sufficient for constructive personality change.47 These conditions specify that two 
individuals be in contact with each other, and that while one individual (the client) is in a 
state of ‘incongruence’, the other (the therapist) is ‘congruent or integrated in the 
relationship’ (Rogers, 1957: 96). The fourth and fifth conditions stipulate that the 
therapist provide unconditional positive regard for the client and an empathic 
understanding of the client’s frame of reference. In addition, it is necessary for the 
therapist to attempt, and at least minimally achieve, communication of their attitude of 
unconditional positive regard to the client. Based on observations from his own clinical 
experience, Rogers hypothesised that therapeutic personality change was dependent on 
these fundamental conditions, and, moreover, that these conditions alone would suffice 
in bringing about change. Although the sufficiency of these criteria is contested, it is 
largely agreed that the therapeutic relationship, upon which Rogers’ conditions rest, is of 
vital importance for therapeutic change.48 
The relationship between the therapist and client is referred to as the ‘working 
alliance’ or therapeutic alliance. This construct has been described as ‘the relatively non-
neurotic, rational and realistic attitude of the patient towards the analyst’ (Greenson, 
1967: 29), or, more broadly, as ‘the collaborative relationship between client and therapist’ 
(Horvath & Bedi, 2002: 41). When tested empirically, this relationship is typically 
measured on the basis of three components: agreement on the goals of therapy, 
consensus related to the tasks of therapy, and positive bond between therapist and client 																																																								
47  Rogers defined psychotherapeutic change as ‘change in the personality structure of the 
individual, at both surface and deeper levels, in a direction which clinicians would agree means 
greater integration, less internal conflict, more energy utilizable for effective living; change in 
behavior away from behaviors generally regarded as immature and toward behaviors regarded as 
mature’ (1957: 95).  
48 Cooper (2011) points out that Rogers’ conditions may not be strictly necessary in view of the 
attested efficacy of self-help manuals and web-based therapies which do not exhibit any relational 
component (ibid: 100). Nonetheless, research has shown that interpersonal contact boosts the 
efficacy of these more remote therapies (van Boeijen et al., 2005, cited in Cooper, 2011), therefore 
the significance of relational factors remains. I would argue that in some sense, the reader of self-
help therapies is relying on relational factors, having created a fictional, non-existent character (i.e. 
the author) with whom they suppose a relationship. 
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(Bordin, 1979, as cited in Cooper, 2011). Studies have demonstrated that clients 
themselves identify the therapeutic alliance to be an important aspect of their therapeutic 
outcome and that a positive alliance decreases the likelihood that clients will drop out of 
therapy (Piper et al., 1999). A word of caution, however: evidence suggests that the 
alliance must be established in the early stages of therapy, at least by the sixth session 
(Horvath & Bedi, 2002). Based on this finding, Horvath and Bedi advise development of 
the alliance as ‘the highest priority in the early stages of therapy’ (ibid: 60). One may, 
therefore, conclude that the therapeutic relationship facilitates a successful therapeutic 
outcome, though the window for constructing this relationship is limited.49 
A significant aspect of the therapeutic alliance is the level of empathy perceived by 
the client; indeed, clients consistently rate this characteristic as one of the most helpful 
factors in therapy. Empathy is defined as the therapist’s ability to ‘enter the private 
perceptual world of the client’ (Cooper, 2011: 106) and to be ‘sensitive, moment by 
moment, to the changing felt meanings which flow in this other person’ (Rogers, 1980, as 
cited in Cooper, 2011: 106). Paulson and Worth (2002) found that feeling understood by 
one’s counsellor was regarded as one of the four most important aspects of therapy by 
clients with a history of suicidal thoughts; this ‘empathic’ attribute was selected from a 
total of 65 items. Similarly, research has demonstrated that a perceived lack of 
understanding from the therapist is strongly correlated with negative therapy outcomes 
(see Mohr, 1995).  
Gelso and Carter (1985) remind us that the therapeutic relationship is not as simple 
as it might initially appear. While the working alliance refers to the explicit, verbal and 
conscious form of the therapeutic relationship, additional implicit forms exist, such as the 
transference and countertransference component. These implicit forms of relationship 
exert a significant influence on the therapeutic relationship as a whole and, therefore, are 
an important consideration when specifying what constitutes effective treatment. 
Through his work on attachment, Holmes (2010) observes that a major task of therapy is 
to assist clients with moving from insecure patterns of attachment to more secure styles 
of attachment. In this respect, psychotherapy is often viewed as a form of ‘re-parenting’.50 																																																								
49 Though contemporary research emphasises the importance of the relationship between client 
and therapist, there is no doubt that certain modalities are more suitable for certain disorders than 
others. Working with personality disorders, for example, may be best treated by psychodynamic 
therapy (Leichsenring & Leibing, 2003), while anxiety disorders are well suited to the work of CBT 
(Gloaguen et al., 1998).  
50 A quote from Bergmann and Hartman seems particularly relevant to explain the basis for 
regarding psychotherapy as an act of re-parenting; they write ‘following Freud’s emphasis on 
archaeology as the model for psychoanalysis, psychoanalysts tended to see their work essentially as 
reconstruction of what has once existed and was buried by repression’ (1976: 466). It is important 
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Holmes stresses the need for therapists to be securely attached themselves, in order to 
avoid reinforcing clients insecurities, as opposed to redressing them. This example 
highlights how implicit forms of communication between the client and the therapist, 
often in terms of countertransference, can affect the working alliance, and therefore the 
therapeutic outcome, as much as explicit forms of communication (such as openly 
empathic remarks).51 
Corroboration of the impact of the therapeutic relationship on the efficacy of 
therapy is often taken as a criticism against non-relationally oriented modalities, such as 
CBT. Given that cultivation of this relationship, and a supportive empathic approach, is 
integral to humanistic therapies, the evidence in favour of the relational turn is habitually 
taken as evidence for this theoretical framework. However, research has demonstrated 
that the therapeutic relationship is equally important and determinant of success in 
technique-orientated approaches like CBT. In a retrospective survey on patients’ 
experience of behavioural therapy for example, Ryan and Gizynski (1971) found that ‘the 
most universally helpful elements of their experience were the therapist’s calm, 
sympathetic listening, support and approval, advice, and “faith”’ (ibid: 8, cited in Cooper, 
2011: 100). These relational factors were consistently chosen over behaviour modification 
techniques.  
Part of my motivation for this overview of the psychotherapeutic enterprise has 
been to give a flavour of the complexities of this domain. Through exploration of subtle 
differences between practices and the unique dynamic between a therapist and their 
client, I hope to have shed some light on the multifaceted nature of this context. In the 
next and final section of the chapter, I turn my attention towards the nature of the 
communication in psychotherapy and, above all, to the ways in which it is both distinct 
from and akin to everyday discourse.  
 
3.5 DEFINING ‘COMMUNICATION’ IN PSYCHOTHERAPY  
 
The study of communication in psychotherapy is pertinent, not only because of the 
objectives of this thesis, but also in view of the observations made in the preceding 
section. We have noted that the relationship between the client and the therapist is a key 																																																																																																																																																													
to note, however, that not all therapists see their work in such light: talking about transference 
interpretation, the authors conceive therapy ‘not only, or even primarily, as that of reconstruction, 
but rather as the establishment of a new connection, and therefore as a new creation’ (idem). 
51 I acknowledge a debt of gratitude to personal communication with training psychotherapist 
Robert Scaife, whose writings on attachment and affective neuroscience, and the interplay between 
the explicit and implicit forms of the therapeutic relationship inform this writing.  
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contributor to the outcome of the therapeutic process; communication is the essential 
means of fostering that relationship. Use of the word ‘communication’ by 
psychotherapists is predictably broader than the more restricted sense of the word 
employed by pragmaticists like Carston, Sperber and Wilson. In this section, I clarify my 
area of interest by unpacking the notion of communication as it is applied in each field of 
study. It is my hope that this will facilitate future dialogue between therapists and 
pragmaticists and that it will also go some way toward refining my use of the term 
metaphor (which, again, is distinct from psychotherapists’ usage and which, I will clarify 
in the next chapter).   
Communication in the broad sense refers to the transfer of information between 
two parties. For psychotherapists, this transfer or exchange may occur explicitly, through 
articulated speech and intentional bodily/facial gestures, and implicitly, through 
unintentional gestures, eye contact, tone of voice and transference/countertransference.52 
The existence of transference and counter-transference is considered a form of implicit 
communication, which of course may become explicit if openly expressed and 
interpreted. As used in psychotherapy, what is known as ‘implicit communication’ is 
unintentional in the sense that clients are assumed to not be conscious of their 
productions, be it raising their voice, shifting around uncomfortably in their seat, 
avoiding the therapist’s eye gaze etc. Language too may fall under this characterisation of 
‘implicit’ communication. For example, a client who persistently refers to her parents 
using their first names (as opposed to ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’) may implicitly communicate a 
lack of affection for her parents. Similarly, a client who repeatedly refers to her behaviour 
as ‘idiotic’ (as opposed to simply ‘naïve’) unwittingly communicates a negative view of 
herself. Implicit communication by this characterisation is not communicatively intended 
in the relevance-theoretic sense; that is, there is no higher-order intention to make it 
mutually manifest to the hearer and speaker that the speaker intends the addressee to 
entertain a particular proposition/thought or set of propositions/thoughts (Carston, 
2002).53  
																																																								
52 This classification does not take into account non-verbal behaviour which is deliberate and 
accompanied by a communicative intention, for example pointing or miming. If psychotherapists 
were to consider such communicative acts, I believe that they would categorise them firmly within 
the domain of explicit communication. 
53 This demarcation of explicit and implicit communication does not coincide with the relevance-
theoretic notion of explicit and implicit content. For relevance theorists, both explicitly and 
implicitly communicated assumptions are speaker-meant or intentional (they both fall under a 
higher level communicative intention), differing only in how they are accessed by the addressee 
(see chapter 1, section 1.3.1 for further detail). 
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The importance of implicit forms of communication in psychotherapy is partly 
attributable to the role they play in indicating the therapist’s empathy. Child development 
and affective neuroscience research has found that ‘the mere perception of emotion in the 
partner creates a resonant emotional state in the perceiver’ (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002: 
43). Quite remarkably, Jung made this observation back in 1935 when he wrote that 
‘emotions are contagious, because they are deeply rooted in the sympathetic system’ 
(1935: 138). Many psychotherapists attest to this observation, noting how a client’s 
emotional state often has an effect on their own breathing and tone of voice. This 
continual process of mutual adjustment between a client and therapist, known as goal-
corrected empathic attunement (GCEA), is recognised as a powerful form of implicit 
communication (McCluskey, 2005). GCEA is a powerful kind of empathy, which may also 
be a component of what Daniel Stern refers to as ‘moments of meeting’, ‘authentic 
moments of person-to-person connection’ (Stern et al., 1998: 904). Stern believed that 
moments of meeting create altered domains of ‘implicit relational knowing’ and may 
operate as vehicles for change.54 He elaborates: 
 
When we speak of an ‘authentic’ meeting, we mean communications that reveal a 
personal aspect of the self that has been evoked in an affective response to another. 
In turn, it reveals to the other a personal signature […]. It is these stable, implicit 
knowings between analyst and analysand, their mutual sensings and apprehendings 
of one another, that we are calling their ‘shared implicit relationship’.  
(ibid: 917)55 
 
Stern suggests that it is in these implicit moments of meeting that the majority of 
therapeutic change takes place. In other words, implicit communication may determine 
the outcome of therapy as much as (or even more than) interpretation of explicitly 
communicated information, that is, verbally expressed thoughts. As Angus and Rennie 
wrote ‘investigators who use client-therapist discourse as data are handicapped to the 
extent that verbal communication underrepresents subjective meaning’ (Angus & Rennie, 																																																								
54 Stern suggests that therapeutic change occurs in two domains: the declarative, verbal and 
conscious domain and the implicit, procedural and relational domain. The latter domain is 
represented in the form of implicit relational knowing and concerns knowledge of interpersonal 
and intersubjective relations (see Stern et al., 1998 for further discussion).  
55  While Stern and colleagues distinguish ‘moments of meeting’ from heightened affective 
moments, there is much similarity between the two and between moments of meeting and I-thou 
moments, conceptualised by existentialist philosopher Martin Buber (see Buber, 1970). Both 
require a deep attunement to explicit and implicit aspects of the therapeutic encounter, and both 
give rise to profound experiences of connectedness. 
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1988: 559). Given the great value of unintended implicit communication to the process of 
therapy, it is natural that psychotherapists rarely restrict their characterisation of 
communication to articulated speech or intentional forms only. 
The recognition of both implicit and explicit forms of communication informs 
many psychotherapists’ ways of interacting, as was implied at the end of section 3.3.1 in 
my description of countertransference as an obstacle. This brings us to our first line of 
comparison between psychotherapeutic discourse and everyday conversational 
exchanges. Due, in part, to consideration of the implicit levels of communication, 
therapists will often not outwardly engage with (not respond to) the recovered content of 
the client’s communicative intention. For psychoanalytical therapists, for example, who 
are more interested in uncovering unconscious feelings, words may often be seen as 
superficial disguises for these feelings, or indeed a reflection of transference. In instances 
of this sort, therapists may choose to engage in transference interpretation, thereby 
ignoring both the explicature and implicatures (the communicatively intended content) 
of the client’s utterance. For example, Cirillo and Crider (1995) reported a female client in 
her first session recounting instances of childhood sexual abuse, which took place at the 
hands of powerful men. The response of the male therapist was to comment on how the 
client was saying that it was frightening for her to enter into psychotherapy with an 
unfamiliar man such as him. This is a clear example of a psychotherapist focusing not on 
the explicitly communicated information, but instead on implicit information that has 
not necessarily been consciously produced. Here we see how the interest in ‘implicit 
meanings’ (what lies behind the client’s consciously intended meaning, i.e. what may be 
motivating the utterance at a deeper level), which are not knowingly communicated by 
the client, influences the psychotherapist’s interpretation ‘strategies’. Use of these 
‘strategies’, which are no doubt a consequence of training, represents a significant 
departure from the way in which addressees standardly engage in ordinary conversation. 
While therapists will inevitably (and automatically) also engage in standard pragmatic 
processing (assigning reference, enriching lexical concepts, recovering implicatures, etc. 
all of which are communicatively intended by the client), their more conscious attentional 
resources are likely to be concentrated elsewhere, that is, on implicitly communicated 
information (as defined above). One might say that this is where therapists seek relevance 
– in implicitly communicated information, as opposed to in content that the speaker 
intends to communicate. To clarify, according to pragmatic theories like Relevance 
Theory, the goal in processing utterances (and other ostensive stimuli) is to recover the 
communicatively intended content. However, for psychotherapists this comprehension 
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procedure is not the only, or perhaps even the primary, mode for interpreting their 
clients.   
I believe that psychotherapy’s broad definition of communication may be, in part, 
responsible for the apparent unwillingness of pragmaticists to conduct research in this 
field, since the disparity of definition may render discussions both confusing and 
frustrating. Yet, understanding how important implicit forms of communication are to 
the therapeutic process enables us to appreciate why the definition of communication in 
therapy is so broad. It is my hope that such an appreciation will foster understanding 
between parties and pave the way for further research between these two fields. In this 
thesis I am primarily concerned with ostensive inferential communication, as it is 
specified in pragmatics. So, in what follows in chapter 4, I do not consider unintended 
meanings, inferred by therapists, which, while potentially communicated by clients in the 
broad sense, either consciously or unconsciously, are not part of the speaker’s intended 
meaning.  
A further point of interest related to the distinctive quality of psychotherapeutic 
discourse concerns the roles of speaker and hearer in this context. Pragmatic theories like 
Relevance Theory adopt a clearly defined view of the roles of speaker and hearer: the 
speaker produces an utterance with the goal of affecting the mental state of a hearer in a 
particular way and the hearer, who is a distinct individual, interprets that utterance with 
the goal of recovering the speaker’s intended meaning. While this is, undoubtedly, the 
way in which the majority of communication operates, it is less appropriate to view the 
communicative parties in psychotherapy along these lines. The speaker-hearer dynamic 
in the context of a therapeutic exchange is much more fluid. For example, in addition to 
generating utterances (thereby acting as speakers), clients are likely to perform the role of 
hearer/interpreter at the same time – submitting their own utterances to their own 
interpretative processes (recall, e.g., the two-chair technique mentioned above). This may 
be a consequence of psychotherapeutic techniques like free association, which encourages 
clients to say whatever comes into their mind without thinking beforehand. 
Interpretation of one’s own utterances can thus be seen as a reflection of having bypassed 
the stage prior to speaking, where one more fully conceptualises one’s thoughts. The 
convergence of speaker-hearer roles in psychotherapy is, furthermore, a reflection of the 
prescribed work of therapy; interpreting one’s own speech is part of considering the 
deeper meanings that lie at the root of our utterances and which have the potential to 
elicit insight into our unconscious feelings and motives. From now on, I move from 
talking about ‘speakers’ and ‘hearers’ to ‘speakers’ and ‘interpreters’. This move is 
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intended to reflect the fact that in psychotherapy the interpreter is not necessarily 
interpreting an utterance spoken by a different individual; we may hear our own 
utterances and interpret our own utterances.  
Given my interest in theories of utterance processing, I am primarily concerned 
with the role of the interpreter. Nevertheless, my focus on psychotherapy calls for a brief 
discussion of the speaker’s role as well. As noted above, psychotherapeutic techniques 
often encourage clients to articulate thoughts before they have been fully formulated. In 
part, this is to enable processing and interpretation to take place outside the censuring 
and distorting dimensions of the speaker’s mind. The client is encouraged to relinquish 
the usual aspects of executive control and design, which almost always accompany our 
utterances. By allowing thoughts to naturally erupt, a person externalises their thoughts 
as directly as possible, and in so doing, exposes him or herself for analysis. In my own 
experience of psychodynamic therapy I found myself engaging in this practice frequently 
and with ease. On several occasions a thought or an image would come into my mind, 
and, driven partly by a sudden awareness of the therapist in the room and the silence 
between us, I filled that silence by articulating what had just come into my mind, stating 
“I just had an image of…” or “I was thinking of…”. Often disclaimers, such as “I don’t 
know why this came to mind”, would accompany these utterances. These disclaimers 
served to illustrate a lack of communicative intention on my part. Of course, I was 
producing the words intentionally, but not in the standard RT sense. Blakemore defines 
style as a difference ‘in the amount of help the hearer is given in recovering whatever is 
communicated’ (1992: 8). Thinking about this quote, I began to wonder if 
psychotherapeutic exchanges exhibit a different style in the relationship between speaker 
and hearer. It is not so much that speakers give less help to their hearers in 
psychotherapy, but rather that the issue of helping the hearer (the therapist) does not 
always feature since clients may not always form communicative intentions when 
speaking, that is, the primary concern is self-expression rather than informing someone 
else. 
The issue of implicit and explicit forms of communication and the roles of the 
speaker/hearer aside, in what ways is psychotherapeutic discourse distinct from everyday 
discourse (on which pragmatic theories of communication are typically built)? Recall that 
the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic states that hearers follow a path of least 
effort in deriving cognitive effects, accessing and testing interpretations until their 
expectation of relevance is satisfied, or abandoned (see chapter 1, section 1.3.1 for further 
detail). It is uncontroversial to suggest that interpreters in psychotherapy, be they client 
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or therapist, set their expectations of relevance significantly higher than do interlocutors 
engaged in ordinary conversations. As suggested above, interpretation will often continue 
outside the confines of the original communicative situation (that is, outside of the 
therapy session). This is the case for both clients and therapists. For the therapist, 
utterances may be subjected to further reflection during their own supervision sessions, 
and for the client, they will likely be reflected upon between sessions as part of the on-
going process of ‘being in therapy’. Such reflective practices, which entail greater amounts 
of processing effort, are presumably engaged in on the assumption that the additional 
effort will eventually cash out in terms of insight and therapeutic change (i.e. particular 
kinds of cognitive effects).56 
Of course, such reflective activity is not an exclusive property of the 
psychotherapeutic context. Indeed, the way in which psychotherapy may inspire one to 
go beyond commonplace interpretations bears an interesting resemblance to the way in 
which literary works often motivate readers to go beyond their initial readings of a text. In 
her research on interpretive strategies and literature, relevance theorist Anne Furlong has 
suggested a distinction between spontaneous and non-spontaneous interpretations. 
Spontaneous interpretations are fundamentally ‘local’ operations, taking place within the 
confines of a single communicative situation. Non-spontaneous interpretations, on the 
other hand, represent a more global operation in which the interpreter continues the 
process of interpretation beyond the confines of the communicative situation. The more 
evidence the interpretation takes into account, the less spontaneous it is (Furlong, 1996). 
In her efforts to explain, in relevance-theoretic terms, why one might engage in non-
spontaneous interpretation, Furlong suggests that this might be due to the audience’s 
goals (to find meaning beyond the initial interpretation), or to expectations raised or 
imposed by the text; what psychologists would refer to as either a top-down or bottom-up 
triggers, respectively. These possibilities are similarly plausible when applied to 
psychotherapy. In the sense that psychotherapy is work, it will often make greater 
cognitive demands than everyday conversations, which are engaged in for pleasure. 
Likewise, if one is feeling optimistic about the process of psychotherapy, the expectation 
of cognitive effects is likely to be raised. 
																																																								
56 Some therapists, as we shall see in section 4.4 of the next chapter, strive to manage their in-the-
moment interpretations, viewing them as intrusions to the psychotherapeutic process. This 
position may pertain if an aspect of interpretation is tied up with countertransference and if 
countertransference is seen as an obstacle. For these therapists, reflective processing may be a 
result of earlier restrained processing, a delayed processing as opposed to enhanced processing.  
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Just as Furlong asks what characterises a literary interpretation, one may ask, what 
constitutes a non-spontaneous psychotherapeutic interpretation? Furlong’s response to 
her question is to suggest that a literary interpretation is one which ‘produces effects that 
are typically, but not necessarily, wide-ranging in variety and/or scope, intense: highly 
charged aesthetically, and productive’ (Clark & Furlong, 2014). The same characterisation 
seems appropriate for many constructive psychotherapeutic interpretations. Non-
spontaneous psychotherapeutic interpretations (whether by the client or the therapist) 
may lead to changes in perspective, a sense of full-bodied effects and wide-ranging 
insight. For example, an individual may feel as if a weight has been lifted from their 
shoulders and may experience a sense of opening their eyes fully for the first time when 
reaching an understanding of their anger. Such understanding may take place in a single 
session, but when it occurs over the course of long-term therapy, it is more likely that 
clients will have built a fuller picture of themselves, seeing the interrelatedness of a 
multitude of aspects of their lives (e.g. recognising that what they thought of as unrelated 
instances of anger and rejection, were in fact intrinsically connected instances of 
behaviour and self).  
In suggesting that psychotherapy gives rise to interpretations that mirror our 
engagement with literary works, I do not assume that there is anything intrinsic to the 
psychotherapeutic domain that demands non-spontaneous interpretations. Parallel to 
literary texts, it is likely that some forms of psychotherapy will engage and provoke 
reflective processing more than others. CBT, for example, may not impose reflective 
demands on the client to the same extent as psychodynamic therapy, though that is not to 
say that continued processing of material from CBT sessions would not be worthwhile. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the domain of psychotherapy and described some of the 
ways in which it is communicatively unique (whilst also being sufficiently similar to 
everyday discourse to warrant discussion in this thesis). I hope to have demonstrated that 
the idiosyncratic nature of psychotherapeutic discourse may reward and so encourage 
engagement with processing strategies that are different from those typically engaged in 
during more commonplace exchanges, in much the same way that many literary works 
appeal to different interpretive processes. 
In the chapter that follows, I consider the role of metaphor in the context of 
psychotherapy: firstly, how psychotherapists view this use of language; secondly, how 
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metaphor may contribute to the goals of psychotherapy; for example, by facilitating the 
therapeutic alliance on which successful therapy depends, and also by transcending limits 
of current understanding, in a bid to create meaning and insight in place of confusion and 
ignorance. Needless to say, my primary purpose here is to advance pragmatic theories of 
metaphor comprehension.  
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Chapter 4 · Psychotherapy and the use of metaphor 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Having established my interest in ‘explicit’ forms of communication (i.e. those that come 
with a mutually recognised communicative intention, usually verbal utterances), and 
identified some of the idiosyncrasies of psychotherapeutic discourse, I now turn to the 
use of metaphor in psychotherapy. Many writers in the field of psychotherapy, and indeed 
many psychotherapists themselves, have identified metaphor as a particularly useful tool 
in their work. However, what is referred to as ‘metaphor’ does not always neatly mesh 
with pragmaticists’ use of the term. In the first section of this chapter, I consider the 
scope of the term as psychotherapists have applied it and define my specific region of 
interest (namely, spoken verbal metaphor and closely related tropes, e.g. simile and 
allegory). Subsequently, section 4.3, explores the notable functions of metaphor in 
psychotherapy, while section 4.4 looks at a number of therapeutic approaches to 
metaphorical language which aim to make use of these functions. I conclude this chapter 
by highlighting how well suited the metaphorical world route of interpretation (as 
discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2) is as an account of these functions of metaphor. 
 
4.2 DEFINING ‘METAPHOR’ – PERSPECTIVES FROM PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
For an indication of the breadth of phenomena considered under the umbrella term of 
metaphor, consider the following sample of definitions and descriptions, taken from 
clinical literature: 
 
(i) ‘Metaphor, simply defined, is an indirect form of expression’.  
(Boone & Bowman, 1997: 313) 
(ii) ‘Metaphor involves a transfer of meaning from one element to another’. 
(Muran & DiGiuseppe, 1990: 70 and Robert & Kelly, 2010: 182) 
(iii) ‘Metaphors are mirrors reflecting our inner images of self, life, and others’. 
(Kopp, 1995: xiii) 
(iv) Metaphor is ‘an expression or action that represents one thing in terms of 
another’. 
(Cirillo & Crider, 1995: 512) 
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(v) ‘Metaphor is a pattern of images, symbols, words, emotions and actions 
which synthesizes, conserves, and represents experiences’.  
(Santostefano, 1984: 79) 
(vi) ‘Metaphor is a form of verbal expression and cognitive structuring which 
invokes a transaction between differing contexts of meaning and construct 
systems’.  
(Angus & Rennie, 1989: 373) 
(vii) ‘Metaphor is a nonliteral, verbal expression involving pictorial or verbal 
imagery’.  
(Suit & Paradise, 1985: 23) 
(viii) ‘Metaphor involves active, partial transformation of one kind of thing (the 
topic) under the guidance of another kind of thing (the vehicle)’.  
(Dent-Read & Szokloszky, 1993: 227, cited in Boone and Bowman, 1997: 314) 
(ix) Metaphor ‘straddles two different domains at once, providing a conceptual 
bridge from a problematic interpretation to a fresh new perspective that can 
cast one’s experiences in a new light’.  
(Stott et al., 2010: 1) 
 
These definitions/descriptions demonstrate the vast disparity in how clinical researchers 
construe the notion of metaphor. Primarily, divergence relates to the inclusivity of the 
term. For some, metaphor is described using vague and broad language (see (i), (ii), (iii) 
and (iv)), while for others, it is something altogether more specific (for example (vii) and 
(viii)). A palpable discrepancy relates to the extent to which metaphor is demarcated as a 
verbal phenomenon, versus a type of expression that may exist in the form of behaviour 
or action or thought.  
In order to offset any qualms one may feel, as a pragmaticist, on reading the above 
descriptions of metaphor, it is wise to yet again consider the specifics of psychotherapy, 
and to once more invoke the notion of transference. During the early stages of this 
doctoral research, I conducted a number of interviews with psychotherapists in which I 
asked them about their experience and awareness of metaphor in psychotherapy. Much 
to my delight at the time, one therapist reported that metaphor was ‘the bread and butter’ 
of what she did as a therapist. It wasn’t until much later, when I had developed a more 
sophisticated understanding of psychotherapy, that I fully understood what she had 
meant. She was, I now believe, referring to the work of transference and echoing 
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psychoanalyst Jacob Arlow’s sentiments that ‘psychoanalysis is essentially a metaphorical 
enterprise’ (Arlow, 1979: 373). 
Like many others, Arlow regards transference as Freud’s most significant 
contribution to psychoanalysis. For Arlow, transference and metaphor are one and the 
same: 
 
Transference, perhaps the most significant instrumentality of psychoanalytic 
technique, and metaphor both mean exactly the same thing. They both refer to the 
carrying over of meaning from one set of situations to another. […] Transference in 
the analytic situation is a particularly intense, lived-out metaphor of the patient’s 
neurosis.  
(ibid: 382) 
 
In the sense that psychotherapy is a form of re-parenting, the relationship between the 
psychotherapist and the client, and every exchange and act of communication that is 
contained within that relationship, is a metaphor for something else. As Fox says 
‘however clients breathe, laugh, sigh and move are metaphors’ (1989: 236). For example, 
during the course of my psychodynamic treatment, I expressed a desire to terminate 
therapy and for my therapist to consent to letting me go. Although I sought the consent 
of my therapist, I also intended to force her hand on the matter, by listing a series of 
reasons, which were designed to (a) strongly support the termination of our relationship, 
and (b) reassure her that she needn’t worry about letting me go. This feeling, of needing 
to be let go and needing approval, together with the feeling of obligation in managing the 
other person’s emotions, was in fact an expression directed at an object from my 
childhood. In essence, it was an expression directed at my father, from whom I crave 
independence. The attainment of independence would serve to mark my father’s 
acknowledgement of my reaching adulthood (which in turn constitutes approval and 
acceptance). In trying to gain this approval I habitually feel the weight of his anxiety, 
which motivates me to alleviate his worries by presenting a solid case for my 
independence. In Arlow’s sense of the term, my behaviour towards my therapist is 
metaphorical.  
Barker (1987) notes that transference is not the only type of therapeutic metaphor 
(cited in Boone & Bowman). Additional types include: (1) metaphors implying 
comparisons between two dissimilar objects, (2) analogies and similes, (3) major stories 
that offer perspective, (4) anecdotes aimed at limited goals, (5) ‘rituals or other tasks that 
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have metaphorical meaning’, (6) relationship metaphors that personify the problem 
enabling clients to relate to it, (7) metaphorical objects and (8) metaphorical creations 
such as drawings, clay models and poetry (Boone & Bowman, 1997: 317). In a similar vein, 
Bayne and Thompson distinguish ‘verbal, behavioural, physical and physiological’ 
metaphors (2000: 38). An example of a behavioural metaphor is compulsive eating, which 
can be seen as a metaphorical attempt to feed other appetites that do not concern hunger 
(for instance, a need for sex or for comfort). Likewise, body language can be a 
metaphorical manifestation of an inner process, such as attraction. Physical metaphors 
may, of course, become verbal metaphors over time. For example, consider a couple in 
relationship counselling being asked to bring concrete objects to therapy which represent 
the obstacles posed by their partners in the relationship. One party may bring a rock to 
signify their partner’s inflexibility. The moment that individual begins to speak about 
their partner as this rock, the metaphor transforms from physical to verbal.  
Focussing now on language use and returning to the nine characterisations of 
therapeutic metaphor cited at the beginning of this section, what seems noteworthy in 
the context of this thesis is the lack of distinction made between metaphor and other 
figurative forms of expression, such as simile, allegory, symbol, analogy, juxtaposition, etc. 
As McMullen (1996) points out, writers in the field of psychotherapy tend to equate 
metaphorical language with figurative language in general. In pragmatics, 
psycholinguistics and philosophy, on the other hand, many interesting differences 
between these figurative modes of expression (metaphor, simile, allegory, symbol, 
analogy, juxtaposition) are found, and duly noted. For instance, metaphor is clearly 
distinguished from simile: while metaphor involves a domain shift which is standardly 
expressed by a categorical statement of the structure X is a Y, a simile makes an explicit 
comparison using the words like or as, X is like a Y.57 For myself, while I concede that 
metaphorical language and similes may not give rise to completely identical kinds of 
cognitive effects, nor be processed by the same mechanisms, my interests span both 
figures and on my preferred accounts of metaphor comprehension (e.g. Carston’s 
imaginary world approach) the differences are largely erased. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I follow McMullen and other clinical researchers by widening my interests in 
‘metaphor’ beyond the scope of categorical statements of the X is a Y form.  																																																								
57 Metaphors may not always appear in the classical X is a Y form; take, for example, this extract 
from T.S Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufock ‘I have seen the moment of my greatness flicker, 
and I have seen the eternal Footman hold my coat, and snicker, and in short, I was afraid’ (Lakoff & 
Turner, 1989: 10). Though the X and the Y are not immediately obvious in this example, in the way 
that they are in the case of John is a lion, the metaphor can still be cashed out in terms of X is a Y; 
in other words, one can still identify the topic and vehicle. In this case, ‘death is departure’. 
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Semino’s definition of metaphor as a ‘phenomenon whereby we talk, and 
potentially, think about something in terms of something else’ (2008: 1, my emphasis) 
brings us onto the final comment on clinical characterisations of metaphor. Semino’s 
definition explicitly leaves open the possibility that metaphor is a component of thought, 
an idea that recalls Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of metaphorical cognition (1980). Clinical 
conceptualisations of metaphor also give credence to this idea, talking of metaphor as a 
‘conceptual bridge’ and a form of ‘cognitive restructuring’. It is natural that therapeutic 
accounts of metaphor have turned to Lakoff and Johnson’s arguments, given that their 
interest in strengthening the therapeutic alliance finds support in statements by Lakoff 
and Johnson, such as: ‘metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating rapport’ 
(1980: 151). Nevertheless, for reasons outlined in chapter 1, I do not take metaphor to be 
fundamentally a characteristic of thought. I return to this topic in section 4.4, where I 
explore systematic approaches to the (ostensive) communicative use of verbal metaphor 
in therapy and investigate how the adoption of different practices hinges on acceptance of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
My focus henceforth is on verbal figurative expressions that arise in 
psychotherapeutic discourse, whether in simile form or categorical metaphor form. While 
my primary interest lies in novel and extended forms of figurative language, I do not 
completely exclude conventional forms of figurative expression from discussion. This 
inclusive policy is based on the belief that very few metaphors are truly dead, only 
sleeping (and so capable of being wakened).58 As Evans wrote, ‘the kiss of consciousness 
[explicit elaboration] begins the process of bringing one’s dead metaphors back to life’ 
(Evans, 1988: 549). To get a flavour of the range of metaphors found in therapy, consider 
the examples below: 
 
1. My life is Groundhog Day.  
(Bayne & Thompson, 2000: 40) 
2. He walks all over me; I feel like a doormat.  
(idem) 
3. I’m following a path with no map.  
(ibid: 41) 
4. I feel like there’s this dark cloud hanging over me that will rain AIDS down 
upon me.  																																																								
58 For a discussion of dead or sleeping metaphors, contrasted with those that are alive or waking, 
see Müller (2008).	
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(Kopp & Craw, 1988) 
5. I’m in a rowboat with no oars, in an ocean, being overwhelmed by the 
constant waves that rock the boat, I didn’t know how to stay afloat.  
(Robert & Kelly, 2010: 185) 
6. My head is a chest of drawers, some drawers open, some shut but with things 
hanging out as though someone has been rummaging through. When on 
Prozac, the drawers are all closed, everything is tidied away and only one 
drawer opened at a time.  
(Bayne & Thompson, 2000: 41) 
 
These examples mirror the metaphorical expressions seen at the beginning of 
chapter 2, in terms of their breadth and diversity. Examples (1), (2) and (3) are notably 
short; (1) has a fairly determinate content, (2), which appears in simile form, is highly 
familiar and conventional, and (3) makes use of a common metaphorical scheme (that life 
is a journey). Example (4) is slightly more extended, markedly more novel and 
personalised to the speaker, while (5) and (6) are considerably extended, with (5) also 
displaying a certain poetic quality. 
Research on the use of figurative language in psychotherapy has been largely 
concerned with specifying the role that this language can have in facilitating therapeutic 
change. One noteworthy exception to this is the work of discourse analyst Dennis Tay, 
whose interest lies more with understanding the nature of metaphor and how 
metaphorical meaning is modulated in different contexts of use, rather than the extent to 
which it is therapeutically beneficial (see Tay, 2013).59 Tay’s work, however, is in the 
minority. As McCurry and Hayes (1992) note, psycholinguistic theories of metaphor 
comprehension have had little impact on such applied uses of metaphor. Similarly, 
research on the applied uses of metaphor in psychotherapy has not informed current 
debates in psycholinguistics or pragmatic theory. The purpose of the next three sections 
is not merely to highlight the therapeutic effects and utility of metaphor, as others have 
done before me, but more centrally, to consider the implications that those attested 
effects have for the pragmatic theories of metaphor comprehension discussed in chapters 
1 and 2.  
 
 																																																								
59 Although Tay focuses on the contextually modulated nature of metaphor, over its therapeutic 
functions and effects, a number of recommendations for psychotherapeutic practice fall naturally 
out of his work (for further detail see Tay, 2013: 171-173). 
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4.3 THE FUNCTIONS OF METAPHOR IN PSYCHOTHERAPY  
 
4.3.1 METAPHOR AS A COMBATANT OF RESISTANCE 
 
One of the most widely attested uses of metaphorical language in the context of 
psychotherapy concerns its service to material that is particularly sensitive for the client. 
‘Like the dream, the metaphor enables the patient to maintain the necessary distance 
from content […] only gradually is the meaning accepted as part of the inner reality’ 
(Caruth & Ekstein, 1966: 36). While literal language is characteristically direct, 
metaphorical language is characteristically indirect and open-ended, and, because it is 
open-ended, it is often deemed to be less hard-hitting. When broaching delicate 
(potentially painful) issues, as one often does in psychotherapy, any tool that enables one 
to tread more gently is valuable – metaphor does just this.  
As has already been discussed, psychotherapists are often faced with a tricky 
decision relating to transference interpretations; as we saw, deciding whether or not a 
client is ready to hear such interpretations is of utmost importance. In fact, the same can 
be said of every interpretation or comment that a psychotherapist makes, as the issue of 
timing is ever present; thus, how clients will take and interpret interjections is always an 
essential consideration. As psychotherapists have observed from their clinical practice, 
metaphor serves two noteworthy functions with regard to discussing sensitive material. 
Firstly, since metaphor is a less direct form of communication it can be easier for 
psychotherapists to offer their insights using figurative language. Literal language, in 
contrast, is more likely to provoke resistance given that it is more confrontational. 
Secondly, in the face of resistance that has already arisen (for example, rejection of an 
interpretation or a refusal to discuss a particular issue), metaphor can be used to soften 
resistance. As Arlow said, metaphor ‘enables the patient to maintain the necessary safe 
distance from content’ (1979: 370) and to discuss ‘topics that would otherwise be too 
painful for self-examination’ (Cirillo & Crider, 1995: 512).     
In order to fully appreciate how metaphor fosters less confrontational, more 
therapeutic exchanges, let us consider an example. For instance, imagine a client suffering 
from depression, who, despite medication and months of therapy finds himself 
unimproved; frustrated by his situation, he says “I really should be feeling better by now”. 
This thought, that he should be feeling better, has led him to push himself, by returning 
too soon to work full-time, so rather than being invigorated as he had hoped (by renewed 
social contact and having a ‘purpose’), it has exhausted him and he has since been in bed 
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for days. CBT therapists attest to the enlightening effect that a simple figurative 
expression induces in this scenario: “think of your depression as a broken leg”; which 
invites the client to engage in a metaphorical conceptualisation that her depression is a 
broken leg. Elaborating on this figurative expression, the therapist asks their client “would 
you be so harsh and demanding on yourself after a broken leg?” The therapist further 
explicates the metaphor/analogy, “a broken leg needs time to heal, you need to walk on it 
gradually to build up your strength, you can’t run before you can walk, and if you try to, 
you’re likely to cause further injury to yourself” (adapted from Stott et al., 2010: 1). Many 
psychotherapists attest to the therapeutic utility of this simple metaphorical offering, 
which they say enables their clients to see the symptoms of depression not as a sign of 
laziness or worthlessness, but rather as an understandable part of their illness, one which 
they can accept and forgive themselves for. The acceptance and forgiveness that is 
provoked by this metaphor is essential to the client’s wellbeing, and so too, to their 
recovery. It is difficult to see what parallel expression, in literal language, could have an 
equivalent effect. Those that come to mind feel more accusatory somehow, and too close 
to the harsh reality of depression, to be easily integrated into the client’s thinking. 
Consider, “you’re unwell” or “you need to rest more”. The metaphor of (or analogy to) a 
broken leg creates a certain distance between the client and their experience of their 
illness, a distance that enables the client to consider and take on the painful and 
disappointing reality that they ‘cannot run before they can walk’.  
Psychologists Caruth and Ekstein note how the distancing function of metaphor is 
particularly useful in working with borderline and schizophrenic patients, ‘who are 
constantly in danger of being inundated by a break-through of primary process material’ 
(Caruth & Ekstein, 1966: 35), that is, illogical and irrational impulses (distinguished from 
secondary process material, which ‘involves ordinary ways of reasoning that respect 
rational logic’ (Yeomans, Clarkin & Kernberg, 2002: 237)). Consider Teresa, an adolescent 
schizophrenic client, who says ‘I’m in the middle of an island, Doctor’ (ibid: 37). Working 
with her metaphorical expression, her therapist says:  
 
We say you keep your island and I try to build a bridge to the island … then you 
won’t be on an island any more, but from the island there will be a bridge; and if 
you want to walk on the bridge, you will; and if you don’t want to walk on the 
bridge, you won’t … no one wants to be on an island all by herself.  
(idem) 
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The authors recount how the therapist continued to work with this metaphor later on in 
the session, thereby respecting the client’s need to maintain a distance from the content 
of her conflict. The therapist explained how Mexico City was originally an island: 
 
At first the Aztecs were isolated and alone and do you know why they were alone, 
why they preferred to live on islands? … It was safer … in those days the tribes used 
to fight each other and on an island in the middle of the lake it was easier to defend 
it, because the enemies could not get to the island. And only later when the tribes 
around them became all their friends, then they slowly built bridges from the island 
to the mainland and after a while the islands were not needed any more.  
(ibid: 39)   
 
For Caruth and Ekstein, metaphor is a ‘preliminary approximation to the final therapeutic 
act’, which necessarily consists of explicit interpretations made in the literal domain. It is 
during this final therapeutic act that the safe distance created by the metaphor is 
broached and the gap between the figurative description and the literal reality is closed. 
The necessity of closing this gap is a sentiment echoed in many models of metaphor use 
in psychotherapy, which will be discussed in section 4.4.  
As is implied in Caruth and Ekstein’s writing, the distancing function of metaphor 
is useful, but only to an extent. I believe that this so-called distancing function is 
responsible for some psychotherapists’ distrust of the medium. Indeed, some therapists 
express unease in working with their clients’ metaphors. On the one hand, a metaphor 
may serve to maintain a safe distance from content (as it can do when a therapist offers a 
metaphor or when a schizophrenic client talks in metaphors); on the other hand, it may 
serve a defensive function, reinforcing too great a distance, a distance which as previously 
stated needs to be closed if any real therapeutic change is to be achieved. In this sense, 
clients’ use of metaphor may represent an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to keep 
their therapist at bay. This idea is reminiscent of philosophers’ Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke view that metaphor is no more than ornamental rhetorical flourish which creates 
deception: 
 
The art of rhetoric is ‘for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the 
passions and thereby the judgement, and so indeed [metaphors] are perfect cheats’. 
(Locke, 1975: 508) 
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Metaphors ‘openly profess deceit; to admit them into counsel, or reasoning, were 
manifest folly’. 
(Hobbes, 1651: 17) 
 
It is possible that metaphor may, therefore, sometimes be an obstacle to therapeutic 
change. Speaking metaphorically, Caruth and Ekstein note how clients may employ 
metaphor ‘as a sort of alibi […] a way of simultaneously keeping and revealing a secret’ 
(ibid: 38). Throughout these next two sections, I emphasise that although there are 
inherent dangers in working with metaphorical language, their deceitful potential being 
one of them, there are a number of ways to mitigate these dangers. Some of these ways, or 
if you like ‘tactics’, have been specifically designed by practicing psychotherapists who, 
like me, believe that the benefits of working with metaphor outweigh its difficulties.    
 
4.3.2 METAPHOR AS A SERVICE TO THE THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE: A SIGNAL OF EMPATHY  
 
As discussed in section 3.4 of the previous chapter, the relationship between the client 
and the therapist is a key determinant of therapeutic success, so if the use of metaphor 
can facilitate the therapeutic alliance this is too important a function to ignore. That 
metaphorical language does support the therapeutic alliance is extensively confirmed in 
the literature by psychotherapists. Yet, how and why metaphorical language serves this 
function are complex questions, which need some unpacking.  
Metaphorical language shared between two interlocutors has several beneficial 
dimensions. At the root of this is the fact that the collaborative activity of building and 
extending a metaphorical expression takes more time and effort than the interpretation 
and construction of more literal language (or simpler lexical/phrasal metaphors), which is 
relatively rapid. Any psychotherapist’s willingness to interpret, or jointly construct, an 
extended metaphor represents a willingness to expend a level of effort above that which is 
typically expended during exchanges that involve literal language. A therapist’s 
willingness to put in this additional effort and to, as it were, enter the client’s 
metaphorical world in order to understand him/her signals the therapist’s commitment 
to the client. In turn, the client’s perception of this commitment fosters his or her sense 
of the therapist’s empathy, which is essential to establishing a positive therapeutic 
alliance. Philosopher Ted Cohen (1978) echoes this idea by claiming that metaphors issue 
a concealed invitation to derive meaning, and that a hearer’s special effort to interpret a 
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speaker’s metaphor brings the two (metaphor maker and appreciator) into a deeper, more 
intimate relationship.   
Again, it is useful to illustrate this therapeutic function of metaphor with an 
example from clinical practice. Consider a client telling his therapist how he struggled to 
‘unpack his thoughts from their knapsack and arrange them neatly so that we can discuss 
them in here’ (Stine, 2005: 541). This initial metaphorical expression uttered by the client 
was extensively dissected during the course of therapy. While it might not seem 
particularly informative to the layperson, the therapist’s close attention to the metaphor 
enabled him to understand that it epitomised an important belief of the client’s. Namely, 
the client felt a need to keep his mental life contained (‘concealed in a sack’) and to be 
ready for flight, in case he was suddenly abandoned (idem). Exposure of these beliefs led 
the client to consider his adoption and to recall how as an infant in the nursery he was 
told that he’d been chosen as the ‘special child’. Stine reports on how the client, in the 
midst of this discussion, suddenly said “maybe I can write a musical comedy for my wife 
and daughter” (both of whom were performers), an idea that he dismissed almost 
immediately after suggesting it. The therapist immediately returned to the metaphorical 
expression of the knapsack; he suggested that his client must have longed to be creative as 
a child, but at the same time, that he must have feared any creative, unconventional 
thoughts in case they jeopardised his status as a ‘special child’. The therapist then offered 
the following interpretation: ‘all spontaneous thoughts, feelings and creative urges would 
have to be kept in a mental knapsack, concealed and ready to be transported at a 
moment’s notice in case he was abandoned’ (ibid: 542). Stine credits the moment of 
articulating this interpretation with marking a dramatic shift in the client’s level of 
comfort and in his cognitive style. It was, he believes, his ‘empathic interpretation’ and 
close attention to the metaphor that facilitated this change.  
 
It is precisely this shared, specially evolved dialect of shared metaphor that 
contributes to the sense of a private, dyadic psychological community that provides 
the intimacy necessary for the analyst to listen to the patient’s metaphors and, 
reciprocally, to forge those metaphors that will enlist the patient’s involvement and 
the intimacy necessary for the patient to make the special effort to accept and 
creatively react to those interpretations.  
(ibid: 535) 
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The claim that metaphors benefit the therapeutic alliance is not only supported by 
anecdotal evidence in the form of single case studies, but also by empirical analysis. Suit 
and Paradise (1985), for example, examined how counsellor-offered metaphors affect 
clients’ perception of the counsellor, specifically investigating five core counsellor 
attributes: perceived empathy, regard, expertness, attractiveness and trustworthiness. In 
this study participants were asked to carefully listen to excerpts from counselling sessions 
and to put themselves in the position of the client. The dependent measures of empathy, 
regard, expertness, attractiveness and trustworthiness were then assessed using subjects’ 
responses to standardised questionnaires (the Barrett-Leonard Relationship Inventory 
(BLRI) and the Counsellor Rating Form-Short Version (CRF-S)). Suit and Paradise found 
that the use of moderately complex metaphors enhanced subjects’ perception of the 
counsellor’s empathy, level of regard and expertness (more so than the use of analogies, 
clichés and literal language to express the same point). Though the authors concede 
various limitations of their study, it provides encouraging support for the notion that 
metaphorical language can enhance the therapeutic alliance by strengthening many 
characteristics on which that alliance is based (most notably, empathy).60  
 
4.3.3 METAPHOR AS A SERVICE TO THE THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE: CREATION OF SHARED 
SHORTHAND  
 
An additional way that metaphor may strengthen the therapeutic alliance is to be found 
in metaphor’s ability to act as a kind of shorthand between interlocutors. This is a distinct 
psychotherapeutic function of metaphor that is worthy of note and stems from the 
compactness element of metaphorical language. 
According to Relevance Theory, the more poetic a metaphor is, the wider the range 
of potential implicatures and the greater the hearer’s responsibility for deriving them 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 236). This notion reflects a frequently observed feature of 
metaphorical language, namely, its ability to imply a wide range of meanings in a succinct 
way. It is for this reason that metaphorical language is often thought of as an economical 
mode of expression. When Ortony (1975) championed the claim that metaphor was 
‘necessary and not just nice’, he developed a series of hypotheses, one of which speaks to 
this condensed quality of metaphor. Ortony’s ‘compactness thesis’ suggests that in many 
contexts metaphorical language represents the most economical way of expressing 																																																								
60 Suit and Paradise emphasise the need for additional empirical studies, for example to examine 
subjects’ perceptions of counsellors at multiple stages of the therapeutic process.  
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something and that this economy of expression enables even relatively short metaphors 
to convey a great wealth of information (ibid: 47).61  
Ortony’s compactness thesis relies on a reconstructionist view, which suggests that 
language comprehension involves hearers ‘reconstructing’ (that is, enriching or 
amplifying) described scenarios using their existing knowledge of the world (idem). 
Imagine for example that I read about a woman jumping off Beachy Head cliff.62 I build a 
representation that invokes what I know about women, the act of jumping off a cliff and 
what I know or believe to be true about Beachy Head. Ortony notes that what I invoke 
will be ‘largely experiential, perceptual and cognitive’ (idem). However, there will, of 
course, be details unique to my subjective experience. I may infer that the woman was in a 
distressed state of mind at the time, that the sea beneath was very cold; perhaps I imagine 
the wind to have been fierce and the sky to have been dark and dramatic. It is possible 
that I also invoke thoughts about her family’s reaction of sadness to her death, based on 
my knowledge of human feelings and responses to such events. Ortony suggests that the 
most efficient manner in which to construct such a representation is ‘to form a mental 
image’ (idem) and he labels the overall process ‘particularisation’.63 
As well as ensuring that language comprehension can take place without a speaker 
having to explicitly state this amount of detail, Ortony suggests that this process of 
particularisation serves as a listener’s ‘digital to analogue converter: it takes him nearer to 
the continuous mode of perceived experience by taking him further away from the 
discrete mode of linguistic symbols’ (idem). For Ortony, metaphors constrain and guide 
this process, they ‘allow large “chunks” to be converted or transferred’ (idem). For 
example, with the aforementioned scenario in mind, imagine a report in a newspaper: ‘she 
stepped off the cliff edge and fell like a punctured balloon’. What we know about 
punctured balloons includes abstract characteristics such as damage, emptiness and failed 
containers. The figurative expression is said to focus our attention on a subset of these 
characteristics. This subset includes features that are conceivably compatible with the 
topic (the woman who is killing herself). The resulting interpretation is thus extremely 
rich, with ‘punctured balloon’ being the condensed meaning for something like ‘the 
woman stepped off the cliff edge, her body limp as she fell, she was physically present, but 																																																								
61 It is not clear if Ortony proposed the compactness thesis as a reason for using metaphors, or 
merely, as a consequence and advantage of the figure. 
62 Beachy Head is a famous cliff in Southern England which sits 162 meters above sea level; it is a 
notorious suicide location. 
63 Ortony’s process of ‘particularisation’ is in some respects similar to Relevance Theory’s notion of 
pragmatic enrichment; through enrichment, an utterance’s encoded meaning, which is highly 
schematic, is developed into fully propositional content (on the basis of highly accessible 
conceptual material). See Carston (2002: 22-28) for further detail.  
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there was life, no emotion, left within her, her spirit was irreparably damaged, all sense of 
hope gone, and so on’. Trying to express the idea depicted here by using literal language 
rather than metaphor evidently involves a far lengthier description, which even when 
developed may not be sufficient to capture its full meaning. As Sperber and Wilson (1995: 
236-237) wrote,  
 
The surprise or beauty of a successful creative metaphor lies in this condensation, 
in the fact that a single expression which has itself been loosely used will determine 
a very wide range of acceptable weak implicatures.64 
 
Metaphor, therefore, ‘is the power whereby language, even with a small vocabulary, 
manages to embrace a multimillion things’ (Langer, 1948: 141). When metaphorical 
language is elaborated during the course of therapy, particularly when it is elaborated 
over the course of multiple sessions, that metaphor may become a sort of shorthand – a 
way of expressing a wealth of meaning. Co-creating this shorthand (a kind of additional 
shared sublanguage) consequently creates an intimacy between the client and the 
therapist that strengthens the alliance, and may, therefore, contribute to 
psychotherapeutic success.65 
Naturally, as with all things, there are two sides to the coin. Just as an apt metaphor 
may strengthen the therapeutic alliance, the wrong metaphor offered at the wrong time 
may weaken the therapeutic alliance.  
 
A metaphor not understood by a listener is likely to increase his sense of 
estrangement from the speaker, while a metaphor understood by the listener is 
likely to lessen his sense of isolation. 
(Lenrow, 1966: 147) 
 
At the end of Suit and Paradise’s (1985) experiment, which was mentioned in the 
previous section, subjects were asked to summarise what they thought the counsellor’s 
intent was. While the authors did not provide any concrete details to illustrate their 																																																								
64 Recall that weak implicatures (weakly intended by the speaker) shade off into unintended 
implications (see chapter 1, section 1.3.1, footnote 16). 
65 For metaphorical expressions that end up serving as a kind of shorthand between client and 
therapist, it may be that the metaphor is initially interpreted through a process of metaphorical 
world construction (particularly likely if the metaphor is collaboratively extended by client and 
therapist over a number of sessions). However, I speculate that in order to act as shorthand the 
metaphor would, at some point, have to be interpreted through the construction of an ad hoc 
concept (e.g. KNAPSACK*, or PUNCTURED BALLOON*).   
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findings, they advise that their results demonstrate ‘the potential for misunderstanding by 
the client when complex metaphors were used’ (Suit & Paradise, 1985: 27). On this basis, 
they recommend caution with regard to counsellor’s use of overly complex metaphors or 
metaphors which are very subtle in their implications. As we shall see in section 4.4, the 
risk that a therapist’s use of metaphorical language may lead to misinterpretation and so-
called ‘ruptures’ in the therapeutic alliance is a significant concern for some 
psychotherapists. How seriously this concern is taken affects the ways in which therapists 
choose to use metaphor.  
 
4.3.4 MNEMONIC FUNCTION OF METAPHOR 
 
An additional, widely attested benefit of using metaphor in psychotherapy is its ability to 
increase our memory for the ideas it depicts. Increasing one’s ability to recall thoughts 
and insights that arise during psychotherapeutic exchanges is useful in that doing so can 
lead to increased impact of those ideas and insights as they are more likely to permeate 
the client’s daily life and bring about real therapeutic change. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
interest in the mnemonic function of metaphor has not been restricted to researchers in 
the field of psychotherapy alone; many philosophers and psychologists have sought to 
theoretically develop and test the mnemonic function of metaphor. Reviewing the 
plethora of research on this topic reveals the mnemonic function of metaphor to be a 
complex characteristic, which seems primarily to be the result of metaphor’s imagistic 
component. Metaphor aids recall of information because it facilitates construction of 
rich, detailed mental imagery. In this section, I expand on the theoretical underpinnings 
of this claim and subsequently, turn to its empirical validation.  
Ortony’s ‘vividness thesis’ speaks explicitly to the imagistic component of 
metaphor, and therefore, to metaphor’s mnemonic function. Since, in Ortony’s view, 
metaphors evade ‘discretization’ and maintain a greater proximity to perceived 
experiences, they facilitate a richer, more detailed picture (mental imagery) that cannot 
be easily, or perhaps ever, achieved through literal use of language. ‘The emotive as well 
as the sensory and cognitive aspects are more available, for they have been left intact in 
the transferred chunk’ (Ortony, 1975: 50). Camp echoes Ortony’s sentiments that 
metaphors are closer to perceptual reality and, therefore, more vivid. To illustrate her 
point, she discusses a metaphor in which a drunken man’s talk is described as a ‘wheezing 
bagpipe’. As she aptly notes, this metaphor vehicle allows one to capture the drunk’s tone 
of voice: ‘loud, braying, continuous, nasal’ (2006: 10). ‘The metaphor is considerably more 
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vivid and precise, because it exploits your specific, experiential knowledge of the sound 
that bagpipes make’ (idem).66 Being highly vivid, the metaphor is also highly memorable. 
In his work on mental imagery, psychologist Allan Paivio attests to the mnemonic 
value of images. Paivio explains how images are particularly memorable as a result of their 
density of information – that is, their ability to represent a lot of information in a 
compact format:  
 
When you dip down into your memory well, if you pull up an image, it is a 
simultaneous bundle of complex information; if you pull up a word, however, it 
represents only one bundle of information. It may have other words strung out 
after it in a chain, but you have to keep pulling up the links one at a time. 
(Paivio, 1983: 9) 
 
For images, Paivio explains, complex information is available simultaneously, so that ‘two 
units of information in one image take up the same amount of space in the memory well 
as one word without an image’ (idem). That an image requires less storage space ensures 
that it is more memorable, and as such that it is an economical way of representing 
information. The fact that images are highly memorable relates to metaphor since, if 
Ortony is right, comprehension of metaphorical language necessitates construction of 
mental images.67 Paivio writes, ‘novel metaphors in particular appear to need imagery for 
interpretation, especially vehicle imagery’ (Sadowski & Paivio, 2001: 87).   
While many psychotherapists have shown an interest in the mnemonic function of 
metaphorical language, few have sought to validate this function with empirical research. 
One notable exception is Martin, Cummings and Halberg’s analysis of psychotherapeutic 
interactions in which therapists were trained to introduce and elaborate metaphors in a 
‘purposeful manner’ (1992). After each psychotherapy session, both clients and therapists 
were told to ‘relax and think back to the session in which you just participated’; they were 
then asked to complete Episodic Memory Questionnaires (EMQs), which consisted of five 																																																								
66 Notice how this vivid metaphor, of a drunk as a ‘wheezing bagpipe’, communicates a wealth of 
information. Metaphors may, therefore, feel compact (i.e. may imply a wide range of meanings 
using a small vocabulary) as a result of their interpretation having involved the construction of an 
image. 
67 The claim that metaphors necessitate the construction of mental images is not to suggest that 
metaphors involve the representation of pictorial information alone. In other words, the term 
‘mental imagery’ is neutral in terms of sensory modalities. While the visual modality is often fairly 
dominant during metaphor interpretation, mental images contain information from the full range 
of perceptual modalities. Camp’s demonstrates that this is the case through her metaphor of a 
‘wheezing bagpipe’; this metaphor requires construction of a ‘mental image’, in which information 
from the auditory modality is dominant.  
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basic questions: 
 
(i) Try to remember some of the specific phrases or sentences that were spoken, 
what were some of these phrases or sentences? 
(ii) What was the most memorable event that occurred in this session? (Try to 
remember exact words, phrases or sentences spoken during the event).  
(iii) Why do you remember this event? 
(iv) What was the next most memorable event?  
(v) Why do you remember this event? 
 
Participants were then asked to rate the helpfulness of the session on a scale of 1-5 (1 
being not at all helpful and 5 being extremely helpful) and to rate the session overall on a 
6 point scale (from very poor to very good). Though intentional therapeutic metaphors 
accounted for less than 10% of the total dialogue in any given psychotherapy session, 
Martin and colleagues found that clients recalled therapists’ intentional use of metaphor 
in 66% of the sessions.68 The authors, furthermore, found that the sessions in which 
clients recalled events associated with the therapist’s intentional use of metaphor were 
judged to be significantly more helpful than those sessions in which events other than the 
therapist’s intentional use of metaphor were recalled. Overall, these findings support the 
claim that discussing events using metaphorical language enhances clients’ memory for 
them. This result reinforces the view that metaphor has a positive function in the context 
of psychotherapy: enhancing clients’ recall of psychotherapeutic material increases the 
likelihood that clients will be able to apply insights revealed in psychotherapy to their 
daily life, thereby effecting real change. 
 
4.3.5 HEURISTIC AND EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF METAPHOR 
 
A fifth function of metaphorical language in the context of psychotherapy is its ability to 
facilitate the construction of new perspectives, to make the unfamiliar more familiar. As 
Evans (1988: 550) elegantly (and metaphorically) notes: 
 
The client lives at the centre of a world formed completely by his or her own 
experiences, the therapist offers healing not primarily by being an expert in the 																																																								
68 Clients were judged to have recalled a therapist’s intentional use of metaphor if their answer to 
question (i), (ii) or (iv) contained any of the exact metaphor vehicles used by the therapist, or 
obvious synonyms for these vehicles. 
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various forms of pathology and adaption, but rather by forming a bridge to this 
world and seeing the unrealised possibilities within it. This bridge is erected from 
the metaphors of both the therapist and the client. 
 
Recall how we have already considered figurative language’s ability to reveal ‘unrealised 
possibilities’ from a theoretical standpoint in chapter 2, in which I explored Camp’s (2008, 
2009) suggestion that metaphor fosters insight by highlighting or foregrounding 
previously unconsidered meanings. In this section, I consider how metaphor’s ability to 
highlight and suppress properties of a topic and thereby facilitate insight is of use in the 
context of psychotherapy.  
An example from clinical practice clearly illustrates this function of metaphor.  
Imagine two individuals in couples’ therapy being asked to articulate the obstacles in their 
relationship that were presented by their partner. The husband spoke of his wife as a 
rock, a metaphor that was intended to convey her inflexibility and rigidity. For her 
husband, the wife chose a closed door, which symbolised her feelings that he had closed 
off parts of himself from her (Coombs & Freedman, 1990, cited in Cirillo & Crider, 1995). 
While the clients were initially focused on the negative aspects of their respective 
metaphorical vehicles, their relationship with these vehicles transformed through 
exploration of the metaphors. The husband appeared to shift his focus from the inflexible 
feature of the rock to positive aspects of it, for instance, how the rock was stable and 
organised. In fact, his relationship with this object transformed to the extent that he 
would carry a rock in his pocket to remind himself that he appreciated the stability that 
his wife provided. Similarly, the wife’s perspective changed, from seeing her husband as 
closed off she moved to seeing him as independent and self-reliant. This example neatly 
demonstrates how the complexity of figurative language can foster insight and aid clients 
to consider previously unconsidered views. As Petrie and Oshlag (1993: 582) note: 
 
The very possibility of learning something radically new can only be understood by 
presupposing the operation of something very much like metaphor. This is not just 
the heuristic claim that metaphors are often useful in learning, but the epistemic 
claim that metaphor, or something very much like it, is what renders possible and 
intelligible the acquisition of new knowledge.  
 
As with the other functions of metaphorical language, it is not difficult to see how 
this characteristic of metaphor may pose a danger in psychotherapy. As Paivio puts it, 
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metaphor is ‘a solar eclipse [that] hides the object of study and at the same time reveals 
some of its most salient and interesting characteristics when viewed through the right 
telescope’ (1979: 150); psychotherapy is about looking through the right telescope. When 
left to their own devices, the metaphors of a rock and a closed door promoted each 
party’s anger and resentment towards each other, thereby fostering discontent within the 
marriage. It was only when the couple worked with this metaphor with the guidance of a 
therapist that another frame of reference was considered. While this example 
demonstrates the effectiveness of metaphor, it also reveals how metaphors can cement 
beliefs that are maladaptive. An essential part of psychotherapy, therefore, should be to 
reveal the metaphors that underpin clients’ beliefs and subsequently, to dissect these 
metaphors and thereby grant clients greater cognitive flexibility (an increased ability to 
see things from multiple perspectives).  
 
4.3.6 THE DANGER OF METAPHOR IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
Throughout this section, I have tried to emphasise that, although metaphor may be of 
significant therapeutic utility, it should be used with caution. As was noted in section 
4.3.2, comprehension of metaphor places a high degree of responsibility on the 
interpreter. Given this interpreter responsibility, and the fact that metaphor 
communicates a wide array of weak implicatures, predicting how a metaphor will be 
interpreted is arguably less straightforward than predicting how literal language will be 
interpreted. Schizophrenic individuals, in particular, may be prone to unpredictable 
idiosyncratic interpretations, given their inability to form abstract relationships between 
objects (McCurry & Hayes, 1992). Naturally, it is of paramount importance in 
psychotherapy that misinterpretations between client and therapist are minimised. Any 
miscommunication between the two parties will likely lead the client to feel 
misunderstood and, in so doing, will disrupt the therapeutic alliance, which is essential to 
a positive therapeutic outcome. As Muran and DiGiuseppe note, given the ambiguity and 
frequent obscurity of metaphors the ‘possibility of mistakes abound’ (1990: 72). Using 
metaphorical language, and in particular offering metaphors to clients, may therefore lead 
clients to feel ‘at best unsure and confused, and at worst resentful and distrustful’ (Small 
& Manthei, 1986: 410).  
In an interesting study Angus and Rennie examined clients’ and therapists’ 
experiences and recollections of ‘metaphoric events’ in psychotherapy. Four pairs of 
psychotherapists and clients, who had been in therapy together for at least 12 sessions, 
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were recruited for the study. Each therapist in the four pairs recorded one of their 
sessions, and from these recordings the authors identified metaphor sequences (in total, 
five client-produced metaphors and six therapist-produced metaphors were identified). 
The selected instances of metaphorical exchanges were replayed to both parties within 24 
hours of the therapy session. Each participant was asked to recall the thoughts, images, 
emotions and feelings that they had been experiencing when the segment they listened to 
took place. It was emphasised to subjects that they should ‘discriminate between actual 
recall of their experiences and construction of what they were likely experiencing in the 
light of their reflection’ (Angus & Rennie, 1989: 373).  
Among other things, the authors found discrepancies in interpretation of the 
metaphors between client and therapist; ‘it was striking how therapists and clients 
generated distinctly different private imaginal representations of the same metaphor 
spoken in the session’ (ibid: 378). Yet, Angus and Rennie do not use this result to oppose 
the use of metaphor in psychotherapy. Quite the opposite, in fact, they advocate working 
with figurative language on the basis that achievement of a shared understanding through 
metaphor (though it may not often occur) fosters the therapeutic alliance (by creating a 
deep connection and shorthand for communication). What Angus and Rennie appear to 
be suggesting is that whether or not client and therapist achieve complete shared 
understanding of a metaphor is of secondary import; perfect duplication of meaning 
between interlocutors is not necessary. What makes metaphor so valuable in the context 
of psychotherapy is the sense of collaboration between client and therapist that emerges 
during interpretation. Engagement in this joint project, whether it results in complete 
sharing of content or not, achieves a precious sense of connectedness between the two 
parties.  
Despite Angus and Rennie’s conclusion in favour of using metaphorical language in 
psychotherapy, their study reiterates the importance of psychoanalysts clarifying the 
meaning that metaphors evoke for clients, and avoiding ‘substituting an unwitting 
projection of their own understanding of what phrases must mean’ (idem). In the next 
section, I consider a number of psychotherapeutic approaches, which have been 
specifically designed to make use of metaphorical language. These approaches set out 
concrete instructions for the use of metaphor, and in so doing, seek to manage any 
detrimental effects that its use may have. 
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4.4 SPECIALISED APPROACHES FOR THE USE OF METAPHOR IN 
PSYCHOTHERAPY  
 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Approaches that make explicit use of metaphorical language in psychotherapy diverge in 
terms of the roles they ascribe to client and therapist. At the extreme end of the scale are 
those who believe that metaphor construction should be left solely to the client (Grove & 
Panzer, 1989; Sullivan & Rees, 2008), and, at the less extreme end, those who grant 
linguistic freedom to both parties, thereby accepting that both therapists and clients use 
metaphorical language (Kopp, 1995; Sims, 2003; Strong, 1989). In this section, I consider 
some of these approaches and reflect on the implicit theoretical assumptions that 
underpin the adoption of different strategies of metaphor use. 
 
4.4.2 CLEAN LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC MODELLING 
 
‘Clean Language’ is effectively a method of questioning, which is purposefully designed to 
elicit metaphors from clients. Though the approach was developed by the humanistic 
counselling psychologist David Grove, who sought to aid his clients with resolving 
traumatic memories, it is now utilised in a range of settings; for example, in education, 
marketing and business practice. While many psychotherapists before Grove had noticed 
the abundance of rich metaphorical expressions articulated spontaneously by clients, 
Grove came to realise the therapeutic benefit of clients immersing themselves in these 
metaphorical articulations. Echoing the sentiments of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Grove 
maintained that attention to clients’ metaphors provided the key to understanding their 
‘symbolic world’ (that is, the way in which they viewed, and had constructed, their 
reality). In order to facilitate immersion in this symbolic world, Grove devised a series of 
questions, which encouraged clients to explore and elaborate their metaphorical 
conceptions. For Grove, it was important to use clients’ exact words when elaborating 
metaphors, in order to avoid contaminating or distorting the client’s symbolic world. His 
questions, therefore, are constructed so that the therapist (or practitioner) can ‘clean’ 
their own language, making it as devoid of metaphors as possible. Using only the clients’ 
words ensures that any presuppositions and prejudices on the part of the therapist do not 
interfere with the clients’ construction of their own ‘metaphor landscape’ (Lawley & 
Tompkins, 2000: 17). 
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The 12 basic questions, which are used 80% of the time in the practice of Symbolic 
Modelling, form the method that is known as ‘Clean Language’. While these questions 
were specifically designed to explore client-generated metaphors, in principle they can be 
asked about anything a client says. First, there are the six ‘developing questions’ as below: 
 
1. And is there anything else about X? 
2. And what kind of X is that X? 
3. And where/whereabouts is X? 
4. And that X is like what? 
5. And is there a relationship between X and Y? 
6. And when X, what happens to Y? 
 
In accordance with Grove’s initial observation, X and Y represent direct quotations of the 
client’s original words, which may or may not be metaphorical. Using a question like that 
in (4), as opposed to something like ‘what’s that like to you?’ is intended to ensure that the 
client maintains a direct relationship to their expression, which is said to underpin their 
thinking. The next set of three questions, which create the context for the scenario being 
developed, are labelled ‘moving time’ questions: 
 
1. And then what happens? / And what happens next? 
2. And what happens just before X? 
3. And where could/does X come from? 
 
Needless to say, these questions will not all work for every topic (X); it is up to the Clean 
Language practitioner to select the appropriate question that flows naturally from their 
client’s expression. Lastly, there are ‘intention questions’ whose purpose is to direct the 
metaphor to the client’s actual experience and desired outcome. 
 
1. And what would you/X like to have happen? 
2. And what needs to happen for X to [achieve what X would like to have 
happened]? 
3. And can X [achieve what X would like to have happened]? 
 
In any course of therapy, it is essential that the client remains focused on their own 
metaphorical map and does not allow themselves to be misled by any unwarranted 
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assumptions and interpretations from their therapist. By cleansing the therapist’s 
language the possibility of unintentionally influencing a client through language is 
reduced to a minimum.  
To see Symbolic Modelling and the Clean Language approach in action, consider 
the short extract below taken from a transcript of a participant engaged in a Clean 
Language interview: 
 
Practitioner: When your work-life balance is at its best it’s like what?  
Client:  Um, I think when, when, when my work-life balance is at its best, 
um, I, I think I, I’d be feeling really energized and that um, and that 
things are sort of under my belt that I can, I’m sort of juggling 
things and it, I don’t think it’s necessarily based on how busy I am 
but it’s that sort of feeling that, that there is a sort of sense of 
balance and…  
Practitioner:  OK, so energized and things are under your belt, juggling, and a 
sense of balance  
Client:  Mm-hmm…  
Practitioner:  And what kind, what kind of juggling is that when it’s like that?  
Client:  Um, you, I mean if you’d maybe feel that you’re holding quite a few 
things at the same time but they’re still within your reach, you’re 
not – they’re not sort of – I suppose the image of juggling is that 
you’re…. throw balls into the air but you’re also catching them 
Practitioner:  Yes  
Client:  And, yes, so it’s a… and also that sort of sense that there’s an ease 
which… I mean if you see a really competent juggler, there’s a real 
ease in what they’re doing, they, that looks, I mean it may be very, 
very difficult but it looks really easy. 
 (Tosey, Lawley & Meese, 2014: 14-15)  
 
Notice how the Clean Language practitioner attends to the client’s metaphors and invites 
the client to extend their initial metaphor by asking ‘what kind of juggling is that?’ As the 
session continued, the client and practitioner discussed how work-life balance related to 
feeling at ease with reaching targets, returning to the image of juggling:  
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Client:  Um, yes I suppose – going back to the image of juggling, it sort of, 
you’re tossing the balls up into the air and then they, they’re kind of 
almost falling back into your hands without you sort of having to 
strain and struggle to kind of catch them again. 
Practitioner:  Mm, when they’re falling into your hands, is there anything else 
about that…?  
Client:  Um, well I was just sort of going on with the image of juggling, it 
sort of, it has a sort of playful feel about it, um, and…  
Practitioner:  When it’s a playful feel and… is there anything else about that?  
Client:  Um, the s-, I suppose it’s, it, I mean I, you think of a juggler as an 
entertainer but um, I sort of think of, I mean… the playfulness is… 
there’s kind of an enjoyment in what you’re doing and um, there’s 
kind of a pleasure in, in just being skilful and being able, and 
actually doing something that’s quite hard but doing it with ease. 
(ibid: 15) 
 
The practitioner’s questions here (‘is there anything else about that?’) invite the client to 
further develop their symbolic world, to flesh it out in greater detail if you like. Again, 
notice how the therapist does not introduce any language that has not already been 
offered by the client. This practice enables the client to get in touch with her own unique 
idea of what constitutes work-life balance, by developing her metaphorical conception 
that underpins this idea and exploring the feelings it evokes.  
Lawley and Tompkins, who have studied Grove’s work for many years, ground the 
approach in Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor. The underlying theoretical 
assumption behind Clean Language is, therefore, that cognition is fundamentally 
metaphorical. This conception is prevalent across many approaches to metaphor use in 
psychotherapy and has done great service in aiding understanding of the use of metaphor 
in this context; it was for this reason that a significant part of chapter 1 was dedicated to 
its discussion. To explain how Clean Language interacts with Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, consider the assertion from Lakoff and Johnson that ‘metaphorical thought is 
unavoidable, ubiquitous, and mostly unconscious’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 272). 
Adoption of this view validates the use of metaphor in psychotherapy by suggesting that 
articulating metaphors will reveal an individual’s tacit assumptions; assumptions which, 
in the case of therapy, may be contributing to a person’s maladaptive behaviour or 
unease. That metaphor serves this function has been supported by many writers in the 
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field of psychotherapy (for example, Goncalves and Craine, 1990). It is this aspect of the 
theory that supports purposeful elicitation of metaphors from clients, which is the 
primary objective of the Clean Language questions. The utility of CMT in grounding the 
use of metaphor in psychotherapy is, however, jeopardised by the inherent problems with 
the theory, discussed in chapter 1 (for example, the lack of concrete evidence in support 
of the claim that verbal metaphors reflect an underlying metaphorical fabric of the mind). 
That CMT’s claims are not well supported calls into question, not the practices of Clean 
Language, but rather the usefulness of CMT in supporting those practices.  
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, if it is believed (as it is by followers of Clean 
Language), not only validates the use of metaphor in psychotherapy by supporting its 
ability to reveal clients’ tacit assumptions, but also supports the specific Clean Language 
approach’s requirement that therapists ‘cleanse’ their speech. This argument naturally 
falls out of the theory, given its claim that many seemingly literal expressions, such as 
‘let’s spend more time together’, are in fact metaphorical (since they are grounded in 
conceptual mappings, in this case TIME IS MONEY). For Clean Language practitioners, as 
for conceptual metaphor theorists, even simple, seemingly literal questions such as ‘what 
compelled you to get involved in this work?’ or ‘what gives you hope?’ are seen as 
metaphorical (Tosey, Lawley & Meese, 2014: 5). Though these expressions are clearly 
dead, or least heavily sedated, metaphors, they are nonetheless metaphorical (in origin, at 
least), so that adoption of CMT leads to the position that they have the potential to reveal 
hidden cognitive assumptions, when revived. Widening the definition of metaphor in this 
way, so as to take seriously the figurativeness of very conventional, even dead, metaphors, 
entails that almost all utterances involve some components of metaphorical mapping, and 
therefore, virtually every word is seen as a reflection and an indication of a speaker’s tacit 
assumptions. As previously stated, it is these tacit assumptions that Clean Language seeks 
to (a) elicit from clients and (b) silence from therapists. When one considers the 
definition of metaphor adopted by Clean Language practitioners, one appreciates the 
necessity of using the client’s exact words, and only those words. Eradicating evidence of 
tacit assumptions from a therapist’s language enables clients to be undisturbed when 
articulating their own metaphorical landscape. Looking at transcripts that utilise Clean 
Language does indeed reveal this method to be a successful means by which participants 
get in touch with their most deeply rooted beliefs. Intuitively, being undisturbed in this 
process guarantees that a client will feel a powerful sense of responsibility for uncovering 
these beliefs, and for attaining insight into their own behaviour and the feelings that 
accompany this discovery.  
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Although subscribing to the notion of metaphoric cognition validates the utility of 
metaphor in psychotherapy, in the case of Clean Language it has also instilled a certain 
fear with respect to therapists using metaphorical language (perhaps as a result of the 
broad definition of metaphor adopted). A consequence of the belief that language reflects 
and influences cognition is to see the power of language and so too the power of 
metaphor. Clean Language theory appears to take this aspect of Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory very seriously and, in doing so, adopts great caution with regard to therapists 
influencing clients through language.  
There is an extent to which this very safe approach could be seen as representing a 
lack of faith in a therapist’s ability to judge whether and when such caution is necessary. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for many therapists, making considered judgments 
and delivering timely comments and interpretations is considered the main area of a 
therapist’s expertise. Furthermore, for many clients, being privy to these expert 
interpretations constitutes the primary motivation for embarking on a course of therapy. 
No doubt, there is a time and a place for some form of Clean Language in almost all cases 
of therapy. For example, when a client is demanding more direction than the therapist 
deems appropriate, Clean Language may provide a useful tool for the therapist to insist 
on more of a back-seat role. It may also be a particularly helpful technique to employ 
when clients, to their detriment, do not give themselves any credit for their progress. 
Showing a client that a revelation has come squarely from words that they themselves 
have uttered will likely serve to empower them, which in turn may effect therapeutic 
change.69 In the following sections, I consider two other approaches to metaphor in 
psychotherapy that, in contrast to Clean Language, do not advocate therapists eradicating 
metaphors from their speech.   
 
4.4.3 KOPP’S METAPHOR THERAPY 
 
In the mid-90s, Kopp proposed a structured interview protocol for psychotherapists, 
which was designed to assist clients with exploring and transforming their metaphorical 
articulations. The seven-step approach, which includes questions for therapists to ask, is 
as follows: 
 
(i) Notice metaphors. 																																																								
69 For a discussion of how Clean Language techniques may serve to make qualitative research 
practices more standardised and rigorous, see Tosey, Lawley and Meese (2014). 
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(ii) “When you say [repeat the metaphor], what image or picture comes to 
mind?” alternatively, “what image or picture do you see in your mind’s eye?” 
or, “what does the [metaphor] look like?” 
(iii) Explore the metaphor as a sensory image: 
- Setting (e.g. “what else do you see?” or, “describe the scene or some aspect 
of the scene [associated with the metaphoric image]”); 
- Action/Interaction (e.g. “what else is going on in [the metaphoric 
image]?” or, “what are the other people [in the metaphoric image] 
saying/thinking/doing?”); 
- Time (e.g. “what led up to this?” or, “what was happening just before [the 
situation in the metaphor]?” or, “what happens next?”) 
(iv) “What is it like to be [the metaphoric image]?” or, “what is your experience of 
[the metaphoric image]?” or, “what are you feeling as you [the metaphoric 
image]?” 
(v) “If you could change the image in any way, how would you change it?” 
(vi) “What connections (parallels) do you see between your image of [repeat the 
metaphor] and [repeat the original situation]?” 
(vii) “How might the way you changed the image apply to your current situation?” 
 
Like Clean Language, Kopp’s protocol does not treat metaphorical utterances as if they 
were disguising some important truth. Instead, Kopp advocates deeply attending to 
metaphors on the assumption that they represent the speaker’s reality. For Kopp, the 
literally nonsensical content represents a mental reality for the speaker and denotes some 
genuine experience for the client. Thus, clients are encouraged to further develop 
metaphorical meaning, in order to attain deeper understanding of their own thoughts and 
feelings.  
Mirroring ‘Clean Language’, Kopp’s protocol is also intended to ensure that 
therapists do not interrupt the ‘client’s process with interpretations, empathic reflections, 
comments, questions (other than those in the protocol), conclusions and so forth’ (Kopp 
& Craw, 1998: 307-308). This can be seen as a parallel attempt to cleanse the therapist’s 
language of metaphors, which may colour the client’s thinking. Admittedly, however, the 
questions in Kopp’s protocol are slightly more directive and certainly less ‘clean’ than 
those in Clean Language. In fact, despite initial appearances the two approaches do 
clearly diverge with respect to their views on how active the therapist may be in terms of 
intervention. While Kopp’s protocol is relatively non-directive, he does not intend 
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therapists to limit themselves to the above questions alone (as is the case with Clean 
Language practitioners). Kopp grants that after the final, seventh step, therapists 
introduce all manner of interpretations and comments.  
In order to fully appreciate Kopp’s method, it is useful to reflect on one of his case 
studies: this involves a 38-year-old male client who presented with suicidal thoughts, 
symptoms of depression and problems with anger management. He was HIV positive and 
because he experienced severe side effects from medication was unable to take the 
favoured drug. He did not have blood work for his HIV for several years and thus, was 
relatively in the dark with regard to his health.70 He was very concerned that the disease 
would take over his life and in one therapy session spontaneously produced a novel 
figurative utterance: “I feel like there is a dark cloud hanging over me that will rain AIDS 
down upon me”. Upon noticing this metaphor, the therapist enacted Kopp’s protocol, 
thereby assisting the client to explore and transform this metaphorical utterance. The 
following dialogue ensued: 
 
Therapist: When you think of feeling like there is a large cloud hanging over 
you that will rain AIDS down upon you what image comes to mind? 
Client:   I am walking along and there is a dark cloud that follows me 
wherever I go. I cannot escape it. 
Therapist:  What else is happening? 
Client:  If I stop it will shower me with AIDS.  
Therapist:  What would that look like? 
Client:  The AIDS are individual raindrops that glisten like water, but they 
are deadly. They shower down upon me with great force. I am 
swept away by them, and I have no control over my body against 
the force of the torrent of AIDS.  
Therapist:  What do you feel as you are followed by the cloud that rains AIDS 
down upon you? 
Client:   I am feeling hopelessness, depression, that I am totally out of 
control. I have no identity. My life is totally taken over by the 
disease.  
Therapist:   If you could change the image in any way how would you change it? 
																																																								
70 ‘Blood work’ generally refers to two tests which measure, firstly, the viral load of HIV in a 
patient’s blood and secondly, the patient’s CD4 cell count, which reveals how well the immune 
system is functioning. 
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Client:   The cloud would clear up and the sun would shine. I would see blue 
sky all around me. There is no dark cloud.  
Therapist:   What parallels do you see between your image of the cloud 
following you and your struggle with HIV? 
Client:   The dark cloud that follows me represents my struggle of feeling 
overwhelmed by the disease. Like it is going to take over my life and 
take over my identity. 
Therapist:   Does the way in which you change the image give you any clues 
about how to handle your HIV status? 
Client:   I must learn to control how I feel about the disease, that it does not 
have to take over my life unless I let it. I must find ways to preserve 
my identity and control aspects of the disease. 
(ibid: 308) 
 
Immediately following the above exchange, the client, who up until this point had always 
been devoid of emotion, openly sobbed and acknowledged his illness, expressing his 
emotional distress at being unwell. In the subsequent sessions, he started devising a plan 
to manage his HIV and, after blood tests, he began a new treatment of medication. His 
feelings of despair and hopelessness decreased significantly and his anger management 
improved. Kopp credits these profound shifts in the client as resulting from the client’s 
metaphor ‘transformation’. 
Reflecting on the differences between Kopp’s method and the Clean Language 
techniques, notice how much more instructive the therapist in Kopp’s session is, 
compared to the Clean Language practitioner. For example, he asks “does the way in 
which you change the image give you any clues about how to handle your HIV status?” 
This question jolts the client out of the metaphorically constructed world, in which he 
has a dark rain cloud following him, which may shower him with deadly droplets of HIV. 
While the purpose of this question appears to be much like the purpose of Clean 
Language questions (to direct the client to relate the metaphor to his actual experience 
and a desired outcome), it is far from ‘clean’ in its delivery. From the point of view of 
Clean Language, use of the word handle here reflects an underlying conceptual metaphor, 
such as PSYCHOLOGICAL IS PHYSICAL. Kopp’s approach is, furthermore, significantly 
different from Clean Language in that it does not seek to actively elicit metaphors from 
clients; recall how the first step of the approach is to notice metaphors. Kopp works with 
metaphors that spontaneously arise from clients, but does not strive to create the 
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circumstances in which metaphors will be produced (as is the case in Symbolic 
Modelling). 
It is not a goal of this thesis to argue in favour of one approach to the use of 
metaphor in psychotherapy over another, an argument I am not qualified to make. What 
is interesting for my purposes is simply that such views about the utility of metaphor 
exist. Also of interest are the purported effects that these approaches have. Before 
considering how these effects may inform pragmatic theory, I dedicate the next section to 
a brief discussion of approaches that suggest that therapists should generate metaphors 
(in contrast with the two approaches discussed so far, which focus on client-generated 
metaphors).  
 
4.4.4 PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACHES 
 
The picture presented in the previous sections of models of metaphor use in 
psychotherapy is, in fact, not at all representative of the clinical literature on the topic. 
Though there are a number of approaches to metaphor in psychotherapy that focus on 
client-generated metaphors, two of which I have discussed, the more common trend is 
advocacy of therapist-generated metaphors and interventions (see for example, Barker, 
1996; Burns, 2001, 2007; Goncalves and Craine, 1990; Lankton and Lankton, 2000; 
Stoddard and Afari, 2014). Recall the example discussed in section 4.3.1, where the CBT 
therapist offered the metaphor (or analogy) of a broken leg to the depressed client. There 
is a multitude of guidebooks containing such metaphors and metaphorical stories, which, 
the guidebooks say, can be learnt and subsequently recalled for use with a number of 
different clients in different scenarios. I call these approaches ‘prescriptive’, as they 
prescribe metaphors to clients. Kopp and Craw use slightly more loaded language when 
they say that these approaches ‘implant’ metaphors into clients.  
Drawing on the pioneering work of psychologist and hypnotherapist Milton 
Erikson, Goncalves and Craine propose some loose strategies to assist therapists in their 
employment of metaphors. They recommend that metaphors offered by therapists be 
derived from clients’ own metaphors, for, in their opinion, ‘completely different 
metaphors do not take into account clients’ level of conceptual development and 
therefore will be either ignored or not fully elaborated’ (Goncalves & Craine, 1990: 141). 
In addition, they advise introducing metaphors that are sufficiently flexible to assure 
viability and development. For example, imagine that a client views reality as a 
threatening and violent creature. Rather than substituting this metaphorical view of the 
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world with the opposite view (that reality is a friendly, benevolent creature), the authors 
recommend offering a more ‘flexible’ metaphorical expression, for instance, one that 
reflects the conceptual metaphor REALITY IS FOOD. Expressions that depict reality as 
friendly, they say, perpetuate a dichotomous viewpoint and do not enable the client to 
conceptualise experiences that are not friendly. Metaphorical expressions that are rooted 
in a notion of ‘reality as food’, on the other hand, are flexible in that they allow the client 
to consider how reality is sometimes delicious food (i.e. good), sometimes disgusting (i.e. 
bad), sometimes bland and flavourless (i.e. uninteresting), but fundamentally it is always 
necessary (i.e. inevitable). The authors, furthermore, recommend that therapeutic 
metaphors have a ‘gestalt’, integrative capacity, such that their different elements fit 
together and make sense as a whole. Lastly, they advise that metaphors ‘find some 
validation through the viability of client’s action’ (idem). That is to say, the therapeutic 
metaphor should provide a basis for the client to act on. For example, a therapist might 
advise a client who is feeling uneasy about finding a new job to taste a few dishes, get the 
flavour of some work, if the flavour doesn’t agree with their stomach the client can always 
spit out the food, though ultimately, they will have to find some substance with which to 
feed themselves. 
Goncalves and Craine explicitly acknowledge the benefit of metaphors growing 
from clients’ own conceptualisations. Yet, this is not the approach taken by all 
prescriptive models. Indeed, as previously stated, many handbooks simply detail and list 
metaphors that a therapist may use with a number of different clients. Rather than 
endowing therapists with specific techniques and strategies for tailored use of metaphor, 
these guides provide them with a ready-made stock of metaphors to deploy in therapy. 
While a stockpile of neat analogies and metaphors might be a nice thing for a therapist to 
have up his or her sleeve, research has shown that clients remember their own metaphors 
much better (Angus & Rennie, 1988; Martin, Cummings & Halberg, 1992).  
It is interesting that these therapist-generated metaphor guides are so often used 
and recommended in cognitive and behavioural therapies, less so in more psychodynamic 
and humanistic practices. This is hardly surprising given the more active role ascribed to 
therapists in CBT. In addition, the primary focus in these approaches is to bring about 
cognitive restructuring and ensure behaviour modification. In the Oxford guide to 
metaphors in CBT it is written that metaphor provides ‘a conceptual bridge from a 
problematic interpretation to a fresh new perspective that can cast one’s experiences in a 
new light’ (Stott et al., 2010: 1). CBT therapists often suggest metaphors in order to 
redirect and restructure the client’s conceptualisations in a more functional and adaptive 
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manner. It seems natural that psychodynamic and humanistic therapies would be more 
drawn to working with client-generated metaphors, given their interest in clients’ 
unconscious thoughts, which provide the basis for therapeutic insight. For less directive 
psychotherapeutic practices it is more likely that the role of the therapist will not be ‘to 
interpret the client’s metaphors or to directly modify the client’s belief system but to 
facilitate, guiding the client’s exploration and meaning in a supportive but challenging 
manner’ (Lyddon, Clay & Sparks, 2001: 271). In the next, and concluding, section I 
consider how the different models of metaphor use in therapy relate to pragmatic 
theories of metaphor comprehension.  
 
4.5 THE USE OF METAPHOR IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRAGMATIC THEORY 
 
In order to demonstrate how both theoretical positions on metaphor use in 
psychotherapy and actual specific instances of metaphor use may provide material to help 
in assessing pragmatic theories of metaphor comprehension, it is useful to consider an 
example taken from a psychotherapy transcript. This example is taken from Kopp’s 
metaphor therapy approach. The client in this extract is suffering from bipolar illness, 
and during the session she attempts to express her experience of this mental illness: 
 
Client:  Bipolar illness is like being a balloon. Sometimes the balloon is so 
full of air that it is about to burst, and sometimes there’s no air in 
the balloon at all, it’s limp and not pretty. 
Therapist:  What does it feel like to be the balloon? 
Client:   It’s scary because when I wake up in the morning I don’t know if my 
balloon is going to be inflated or not, and not being stable feels 
terrible. 
Therapist:  If you could change something about this balloon, how would you 
change it? Do you even want to change it? 
Client:   Yes, of course I do. I guess I could tie the knot on the bottom of the 
balloon tighter, to make sure nothing leaks out. 
Therapist:  So then you would be completely stable, with no movement of your 
thoughts in and out? 
Client:   Well... I guess that’s not right, I should expect that my moods will 
be a little different everyday... like normal people, right? 
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Therapist:  Do you feel that your thoughts should be able to roam freely in and 
out of the balloon? 
Client:   I’d like to have greater control over this process and not just let my 
thoughts run away with themselves, like they seem to be doing all 
the time! 
Therapist:  So how could you regulate that flow? 
Client:   Maybe I could hire a guard to stand at the foot of the balloon and 
watch to see that the air in the balloon is flowing freely. 
Therapist:  You said you would “hire” a guard? 
Client:   Well, there’s always a price to pay. 
Therapist:  Can you afford that price? 
Client:   I can’t afford not to! 
Therapist:  So what will the guard be doing? 
Client:  I guess she’d stand there and either hold open the end or shut it 
tight, depending on what was happening. 
Therapist:  So who is this guard anyway? 
Client:   Um... I don’t know. 
Therapist:  You said “she”… Is it a female? 
Client:   Well, right now it’s the medication, but I guess when it comes down 
to it, the ultimate guard is really myself. 
(Kopp, 1995: 29-30) 
 
The client’s figurative expressions, which appear in both comparison form (bipolar illness 
is like being a balloon) and categorical form (I don’t know if my balloon is going to be 
inflated or not), are indications of how bipolar illness feels to her; that is, how she 
experiences her depression and her manic phases. As such, they assist the therapist in 
understanding the client’s current emotional state. Arguably, they also assist the client in 
understanding herself, in the sense that she may not have fully grasped her emotions and 
understood the implications of her thoughts at the moment of expression. Through 
articulating her thoughts via metaphor and subsequently working with the therapist on 
the meaning of her utterances, which is achieved initially by a process of extending and 
developing the balloon metaphor, both client and therapist attain insight into the client’s 
emotional experiences. 
One can see how the initial conception, ‘bipolar illness is like being a balloon’, 
evolves over the course of the exchange. At the beginning, the client sees herself (or her 
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mental-emotional life at least) as a balloon; sometimes her mind is so full of air that she 
feels ready to burst and sometimes she’s entirely deflated, ‘limp and not pretty’. Yet, as 
this metaphorical idea is extended, the client comes to see herself as quite separate from 
the balloon, no longer identified with it or wholly contained within it; notice how she 
speaks of ‘watching’ the balloon and later ‘standing at the foot of the balloon, guarding it’. 
Insight is apparent when, in the final line, the client says ‘the ultimate guard is really 
myself’. This utterance represents the powerful realisation that she, the client, is 
ultimately responsible for and in charge of her alternating highs and lows. The exchange 
demonstrates how our metaphorical conceptions are malleable, and how skilled guidance 
from a therapist facilitates development and modification of metaphorical meaning, 
which in its initial undeveloped state may be the root of maladaptive thinking. 
Reflecting on how this exchange may be used, albeit speculatively, to inform 
pragmatic theory, recall the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account of metaphor 
comprehension outlined in chapter 1. According to this account, comprehension of the 
metaphorical expressions in this exchange involves constructing multiple ad hoc concepts 
in a rapid, on-line fashion; for example, BALLOON*, SO-FULL-OF-AIR*, BURST*, INFLATED* 
etc. So, although the literal meanings of the expressions would be initially activated, they 
would be swiftly replaced by these occasion-specific pragmatically derived senses 
(Sperber & Wilson, 2008). According to Carston’s imaginary world construction route, on 
the other hand, comprehension of the metaphorical expressions involves entertaining and 
sustaining the internally consistent literal meaning as a whole, metarepresenting that 
meaning and its accompanying imagery as descriptive of an imaginary world and 
subjecting it, as a whole, to reflective inferential processing (Carston, 2010). It appears, at 
least on the surface, that both client and therapist in this exchange are engaged in this 
alternative route of processing. Indeed, the therapist’s questions almost demand that the 
client sustains the literal meaning of her metaphorical expressions. For example, the 
therapist asks, “what does it feel like to be the balloon?” and “how could you regulate that 
flow?” These questions may be seen as an invitation or request for the client to engage in 
the metaphorical world route of processing. Note also how, towards the end of the 
extract, the therapist says “so who is this guard anyway?” This question invites the client 
to ‘bridge back’ to her life (the cognitive reality she has been describing metaphorically) 
and to consider who the guard in the metaphorical world represents in ‘real-life’. In light 
of Carston’s theory, this question may be seen as an explicit prompt to begin the process 
of subjecting the metarepresented literal meaning to the kind of reflective inferential 
processing which will lead to ‘real world’ implications. At this stage, the client may derive 
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implications which can be integrated with her existing (non-metaphorical) beliefs about 
her depression and which may even lead to the elimination of some of them (e.g. ‘I can’t 
do anything to control my manic phases’) if the new insights she has gained indicate that 
they are incorrect or unhelpful. 
The approach of metaphor therapist Kopp can be interpreted as inviting clients to 
entertain, develop and engage with the metaphorical world for two reasons. Firstly, so 
that clients may bring their unconscious thoughts (reflected by their metaphorical 
expressions) to the surface and, secondly, so that they may attain therapeutic insight, 
which is derived from accessing deep-rooted assumptions. Related to this first point, 
Kopp states that ‘the fact that a metaphor is false as a literal statement does not address or 
pertain to the way in which it is true as a correspondence of similar pattern or 
organisation’ (Kopp, 1995: 99). Here Kopp echoes Gregory Bateson’s view of metaphor as 
a phenomenon by which ‘the whole fabric of mental interconnections hold(s) together’ 
(Capra, 1988: 77). For Bateson, and for Kopp, metaphors are logically and literally false, 
yet at the same time, they may be apt representations of experience. That is, metaphors 
identify and point to an important structural resemblance between an imaginative 
conception and a concrete experience (‘a correspondence of similar pattern’, e.g. between 
the inflation/deflation of a balloon and the phases of bipolar illness). 71  Only by 
encouraging clients to extend their metaphors and to develop conceptually rich 
metaphorical scenarios can this structural resemblance, and its resulting insight, come to 
light. To immediately replace metaphorically used expressions with rapidly constructed 
ad hoc concepts would be inadequate as a representation of the client’s conceptualisation 
of their experience.  
As suggested in chapter 2, the process of constructing multiple local ad hoc 
concepts in the case of extended metaphors may also be overly demanding on our 
cognitive resources, given the high activation of the literal meaning of the whole 
metaphor, reinforced as it is by forwards and backwards priming between the literal 
meanings of specific words and phrases which depict a scenario with its own internal 
coherence. Yet, more to the point, in the context of psychotherapeutic exchanges, ad hoc 
concept construction is unlikely to reveal comparable effects to those elicited by the 
metaphorical world construction route. Specifically, it is unlikely to reveal the kinds of 
effects and insights that are so essential to therapeutic success and change. When one 																																																								
71 This view of metaphor as non-linear correspondence mirrors that of Dedre Gentner who ‘unifies 
metaphor with processes of analogy and similarity’ (Gentner et al., 2001: 199). Gentner and 
colleagues argue that metaphor comprehension is a process of structural alignment, alignment of 
relations as opposed to attributes (see Gentner and Bowdler, 2008). 
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engages in the more reflective, imagistic processing that takes place on the metaphorical 
world construction route, the literal meanings, and all their associations, work together to 
form a coherent scenario. This interim rich literal representation enables the ultimate 
derivation of an interpretation of much greater depth and insight, one which, in 
accordance with the aims of therapy, may shed light on our maladaptive thoughts. 
Thinking back to the therapeutic functions of metaphor cited in section 4.3, it is 
difficult to see how these effects could arise on the ad hoc concept construction route. 
The four primary uses of metaphorical language in psychotherapy were: (i) as a means to 
maintain safe distance from content and combat resistance, (ii) as a service to the 
therapeutic alliance, (iii) as a way to increase memorability and (iv) as a tool to generate 
new perspectives. Presumably, there is no safe distance from content if metaphors are 
continually interpreted via ad hoc concept construction. Likewise, the therapeutic 
alliance relies on the therapist outwardly engaging with and sustaining the literal content 
of the client’s metaphor, in a way that is suggestive of their having comprehended it via 
metaphorical world construction. As Sims says, ‘prematurely arriving at a solo 
interpretation of the metaphor’s meaning’ (as would be more likely if one had 
comprehended the metaphor via ad hoc concept construction) is the ‘chief pitfall’ to 
employing metaphor effectively (Sims, 2003: 535).72 Given the greater role afforded to 
imagery on Carston’s account, it is furthermore likely that interpreting metaphors via 
construction of metaphorical worlds will guarantee greater memorability of metaphors, 
which, as discussed above, is conducive to the resulting insight being retained and so 
implemented in the client’s daily life. Lastly, though comprehending metaphors via local 
ad hoc concept construction may facilitate new perspectives, these perspectives will be 
fairly shallow in comparison to those derived from the kind of holistic engagement 
required by the metaphorical world processing route. Needless to say, it is not possible to 
definitively verify that clients and therapists do indeed comprehend metaphorical 
utterances via the construction of metaphorical worlds. However, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that doing so would greatly strengthen the therapeutic effects that support 
psychotherapists’ use of metaphor.   
As was suggested in section 3.5 of the previous chapter, the expectation of 																																																								
72 Of course, it is possible that a therapist may comprehend metaphorical language via the ad hoc 
concept construction route, and that their continued elaboration of metaphorical meaning be a 
mere pretense at engaging in a process such as Carston’s. In other words, a therapist’s extension of 
metaphorical meaning may not reflect their pragmatic processing. What is important, however, is 
that the client assumes the therapist is engaging in this route of processing. It is the client’s belief 
that the therapist is attending deeply to the literal meaning of his or her metaphors which 
guarantees the therapeutic effect of the strategy in terms of servicing the therapeutic alliance.  
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relevance in the context of psychotherapy (at least in the context of psychodynamic and 
humanistic therapies) may be calibrated at a much higher level than is typical of most 
conversational exchanges. It follows that both parties involved in this process will be 
willing to engage in deeper levels of processing, for example in constructing and 
developing (impossible) imaginary worlds corresponding to the literal meaning of 
metaphors instead of immediate on-line local formation of ad hoc concepts descriptive of 
the actual world. I suggested that this high expectation of relevance might not be present 
to the same extent in instances of cognitive behavioural therapy. Therefore, accordingly, 
it may be the case that interpreters engaged in CBT will choose to comprehend 
metaphorical utterances by constructing ad hoc concepts, as opposed to metaphorical 
worlds.  
As emphasised in chapter 3, section 3.3.2, CBT is a largely solution-focused and 
goal-oriented approach; furthermore, it is a shorter process than psychodynamic and 
humanistic therapy. From my own experience, I found both CBT and psychodynamic 
therapy to be hugely effective. Nevertheless, I was able to distinguish a clear difference in 
terms of the effects of each method. While CBT afforded me valuable immediate coping 
skills that served to change my behaviour, it was in psychodynamic therapy where I 
attained a deeper understanding of the root of my maladaptive thoughts and behaviour, 
the how and the why of their existence. I believe that these distinct effects may be 
attributable to the pragmatic processing strategies that I was engaged in during the 
respective practices. When I spontaneously produced a figurative expression in 
psychodynamic therapy, my therapist would encourage me to reflect on that utterance 
and, if you like, to ‘run with it’, thereby entertaining and exploring its associated literal 
meanings. The metaphors that I recall from my experience of CBT, on the other hand, 
were all generated by the therapist, for example, he/she suggested that I was setting 
myself up to be a doormat. These therapist-generated metaphors were intended to 
provide a quick route to understanding my situation, and did not, it seemed, necessitate 
sustaining or developing the literal meaning of the metaphor vehicle. Instead, deriving an 
occasion-specific, albeit pretty conventional, sense of doormat was sufficient for 
generating the level of understanding required. In contrast to my own, ultimately 
extended metaphorical expressions from psychodynamic therapy, the therapist-offered 
metaphors in CBT served to provide a quick, snappy route to understanding and 
reframing my thoughts; they did not serve to foster deep insight.  
Since therapist-generated metaphors may not reflect the underlying beliefs of a 
client, it is not necessary to reflect on their literal meaning in the same way that it is 
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necessary to reflect on the literal meaning of client-generated metaphors, which typically 
arise during the course of psychodynamic and humanistic therapies. That different 
approaches to metaphor exist in CBT and insight-orientated therapies, speaks to the 
different interpretive effects that one may derive from interpreting metaphorical 
language. This, in turn, suggests that there is more than one route by which to interpret 
and appreciate metaphors. One could speculate that the different effects of client-
generated metaphors and therapist-generated metaphors reflect the different processing 
routes that the interpreter takes to comprehend the metaphors. Of course, this is not to 
suggest that therapist-generated metaphors are incapable of producing parallel effects to 
client-generated metaphors. To the contrary, an apt therapist-generated metaphor is 
perfectly capable of being highly evocative and accurate for the client; when this is the 
case I would conjecture that the client be moved to explore the metaphor, and its 
associated literal meanings, in depth (potentially indicative of their engagement in 
imaginary world construction). 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the rich therapeutic potential of metaphorical language, 
explicitly acknowledged and exploited by many psychotherapists. I have found support 
here for Carston’s imaginary world processing route and shown that the ad hoc concept 
construction route is not the only method by which metaphors may be interpreted. The 
effects sought during certain psychotherapeutic practices, I argue, may be best derived 
from interpreting metaphorical language via a process of imaginary world construction. 
As Lenrow (1966: 145) says,  
 
The wide range of connotations provided by metaphor [particularly metaphor 
whose literal meaning is sustained and scrutinised (my gloss, N-D)] stimulates the 
greater variety of associations in the client and thus helps make available the 
greatest variety of experiences from which the client may create new thoughts or 
interpretations of his behaviour.  
 
In the next chapter, I report on an empirical investigation of the imaginary world 
processing route that I have carried out in order to further assess its explanatory validity. 
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Chapter 5 · Empirical testing of the dual processing view 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the preceding chapters I have argued that the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept 
theory of metaphor comprehension may not be the only processing route available to 
hearers when interpreting figurative utterances. In describing approaches that advocate a 
greater, more sustained role of literal meaning in the comprehension procedure, I have 
sought to validate the existence of an alternative course by which we may process 
metaphorical language. I have argued that this may be a more appropriate path along 
which to travel in the case of certain metaphors (especially extended ones) and in certain 
contexts. As was demonstrated in chapter 2, the two processing routes are likely to yield 
different effects, which may be more or less desirable in different scenarios (recall the 
discussion of Karla’s depression as a toad, chapter 2, section 2.2). For example, if one 
wishes to develop rich, detailed images (as in interpretive contexts with a high 
expectation of cognitive effects, such as reading poetry or psychotherapy), it may be 
worthwhile processing metaphorical language by metarepresenting its literal meaning 
and engaging in reflective inferential processes. If the desired effect or outcome of 
interpretation is a more limited and more quickly yielded meaning, on the other hand, 
then constructing an ad hoc concept is likely to suffice.  
The imaginary world processing route, in which the literal meaning of 
metaphorical expressions plays a greater role in the interpretation process, is of particular 
relevance to this thesis given the focus on psychotherapeutic discourse. As has been 
discussed, in many therapeutic approaches clients are actively encouraged to work with 
their own metaphorical expressions. They may be invited to reflect upon and extend their 
metaphors, thereby entertaining far-reaching literal associations of those expressions. 
Such an approach would seem to require, or at least invite, the literal meanings of the 
metaphorical expressions to be sustained in the manner in which Carston (2010) 
suggests. The deep attention to one’s utterances that often takes place in psychotherapy, 
psychodynamic practices in particular, is recommended in the hope that it will invoke 
insight and changes in perspective. The implicit assumption of this approach is that 
suppressing related but irrelevant meanings, while potentially beneficial in terms of 
processing effort, will not yield the same effects as sustaining those meanings.  
Evidently, the theoretical arguments for the imaginary world processing route 
would be greatly boosted if they could be supported by empirical data. As of yet, no 
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studies have directly assessed this alternative mode of interpretation. In this chapter, I 
present two experiments in which I tried to test the predictions of the theory to see if I 
could find processing evidence to support it. Before that, though, I first survey some 
existing empirical findings on metaphorical language comprehension, the initial aim 
being to investigate the varied support for the ad hoc concept account. In my exploration 
of empirical research, I assess the ad hoc concept theory’s entailed claims that (a) we can 
be as quick to process metaphorical language as we are to process literal language, and 
that (b) activation of literal meaning is rapidly suppressed after the recovery of a 
metaphorical interpretation; in each case I focus on the empirical findings related to these 
proposals. In the subsequent section, 5.3, I outline the alternative predictions made by the 
imaginary world account of processing and suggest a number of paradigms which could 
shed light on the hypotheses made. The final section of this chapter is dedicated to my 
own empirical studies which investigate the claim that extended metaphors may be 
processed via a different mechanism from that of simple, lexical/phrasal metaphors, 
which I take to be understood via ad hoc concept construction.  
 
5.2 KEY FINDINGS FROM EXISTING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
5.2.1 COMPREHENDING LITERAL AND METAPHORICAL LANGUAGE: DISTINCT OR PARALLEL 
PROCESSES? 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, relevance theorists claim that metaphor is not a special 
category of language use, that it is continuous with other kinds of loose use of language 
and that, therefore, metaphorical language requires no special interpretive mechanisms. 
It is proposed that comprehension of metaphorical utterances proceeds in much the same 
way as that of literal language (see section 1.3.2 for further detail). The relevance-
theoretic position leads to two interesting claims that have been widely tested using 
empirical means. Firstly, if metaphorical language interpretation makes use of the same 
pragmatic mechanisms as literal language interpretation, then it should not be necessary 
to access a literal interpretation of an utterance before deriving metaphorical meaning.73 
It follows that metaphorical interpretations should be available from the beginning of 																																																								
73 Note the distinction between literal meaning and literal interpretation. In a sense, it is inevitable 
that interpretation proceeds via the literal meaning of a word (i.e. via the decoded concept). 
However, that literal meaning is not inevitably adopted as the interpretation. Whether the decoded 
concepts form part of the interpretation ultimately depends on the mutual parallel adjustment 
process (which considers literal meaning, context and cognitive effects in parallel). 
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processing. Secondly, the RT account entails that deriving the metaphorical meaning of 
an utterance need not be systematically either more complex or more costly than deriving 
literally intended meaning; in others words, metaphor comprehension need not always 
take longer than comprehension of literally used language. These claims stand in stark 
contrast to Grice’s theory of pragmatics, mentioned in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1, which 
entails a sequential model of communication in which figurative interpretations are only 
derived following rejection of default literal interpretations.  According to this literal-first 
view, literal interpretations have unconditional priority over alternative, figurative 
interpretations. It is, therefore, assumed by Gricean models that the literal interpretation 
of an utterance is automatically derived first and, inevitably, is quicker to process than 
figurative interpretations.  
Let us first explore the empirical evidence brought to bear on the non-sequential 
aspect of the relevance-theoretic model (that is, research designed to test whether or not 
hearers are obliged to start with a default literal interpretation before deriving a 
metaphorical interpretation). Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin (1982) tackled this issue by 
adapting Stroop’s (1935) task, which demonstrates that linguistic meanings are 
automatically activated during reading and cannot be easily ignored or suppressed. 
Stroop presented participants with colour words that were printed, either in ink of the 
colour which was denoted by the word, or in ink of a colour which was not denoted by 
the word; for example, red or red. When the word is printed in a colour other than the 
one it refers to, e.g. red, the stimulus is said to be incongruent. Participants’ task was to 
name the colour the words was printed in, i.e. to name the ink, e.g. to name red as green. 
Stroop found that subjects experienced difficulty with this task; they were both prone to 
errors and also slower to respond (compared to when naming congruent stimuli, e.g. red). 
Stroop’s study is taken as evidence that reading linguistic items is automatic and difficult 
to inhibit – if subjects were able to ignore linguistic items when reading, they would 
experience no difficulty with naming red as green. 
In their study, Glucksberg and colleagues investigated the automaticity of 
metaphorical interpretations, and considered whether figurative interpretations are, like 
the reading of linguistic items, automatic and difficult to inhibit. Their experiment 
employed a standard sentence verification task in which participants were presented with 
a number of sentences and asked to judge whether or not the sentence was literally true 
or literally false. Sentences belonged to one of five categories, detailed below:  
 
i. True, high-typical (Some birds are robins) 
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ii. True, low-typical (Some birds are penguins) 
iii. Standard false (Some birds are apples) 
iv. Metaphor (Some hearts are closets) 
v. Scrambled metaphor (Some flutes are jails) 
 
The metaphors were all literally false category membership statements, easily 
interpretable and clearly meaningful in the case of (iv) and difficult to interpret in the case 
of (v). It was predicated that if participants are capable of ignoring metaphorical 
meanings then it should not take them any longer to reject meaningful metaphors than 
scrambled metaphors, since the true non-literal meaning of the metaphor would not 
interfere with recognition of the falsity of the literal statement. Remember that 
participants’ only task is to judge whether or not the sentences are literally true (both (iv) 
and (v) are patently not literally true, though in some sense (iv) is figuratively true). If, on 
the other hand, metaphorical interpretations are automatic and difficult to inhibit, a 
difference in reaction time between meaningful metaphors and scrambled metaphors will 
be manifest, since the true non-literal meaning in the case of meaningful metaphors (iv) 
will have been automatically registered by the interpreter and will interfere with the 
literal truth judgement. 
Glucksberg and colleagues (1982) found that the availability of true metaphorical 
interpretations did indeed interfere with participants’ judgements of literal truth and 
falsity. Subjects were significantly slower to judge meaningful metaphorical statements as 
literally false, as compared to scrambled metaphors. This result was taken to support the 
claim that metaphorical interpretations are automatic and not optional: ‘people can no 
more easily refuse to understand statements such as Sam is a pig than statements such as 
tomatoes are red’ (ibid: 94). For Glucksberg, the accessing and rejection of literal meaning 
cannot be a necessary condition as figurative interpretations are, in principle, always 
available. 
McElree and Nordlie (1999) set out to provide further support for the non-
sequential model of figurative language comprehension. In their first experiment, 
participants were required to judge the ‘meaningfulness’ of sentences, while their second 
experiment replicated that of Glucksberg and his colleagues, which asked participants to 
judge the literal truth of sentences. In a modification of Glucksberg’s design, McElree and 
Nordlie set a response time limit for participants’ judgements, which enabled them to 
measure (a) the probability of participants converging on a literal or figurative 
interpretation and (b) the time course for each interpretation. Each experiment involved 
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three conditions, figurative (some mouths are sewers), literal (some tunnels are sewers) and 
nonsense (some lamps are sewers).  
In the first experiment, they found no difference between literal and figurative 
conditions, in terms of participants’ judgements of meaningfulness; interestingly, it took 
participants no longer to judge metaphorical statements as meaningful, than it did to 
judge literal sentences as meaningful. The authors use these findings to argue in favour of 
a non-sequential model of metaphor interpretation, on the basis that if literal meanings 
took priority in interpretation, then literal falsehood (in the case of metaphorical 
sentences) would interfere with participants’ meaningfulness judgements. As predicted, 
participants were significantly less likely to judge nonsense sentences as meaningful 
compared to metaphorical sentences. However, it was revealed that the temporal 
dynamics of figurative sentences and nonsense sentences were indistinguishable, i.e. the 
former took no longer to reject as literally true than the latter. The lack of distinction 
between figurative sentences and nonsense sentences in terms of the time course of literal 
truth verification might imply that figurative interpretations are not as automatic as 
Glucksberg and colleagues suggest. If figurative interpretations were automatic, one 
would expect participants to take longer in rejecting figurative utterances as literally true, 
compared to nonsense sentences. Still, McElree and Nordlie (1999: 492) stress that ‘time-
course profiles do not, of course, uniquely specify the type of mental processes that 
underlie the construction of a figurative or a literal interpretation’. They maintain that 
figurative processing is not contingent on an initial assessment of literal plausibility, 
taking as their primary evidence the finding that metaphorical sentences and literal 
sentences are equal in terms of meaningfulness judgements. Similar studies from Keysar 
(1989) and Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (1978) have supported this same 
argument: namely, that metaphorical and literal interpretations are ‘functionally 
equivalent’ in terms of comprehension (Keysar, 1989: 385). 
In summary, there is a wealth of data in support of the argument that metaphorical 
interpretations are not dependent on prior literal interpretations. Together these studies 
give weight to the claim that derivation of figurative meaning is neither optional nor 
necessarily more complex than derivation of literal meaning. These findings pose a 
problem for any ‘literal first’ sequential model of utterance comprehension, such as 
processing models based on Grice’s (1989).74 The findings, however, are in line with the 
relevance-theoretic account, which argues against the literal first view, proposing instead 																																																								
74 It is important to note that Grice himself did not make any predictions concerning processing; 
he described his account as a matter of ‘rational reconstruction’, and not as a psychologically 
accurate description of actual cognitive processes.  
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that mutual adjustment of explicit content and contextual implications takes place in 
parallel and may result in either a literal or figurative interpretation, depending on which 
items of encyclopaedic information are most highly accessible in the context and so 
employed in the derivation (Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 2008).  
It is important to acknowledge that the claim that metaphorical interpretations 
take no longer to process than comparable literal interpretations does come with certain 
provisos. Effects of familiarity, aptness and context, for example, have been found to 
affect the relationship between metaphorical and literal language processing. With 
respect to metaphor, ‘aptness’ is defined as ‘the extent to which the [metaphor] vehicle’s 
figurative meaning expresses an important [i.e. salient and relevant] feature of the topic’ 
(Jones & Estes, 2006: 19; for additional research related to aptness see Chiappe and 
Kennedy, 1999 and Pierce and Chiappe, 2009). Blasko and Connine (1993) studied the 
effects of familiarity and aptness using a cross-modal priming paradigm, which makes use 
of multiple (in this case two) sensory modalities. Participants were presented with 
metaphorical sentences, which did not have rich supporting contexts, for example ‘the 
belief that hard work is a ladder is common to this generation’. Subjects were first 
presented with this metaphor through headphones (auditory modality), and 
subsequently, were presented with a target word on the screen (visual modality); target 
words were either presented at the offset of the metaphor vehicle or 300ms later. The 
target word either bore no relation to the metaphor (thereby acting as a control target, 
e.g. ‘pastry’), a literal relation to the metaphor (e.g. ‘rungs’) or a metaphorical relation to 
the metaphor (e.g. ‘advance’). The participants’ task was to judge as quickly and as 
accurately as possible whether or not the target word was a word of English (a lexical 
decision task, in which some of the word strings presented were not words of English, e.g. 
‘gloj’).  
Blasko and Connine found that subjects were faster to respond to metaphor-related 
targets than to controls, both when the target was presented immediately and at the 
300ms delay. However, this effect depended on both the familiarity and aptness of the 
metaphors, such that the metaphor-related target (e.g. ‘advance’) was only facilitated in 
the case of highly familiar metaphors. Metaphorical targets were not facilitated by low 
familiarity metaphors, indicating that the figurative meaning of these metaphors was not 
immediately available. However, in the case of low familiarity metaphors that were highly 
apt (e.g. ‘they were warned that perjury is a boomerang many times’), figurative meanings 
were immediately available (i.e. the metaphor-related target ‘backfires’ was facilitated, 
even though the metaphor was not familiar). These findings indicate that both familiarity 
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and aptness affect the availability of metaphorical interpretations, and that aptness (or 
relevance) seems to contribute to availability of meanings to a greater extent than 
familiarity.  
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (1978) claim that it is necessary to place a 
condition on the assertion that figurative interpretations are automatic and do not 
require a prior rejection of literal meaning. The authors found a significant effect of 
context that mediates the speed with which metaphorically used language is interpreted. 
Metaphors that were preceded by a short context took participants significantly longer to 
read than literally used sentences. However, this difference disappeared when a longer 
context preceded the metaphor; in such cases, metaphors were once again readily 
comprehensible. These results indicate that while it is not necessary to derive a literal 
interpretation before deriving a metaphorical interpretation, the time course of the two 
meanings is not always the same; rich contextual preparation for a metaphorical meaning 
is often necessary, and without it, figurative interpretations may be delayed.  
It is worth noting that all the studies discussed in this section have tested the 
comprehension of relatively short metaphors, which typically conform to the standard X 
is a Y structure. Their findings, therefore, cannot, inform us of the relative speed with 
which extended metaphors are processed, compared to extended literal passages. Nor do 
they indicate anything about whether or not such language is processed via the same 
mechanism. It is interesting to consider whether extended metaphors would incur greater 
processing effort than their literal counterparts, as Carston’s (2010) account certainly 
seems to suggest: the literal meaning is metarepresented as a whole and engages more 
attentive (reflective) processing. The multitude of factors at play in such lengthy passages 
makes this a difficult issue to investigate empirically. The longer a passage is, for example, 
the harder it becomes to control for effects of word familiarity and complexity. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether a finding of longer reading times for 
extended metaphors would constitute a challenge to the standard relevance-theoretic 
approach or support for Carston’s alternative route. Any interpretation that involves the 
derivation of more implicatures will (other things being equal) incur more processing 
cost. While there is no reason to suggest that extended metaphors will always give rise to 
more implicatures than extended literal passages, it seems likely that they often will, given 
the well-attested open-endedness of metaphorical interpretation. It is possible that 
extended metaphors may take longer to process simply because interpreters are deriving 
more implicatures. If this were indeed the case, finding longer reading times for extended 
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metaphors would neither challenge the ad hoc concept account, nor support Carston’s 
imaginary world account.  
Whilst the aforementioned studies do not speak to our comprehension of extended 
metaphors, they provide stable evidence that simple metaphors at least are processed by 
comparable means to literal sentences, as the ad hoc concept account proposes. I turn 
now to an additional feature of the ad hoc concept account that pertains to the activation 
of metaphor inconsistent features of the literal meaning. This claim draws us closer to the 
differences between the standard RT proposal and Carston’s dual processing account, 
which make concrete and opposing predictions on this matter.  
 
5.2.2 PROCESSING METAPHOR: HOW LONG DOES LITERAL MEANING REMAIN ACTIVE?  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the pragmatic process of lexical concept adjustment 
(broadening and narrowing) by which metaphor is understood, entails that properties of 
lexically encoded concepts are either demoted or promoted. In the case of metaphor, 
features of literal meaning that are inconsistent with the metaphorical interpretation are 
dropped during comprehension (hence broadening of the lexical concept) while other 
features that are consistent with and relevant to the metaphorical interpretation are 
promoted (hence narrowing of the lexical concept). These relevant features which 
become central components of the derived concept (i.e. the metaphorical meaning) are 
accessed from the encyclopaedic entry of the metaphor vehicle (see chapter 1, section 
1.3.2 for further detail). Recall that promotion and demotion of features occurs as part of 
the process of constructing an ad hoc concept. When interpreting the metaphor ‘my 
marriage is a prison’ for example, properties of the lexically encoded vehicle concept 
‘prison’, which are not relevant to the metaphor, become ‘demoted’ (Carston, 2002). In 
particular, the logical (or defining) property, i.e. ‘means of incarceration of criminals’, is 
dropped and some encyclopaedic properties, such as ‘hard to escape’, ‘lack of freedom’ 
and ‘punishment’, become elevated to the status of content-constitutive components. 
Rubio-Fernández (2007, 2008) suggests that the promotion/demotion of properties 
manifests itself in degrees of activation of the properties in question.  
Whether or not demotion (or deactivation) is the result of passive decay or active 
suppression is not explicitly specified in the RT account. However, a number of studies 
have set out to test these two possibilities and, in doing so, have supported the claim that 
irrelevant properties of lexically encoded concepts are actively suppressed during 
language comprehension. In this present section, I first outline the difference between 
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passive decay and active suppression, and then survey two studies that relate to the 
distinction.  
Suppression is characterised as an active process in which the degree of activation 
of a given representation is reduced; decay, in contrast, is a passive process by which 
activation simply drops off. Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) distinguish suppression from 
other inhibitory mechanisms such as decay, on the basis that suppression requires a 
trigger, unlike other mechanisms of activation loss. In language processing, incoming 
information that is consistent with information already represented in the system is 
mapped onto the structure under construction, whereas inconsistent, irrelevant or 
confusing information gets actively suppressed. Decay, on the other hand, is a passive 
process, which does not require a trigger. Any mental representations that do not receive 
activation, due to being irrelevant in the context, decay automatically.  
In an effort to distinguish between decay and suppression during metaphorical 
language interpretation, McGlone and Manfredi (2001) conducted a lexical priming study 
in which participants were presented with prime sentences before being asked to 
interpret a metaphor. Prime sentences belonged to one of seven categories, detailed 
below, where the corresponding metaphor is ‘my lawyer is a shark’:  
 
(i) topic concept alone (Some lawyers are ****) 
(ii) vehicle concept alone (Some **** are sharks) 
(iii) metaphor-relevant property to the topic concept (Lawyers can be ruthless) 
(iv) metaphor-relevant property to the vehicle concept (Sharks can be ruthless) 
(v) metaphor-irrelevant property ascribed to the topic concept (Lawyers can be 
married) 
(vi) metaphor-irrelevant property ascribed to the vehicle concept (Sharks can be 
blue) 
(vii) baseline prime (Some **** are ****) 
 
Participants were instructed to read the primes (which were presented as above, asterisks 
included) ‘so that they might gain a head start in interpreting the subsequently presented 
metaphor’ (ibid: 1212). The prime sentences remained on the screen for 2000ms, after 
which the metaphor was shown and participants were asked to press the spacebar when 
they felt they had understood the metaphor (my lawyer is a shark). To motivate full 
understanding of the metaphors and discourage premature pressing of the spacebar, 
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participants were told that they would be asked to recall information about the primes 
and metaphors, and to answer questions about the meaning of the metaphors.  
The authors found that participants were quicker to respond to metaphors 
following the primes that belonged to categories (i) to (v). McGlone and Manfredi argued 
that the fact that the metaphor-irrelevant property ‘blue’ impeded comprehension of the 
metaphor (my lawyer is a shark) was indicative that the inconsistent literal interpretation 
of the metaphor vehicle (shark) had been suppressed during interpretation of the 
metaphorical sentence, i.e. ‘blue’ had been suppressed during interpretation because it 
was not relevant to a figurative interpretation of ‘my lawyer is a shark’. According to 
McGlone and Manfredi, the prime ‘lawyers can be married’ does not impede participants’ 
comprehension of the metaphor (my lawyer is a shark), since ‘married’ does not interfere 
with the identification of the metaphor topic’s intended referent (literal lawyers). Their 
results support the RT claim that irrelevant properties of a metaphor vehicle become 
demoted during language processing. Furthermore, their findings suggest that demotion 
is not merely the result of decay, that is irrelevant properties do not simply ‘“drop out” of 
the discourse representation’ (ibid: 1216); rather, demotion is the result of suppression, as 
evidenced by the negative effect that the prime ‘blue’ had on the interpretation of the 
metaphor ‘my lawyer is a shark’.  
In a bid to further test the activation of meaning properties associated with a word 
and to measure the point at which suppression of metaphor-irrelevant properties takes 
place, Rubio-Fernández (2007) employed a cross-modal lexical priming method similar to 
Blasko and Connine (1993). Participants in this study listened to a series of passages 
through headphones, each of which ended with a metaphor. For example:  
 
John doesn’t like physical contact. Even his girlfriend finds it difficult to come close to 
him. John is a cactus. 
 
After listening to this passage, participants saw a string of letters on the computer screen 
(e.g. ‘plant’) and were asked to judge whether or not the string in question corresponded 
to a word of English or not (a standard lexical decision task). This string was presented 
either at 0, 400 or 1000ms after the acoustic input.  
Rubio-Fernández found that both ‘distinctive’ properties of the metaphor vehicle 
‘cactus’, which related to the metaphorical interpretation (e.g. spike) and ‘superordinates’ 
(e.g. plant) which were not relevant to the metaphorical interpretation, remained active 
up to 400ms. This result is somewhat surprising from a relevance-theoretic perspective, 
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indicating that irrelevant literal meaning lingers beyond the point at which a relevant 
interpretation has been reached. Between 400ms and 1000ms, however, irrelevant 
meanings, such as plant, lost their activation. On the basis of previous findings, which 
indicate that superordinates remain active up to 1000ms in neutral contexts (Rubio-
Fernández et al., 2003), it is argued that the deactivation of superordinates is due to 
suppression, and not to decay. The ‘loss of activation [of superordinate properties of the 
metaphor vehicle, such as plant] could not, therefore, have been the result of passive 
decay but has to be due to active suppression’ (Rubio-Fernández, 2007: 360).  
McGlone and Manfredi’s and Rubio-Fernández’ research provides evidence in 
favour of the RT account, supporting the claim that irrelevant features of metaphor 
vehicles become demoted during the interpretation process. This claim is in line with the 
ad hoc concept construction theory, which asserts that logical and encyclopaedic 
properties that are irrelevant to the figurative interpretation are ultimately demoted, and 
do not feature in the ad hoc concept. However, Rubio-Fernández’ results suggest that 
irrelevant literal meanings may not be quite so quick to fall away as is implied by the ad 
hoc concept account. RT predicts that as soon as an ad hoc concept has been constructed, 
i.e. as soon as a figurative interpretation has been derived, properties that are inconsistent 
with or irrelevant to that interpretation, although central to the literal meaning (e.g. plant 
in the case of metaphorically used ‘cactus’), will lose activation. Rubio-Fernández 
demonstrates that this is not quite the case; figurative interpretations are often 
immediate, yet irrelevant (and even inconsistent) components of meaning remain active 
up to 400ms. The fact that literal, yet irrelevant, components of meaning remain active 
beyond the derivation of figurative interpretations could be taken as tentative support for 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world construction proposal; intuitively, if the literal meaning 
of a metaphorically used expression stays active, even when irrelevant, then that meaning 
is available for additional processes (i.e. more reflective inferential processes) to act on 
and utilise. In the section that follows, I consider the empirical implications that fall out 
of Carston’s alternative processing route, thereby clarifying the aims of my own empirical 
investigation.  
 
5.3 EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS OF THE ‘IMAGINARY WORLD’ ACCOUNT 
 
According to the dual processing view, when the accessibility of the literal meaning of a 
metaphor starts to heavily outweigh that of the metaphorical ad hoc concepts, the literal 
meaning ‘wins out’ for a period of time. In such cases, it is suggested that hearers 
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‘entertain the internally consistent literal meaning as a whole’ (Carston, 2011) and 
represent it as descriptive of an imaginary world. In order to derive the meaning intended 
by the speaker, this representation of literal meaning is metarepresented (hence kept 
apart from factual belief representations) and subjected as a whole to additional reflective 
inferential processing. 
Carston’s account implies that the literal meaning of metaphorical expressions 
comprehended via this route will remain active for longer than is standard on the ad hoc 
concept account. Therefore, if one were to construct a cross-modal priming study, like 
that of Rubio-Fernández’s (2007) study, one would expect that metaphor-irrelevant 
properties such as ‘plant’ for the example discussed above (‘John doesn’t like physical 
contact. Even his girlfriend finds it difficult to come close to him. John is a cactus’) would 
continue to be activated up to and perhaps beyond the 1000ms mark. In fact, it is 
hypothesised that the priming results for this target word in the case of an extended 
metaphor will converge with results from a wholly literal passage and be distinguished 
from the same word used to communicate an ad hoc concept, where, as mentioned 
previously, the literal meaning is suppressed before 1000ms. Such a finding would not 
only validate the dual processing view, but also inform the use of metaphor in 
psychotherapy – for such results could be used to recommend both the judicious use of 
metaphors and caution in doing so, as it demonstrates that they may have far-reaching, 
lingering consequences for clients’ thinking.   
 
5.4 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTRODUCTION 
 
The studies outlined herein are intended to explore Carston’s (2010) dual processing 
route and to explore whether extended metaphors trigger a distinctive mode of 
processing, one that is distinguished from the interpretation of simple metaphors and 
literal language. I aimed to test the following two claims in parallel:  
 
(i) Simple metaphors (when properly contextualised) and literal language 
correspond, in terms of the effort required to process them; 
(ii) Extended metaphors are distinct from both literal language and simple 
metaphors, in terms of processing (because their literal content is 
metarepresented).  
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These hypotheses were tested using a simple self-paced reading time paradigm, which 
compares the comprehension of the same expression preceded by three distinct contexts 
(three distinct conditions and types of passages): an extended metaphorical context, an 
extended literal context in which the final sentence is a phrasal metaphor and an 
extended literal context which is entirely literal. In all cases, the target expression, which 
is a literal sentence, appears after the context passages. The following sample items, with 
the target expression in bold and the phrasal metaphor in italics, illustrate the three 
different conditions: 
 
Condition A: Extended metaphorical context + target sentence 
Shirley’s cancer had broken into her life and stolen all her hopes for the future. Her 
sickness was a fierce dictator. She longed to emigrate and escape his clutches, but 
he had closed all the borders. As she plotted their reopening, determined to 
overthrow his controlling regime, he violently trampled on her soul, suffocating her 
beneath his heavyweight boots. This illness was a merciless tyrant. Shirley 
considered her funeral arrangements. 
 
Condition B: Extended literal context, with phrasal metaphor at the end + target 
sentence 
Shirley had been unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer six months ago and told that 
her chances of recovery were very low. She was determined not to die and was 
desperate to get well again by any methods. As she researched alternative 
treatments, the sickness continued, making her feel weak and disheartened, both 
her energy and hope diminished. This illness was a merciless tyrant. Shirley 
considered her funeral arrangements. 
 
Condition C: Extended literal context + target sentence 
Shirley had been unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer six months ago and told that 
her chances of recovery were very low. She was determined not to die and was 
desperate to get well again by any methods. As she researched alternative 
treatments, the sickness continued, making her feel weak and disheartened, both 
her energy and hope diminished. The illness appeared to be incurable. Shirley 
considered her funeral arrangements. 
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These materials were constructed so as to distinguish between the predictions of the 
relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account of metaphorical language comprehension 
and Carston’s (2010) proposal of extended metaphor interpretation. The reading times of 
the target sentences in these three different conditions were recorded, and used to clarify 
whether (i) simple metaphors involve the same pragmatic processes as literal language, 
and (ii) extended metaphors require distinct pragmatic processes from simple metaphors 
and literal language.  
It was hypothesised that if extended metaphors do trigger a different style of 
processing from literal language and simple metaphors, as Carston (2010) suggests, then 
switching from the extended metaphorical passage to the literal target sentence in 
condition A will incur additional processing effort, as compared to the simple metaphor 
condition and the literal condition, which presumably do not involve a shift in processing 
routes at the target sentence stage, since the target sentence is literal and, therefore, 
makes use of the same pragmatic process as the passage that precedes it. It is assumed 
that additional cognitive effort will be manifested by an increase in reading time. 
Consequently, it is predicted that the reading times of target sentences that follow a 
metaphorically extended passage (i.e. condition A) will be greater than the reading times 
of target sentences that follow extended literal passages (both those which have a phrasal 
metaphor at the end, condition B, and those without, condition C). In other words, the 
presence of a phrasal metaphor in condition B is not expected to affect the reading time 
of the target sentence, given the strong supporting context for that metaphor; reading 
times of target literal sentences in conditions B and C are, therefore, expected to 
converge. This hypothesis is based on Relevance Theory and the empirical work outlined 
in section 5.2.1, which supported the RT claim that processing simple metaphorical 
language and literal language involves the same mechanisms (and therefore, the presence 
of a lexical/phrasal metaphor should not disrupt the interpretation process).  
To summarise, only Carston’s (2010) account of imaginary world interpretation 
predicts that the target literal sentence will take longer to comprehend in condition A 
(after the reader has interpreted an extended metaphorical passage), compared to 
conditions B and C. According to the standard relevance-theoretic account of metaphor 
comprehension (Sperber & Wilson, 2008), literal language, simple metaphors and 
extended metaphors involve the same processing mechanisms. Therefore, the relevance-
theoretic account predicts no differences in the reading time of the target sentence across 
the three conditions, as the reader does not have to switch processing strategies in any 
condition (it should, in other words, be just as easy to read a literal sentence after an 
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extended metaphor, as it is to read a literal sentence after a phrasal metaphor or a literal 
passage).75  
 
5.5 PRELIMINARY OFF-LINE RESEARCH 
 
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Preliminary research was carried out in order to validate the materials constructed for 
this experiment, in which, as outlined above, I compared reading times of target 
sentences which are either preceded by extended metaphorical passages, extended literal 
passages which have a phrasal metaphor at the end or extended literal passages with no 
metaphors. Due to the sensitive nature of reading time tasks, it was essential that the 
materials were completely novel and designed specifically for the experiments discussed 
in this chapter. In addition, it was necessary that the experimental items adhered to a 
specific set of criteria in order to guarantee accurate, direct comparison between the 
processing of metaphorical and literal passages (see details below). Preliminary offline 
research was intended to establish the following: 
 
(i) All experimental items, context passages and target literal sentences, are 
readily comprehensible by readers; 
(ii) Target literal sentences cohere or fit (i.e. bear sufficient relation) to their 
preceding contexts in all three conditions. 
 
5.5.2 METHOD 
 
Participants 
60 native English speakers between the ages of 18 and 45 completed the pre-test 
questionnaire. Participants were recruited via the psychology subject pool database 
Prolific Academic and received £4 compensation for their time. 
 
Materials 
21 extended metaphorical passages were constructed, together with 21 corresponding 
literal passages with a phrasal metaphor appearing as the final sentence of the context and 																																																								
75 In accordance with standard regulatory practice, ethical approval was sought (and granted, 
reference LING-2013-06-23) for the experiments outlined herein. 
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21 passages that were entirely literal (i.e. no metaphorical uses of language); the target 
literal sentence was the same across these three conditions. The literal contexts in 
condition B and C, as can be noted from the sample items in section 5.4 above, are 
entirely the same, apart from the presence of a phrasal metaphor in the case of condition 
B. In order to match word length across conditions a single sentence was added to the 
extended literal passages (condition C), one that replaced the phrasal metaphor that 
appears as the final sentence in conditions A and B. Target sentences were constructed 
using only literal language; any loose uses that were included were highly 
conventionalised. Special attention was paid to target sentences to ensure that the link 
between them and their preceding passages was similar in all three conditions. In other 
words, the target sentence was constructed so as to flow as naturally as possible from the 
preceding context passages in all three conditions and not to be expected to any greater 
or lesser degree in any one condition.  
The extended context passages ranged between a minimum of 60 words and a 
maximum of 78 words. The average number of words in condition A (extended 
metaphorical context) was 69.33, range 61-78 (SD 4.43), while the average number of 
words in condition B (extended literal with one phrasal metaphor) was 68.52, range 60-78 
(SD 5.02), and for condition C (extended literal passage) the average number of words 
was 68.24, range 60-76 (SD 4.34). All target literal sentences were between 4 and 8 words 
long, with an average length of 5.71 words, and a standard deviation of 0.96. The most 
important consideration was that variances between conditions within each item were 
low. While as mentioned above the standard deviation of word length for each condition 
was 4.43, 5.02 and 4.34, for condition A, B and C respectively, the average standard 
deviation between conditions for any one item was significantly lower at 1.40. The phrasal 
metaphors that appeared in conditions A and B were on average 6.81 words in length, 
ranging between 5-12 (SD 1.97). 
The contexts, which preceded the target sentences, were all written with the 
following considerations in mind: 
 
(i) In the case of the extended metaphorical passages (condition A), an initial 
sentence employing literal language was sometimes necessary to introduce 
the figurative passage and facilitate comprehension (this is based on Ortony, 
Schallert, Reynolds and Antos’ (1978) work discussed in section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter, which demonstrates that metaphor interpretation requires 
contextual preparation). Consider for example:  
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Condition A: Extended metaphorical context + target sentence 
Chris found everyday life hard to cope with and felt an overwhelming sense of 
emotional frailty. His psyche was an intricately complex crystal, a rare and 
fine mineral that needed to be handled with sensitivity and caution. Chris 
was all too aware of the shattering effect other people’s careless handling 
might have. And so, he decided to lock himself away for fear of breaking 
entirely. His soul was a brittle shard. Chris’ social life was non-existent. 
 
Notice that the first sentence (shown in italics) is literal and eases the reader 
into the subsequent metaphorical descriptions. When such an introductory 
sentence was necessary, all efforts were made to ensure that the passage 
overall maintained a distinctly metaphorical feel, which was made possible by 
the length of the passages. 
 
(ii) Figurative expressions in the extended metaphorical passages were always in 
categorical form; therefore, no simile markers (such as ‘like’ or ‘as’) were used 
in the construction of these passages. 
 
(iii) The phrasal metaphor in the extended literal condition B was the same as the 
final metaphor used in the extended metaphorical condition. Like the target 
sentences, care was taken to ensure that this phrasal metaphor exhibited a 
similar degree of relation to the sentences that preceded it, in both the 
metaphorical condition and the literal condition. 
 
The offline questionnaire, to be outlined below, was intended to pre-test the experimental 
materials and to ensure that the contexts and materials constructed did indeed adhere to 
the guidelines above.  
 
Procedure 
The aims of the pre-test questionnaire were twofold: in the first instance, it was intended 
to establish whether the items made sense and secondly, whether the experimental items 
constructed (the literal target sentences) had a clear relation to the preceding context in 
each condition. The questionnaire, therefore, consisted of two different tasks:  
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(i) Rating the comprehensibility of the contextual passages and their literal 
target sentences; 
(ii) Rating how well the target sentences fitted their preceding contexts.  
 
In the first task, contextual passages were not distinguished from target sentences, unlike 
in the second task where the literal target sentences were underlined and, therefore, 
marked out for attention.  
Each participant was presented with 21 target sentences, 7 of which appeared after 
extended metaphorical contexts, 7 after extended literal contexts, which had a phrasal 
metaphor at the end, and 7 after wholly literal contexts. Which target sentences appeared 
in which condition was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were asked to 
rate, firstly, how much sense the passages made on a scale of 1 – 7 (1 = makes no sense 
whatsoever and 7 = makes perfect sense). The notion of ‘sense’ was elaborated as follows: 
 
In judging how much sense passages make, please consider how well you feel you 
have understood what the author is attempting to communicate. Understanding 
the content of the passage well indicates that it makes sense to you. 
 
Secondly, participants were asked to rate how well the target sentence fitted to the 
preceding context on a scale of 1 – 7 (1 = does not fit at all and 7 = fits perfectly), recall 
that the target sentences in this second task were underlined. This task was spelled out as 
below: 
 
If the underlined sentence seems to bear little relation to the preceding context, 
one would say that it does not fit that context well. On the other hand, if there is a 
comprehensible link between the passage and the underlined sentence, one would 
say that the underlined sentence fits the preceding context well. 
 
Note that the passages were the same in the two tasks; therefore, each participant saw the 
same 21 items twice. The questionnaire was built using the online survey software Survey 
Monkey, and was administered through a psychology subject pool database, Prolific 
Academic. For each task the materials were presented in a fixed random order.  
 
5.5.3 RESULTS 
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For the overall comprehensibility ratings (whether the items ‘made sense’), mean item 
ratings for the extended metaphor passages (condition A) ranged from 4.3-6.4, with a 
global mean of 5.4 (SD 0.55). The mean item ratings for the extended literal passages with 
phrasal metaphor (condition B) ranged from 5.1-6.5, with a global mean of 6.0 (SD 0.32), 
for the extended literal passages (condition C) comprehensibility ratings ranged from 5.3-
6.6, with a global mean of 6.2 (SD 0.32). Therefore, participants considered that the literal 
passages made the most sense, followed by the passages with a phrasal metaphor, 
followed by the extended metaphor passages.  
When judging how well the target sentences fitted their preceding passages ratings 
were slightly lower. The average rating of target sentences following an extended 
metaphorical passage ranged from 3.2-6.0, with a global mean of 4.9 (SD 0.91), for literal 
passages with a phrasal metaphor ratings ranged from 4.1-6.3, with a global mean of 5.3 
(SD 0.63) and for literal passages ‘fit’ ratings were between 3.7-6.5, with a global mean of 
5.2 (SD 0.87). Therefore, participants considered that the target sentences fitted better 
after the literal passages and literal passages with a phrasal metaphor, compared to the 
extended metaphor condition.  
 
5.5.4 DISCUSSION 
 
It was concluded from the pre-testing of materials that all contextual passages were 
sufficiently comprehensible. Following standard practice in experimental pragmatics (see 
Deamer, 2013), if an item had been found to have a mean score of below 3 on the ‘make 
sense’ scale it would not have been included in the experimental materials. However, 
items across all conditions had a mean rating of above 3, and as a result, none of the 
passages were rejected on that basis. 
In addition, it was concluded from the ‘fit’ results of the off-line questionnaire that 
the target sentences bore sufficient relation to their preceding passages in all three 
conditions. Again, if a target sentence had had a mean score of below 3 on the ‘fit’ scale it 
would not have been included in the experimental materials. Items across all conditions 
were consistently rated above 3, and were therefore not included in the on-line 
experiment, to be outlined below. 
 
5.6 ON-LINE EXPERIMENT 1: SELF-PACED READING TIME STUDY 
 
5.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
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As outlined in section 5.4, this experiment contrasts the processing of extended 
metaphors, simple metaphors and literal language using a self-paced reading paradigm. It 
was hypothesised that the reading times of the target literal sentences would be 
comparable when these sentences appeared after context passages that employed either 
wholly literal language or literal language with one phrasal metaphor. This hypothesis is 
based on the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor comprehension, which suggests 
that simple (i.e. lexical or phrasal) metaphorical language and literal language are 
comprehended via the same mechanisms, and that neither type of language requires more 
processing effort than the other.  
It is, furthermore, predicted that the reading times for target literal sentences that 
follow extended metaphorical passages will be slower (i.e. the reading times will be 
greater) than reading times of target literal sentences that are preceded by contexts which 
make use of literal language with one phrasal metaphor (condition B) and entirely literal 
language (condition C). This prediction is rooted in Carston’s (2010) proposal that 
extended metaphors inspire a different route of interpretation, distinguished from that 
applied to literal language and simple metaphorical language.  
 
5.6.2 METHOD 
 
Participants 
60 native English speaking adults aged between 18 and 45 took part in this study. 
Participants were recruited via the University College London psychology subject pool 
and received £4 compensation for their time. 
 
Materials 
As discussed above, all stimulus materials were specifically devised for the purposes of 
this experiment and were thus completely novel.76 21 extended metaphorical passages 
were constructed, together with 21 corresponding literal passages with a phrasal 
metaphor appearing as the final sentence of the context (the same phrasal metaphor that 
appeared in the extended metaphor condition) and 21 passages that were entirely literal 
(i.e. no metaphorical uses of language); the target literal sentence was the same across 
these three conditions. The extended context passages ranged between a minimum of 60 																																																								
76 The process of creating these materials took several weeks of intensive work and consultation 
with my supervisors and others. See appendix I for the full list of experimental items. 
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words and a maximum of 78 words. The average number of words in condition A 
(extended metaphorical context) was 69.33, range 61-78 (SD 4.43), while the average 
number of words in condition B (extended literal with one phrasal metaphor) was 68.52, 
range 60-78 (SD 5.02), and for condition C (extended literal passage) the average number 
of words was 68.24, range 60-76 (SD 4.34). All target literal sentences were between 4 and 
8 words long, with an average length of 5.71 words, and a standard deviation of 0.96. The 
average standard deviation between conditions for any one item was 1.40. The phrasal 
metaphors that appeared in conditions A and B were on average 6.81 words in length, 
ranging between 5-12 (SD 1.97). 
See below for a complete set of contexts for the target sentence: ‘Dan was forever 
complaining’. The target sentence appears at the end of each condition and is presented 
here in bold; the phrasal metaphor appears here in italics. Note that, in the experiment, 
the target sentences and phrasal metaphors were not marked in any way.  
 
Condition A: Extended metaphorical context + target sentence 
Dan tried everything he could to be optimistic, reciting positive mantras and 
forcing a smile. Yet, his bleak outlook remained, pessimism continued to invade his 
mind and body. No emotional antibiotics were strong enough to control the 
violence and strength of this poison that tormented him day and night. Hoping to 
prevent its toxicity from spreading to those around him, Dan shut himself away 
from the world. His negativity was a rampant infection. Dan was forever 
complaining. 
 
Condition B: Extended literal context, with phrasal metaphor at the end + target 
sentence 
Dan was always in a bad mood and appeared to be incapable of seeing the good in 
anything or anyone. Though he tried to be more positive, his bleak outlook on life 
remained. No amount of forced smiling helped. He knew that other people could 
sense his pessimism and worried about making them feel bad through his 
behaviour. This fear led Dan to isolate himself. His negativity was a rampant 
infection. Dan was forever complaining. 
 
Condition C: Extended literal context + target sentence 
Dan was always in a bad mood and appeared to be incapable of seeing the good in 
anything or anyone. Though he tried to be more positive, his bleak outlook on life 
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remained. No amount of forced smiling helped. He knew that other people could 
sense his pessimism and worried about making them feel bad through his 
behaviour. This fear led Dan to isolate himself. He hated his negative attitude. Dan 
was forever complaining. 
 
Counterbalancing 
3 lists of materials were created, each list containing 21 passages and their 21 
corresponding target sentences. Each list contained 7 items from each experimental 
condition (7 passages from the extended metaphor condition, 7 from the extended literal 
passage with a phrasal metaphor condition and 7 passages from the extended literal 
condition); no target sentence was seen twice by a single participant, i.e. target sentences 
were counterbalanced across the three lists. For example, if a target sentence (e.g. Alan 
was 90 years old) was preceded by an extended metaphorical passage (As he grew older 
Alan knew it was only a matter of time until death came barging into his home, uninvited, 
of course. Every day he listened closely for the loud sound of knuckles rapping callously 
against the door. He wished someone could bail him out, but death accepted no bribes. The 
grave, God’s bankruptcy court, would clear him of his debts. Dying is the final tax paid to 
the world) in the first list, then it was placed in an extended literal with phrasal metaphor 
context in the second list (With every year that passed, Alan became increasingly aware 
that his time on earth was limited. Despite being healthy and in good condition for his age, 
he was still expecting to die soon. His fear of death stopped him from leaving the house and 
enjoying his life. Desperately he wished for immortality, though he knew no such thing 
would be possible. Dying is the final tax paid to the world) and an extended literal context 
in the third list (With every year that passed, Alan became increasingly aware that his 
time on earth was limited. Despite being healthy and in good condition for his age, he was 
still expecting to die soon. His fear of death stopped him from leaving the house and 
enjoying his life. Desperately he wished for immortality, though he knew no such thing 
would be possible. Dying is an inevitable part of life), and so on. The order in which the 
experimental items appeared was randomised and participants were randomly allocated 
to one of the 3 lists.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment measured the time it took participants to read the target sentence that 
followed the different types of passages (extended metaphorical, literal with phrasal 
metaphor and wholly literal). A now standard method of measuring reading times was 
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used in which the reading times of sentences are recorded from the onset of the sentence 
on the screen until the participant hits a designated key on the keyboard. 
The experiment began with subjects reading a set of instructions in which they 
were told what buttons to press and what they would see on the screen. They were told 
that the experiment was a simple, computer-based study interested in how people process 
language. No information about the exact relationship between the context and the 
critical target sentence was provided. Subjects were instructed to read the passages at a 
normal rate, making sure that they understood each passage. 
After reading through the instruction page participants were told to press the 
spacebar to begin a series of practice trials. Passages were then presented on the 
computer screen in an adaption of a moving window display (Just, Carpenter & Wooley, 
1982). At the start of each trial, the display showed lines of dashes that represented all 
non-space characters of the passages. All sentences were read word-by-word, with 
participants hitting the spacebar to reveal one word at a time. After the first press of the 
spacebar the first word in the passage appeared at the left margin on the top line, 
replacing the dashes that corresponded to that word. In order to advance the moving-
window display and reveal the next word in the passage, participants pressed the spacebar 
again; words were revealed one at a time. When the second word was revealed (by 
participants hitting the spacebar), the first word was replaced again by dashes. After 6 
familiarisation trials, the participants were asked to press the spacebar when they were 
ready to start the main experiment; at this point they were also invited to ask the 
experimenter any questions if they did not understand the procedure. The press of the 
spacebar initiated the first screen of the first trial and the same procedure was followed 
for all 21 experimental items. Context sentences were displayed on the same screen as 
target sentences and therefore, not clearly distinguished by the experimental design. 
 
Apparatus 
The experiment was carried out using a small laptop computer, which was positioned on 
a table. Participants sat on a chair, in the same room as the experimenter, and operated 
the computer. The sentences were presented in lower case, font size 24. The experiment 
was programmed using self-paced reading time software Linger. 
 
Data analysis 
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The dependent variable in this experiment was sentence reading time. The independent 
variable was type of preceding context. The sentence reading time was calculated by the 
length of time from the onset of the target sentence text to the response on the keyboard. 
 
5.6.3 RESULTS 
 
Results were analysed from 59 participants, with one set of results discarded on the basis 
of the reading times being unfeasibly long. The raw data comprised 413 reading times per 
condition (7 each from 59 participants). Analysis was conducted on the last word in the 
target sentence. The mean reading time for this word in condition A (the extended 
metaphor condition) was 639ms (SD 111ms), in condition B (the extended literal 
condition with phrasal metaphor condition) the mean reading time was 607ms (SD 
89ms), and in condition C (the literal condition) it was 604ms (SD 121ms). Analysis of 
variance in reading times within subjects was analysed using a one-way ANOVA (with 
participants as the random variable (F1) and items as the random variable (F2)), and 
condition as the within subjects factor. There was no main effect of condition (F1 (2, 174) 
= 0.192, p = 0.825, F2 (2, 60) = 0.677, p = 0.512), indicating that there was no significant 
difference between reading times in the three conditions.  
 Further analysis was conducted removing outlier data points that were more than 
2.5 standard deviations from the mean for each participant. This resulted in a total of 12 
data points being discarded from condition A, 9 from condition B and 11 from condition 
C). For the resulting 1,207 data points, the mean reading time for the final word in the 
target sentences was 608ms (SD 87ms) in condition A, 595ms (SD 76ms) in condition B, 
and 576ms (SD 98ms) in condition C. Analysis of variance in reading times within 
subjects was analysed using a one-way ANOVA (with participants as the random variable 
(F1) and items as the random variable (F2)), and condition as the within subjects factor. 
There was no main effect of condition (F1 (2, 174) = 0.162, p = 0.851, F2 (2, 60) = 0.701, p 
= 0.5), indicating that there was no significant difference between reading times in the 
three conditions.  
 
5.6.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The first comparison, between reading times of the target expression (e.g. ‘Dan was 
forever complaining’) which followed the extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor 
(condition B), on the one hand, and the wholly literal passage (condition C), on the other 
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hand, supported the view that there is no processing distinction between literal language 
and metaphorical language, as predicted by the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept 
account. That reading times of the literal target sentences between these two conditions 
were comparable is suggestive that, as RT claims, lexical and phrasal metaphors are 
interpreted with the same ease as literal language. Furthermore, the lack of distinction in 
terms of reading times in conditions B and C implies that interpreting these two types of 
language (metaphorical and literal) does not require dramatic shifts in processing routes 
(i.e. shifting between metaphorical language interpretation and literal language 
interpretation does not incur additional processing effort).  
The second comparison revealed that, contrary to what seems to be predicted by 
Carston’s imaginary world account, literal expressions that follow extended metaphorical 
uses of language do not take longer to comprehend than literal expressions that follow 
literal uses of language and simple metaphorical uses of language. The lack of significant 
difference between condition A on the one hand, and B and C on the other, suggests that 
interpreting extended metaphors may not involve processes radically different from those 
enacted in literal language and simple metaphorical language comprehension. 
Participants demonstrated no difficulties with switching from extended metaphor 
processing to literal language processing (as is evidenced by the lack of increased reading 
time of the literal expressions that followed extended metaphorical passages). This lack of 
a significant difference implies that subjects were able to switch from processing 
extended metaphorical language to processing literal language with ease. This latter result 
is in line with the relevance-theoretic account of communication, which assumes that 
interpretation of extended metaphors proceeds in much the same way as interpretation of 
literal language and simple metaphorical language.  
Although the results are prima facie disappointing for the metaphorical world 
account, it may be that there were problems with the experimental design. Firstly, there is 
the question of whether or not the paradigm did, in reality, as was intended, measure 
participants’ comprehension of the passages. Though participants were instructed, and 
reminded, to make sure that they understood the passages that they were reading, this 
instruction was not incentivised by the experimental design. For example, there were no 
follow up questions at the end of the experiment, nor were there any questions during the 
experiment, which tested participants’ comprehension. On this basis, it is difficult to 
apply the results of this experiment to any model of language comprehension – it is 
possible that participants were pressing the spacebar somewhat robotically, and therefore, 
that their reading times are not representative of comprehension. Seen in this light, the 
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results can neither be used to support the relevance-theoretic account, nor to undermine 
Carston’s (2010) account of imaginary world interpretation. That is, the results and lack 
of significant differences between conditions need not be taken as an indication that 
extended metaphors are comprehended via the same mechanism as literal language and 
simple metaphors. In order to make such a claim it is necessary to conduct a follow-up 
study, which explicitly measures comprehension of passages and not just reading of 
passages. Such an experiment could use the same materials and roughly the same design 
as employed in the present study, adding a simple measure of comprehension to a third of 
the trials. For instance, after the extended metaphorical passage and literal target 
sentence below, participants could be asked to respond true or false to the statement: 
Hannah was underweight (the correct answer here is ‘false’). 
 
Hannah had become addicted to chocolate and was habitually over-eating. Her 
extra weight was an ugly blanket which shrouded her in heavy shame. When she 
first tried it on its warm thick fabric had seemed so comforting, but after a while its 
synthetic fibres began to irritate her. It was harder to tolerate, more and more 
uncomfortable, yet she wasn’t sure she could survive the cold without it. Obesity is 
an ungainly overcoat. Hannah tried to get more exercise. 
 
Supplementing the current experimental design with this measure of comprehension 
would make the results more informative for pragmatic theories, as was intended. 
A further criticism of the experimental design employed in the present study 
pertains to the presentation of items, which was word-by-word. It is possible that the very 
practice of pressing the spacebar to reveal each word, one at a time, may have encouraged 
participants to keep their reading time consistent and to get into a steady rhythm, which 
would minimise any variations in reading times (variations that the experiment was 
intended to reveal). It is made more likely that this occurred by the length of the materials 
in this experiment. All 21 experimental items were considerably extended (between 60 
and 78 words); each passage, consequently, required many spacebar presses, which is 
fairly demanding on the reader. The demands of the task may, therefore, have led 
participants to engage in a less natural style of reading, a kind of ‘keep going’ mentality, 
pressing the spacebar at a steady rate in order to minimise processing effort. If this did 
indeed occur, as the lack of significant differences between reading times suggests it did, 
then yet again, the reading times cited above cannot be taken as an indication of natural 
reading. Instead, the results reported reflect artificial reading that cannot be applied to 
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theories of pragmatic processing. Not only may the word-by-word presentation of items 
have encouraged participants to read in a steady, measured fashion, but also, the 
instruction to read at a ‘natural’ rate may have likewise been interpreted as instruction to 
read in a steady, measured manner – not to pause for longer periods of time, even when 
that felt appropriate for some items. By presenting passages sentence-by-sentence, as 
opposed to word-by-word and modifying the instructions slightly, it might be possible to 
remove this possible confound and, in theory at least, to achieve reading time measures 
that more accurately reflect natural reading and comprehension.  
As discussed, the results of the experiment do not demonstrate that 
comprehension of extended metaphorical passages necessarily involves a different 
processing route to comprehension of literal language and simple metaphors, since no 
significant differences in reading times were found between conditions. However, it 
remains possible that extended metaphors are indeed comprehended in a manner distinct 
from simple metaphors and literal language, not least because the experiment did not 
explicitly measure comprehension. It may be that reading times are simply an 
inappropriate measure to reveal the distinctive quality of extended metaphorical language 
interpretation.  
Recall that the experiment hypothesised a significant result between the reading 
time of the literal target in condition A, on the one hand, and conditions B and C on the 
other hand. It was suggested that the reading time of the literal target sentence in 
condition A would be significantly longer than the reading time of the literal target 
sentence in conditions B and C. This was predicted on the basis of switches in processing 
routes incurring additional processing effort, which would manifest in longer reading 
times. However, it may be that interpreters are simply adept at switching out of the 
imaginary world processing route and back into the literal processing route. Therefore, 
the change of interpretation route that may be required when switching from extended 
metaphorical language interpretation to literal language interpretation may simply be 
imperceptible to reading time data. Likewise, it is possible that reflective, inferential 
processing begins in parallel or overlaps with the constructing of an imaginary world 
(based on the literal meaning). By the time interpreters reach the end of the extended 
metaphorical passages they may, therefore, have already begun deriving real world, 
factual implications, which mesh closely with the meaning of the target literal sentence. If 
this were the case, one would not expect that shifting from imaginary world processing to 
literal processing would take any extra effort. Nevertheless, one would still hope to find a 
difference between literal language and extended metaphorical language in terms of the 
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lingering of widely spread-out literal associates. In other words, one would expect that an 
experiment designed to measure the effects (rather than the costs) of each processing 
route (the imaginary world processing route and the ad hoc concept construction route) 
might be better suited to reveal any differences that may exist, and thereby to support 
Carston’s imaginary world proposal. As mentioned earlier, a cross-modal lexical priming 
study, which measures the activation of literal associates at various temporal intervals, 
would be suitable for this endeavour.  
It is worth noting that when the aims of the study were explained to participants, 
many subjects estimated that they had behaved as the experiment predicted (i.e. that it 
had taken them significantly longer to read the target sentences after reading an extended 
metaphorical passage). One participant, however, remarked that he probably read the 
target sentences the same in all of the conditions, but that he took longer breaks after the 
extended metaphorical passage condition, contemplating a little further during these 
breaks. ‘Linger’, in which the reading time experiment is programmed, does not measure 
the time that each participant takes to move onto the next item, i.e. it does not measure 
the breaks that participants take between items. It would be interesting to observe the 
points at which participants decided to take breaks and to test whether they were more or 
less likely to do so after extended metaphorical items or items that employed literal 
language. 
If one was to find that participants were (i) more likely to take a break after 
extended metaphorical passages and/or (ii) to take longer breaks after extended 
metaphorical passages, it could be argued that, as Carston (2010) suggests, extended 
metaphors provoke more reflective processing (since breaks might indicate moments of 
reflection). Unfortunately, implementing this measure is somewhat problematic from an 
empirical point of view. After each passage, participants could be presented with an 
intermediary screen (before the presentation of the next passage). This intermediary 
screen could ask participants to press the spacebar when they felt ready to start the next 
passage. This would provide a measurement of the time taken to respond to this question, 
from which one could determine whether participants were more likely to delay pressing 
the spacebar, i.e. delay proceeding to the next passage, after reading extended metaphors 
(as opposed to passages which employ literal language or just one phrasal metaphor). 
However, posing this question might not test the presence of reflective processing as 
intended, since being presented with the question may inhibit any reflective processing 
that might have naturally taken place. Imagine that after an evocative, extended metaphor 
you are asked ‘press the spacebar when you feel ready to read the next passage’. This 
	 182 
instruction immediately takes you away from the extended metaphor that you have just 
interpreted, and thereby immediately interrupts any process of reflective interpretation. 
In the next section, I present an additional study designed to remedy some of the 
shortcomings that are manifest in the present experiment and that have been discussed in 
this section. This follow-up study was intended to provide a more realistic measure of 
comprehension time (as opposed to a measure of reading time) and also to reveal the 
divergent effects hypothesised to be involved in the interpretation of extended metaphors 
and simple metaphors. 
 
5.7 ON-LINE EXPERIMENT 2: SELF-PACED READING TIME STUDY AND FREE 
RECALL 
 
5.7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Parallel to the experiment described in the preceding section, this experiment contrasts 
the processing of extended metaphors, simple metaphors and literal language using a self-
paced reading paradigm. The predictions of this experiment mirror those of experiment 1 
(see section 5.6.1). To briefly summarise: (a) it is hypothesised that the reading times of 
target literal sentences in conditions B and C will converge; (b) it is predicted that the 
reading times for target literal sentences in condition A will be greater than those of 
condition B and C.  
The experiment to be discussed in this section is distinguished from experiment 1 
by virtue of five discrete design features:  
 
1. Items are presented sentence-by-sentence, as opposed to word-by-word. 
2. ‘True’ or ‘false’ comprehension questions follow experimental items.  
3. 7 items (i.e. passages) are added; these items act as fillers. 
4. The literal target sentence appears as the penultimate sentence, as opposed 
to the final sentence. 
5. A memory questionnaire follows the main reading-time experiment. 
 
The modification to sentence-by-sentence design is intended to lighten the cognitive load 
placed on participants and to minimise the chances of participants engaging in robotic, 
steady reading, as opposed to natural comprehension. Likewise, the ‘true’ or ‘false’ 
statements that followed just over a third of contextual passages is further intended to 
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ensure that participants engage their comprehension processes fully, and that reading 
time measures are reflective of interpretation. The 7 additional filler items, which appear 
in extended metaphorical form (much like condition A) are intended to balance the 
weightings of metaphorical and literal language items, such that participants read 14 
items that are largely literal and 14 items that are metaphorical. Since the literal target 
sentence appears as the penultimate sentence an additional, literal, sentence is added to 
the materials in this experiment. If there is a shift from the imaginary world route to the 
literal language route it is possible that it is not felt for some time, i.e. it is delayed. If this 
were indeed the case, analysis of an additional literal sentence would stand a better 
chance of revealing the processing shift effect.  
The offline memory questionnaire that followed the on-line reading time 
experiment served two functions: firstly, it was intended to strengthen the claim that 
participants’ reading time data are truly indicative of comprehension (and not shallow 
reading); secondly, it was intended to inform the imaginary world construction route and 
to reveal whether passages that make use of metaphorical language are more memorable 
than those that make use of more literal language. Since the imaginary world construction 
route is a more effortful process, it is predicted that when asked to recall stories from the 
reading time experiment, participants will be more likely to recall passages that appeared 
in extended metaphorical form (i.e. they will be more likely to recall passages from 
condition A, than conditions B and C). As well as asking participants to recall two 
passages from the on-line reading time experiment, the memory questionnaire, which 
will be outlined in the method section that follows, also probed for participants’ personal 
judgements concerning the stories that they remembered. For each story recalled, 
participants were asked: why do you remember this story? This was an exploratory 
question, for which I had no formal predictions concerning participants’ answers. The 
addition of the off-line memory questionnaire in this experiment adds a further 
hypothesis, namely: 
 
(i) Passages that employ extended metaphorical language are more memorable 
than those that make use of literal language or an occasional lexical/phrasal 
metaphor.  
 
This hypothesis is rooted in Carston’s (2010) imaginary (literal) world construction route, 
which implies that extended metaphors require deeper global levels of interpretation and 
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engage more imagistic representation, from which it should follow that they are more 
memorable, compared to passages that engage more local and immediate processing.  
 
5.7.2 METHOD 
 
Participants 
Thirty native English speaking adults aged between 18 and 45 took part in this study. 
Participants were recruited via the University College London psychology subject pool 
and received £5 compensation for their time. 
 
Materials 
The materials used in this experiment were largely the same as those used in experiment 
1, with the exception of a few modifications, which resulted from the revised 
experimental design.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this experiment, 7 metaphorical fillers were 
added to the existing 21 items. The length of these 7 metaphorical fillers ranged between 
63 and 77 words, with an average length being 67.86 words (SD 4.74).  
A few minor changes to the contextual passages in condition C were made, to 
ensure that the previous-to-critical sentences were of comparable length in all three 
conditions (A, extended metaphor condition; B, extended literal with phrasal metaphor 
condition and C, extended literal condition). Recall that in conditions A and B the 
previous-to-critical sentence is the same phrasal metaphor. It was only in condition C 
therefore, that a few adjustments to the previous-to-critical were made. In total, 4 
previous-to-critical sentences were modified (to ensure that they were of comparable 
length to the phrasal metaphors that preceded the critical sentences in conditions A and 
B). It was necessary that previous-to-critical sentences were comparable in length across 
conditions, since the items in this study were presented sentence-by-sentence. Had the 
previous-to-critical sentence been of different length in condition C, compared to 
conditions A and B (as was sometimes the case in experiment 1), any significant 
difference in the reading time of the critical target sentence could have been due to the 
differing length of the sentence that preceded the target. The lengths of previous-to-
critical sentences were, therefore, kept constant across conditions. This was intended to 
guarantee that any differences in reading times of the target sentences was a result of the 
type of language used in the preceding contextual passage, and not a result of the 
complexity of language used in the preceding contextual passage. 
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As an example of one change that was made, consider the sample item below. The 
full contextual passage is not provided; only the previous-to-critical sentence, the target 
sentence and the final literal sentence (added in this second experiment) are shown. As 
before, the phrasal metaphor appears in italics and the target sentence in bold: 
 
Condition A: Extended metaphorical context + target sentence 
Writing the concluding chapter was the final ascent to the mighty summit. Melanie 
was dreading the examiners’ report. She couldn’t wait for the viva to be over.  
 
Condition B: Extended literal context, with phrasal metaphor at the end + target 
sentence 
Writing the concluding chapter was the final ascent to the mighty summit. Melanie 
was dreading the examiners’ report. She couldn’t wait for the viva to be over. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: Condition C: Extended literal context + target sentence  
Her dissertation would be a great achievement. Melanie was dreading the 
examiners’ report.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2: Condition C: Extended literal context + target sentence  
Writing the concluding chapter of her dissertation would be a great achievement. 
Melanie was dreading the examiners’ report. She couldn’t wait for the viva to be 
over 
 
Counterbalancing 
Materials were counterbalanced as in experiment 1, with the same 3 lists utilised and 
randomly administered. The 7 metaphorical filler items were randomly added to each list, 
such that each participant saw 28 passages: 7 from condition A (extended metaphor), 7 
from condition B (extended literal with a phrasal metaphor), 7 from condition C 
(extended literal) and 7 metaphorical fillers. 
 
Procedure 
The first half of this experiment proceeded in much the same fashion as experiment 1, 
which was outlined in section 5.6.2, but, in contrast to experiment 1, passages and their 
target sentences were revealed sentence-by-sentence, as opposed to word-by-word. 
Therefore, every press of the spacebar revealed a new sentence. The experiment was set 
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up such that the target literal sentence of interest was always positioned in the same place 
on the screen, and importantly, this sentence never crossed a line boundary.  
In addition to reading 28 passages, participants in this study were also required to 
respond ‘true’ or ‘false’ to 12 statements. The correct answers for these statements were 
evenly distributed between ‘true’ and ‘false’, i.e. 6 statements required a ‘true’ response, 
and 6 statements required a ‘false’ response. Comprehension questions were also evenly 
distributed across conditions, i.e. 3 comprehension questions followed items from 
condition A, 3 from condition B, 3 from condition C and 3 from filler items. 
In the second part of this study, participants were handed a 2-page booklet. On the 
first page was an intermediary ‘distractor’ task, on which was a table with 4 rows and 6 
empty cells per row. Participants were asked to count backwards in 3s from the number 
on the first cell (e.g. 75 – 72 – 69 – 66 – 63 – 60 – 57). The purpose of this task was to 
prevent participants from responding to the memory questionnaire from short-term 
memory, i.e. to guarantee that participants did not just remember the last passage that 
they had read. On the second page of the booklet was a memory questionnaire, based on 
Martin, Cummings and Halberg’s (1992) study. For this task, participants were asked to 
answer the following 4 questions: 
 
(i) What was the most memorable story that you read during this experiment? 
Please try to remember specific details, exact words, phrases or sentences.  
(ii) Why do you remember this story? 
(iii) What was the next most memorable story? Again, please try to recall specific 
details, exact words, phrases or sentences. 
(iv) Why do you remember this story? 
 
Participants were instructed at the beginning of the experiment that statements to be 
verified as true/false would follow some passages, and also that the computer-based task 
would be followed by a short memory questionnaire. It was emphasised to participants 
that they should try to comprehend the passages in the experiment, in order to be able to 
perform on these two tasks. 
 
Apparatus 
The first part of the experiment was carried out as before, using a small laptop computer, 
which was positioned on a table. Participants sat on a chair, in the same room as the 
experimenter, and operated the computer. The second part of the experiment was 
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administered using pen and paper. Participants were given a two-page booklet; the first 
page contained the ‘distractor’ task (of counting backwards in 3s), while the second page 
consisted of the memory questionnaire.  
 
Data analysis 
The dependent variable in this experiment was sentence reading time. The independent 
variable was type of preceding context. The sentence reading time was calculated by the 
length of time from the onset of the target sentence text, to the response on the keyboard. 
 
5.7.3 RESULTS 
 
Results of both the target literal sentence and the literal sentence that followed this target 
were analysed from all 30 participants. The raw data comprise 210 reading times per 
condition for each sentence (7 each from 30 participants). To remove outliers, data points 
that were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean for each participant were 
discarded. For the target literal sentence a total of 18 data points were discarded, 4 from 
condition A, 7 from condition B and 7 from condition C. For the resulting 612 data 
points, the mean reading time for the target sentences was 1650ms (SD 377ms) in 
condition A, 1625ms (SD 275ms) in condition B, and 1577ms (SD 276ms) in condition C. 
Analysis of variance in reading times within subjects was analysed using a one-way 
ANOVA (with participants as the random variable (F1) and items as the random variable 
(F2)), and condition as the within subjects factor. There was no main effect of condition 
(F1 (2, 87) = 0.125, p = 0.882, F2 (2, 60) = 0.298, p = 0.743), indicating that there was no 
significant difference between reading times in the three conditions.  
For the final sentence, that followed the target sentence and that was also literal, a 
total of 17 data points were discarded, 6 from condition A, 6 from condition B and 5 from 
condition C. For the remaining 193 data points, the mean reading time for the target 
sentences was 1859ms (SD 449ms) in condition A, 1871ms (SD 466ms) in condition B, 
and 1898ms (SD 382ms) in condition C. Analysis of variance in reading times within 
subjects was analysed using a one-way ANOVA (with participants as the random variable 
(F1) and items as the random variable (F2)), and condition as the within subjects factor. 
There was no main effect of condition (F1 (2, 87) = 0.023, p = 0.977, F2 (2, 60) = 0.044, p = 
0.957), indicating that there was no significant difference between reading times in the 
three conditions.  
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Analysis of responses from the memory questionnaire, in which people were asked 
to recall two stories that were particularly memorable to them, was also conducted. As 
instructed, each participant provided details of 2 passages, all of which were easily 
identifiable; as a result 60 passages in total were recalled and coded with respect to the 
condition from which they had come. The results are summarised below: 
 
Condition 1st Story Recalled 2nd Story Recalled 
1st & 2nd Stories 
Combined 
Extended Metaphor (A) 40% 53.34% 46.67% 
Phrasal Metaphor (B) 16.67% 36.6% 26.67% 
Extended Literal (C) 43.34% 10% 26.67% 
 
When passages from condition B were recalled, 18.75% of responses mentioned the 
phrasal metaphor of the passage. When recalled stories were derived from the extended 
metaphorical condition, responses were often striking, in terms of the level of detail 
recalled, compared to stories from other conditions. Participants were asked to ‘try to 
remember specific details, exact words, phrases or sentences’. When the story had come 
from condition A, the language of the passage was often remembered almost verbatim. 
Analysis of participants’ responses revealed that of the 28 passages from the extended 
metaphorical condition, 60.71% (i.e. 17) of responses explicitly referenced the 
metaphorical vehicles of the passages (for the 11 remaining participants recalled only 
general features of the stories, which they reported using literal language). For stories 
from conditions B and C, responses were markedly shorter, with participants recalling 
less specific details and fewer exact words, phrases and sentences.  
All participants bar one provided reasons for why they had remembered each story 
(i.e. they answered the question ‘why do you remember this story?’ as instructed). Of the 
29 participants who gave reasons for their recalled stories, many participants provided 
multiple responses (i.e. multiple reasons). In total, 71 reasons were recorded; 35 for the 
first story and 36 for the second story. Coding of these reasons revealed 5 main categories, 
which all but 5 responses clearly belonged to; the 5 responses that could not be 
categorised as belonging to one of these 5 categories were labelled ‘miscellaneous’. See 
below, the 5 main categories identified: 
 
(i) Content of passage resonates with self. 
(ii) Content of passage is affective/emotional. 
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(iii) The language/imagery of the passage is notable. 
(iv) Passage uses name of friend/relative/self. 
(v) Passage was read more recently. 
 
Of these 5 categories, responses were distributed as follows: 
 
 1st Story Recalled 2nd Story Recalled Total % 
Resonates with self 13 10 32.39% 
Affective/emotional 5 5 14.08% 
Language/imagery 9 9 25.35% 
Name (friend/relative/self) 4 6 14.08% 
Recent 2 3 7.04% 
Misc. 2 3 7.04% 
 35 36  
 
2 of the 5 miscellaneous responses noted that the passages were memorable as the reader 
felt like they had learnt something. The other 3 responses pertained to an opinion on the 
content of the story: (i) it was interesting; (ii) it was nice; (iii) it portrayed a bad scenario 
(of a woman who had cheated); arguably, these responses could have been coded as 
‘affective/emotional’, since the reader expressed an opinion on the text, which was 
presumably grounded in an emotive reaction to the content of the story. 
Of the 18 stories that participants recalled on the basis of the language used in the 
story, or the images evoked by that language, only 2 of these stories came from the 
extended literal condition (condition C), 2 from the phrasal metaphor condition 
(condition B) and the remaining 13 from items that had appeared in extended 
metaphorical form (either from condition A, or from the extended metaphorical fillers, 7 
were from the former, 6 from the latter).  Out of the 30 participants, there were just 3 
subjects whose recalled stories both appeared in extended metaphorical form (the other 
27 participants recalled stories from a mixture of conditions). The 3 participants that 
recalled both their stories from extended metaphorical conditions (either filler items, or 
experimental items from condition), all reported doing so on the basis of the language 
used in those items. 
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5.7.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The lack of significant differences in reading time data across conditions mirrors the 
results from experiment 1, and is indicative that switching from interpreting either 
extended or simple metaphors to interpreting literal language does not present a serious 
cost to the interpreter. This finding may be taken as evidence against Carston’s imaginary 
world account, which as outlined, might seem to predict that target sentences that 
followed extended metaphors would take longer to read than target sentences that 
followed extended literal passages or simple metaphors. As was suggested in section 5.6.4, 
however, different processing routes for extended metaphors and literal language may 
exist, and it may simply be that interpreters are highly adept at switching between these 
different strategies.  
In addition, and as mentioned in section 5.6.4, since reflective inferential 
processing may begin in parallel with imaginary world processing, it is possible that 
participants derived real world, factual implications whilst processing the extended 
metaphorical passage (i.e. well before reaching the target literal sentence). If this is indeed 
the case, it becomes much less likely that shifting to literal sentences (i.e. to the target 
sentence in this experiment) would have imposed any additional processing effort on 
participants. It seems, therefore, that there are two ways to interpret the lack of 
significant differences in the experiments presented in this chapter. On the one hand, it 
may be that shifting between imaginary world processing and ordinary language 
processing is incredibly easy for interpreters, and therefore, imperceptible to reading time 
measures. On the other hand, it may be that shifting between these processing routes 
does not pose any significant cost to processing effort, since factual implications are 
derived during imaginary world interpretation. Evidently, neither of these interpretations 
calls for abandonment of the imaginary world processing route.  
In chapter 2, and also 4, I pointed out that the imaginary world construction route 
is claimed to be triggered not only by the use of extended metaphorical language. I 
proposed that certain communicative contexts and individual cognitive styles might 
likewise spark the shift from ad hoc concept construction to this more reflective 
inferential style of processing. It is possible that despite being highly extended, the 
metaphors in this experiment failed to induce imaginary world interpretation due to the 
experimental set-up itself, which intuitively, does not inspire reflection in the same way 
that, for example, poetry or psychotherapy does. A more appropriate experimental 
paradigm might, therefore, seek to induce imaginary world construction, not through the 
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use of extended metaphorical materials, but through the manipulation of the participant’s 
affective state. Still, inducing a reflective state (with high calibration of expectations of 
relevance) is no simple feat, and represents uncharted empirical territory, which as a 
result would be highly speculative.  
In the same vein of enquiry, that is testing whether different cognitive styles 
influence processing strategies, one could adopt a more passive experimental paradigm – 
not seeking to manipulate an individual’s affective state, but instead to observe their 
natural cognitive style. For example, one could combine the experiment described in this 
section with a psychometric questionnaire, which measures how people perceive the 
world and make decisions. Among other things, these questionnaires indicate how 
introverted versus extraverted a person is; that is, the extent to which they are ‘action’ 
versus ‘thought’ oriented, drawn towards ‘breadth’ of knowledge, or ‘depth’ of knowledge. 
The idea of such an exploratory experiment would be to see if the effects of extended 
metaphors, discernible from memory questionnaires, correlate with distinct personality 
types. For example, to see whether introverted people, who favour quiet reflection over 
interaction, are significantly more likely to recall extended metaphors than extraverted 
people. If interesting, and significant, correlations between memory questionnaire results 
and personality types were found, I believe that this would strengthen the claim that 
distinct processing strategies are available to interpreters.  
Regardless of the insignificant results reported in this chapter, I am inclined to hold 
onto the claim that extended metaphors may, in certain contexts at least, prompt distinct 
mechanisms of interpretation to those involved in the comprehension of phrasal 
metaphors and literal language. Indeed, the results from the memory questionnaire are 
very encouraging for Carston’s imaginary world route and indicate that extended 
metaphors do provoke different effects. That these passages were more likely to be 
remembered than passages that employed more literal language, particularly as time went 
on (i.e. particularly in the case of the second passage that was recalled), is suggestive that 
metaphorical language is often highly memorable. Recall that, of the thirty stories 
remembered second by participants, 53.34% of them appeared in extended metaphorical 
form, and only 10% in purely literal form. This finding is not only interesting in the 
context of Carston’s imaginary world route of interpretation, but also in the context of 
psychotherapy. These results support the use of metaphorical language in psychotherapy, 
where long-lasting effects, and insight, are widely sought. 
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Chapter 6 · Cognition and communication: disembodied (amodal) and 
embodied (modal) views 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis, so far, has explored cognitive accounts of metaphor interpretation, and the 
role of metaphor in psychotherapy. In chapter 1, I compared Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory to the relevance-theoretic account of communication, arguing that the latter 
provides a superior account of how metaphorical language is interpreted and how 
metaphorical meaning is derived on-line. No current investigation of CMT, however, 
would be complete without an exploration of more up-to-date research from within the 
discipline. In recent years, those within the CMT community have taken up work from 
the proliferating field of ‘grounded cognition’ to explain how language comprehension 
takes place. This move is intended to make the conceptual metaphor approach better 
equipped to provide an explanatory model of metaphor interpretation.  
Grounded cognition relies on an embodied view of the mind, which stands in stark 
contrast to the relevance-theoretic framework, which takes a disembodied, amodal 
stance. In this chapter, I outline the embodied (modal) view of the mind, on which CMT 
has recently come to rely and clarify how this view of cognition contrasts with that 
adopted by RT (and most other post-Gricean pragmatic theories). In the chapter that 
follows, chapter 7, I consider how the embodied cognition approach has been applied to 
theories of metaphor comprehension, and furthermore, explore how these updated views 
of metaphor comprehension from conceptual metaphor theorists affect the relationship 
between RT and CMT.  
While RT’s classic ad hoc concept account of metaphor comprehension has been 
compared to CMT (both by myself, in chapter 1, and by others), the more recent 
proposals from conceptual metaphor theorists, which rely on the embodiment literature, 
have not yet been considered in relation to RT. As well as considering the relationship 
between the embodiment account of metaphor and the ad hoc concept account of 
metaphor, I also consider the relationship between the embodiment account and the 
metaphor interpretation theories outlined in chapter 2 (all of which emphasise the role of 
sustained literal interpretation). Ultimately, I shall argue that while RT and CMT remain 
fundamentally distinct (and to some extent opposed) models of metaphorical 
communication, the recent developments from within each theory (from Carston (2010) 
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in the RT community, and work on embodiment in the CMT community) shift the 
alignment of the two theories, and bring RT and CMT into greater congruence.  
 
6.2 GROUNDED COGNITION 
 
Proponents of the grounded cognition approach profess a tight coupling of sensory-
motor and conceptual systems. According to this view, our conceptual resources are 
established in the brain’s systems of action, perception and emotion (Barsalou et al., 
2003). To say that conceptual representations and processes are grounded in sensory-
motor systems is to assert that knowledge about the world, which makes up the 
conceptual system, is grounded in the modalities (that is, our various sensory-perceptual 
and kinesic-motor capacities). As such, concepts, ‘the basic unit(s) of knowledge’, are 
multimodal and non-arbitrary (ibid: 84). This view stands in stark contrast to theories 
which assume that concepts are amodal (see Fodor, 1975, whose ‘language of thought’ is a 
central exemplar of this position). In order to connect concepts to perception and action, 
those who take the grounded approach seriously have emphasised the role of the body in 
cognition, thereby subscribing to an embodied account of cognition, in which the mind is 
taken to be embedded in the body. Concepts are related to (instantiated in) those brain 
regions which govern the body’s functioning in the world; that is to say, they are 
structured by encounters and interactions with the world, which take place via our bodies 
and brains. In this sense, ‘we do not simply inhabit our bodies; we literally use them to 
think with’ (Seitz, 2000: 23).  
While the embodied cognition view has received significant positive attention and 
considerable empirical backing in the last decade, there remain many unconvinced 
parties. Before evaluating its claims, I first consider the amodal view of concepts against 
which it is proposed. After this, I outline the central tenets of the multimodal approach, 
its entailed theory of language comprehension, and the empirical work cited in its favour. 
Ultimately, I intend to use my analysis of this empirical work as a springboard to suggest 
that embodied cognition may complement the seemingly disembodied amodal stance of 
the relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). In 
the subsequent chapter, I return to the processing of figuratively used language and 
demonstrate how the multimodal approach may shed some light on recent theories of 
metaphor comprehension developed within the relevance-theoretic framework, 
specifically the imaginary world processing route, and may even be recruited into them. I 
conclude the next chapter by exploring how embodied aspects of figurative language play 
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an important role in therapeutic practice, thus demonstrating that the theoretical account 
developed neatly applies to the use of figurative language in psychotherapy.  
 
6.3 AMODAL THEORIES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND UTTERANCE 
INTERPRETATION 
 
6.3.1 FODOR’S LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT 
 
The most notable advocate of an amodal theory of concepts is philosopher Jerry Fodor 
and it is against his work that embodied approaches to meaning are usually pitted. In 
concerning himself with how the human mind works, Fodor takes seriously the intuitive 
folk psychology that we all employ, that is, we humans routinely explain and predict each 
other’s behaviour in terms of mental states like beliefs, desires and intentions. In this 
respect, we are all folk psychologists. In Fodor’s view, the ‘folk’ are essentially right about 
the human mind and a scientific psychology will have much in common with these folk 
ideas. That is, he takes it that we really do have beliefs, desires, etc. and that they enter 
into our behaviour in the way that we folk psychologists assume, so that such ordinary 
reasoning about the mind as, for instance, ‘If X wants P, and believes that not-P unless Q, 
then, other things being equal, X tries to bring it about that Q’, is a valid scientific 
generalisation.   
As Fodor and many others insist, mental states such as beliefs and desires are 
intentional, by which is meant that they are about possible states of affairs in the world, 
that is, they refer (they have a semantics). This raises the big issue of how these 
intentional states are manifest in our minds and how they interact with each other in 
thinking, planning, making decisions, etc. Fodor’s answer to this question is his 
computational theory of mind (CTM), which is a version of the age-old view that human 
minds are representational. According to the CTM view, thinking is a kind of computing 
and the representations over which the computations operate are language-like, that is, 
they are syntactically structured and compositional. It is these formal structural 
properties of representations that enable us to make inferences and entertain trains of 
thought. This, in extremely short outline, is the view of the mind that has led Fodor to 
develop an amodal account of concepts, where concepts are the basic constituents of the 
structured sentences comprising the ‘language of thought’ (LOT or ‘mentalese’). 
In order for perceptual information to be usable by the mind, it must be 
represented in a way that is accessible to the computations that comprise thinking. In 
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other words, it must be represented in a format or ‘language’ that the system can 
recognise and so use in its computations. Fodor refers to this requirement as the ‘format 
constraint’. As he says, there must be what he calls ‘mechanisms of transduction’ if the 
mind (or a computer) is ‘to interface with the world at all’ (Fodor, 1983: 42). The function 
of these ‘interface systems’ is to register information about the world and to transform 
that input into a representational form which the central computational system can 
interpret and use. The input to these ‘subsidiary’ systems is therefore some kind of 
sensory-perceptual representation (auditory, visual, etc.) and the output is a conceptual 
representation, that is, a common amodal format which enables the computational 
integration of information from a range of modality-specific sources. ‘What perception 
must do is to so represent the world as to make it accessible to thought’ (ibid: 40). It is the 
form, and not so much the quality or content, of the representation that is paramount 
here since the computational processes are syntactic (that is, they operate on the formal 
properties of representations). The idea is that the semantic properties of conceptual 
representations are, for the most part, reflected in their syntactic properties.77  
As already mentioned, according to Fodor, the mental representations that make 
up our beliefs, intentions, etc. belong to the language of thought (LOT) or mentalese and 
it is this common language that ensures their common form and thus their ability to 
interact with each other, so that, for instance, the desire that Q and the belief that (P is 
necessary in order for Q to occur) interact inferentially to yield the intention to bring 
about P. Crucially, what makes LOT like natural languages is that it has a combinatorial 
syntax and semantics. It has a finite set of basic symbols and a finite set of syntactic rules 
for combining those symbols to form an infinite number of sentences (that is, to account 
for the productivity of thought). The meaning of any sentence in LOT is determined by 
the meanings of its primitive elements (i.e. atomic concepts) and its syntactic structure.  
In his comprehensive exposition of Fodor’s work, Cain writes that ‘understanding a 
sentence of English involves tokening a belief about the meaning of that sentence’ (Cain, 
2002: 54). By this, Cain refers to the fact that comprehension of a sentence in natural 
language entails generating a corresponding ‘sentence’ in LOT. It follows that LOT is 
capable of expressing everything that natural language can. In other words, believing, for 																																																								
77 Of course this is not always the case. To illustrate, consider co-referring expressions, which have 
the same semantics but a different syntax, i.e. expressions that refer to the same referent, but have 
a different form. For example, ‘Professor Dust’ and ‘The best saxophone player in London’ might 
refer to one and the same person but it doesn’t follow that they can occur in the same 
linguistic/conceptual contexts, e.g. ‘Mary believes Professor Dust is shy and retiring’ may be true 
while ‘Mary believes the best saxophone player in London is shy and retiring’ may be untrue. So 
syntactic distinctions are more fine-grained than semantic ones and these two co-referring 
expressions can give rise to different (formally-driven) inferences in Mary’s mind.  
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example, that Alice is pretty, involves tokening a sentence in LOT which is the conceptual 
analogue of the English sentence ‘Alice is pretty’. Intentional states, such as beliefs, 
desires, etc., those mental states in which Fodor is so interested, are said to bear distinct 
computational relations to sentences in the language of thought. 
Let me now return to the key point, which is a comparison of amodal concepts and 
multimodal concepts. For Fodor, concepts are amodal because integrating auditory, 
visual, linguistic, and other sources of information requires a modality-neutral system 
whose inputs (and outputs) are in a common format. Consider the following exchange 
between Nicola and Jane: 
 
Nicola: What shall we do now?  
Jane: We could walk up on the ridge if it’s not raining. 
 
They both look out the window and across the fields to the hill ridge Jane is referring to; 
they see black clouds and a wet sheen on the ridge, and conclude that it’s not a good idea 
to walk on the ridge and they’ll have to think of something else to do. Reaching these 
conclusions depends on integrating information that comes from language (Jane’s 
utterance), visual perception (of the state of the ridge and the sky in that region), and 
general knowledge stored in memory (about what black clouds usually indicate, etc.). 
Only when these three inputs appear in the same format can they be integrated with each 
other, and used by Nicola to reach the conclusion that they should not go for a walk up 
on the ridge. In other words, it is only when the visual perceptual representation, 
acoustic-phonetic representation and existing belief representations are couched in the 
same symbolic format that they can be brought together as premises in the inference. For 
Fodor, the format of this representational language is thus inherently non-perceptual as 
the different perceptual formats cannot, as it were, talk to each other (or function as 
premises in inferences or other mental computations). Unlike multimodal concepts, the 
structure of an amodal concept bears no resemblance to the perceptual state from which 
it was produced. In other words, while we might be able to retain a percept of the barking 
sound that a dog makes in the absence of a dog, that percept would be not be able to 
interact directly with the amodal concepts of the central system of thought. For percepts 
to interact with amodal concepts, the former need to be converted into the system’s 
common amodal format. 
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6.3.2 SPERBER AND WILSON’S RELEVANCE THEORY 
 
It is important to note that Relevance Theory subscribes to Fodor’s computational view of 
the mind and so to his amodal view of concepts. Following from this, concepts are 
considered at the abstract level and are viewed much like the address of a file. A concept’s 
address, or label, is responsible for ensuring two things: firstly, it provides the location at 
which various types of information can be stored in memory and secondly, it may appear 
as a constituent of a logical form. Information stored at the conceptual address, in the file 
if you like, falls into three distinct categories: logical content, lexical properties and 
encyclopaedic information. The logical content is made up of a set of deductive rules, 
which capture analytical implications of the concept, so this information is computational 
in form. For example, the logical content for the concept MONKEY contains an inference 
rule whose output is ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN TYPE. The lexical entry specifies linguistic 
properties, including syntactic, semantic and phonological properties, of the lexical form 
which encodes the concept. The encyclopaedic entry is representational and can be 
thought of as general knowledge about the denotation or referent of the concept in 
question. Simply put, it encompasses the set of assumptions for that category, and thus 
provides details about the ‘objects, events and/or properties which instantiate it’ (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1995: 87). Sperber and Wilson note that encyclopaedic entries are open-ended, 
varying across speakers and times, and are continually being added to as a result of our 
experiences. They say, ‘there is no point at which an encyclopaedic entry can be said to be 
complete’ (ibid: 88). Seemingly, relevance theorist Carston goes some way in extending 
the scope of the encyclopaedic entry by stating that it can also contain personal 
experiences and ‘idiosyncratic observations’ (Carston, 2002: 321). It is, furthermore, noted 
that this entry may be formatted in various ways, and that it may include mental images 
as well as amodal conceptual propositional representations. Nevertheless, an abstract 
level of representation remains fundamental to the view of concepts in RT, with sensory 
and motor content yet to be fully incorporated in the picture. 
While the amodal approach to meaning and Fodor’s computational theory of mind 
were most dominant in the 1970s, the early nineties saw a move away from this frame of 
thinking. In 1990, Harnad raised the ‘symbol grounding problem’: how, he asked, do these 
‘free floating’ symbols and words get their meaning and how are they connected to 
perception and action? Grounded cognition, which posits multimodal concepts, is an 
attempt to answer these questions. 
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6.4 MULTIMODAL THEORIES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND UTTERANCE 
INTERPRETATION 
 
6.4.1 BARSALOU’S PERCEPTUAL SYMBOL SYSTEMS THEORY  
 
At the heart of the grounded cognition view is the claim that the conceptual system is 
made up of multimodal concepts (that is, concepts which originate in all the modalities of 
perceived experience: vision, audition, haptics, olfaction, gustation) without any need for 
an amodal counterpart. This assumption entails that such concepts are capable of 
supporting cognitive processes such as those involved in memory, language and thought. 
Advocates of the amodal view, such as Fodor, take issue with the grounded cognition 
approach and call into question the role of sensory-motor information in the formation 
and constitution of our concepts. These theorists reject grounded cognition’s assumption 
that modal concepts are capable of supporting the full range of cognitive functions, such 
as those involved in comprehending verbal utterances, solving abstract problems, drawing 
inferences, making decisions and planning future actions.  
Barsalou believes that amodal theorists’ scepticism stems from a potentially 
misguided equation of modality-specific representations with ‘undifferentiated holistic 
recordings, such as those captured by a camera’ (Barsalou et al., 2003: 88). As opposed to 
capturing dynamic images, which might interpret the types of entities within a scene, 
recording systems capture only static images, representing ‘physical information by 
creating attenuated copies of it’ (Barsalou, 1999: 581). For example, if one takes a photo of 
a classroom, the photo merely records the light at each point in the scene, thereby 
creating a copy of it. It does not and cannot perform the type of functions that our 
conceptual system does. For example, a static image cannot register (categorise) the scene 
as a classroom and in so doing identify instances of student, table, chair, learn, sit, etc. 
Our conceptual system, on the other hand, is capable of such a feat: by binding ‘specific 
tokens in perception to knowledge for general types of things in memory (i.e. concepts)’ 
(idem). Similarly, no camera could provide categorical inferences the way that our 
conceptual system does, going beyond the photo and enabling the perceiver to infer for 
instance that the classroom exists in a primary school that is state-run.  
In order to differentiate simple holistic recording systems from perceptually based 
theories of knowledge, Barsalou developed his perceptual symbol systems theory 
(henceforth PSS). Perceptual symbols are not like photographs or images, they are 
‘records of the neural states that underlie perception’ (ibid: 582). Through PSS, Barsalou 
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sought to demonstrate that modality-specific symbols could indeed implement essential 
conceptual functions. His introduction of the theory, therefore, emphasises modal 
concepts’ ability to distinguish types and tokens, generate categorical inferences, combine 
concepts productively and construct propositions that interpret the world (idem). PSS 
relies on a number of key theoretical principles and mechanisms to explain how 
modality-specific approaches represent knowledge and are capable of achieving full 
conceptual functionality: re-enactment, selective attention, memory integration, 
simulator, frame and simulation. In what follows I outline these constructs and their 
utility with respect to implementing a fully functioning conceptual system, after which I 
consider Barsalou’s response to Fodor’s ‘format constraint’. 
Like virtually all accounts of the mind, including amodal theories of representation, 
PSS assumes that when a physical stimulus enters our perceptual field and we attend to it, 
information concerning this stimulus travels via our sensory channels. Physical stimuli 
cause or induce neural activations, so when we experience any event or entity, feature-
detecting neurons in the relevant neural system are automatically activated. 78  For 
example, when visually processing a car, neurons fire for edges and surfaces, while others 
fire for colour and motion (Barsalou, 2009). The overall pattern of activation represents 
the entity in vision. Similarly, representations of how the car feels and sounds will be 
represented in other sensory modalities. Naturally, different entities will exhibit different 
profiles of activation across the six modalities (vision, audition, action, touch, taste and 
smell) and not all will demonstrate activation in each area of experience. Where PSS 
diverges most clearly from classical amodal theories is in its description of how these 
neural activation profiles become available to and utilised by cognitive processes. 
Crucially, it is claimed that the same neural systems that underlie perception also 
underlie conceptual knowledge.  
Amodal theories maintain that neural representations of stimuli are ‘transduced’ 
into an amodal ‘language’ (see, e.g., Fodor, 1983), such as atomic symbols (Fodor), feature 
lists or semantic networks (see, e.g., Shapiro, 1979). In contrast, PSS ‘bypass[es] this costly 
transduction into an amodal code’ (Prinz & Barslou, 2000: 73) and, instead, cognitive 
processes operate on memories of the original sensory-motor states. In large part, the 
proposal relies on a connectionist view of the mind, which uses ‘neural networks’ to 
explain cognition (see Clark, 1993 and Chalmers, 1990 for further detail). In particular, 
Barsalou relies on Damasio’s ‘convergence zone’ theory (Damasio, 1989). Convergence 																																																								
78 A feature is defined as ‘a meaningful sensory aspect of a perceived stimulus’ (Smith & Kosslyn, 
2007: 162).  
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zone theory (CZT) hypothesises a particular neural architecture in which convergence 
zones, also known as association areas, integrate operations performed in a number of 
different locations into a single gestalt through temporal binding. The simultaneity, or 
synchronisation, of neural activity is the mechanism by which widely distributed memory 
traces are bound into unified concepts. As already discussed, when an object is perceived, 
relevant feature detectors in sensory motor areas are automatically activated. These 
initially activated neural features become stored in memory by neurons in association 
areas (conjunctive neurons), which code the pattern of activation and integrate activation 
patterns across different modalities. Convergence zones located near specific sensory-
motor areas capture patterns of activation relevant to that modality (e.g. binding 
information about shape, colour, size in vision), while convergence zones that are further 
away from specific sensory-motor areas capture higher level patterns of activation, 
integrating information across modality-specific convergence zones (e.g. binding the 
visual image of a dog with the simultaneous auditory image of barking). Once feature 
maps have been established, conjunctive neurons can partially re-activate the original set 
of feature detectors in the absence of bottom-up sensory input. This re-activation, or re-
enactment, of the earlier perceptual states contributes to the knowledge that supports 
memory, language and thought.79 
As Barsalou points out, re-enactment simply implements a ‘recording system’ that 
enables partial replication of experienced states. However, it is insufficient in executing a 
fully functional conceptual system since it does not interpret what each part of a 
recording represents, and so it is overly simplistic and incapable of supporting an account 
of inference. As previously mentioned, a recording or photograph of a classroom cannot 
interpret the entities in that classroom as belonging to the categories of student, teacher, 
etc. Barsalou thus proposes two additional mechanisms: selective attention and memory 
integration. When combined with Barsalou’s notions of a simulator and a simulation, the 
latter of which can be thought of as a partial re-enactment of sensory-motor states (to be 
discussed below), these mechanisms enable modal symbols (memories of sensory-motor 
states) to perform cognitive functions, such as interpreting entities as belonging to 
particular categories.  
Selective attention ensures that conjunctive neurons in association areas capture 
only selected aspects of a given scene; that is, restricted aspects of visual representations. 
To use Barsalou’s terminology, selective attention guarantees that components of 																																																								
79 For further information on CZT, including empirical support taken from lesion studies, see 
Damasio (1989) and Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson (1994).  
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perceptual states are captured, as opposed to entire states. To illustrate, consider being in 
a classroom at school. In observing and attending to the classroom environment, the 
brain does not capture the entire visual scene; instead, selective attention guarantees 
focus on a component of the scene, such as the teacher. Conjunctive neurons in local 
association areas integrate the neural features that represent this component, for example 
neural representations of the teacher, while neural features of other components in the 
perceptual state, such as the blackboard and students, are not included. During this 
integration stage, patterns of activation are coded to form ‘representations’. The 
operation is local in that visual association areas capture patterns of visual features, while 
auditory association areas capture patterns of auditory features and so forth. Patterns of 
activation across modalities are integrated further along the processing stream in higher 
association areas, in the temporal, parietal and frontal lobes, so that, for instance, a visual-
auditory representation of the teacher speaking is formed. The purpose of convergence 
zones, according to Damasio, is to ‘enact formulas for the reconstitution of fragment-
based momentary representations of entities or events in sensory and motor cortices’ 
(Damasio, 1989: 46).  
Memory integration then plays a crucial role. When selective attention focuses on a 
component, e.g. the teacher, a memory of that component becomes integrated with 
memories of similar components, i.e. similar teachers or people in authority, perhaps in 
education. This occurs as a result of conjunctive neurons being aligned to specific feature 
sets and, consequently, the same neurons are likely to capture the same visual 
experiences. Multimodal representations of categories, e.g. teachers, or cars, develop 
because ‘conjunctive areas are organised hierarchically to integrate information across 
modalities’ (Barsalou, 2003: 88). Selective attention and memory integration, as I have 
outlined them, clearly involve the visual and auditory modalities. Moreover, it is intended 
that modality-specific representations capture more general knowledge about entities 
also. For example, knowledge about teachers: how they prepare lessons, set homework, 
mark exams, have low wages, act as parental figures in students’ lives, etc. According to 
Barsalou, ‘perceptual symbols’ (defined as ‘neural representations in sensory-motor areas 
of the brain’ (Barsalou, 1999: 582)) arise across the sensory modalities, and two other 
modalities of experience: proprioception and introspection.80 Proprioception gives an 
awareness of one’s own body states (e.g. an awareness of hunger and tiredness) and 
introspection gives an awareness of one’s thought processes, which includes 																																																								
80 Barsalou (1999) acknowledges that his use of the word ‘perceptual’ does not equate to the 
standard sense of the word. For Barsalou, ‘perceptual’ refers not only to the sensory modalities, but 
also ‘much more widely to any aspect of perceived experience’ (585). 
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representations of emotional states. Barsalou says little about these modalities of 
experience and notes that the latter, in particular, is poorly understood compared to 
sensory-motor processing. It seems likely that at least some of the aforementioned 
information is captured by these additional modalities of experience. However, it remains 
unclear exactly how ‘functional’ information arises out of multimodal concepts. For 
example, where our knowledge regarding the purpose of teachers, their role in society, 
how they behave, what they sound like, how to interact with them etc., comes from.  
Barsalou goes on to introduce the terms simulator, frame and simulation, which, 
together with the concepts of re-enactment, selective attention and memory integration, 
enable a fully functioning conceptual system with multimodal representations of 
knowledge. A simulator is defined as ‘a distributed collection of modality-specific 
memories captured across a category’s instances’ (idem). Whenever a component of 
experience is repeatedly processed by attention, a simulator develops. Likewise, when a 
configuration of components of experience is processed numerous times a simulator is 
established for that configuration. Barsalou asserts that we have simulators for ‘objects, 
actions, events, settings, mental states, features, relations, and so on’ (ibid: 89). PSS refers 
to information accumulating in a simulator; in other words, simulators hold and contain 
information about components. On this way of viewing cognition, simulators simply are 
concepts. When we process a certain category, such as teacher, on a given occasion, a 
selected subset of information in the teacher simulator becomes active. The active subset 
of information in the simulator which is being processed at any given moment, that is, the 
specific components of integrated sensory representations across the category’s instances, 
is then ‘run as a simulation that functions as one of infinitely many conceptualisations for 
the category’ (idem).  
PSS accounts for the potential infinity of conceptualisations by enabling 
simulations to embed in one another, i.e. existing simulators (concepts) can productively 
combine to create new complex simulators (concepts). As Fodor has emphasised and 
Barsalou endorses, productivity (the ability to construct an unlimited number of 
representations from a finite number of symbols, using combinatorial and recursive 
mechanisms) is an essential property of the human cognitive system. Productivity 
naturally falls out of PSS, and can be thought of as the symbol formation process in 
reverse. For example, imagine a schematic perceptual symbol for ball in which only the 
shape is represented. Since the process of symbol formation establishes representations 
for colours and textures, these representations can be productively combined with those 
symbols for shapes to produce complex simulations such as red ball or deflated white 
	 203 
ball. Barsalou, furthermore, maintains that productivity can transcend experience. ‘By 
searching through the combinatorial space of possibilities, one can construct many 
similar simulations’ (Barsalou, 1999: 594). It is noted, however, that though productive 
potential is extensive in PSS, it is by no means a simple process. Constraints on the 
process exist and arise when a perceptual symbol cannot be applied to a simulated entity 
because it lacks a vital feature. To use Barsalou’s example, he notes that it is difficult to 
construct a simulation of a running watermelon because for something to run it is 
required to have legs.  
In his 1999 paper, Barsalou describes how simulators contain two levels of 
structure: ‘an underlying frame’ that integrates the record of neural activation that arises 
during perception across category instances and ‘the potentially infinite set of simulations 
that can be constructed from the frame’ (ibid: 586). The simulations are context-specific 
representations of a category and are multimodal. Given that they are constrained by past 
and present bodily experiences, they are often labelled ‘embodied simulations’. A 
simulation is constrained by bodily experiences in the sense that all information within 
the simulator, from which it comes, is based on an experience that has taken place within 
our bodies. We cannot experience any entity or event separately from how it makes us as 
individuals with distinctive bodies feel. For example, my simulator for teacher consists of 
a collection of modality-specific memories captured across my interactions with teachers 
and those memories and interactions are formed and affected by my body, by my 
existence as a female who cowers in the presence of authority, is hard of hearing, has a 
keen sense of smell, etc. Every memory is rooted in my body.  
It is important to note that simulations are never complete re-enactments of the 
modality-specific states, that is to say, a simulation is ‘not necessarily identical to the 
neural states that underlie perception, but they are cut from the same cloth, running the 
same systems in a similar manner’ (Prinz & Barsalou, 2000: 71). Presumably, the way in 
which a simulation differs from the neural states that underlie perception will vary 
depending on the simulation. One way in which the two may differ is in their level of 
detail; intuitively, a simulation will re-enact a smaller, perhaps more focused subset of 
neural states than perception that is often, but not always, less detailed than perception. 
In the case of certain experiences, the simulations of modality-specific states may be quite 
distinct, that is, quite far from the neural states that characterised the original experience. 
The simulation of pain is a clear case of this, e.g. recalling having burned one’s hand or 
broken a bone will, no doubt, be significantly less intense, and significantly less embodied, 
than the original experience. 
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Having outlined the central tenets of PSS, it is now possible to assess the system’s 
capability in terms of implementing a fully functional conceptual system. One necessary 
function of cognition is the ability to distinguish what’s known as types and tokens. Types 
refer to categories and tokens to instances of categories. For example, the sentence ‘the 
wine is in the fridge’ refers to a token of the type of thing known as ‘wine’ (i.e. a token of 
the category ‘wine’); whereas the sentence ‘wine is very expensive these days’ refers to the 
type ‘wine’ (i.e. to the category of ‘wine’). The distinction between types and tokens 
corresponds neatly to simulators and simulations, respectively. Types are categories, just 
as simulators, which integrate conceptual content of a given category across instances, 
are. As Barsalou notes, ‘a concept is equivalent to a simulator’ (Barsalou, 1999: 587). 
Tokens represent the objects which are particular instances of a category, and, 
analogously, simulations represent a particular form that a category can take. ‘The 
simulator is a type that construes a perceived token as having the properties associated 
with the type’ (ibid: 596). For example, from having multiple experiences with a particular 
kind of entity, for instance cars, a simulator (hence a concept) for that category develops. 
This simulator contains multimodal information within it, which is subsequently 
activated upon future experiences with cars. The theory implements type-token 
mappings through the process of simulation (specific conceptualisations or ways of 
thinking about the concept (ibid: 587)). When using the simulator car, in order to 
categorise and identify an entity, for example, one takes the integrated perceptual 
information in the simulator (the type) and re-enacts experiences of the object by 
producing a simulation (a token). The resemblance between the incoming sensory-
perceptual information and the component parts of the simulator, which become 
simulated are said to guarantee that the right simulator is activated.81 Such a type-token 
mapping also demonstrates PSS’s ability to construct simple propositions, since the 
aforementioned mapping constitutes the proposition ‘the perceived entity is a car’ (i.e. 
belongs to the category of ‘car’).  
Barsalou believes he can account for categorisation and categorical inferences by 
making use of the simulator-simulation distinction. Recall that the simulator of a category 
can produce an indefinite number of simulations for different instances of that category, 																																																								
81 Philosopher Mark Siebel contests that resemblance is capable of effectively identifying objects as 
instances of categories. Siebel illustrates his point by inviting us to consider ‘someone who sees a 
horse that looks like a donkey to him’ (1999: 632). He points out that the horse will activate ‘a 
neural representation that resembles the impressions he normally has when he sees a donkey’ 
(idem), ergo the best-fitting simulation for that impression will be derived from the donkey 
simulator and not the horse simulator. This in turn will lead to misidentification of the object. 
Seen in this light, there are significant gaps within PSS, specifically with regard to demonstrating 
type-toking mappings. 
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so, on any particular occasion of use, the simulator activates the ‘best fitting’ simulation 
available from its resources. It is suggested that one can determine whether or not a 
perceived entity belongs to a particular category by virtue of whether the simulator is able 
to produce a simulation for the given entity. If the simulator is not able to produce a 
satisfactory simulation then the entity in question is not a member of the category 
represented by that simulator. This account has an advantage over amodal theories, in 
that it does not have to explain how two different types of representation (amodal 
features and perceived entities) are compared in the categorisation process. However, 
Barsalou concedes that ‘the criteria for a simulation providing a satisfactory fit to a 
perceived entity remain unresolved’ (ibid: 609). The process of making predictions about 
an entity based on knowledge associated with that entity is what Barsalou refers to as 
categorical inferencing. As previously outlined, simulators contain a vast amount of 
multimodal information and as a result, the active simulation carries implications that go 
far beyond the information presented by the perceived instance. To use Barsalou’s 
example, if a car is perceived from the side, a simulation could generate inferences about 
unperceived components through ‘pattern completion’ (e.g. headlights, engine, the sound 
the car will make when turned on, how it feel to hold the steering wheel). Such information 
enables us to infer how to interact with objects and how to anticipate their behaviour.82  
Lastly, PSS is argued to be capable of constructing propositions, which describe and 
interpret the world, as a result of the binding of simulators and perceived category 
instances. Binding the car simulator to a percept of a car thereby maps a type to a token 
which implicitly constitutes a proposition, such that the perceived car is an instance of 
the car category. Complex hierarchical propositions, for example, it is true that there is a 
book on the table, are attained by embedding simulations in one another (by embedding 
the simulations of book, table and on) (ibid: 596). 
It is not entirely clear that Barsalou directly addresses Fodor’s format constraint 
(discussed in section 6.3.1 of this chapter), apparently assuming that it poses no threat to 
the explanatory adequacy of PSS. Barsalou’s failure to explicitly engage with Fodor’s 
format constraint may be a consequence of his adoption of a connectionist view of the 
mind, which denies the need for a centralised representational processor. Connectionism 
appeals to ‘neural networks’, which are models of the brain that consist of the analogues 																																																								
82 Barsalou briefly mentions introspective processing, by which he refers to the mechanism by 
which we represent entities or events in the absence of any incoming physical stimuli. He suggests 
that this ability involves ‘rehearsal, elaboration, search, retrieval, comparison and transformation’, 
though he notes that ‘much remains to be learned about the neural bases of introspection’ 
(Barsalou, 1999: 585). 
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of neurons and ‘weights’, which measure the strength of connections between neurons, 
i.e. weights generate statistical models of the effects of synapses which link neurons. In a 
sense, neural networks store activation patterns of sensory-motor information in a 
common format – they store such information in a statistical format. Barsalou (2008) 
argues that the mind is ‘sensitive to the statistical structure of experience’ (632). One 
might, therefore, conjecture that key cognitive functions, such as inference, operate not 
on multimodal concepts per se, which are represented in different formats, but rather on 
statistical models of multimodal information. Since my ultimate position is that the 
multimodal approach to cognition (see section 6.5) currently lacks conclusive empirical 
evidence in its favour, I shall not delve deeper into the complex debate between 
connectionism and more traditionalist views of the mind. However, lack of empirical 
evidence aside, more general problems with connectionism may give sufficient cause to 
reject the PSS modal account. (For arguments against connectionism, see Davies, 1991, 
Fodor and McLaughlin, 1990 and Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). 
 
6.4.2   LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION IN GROUNDED COGNITION 
 
6.4.2.1 ZWAAN’S ‘IMMERSED EXPERIENCER’ FRAMEWORK  
 
Barsalou’s theory of cognition offers a compelling characterisation of knowledge 
representation based on the key idea that concepts are rooted in perceptual, and 
potentially also motor and affective, experiences (i.e. that they are inherently embodied). 
It is interesting to consider one of the various approaches to language comprehension 
which have implemented this grounded cognition view in modelling the mechanisms of 
utterance interpretation; namely, Zwaan’s Immersed Experiencer Framework (henceforth 
IEF) (Zwaan, 2004).  
The ‘immersed experiencer’ of Zwaan’s framework refers to the hearer or reader 
who is immersed in discourse in the sense that he or she is richly engaged in a vicarious 
experience of the described situation. In keeping with the grounded cognition view of 
perception, IEF relies on the basic assumption that reading or hearing a word involves the 
activation of multimodal, as opposed to amodal, representations. More specifically, 
Zwaan claims that written text and speech activate both experiential representations of 
words (such as lexical, grammatical and phonological representations, which are of 
course themselves, sensory-motor representations on this account) and experiential 
representations of a word’s referents (for example, motor, perceptual and affective 
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representations). Seen in this light, language comprehension takes place via ‘the 
integration and sequencing of traces from actual experience cued by the linguistic input’ 
(ibid: 38).83 
In building a computational account of language understanding, the IEF appeals to 
three general processes involved in the comprehension procedure: activation, construal 
and integration. ‘Activation’ refers to the stage at which incoming words activate 
‘functional webs’. Functional webs are networks of neurons located throughout the cortex 
which are activated both during perception of a word and during our experience of 
objects and activities in the world which are the referents of words (Pulvermüller, 1999). 
In other words, they are the experiential traces associated with both the word itself and 
with the word’s referent, which according to Barsalou would be contained within a 
simulator. Imagine, for example, the utterance below: 
 
1. Mary visited the monkeys in the zoo.  
 
The activated functional webs will be those previously activated when we have come into 
contact with Mary, visited places, seen monkeys and been in zoos. As one would expect, 
the activated representation for Mary provides the context for the pattern of activation 
for the next functional web, thereby constraining the subsequent webs. If we know Mary 
very well, her functional web will exert a strong constraint on subsequent activation; 
conversely, if she is a stranger to us then the activation will not be strongly biased towards 
a specific representation. Since we may have a number of experiences with monkeys, 
having seen them from a number of different perspectives, the word will diffusely activate 
multiple overlapping functional webs; for example, a functional web encoding 
experiences of seeing monkeys in cages, and others that represent experiences of 
monkeys in the wild. ‘Construal’ refers to the process in which ‘initially activated 
functional webs are integrated to yield a representation of an event’ (ibid: 40). Zwaan 
focuses on the product of construal being ‘the appropriate visual representation’, thereby 
indicating that the outcome of the interpretation process on his account is something like 
an image. Note that Zwaan assumes that representations from modalities other than 
vision also contribute to construal. One can assume, therefore, that the outcome of 																																																								
83 There is an issue in Zwaan’s account, and in the embodied cognition approach in general, 
concerning interpreters’ first encounters with an object or a word. It is interesting to consider how 
processing works in such instances, where no ‘traces from actual experience’ exist. Bergen (2005) 
acknowledges this issue and suggests that while language comprehension is constrained and 
informed by past experiences, ‘combinatorial and other creative capacities allow departures from 
them [i.e. from previous percepts, actions and feelings]’ (ibid: 262). 
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interpretation for Zwaan is a mental image, which depicts information from a range of 
modalities (perceptual, motor, affective etc.). Naturally, the process of construal is 
constrained by grammar, with grammatical factors such as word order and case markers 
signifying what should be construed as the focal entity and what should be construed as 
background. The focal entity is often the subject of the clause, but in some cases, as in (1) 
it may be the object (the monkeys). Background entities are usually signalled by 
prepositional phrases (for example, ‘in the zoo’) and features referred to by adjectives (for 
example ‘Mary visited the endangered monkeys in the zoo’). 
To return momentarily to Barsalou’s theory of cognition, Zwaan’s construal 
process is akin to his account in terms of re-enacting the active subset of modality-
specific representations in the simulator, i.e. running a simulation. As previously outlined, 
the initially diffuse activation of multiple overlapping functional webs becomes 
constrained and integrated during construal, a mechanism which Zwaan refers to as 
‘articulation’. Articulation ensures that the appropriate visual representation (i.e. the 
appropriate mental simulation) results from the construal process. Returning to example 
(1), the prepositional phrase, in the zoo, acts as a constraint on the functional webs and 
guarantees that visual representations consistent with the description, of monkeys in a 
zoo, receive more activation than inconsistent visual representations, for example, of 
monkeys in the wild. The initially diffuse visual representation of monkeys is thus said to 
be articulated.  
The third process in the comprehension procedure put forward by Zwaan is 
integration: the ‘experiential’ move from one construal to the next. To put it differently, 
integration is the process by which transitions between construals, i.e. integrated 
functional webs that have yielded a mental simulation of an event, occur. Naturally, 
components of previous construals influence subsequent construals. Zwaan refers to the 
move between construals as ‘experiential’ since transitions are typically perceptual and 
often involve a visual aspect of ‘zooming, panning, scanning and fixating’ on the event 
depicted by the language. Zwaan’s example from The Hound of the Baskervilles illustrates 
this point most clearly: describing the house of the Baskervilles, Doyle writes: 
 
2. […] and the house lay before us. […] the centre was a heavy block of building 
from which a porch projected. The whole front was draped in ivy, with a 
patch clipped bare here and there where a window or a coat of arms broke 
through the dark veil. 
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The beginning of the sentence establishes the house as the focal entity, from which the 
reader then zooms in on ‘the centre’ of the house, and then further in on ‘a ‘porch’.  
Constructing a construal of the sentence that begins ‘the whole front’, our attention spans 
from the porch of the house to its greater frontage, which is covered in ivy. It is evident 
that the initial construals affect the subsequent ones; for instance, since the house is 
described as ‘lying before us’, when we zoom in on the centre of the house and later on 
the porch we continue to view it as if we were standing in front of it, as opposed to being 
in the porch for example. Zwaan outlines a number of factors that affect the ease of 
integration (the ease of transitioning between construals): concordance with human 
experience, degree of overlap between results of consequent construals, predictability and 
linguistic cues, e.g. when construals accord with our experience, or when neighbouring 
construals overlap and are predictable or familiar, they are easier to integrate and 
therefore, to process (see Zwaan, 2004 for further detail). 
It is interesting to note how different Zwaan’s account of utterance interpretation is 
from that of Relevance Theory. As previously outlined, the ultimate outcome on the 
relevance-theoretic account is a set of explicatures (inferentially developed from the 
logical form encoded by the utterance) and implicatures (contextual implications derived 
solely on the basis of pragmatic inference), both of which are representations in the 
Fodorian amodal language of thought. For Zwaan, on the other hand, the outcome of the 
construal process, that is, the process by which we interpret utterances, is presumably not 
a set of amodal conceptual representations, but a representation which is more like a 
mental image (or set of mental images).  
The hearer’s process of constructing an explicature on the RT account is geared to 
recovering the propositional thought intended by the speaker. Therefore, any 
misunderstanding between parties is manifested in a mismatch of propositional content. 
It is interesting to consider what a disparity between speakers and hearers looks like on 
Zwaan’s account. Perhaps the two mental images (of speaker and hearer), when placed 
one on top of the other (as it were), would reveal differences in form. Without a common 
code between speakers and hearers, however, it is difficult to see how images would ever 
strongly correlate between individuals. Furthermore, without explicitly building any 
pragmatic principles into the interpretation procedure, we have no account of how 
hearers decide that they have arrived at a correct or appropriate 
understanding/interpretation. What constitutes even an adequate interpretation, and 
what criteria are involved for reaching said interpretation, remains unclear. This omission 
may be attributable to Zwaan’s theoretical focus, which unlike relevance-theorists’ seems 
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to be not much concerned with a view of communication as the expression and 
recognition of intentions.  
According to Zwaan, language comprehension ‘occurs with a specific purpose in 
mind: to perform an action’ (Zwaan, 2014: 229). He describes how the action may not 
always be immediate, for example, sometimes it will be an act of committing information 
to memory to be used at a later stage; equally the act may be to ‘escape into a fictional 
world’, where matching propositional content with the writer is not the objective (idem). 
While there is no doubt that these are actions which may be performed as part of the 
overall comprehension process, Zwaan’s attention to these acts, over the more basic 
comprehension process of speaker intention derivation, is telling and possibly indicative 
of the way in which he has composed his theory. A fundamental requirement of any 
theory of language comprehension, as emphasised in chapter 1, is to explain speakers’ 
communicative intentions. Before one decides whether or not to commit communicated 
content to memory (to believe that content), it is essential to understand what the speaker 
is attempting to communicate, i.e. to derive communicated content (one cannot commit 
to memory what has not yet been properly understood). Zwaan’s attention to ‘actions’ 
appears to overlook the fact that verbal utterances are first and foremost ostensive stimuli 
(which come with a special kind of intention and which raise certain expectations for 
their audience). As a result of such oversight, IEF falls far short of the required model of 
any pragmatic theory of interpretation.  
Nevertheless, Zwaan’s Immersed Experiencer Framework presents an interesting 
attempt to extend the grounded cognition view of concepts as multimodal and embodied 
in order to provide a theory of language comprehension. In order to cement the 
multimodal concept account, to which many cognitive scientists are now committed, a 
number of experimental paradigms have been devised with a view to testing the account 
and providing it with empirical support. I review some of this empirical work in the next 
section.  
 
6.5 EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR A MULTIMODAL EMBODIED THEORY OF 
MEANING 
 
The empirical findings cited in support of the embodied approach to meaning are 
plentiful. There exists a wealth of data, gleaned from both behavioural and neural studies, 
which demonstrates activation of sensory and motor systems during conceptual 
processing. Nevertheless, the extent to which this activation data signifies the existence of 
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so-called embodied concepts remains highly questionable. In order to make an informed 
judgment on the topic, it is necessary to review the existing literature with a mind that is 
open to both modal and amodal approaches to meaning. 
Inspired by Barsalou’s thought experiment, Zwaan and colleagues conducted a 
number of experiments to test the claim that multimodal simulation is involved in 
language comprehension (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002). 
Barsalou (1999) had conjectured that systematic interaction between perceptual and 
conceptual (or cognitive) processes entails distinct visual representations for the two 
sentences: ‘the pencil is in the cup’ and ‘the pencil is in the drawer’. According to 
Barsalou, although the amodal account of representation recognises that these lexically 
distinct sentences encode or enact different conceptual representations, they cannot do 
so as easily as a mental simulation account of interpretation. The amodal account gives 
distinct representations for these two sentences, yet the orientation of the pencil is not 
directly encoded. Instead, it is inferred on the basis of what the interpreter knows about 
how a pencil is oriented in a cup and how a pencil is, most likely, oriented in a drawer (i.e. 
it is inferred from the encyclopaedic entries of the (amodal) concepts PENCIL, CUP and 
DRAWER). Barsalou argued that representation of the orientation of the pencil, vertical in 
the former sentence and horizontal in the latter sentence, is not a natural consequence of 
an amodal view of mental representation, which takes the two sentences to be 
represented as [IN[PENCIL, CUP]] and [IN[PENCIL, DRAWER]] respectively. He writes ‘in an 
amodal representation, such inferences would not be made, or they would require 
cumbersome logical formulae’ (ibid: 605), whereas they follow directly from a PSS 
account because they are a component part of those representations.  
In order to test the claim that utterance interpretation involves mental simulation, 
an experiment was devised in which participants first read a sentence which implied a 
particular orientation of an object (for example, he hammered the nail into the floor 
versus he hammered the nail into the wall) (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001). After reading these 
sentences subjects were presented with pictures and asked if the object depicted was 
mentioned in the sentence or not. It was found that pictures of the object that matched 
the orientation implied in the sentences were recognised faster than pictures that did not 
match the implied orientation. Sensitivity to the difference in orientation was taken as 
indicative of participants performing multimodal mental simulations during language 
comprehension. However, strictly speaking, and as previously emphasised, the amodal 
account makes the same prediction as mental simulation does in this experiment. 
Inferential processes, which form a central component of any amodal account, take ‘nail 
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into the floor’ as a premise rendering one conclusion about the orientation of the nail, 
and ‘nail into the wall’ as a premise that renders another conclusion. The results of this 
experiment are, therefore, far from definitive evidence in favour of the multimodal view. 
The ‘match effect’ was later demonstrated in other dimensions of visual experience. 
Employing the same paradigm, Zwaan, Stanfield and Yaxley (2002) found that 
participants routinely simulated the shape of entities. Therefore, after reading sentences 
that implied a particular shape of an animal or object, for example the ranger saw the 
eagle in the sky and the ranger saw the eagle in the nest, participants responded faster (e.g. 
in a naming task) to line drawings of the entities which matched the shape of the entity as 
described in the sentence just read (e.g. an eagle with spread wings or an eagle with folded 
wings). The authors emphasise that the propositional representations of the two 
sentences on an amodal account are largely identical, [[saw [ranger, eagle]], [[in [eagle, 
sky]]] and [[saw [ranger, eagle]], [[in [eagle, nest]]] respectively, and in so doing, they take 
their study as further support for the role of embodied simulation in language 
comprehension. Like Stanfield and Zwaan (2001), Zwaan and colleagues’ interpretation of 
their results fails to acknowledge that an amodal account makes parallel predictions, i.e. 
the same difference between response times to the two different shapes of the eagle is 
predicted by the amodal view, as a result of inferential processes which are not 
particularly cumbersome. These experiments, therefore, do little to boost the validity of 
the embodied simulation account. 
Independent work by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) backs up Zwaan’s findings and 
brings to light the ‘action-sentence compatibility effect’ (ACE), which has since been used 
to argue for the embodied theory of meaning. In this simple lexical decision task, 
participants were asked to judge the well-formedness of sentences by making a hand 
movement, either away from or towards their body (in one condition, a pushing action 
signified a nonsense judgement, while a pulling action signified a meaningful judgment). 
Subjects were presented with sentences which denoted an ‘away’ action, as in ‘close the 
drawer’, or a ‘toward’ action, for example ‘open the drawer’, or a nonsense sentence such 
as ‘boil the air’. It was found that the meaning of the action sentences interacted with the 
type of responses participants made. For example, when interpreting the sentence ‘close 
the drawer’ which denotes an away action, participants were slower to make a response 
which involved an incompatible movement, that is, moving the hand towards the body 
compared to the time it took to make a response consistent with the action described by 
the language, away from the body. This work has been used to corroborate the embodied 
theory of meaning and to suggest that processing language about actions or movements 
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involves motor simulations. That is, the longer response times are taken to indicate the 
interference of the motor schema activated in the process of comprehending the 
language, e.g., ‘close the drawer’ (pushing) on the motor schema involved in performing 
the action of pulling (as required in the experiment). 
Interesting data indicating the somatotopic activation of the motor system, from 
experiments by Hauk et al. (2004), has been used to make a similar point. In brief, this 
work demonstrates that action verbs associated with different effectors (e.g. hand, foot, 
mouth) are processed in different regions of the motor cortex. Participants in the study 
were asked to perform a lexical decision task, deciding as quickly as possible whether a 
sequence of letters constituted a word of their language. It was found that processing 
verbs referring to actions involving the mouth (e.g. ‘chew’), the leg (e.g. ‘kick’) or the hand 
(e.g. ‘grab’) activated the motor cortex areas responsible for the various areas. Again, such 
findings would seem to support an embodied simulation account of utterance 
interpretation and to indicate that an aspect of understanding action verbs, such as 
‘chew’, ‘kick’ and ‘grab’, involves re-activating the same neural substrates that underlie 
performance and perception of the sensory-motor activity depicted by the respective 
verbs. 
While these studies present a compelling case for the activation of sensory-motor 
areas during language comprehension, it is not clear that these results are incompatible 
with an amodal account of concepts. The case against the strong embodied theory of 
meaning is made by Mahon and Caramazza (2008), who make a different proposal of 
‘grounding by interaction’, which grants an important role in cognition to sensory and 
motor information but insists also on the existence of abstract symbolic representations. 
An outline of Mahon and Caramazza’s theory comprises the next section of this chapter 
after which I will conclude by suggesting how embodied cognition may complement the 
seemingly disembodied amodal stance of the relevance-theoretic account of utterance 
interpretation.  
 
6.6 UPDATING THE EMBODIMENT VIEW: MAHON & CARAMAZZA’S 
‘GROUNDING BY INTERACTION’ PROPOSAL 
 
In their comprehensive 2008 paper, Mahon and Caramazza take a critical stance towards 
the interpretation of the vast amount of empirical work which has been used to argue in 
favour of what they term ‘the embodied cognition hypothesis’, which states that 
‘conceptual content is reductively constituted by information that is represented within 
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the sensory and motor systems’ (ibid: 59). Effectively, they demonstrate that empirical 
findings which allegedly reveal embodiment effects can be just as easily explained in a way 
that is compatible with the disembodied cognition hypothesis, which views concepts as 
symbolic, abstract and, most importantly, set apart from sensory and motor information. 
Their line of argument results in the proposal of a middle ground position, between the 
two theories (the amodal and the multimodal concept positions), which they call 
‘grounding by interaction’.  
The ‘grounding by interaction’ position gives credit to the work that shows the 
activation of sensory and motor information during language comprehension and other 
conceptual processes, but does not agree that the results show that such information is 
constitutive of a concept. Much like the disembodied or amodal theory of meaning, 
grounding by interaction assumes that concepts comprise an abstract or symbolic level of 
representation, which is entirely distinct from sensory-motor information. However, both 
the abstract representation of a concept and the sensory-motor information associated 
with that concept contribute to the full account of concepts, with the latter 
complementing the former. As Mahon and Caramazza note, there is a large body of work 
that has demonstrated that the motor system in the cortex is automatically activated 
when subjects perform a wide range of conceptual and perceptual tasks; these findings are 
typically used in support of the embodied cognition hypothesis. However, they see no 
threat to the disembodied theory of cognition in this finding. They suggest that an 
amodal theory of concepts can account for this result, provided it recognises that 
concepts are not represented independently of (unconnected to) motor information and 
provided it does not exclude the possibility of activation of conceptual representations 
spreading (or cascading) to the motor system.  
Recall Glenberg and Kaschak’s experiment that brought to light the action-
sentence compatibility effect and was used to support the embodied cognition hypothesis. 
Mahon and Caramazza reframe their results in accordance with a disembodied (but 
interactive) picture. They suggest that, rather than activation of the motor system 
signifying that the system is involved in the semantic analysis of the sentence, the 
observed activation could be a result of information spreading throughout the system, 
that is, from the abstract amodal concept encoded by a verb, e.g. ‘kick’, to the sensory-
motor regions involved in performing the action it denotes. Mahon and Caramazza 
systematically go through a number of experiments and reframe them in this manner, 
concluding that: 
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Those findings do demonstrate that the motor and sensory systems are activated 
but they do not demonstrate that activation of motor and sensory information 
constitutes the semantic analysis of the sentence.  
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2008: 63) 
 
It is interesting to consider how Mahon and Caramazza’s proposal could be incorporated 
into the relevance-theoretic framework, thereby enabling it to account for the plethora of 
embodiment effects evinced by the cited empirical work.84   
 
6.7 EMBODIMENT EFFECTS AND THE RELEVANCE-THEORETIC AMODAL 
ACCOUNT OF MEANING 
 
This section is intended to move towards the accommodation of the ‘embodiment data’ 
within Relevance Theory, with the ultimate aim of considering how such a move might 
affect accounts of metaphor processing (to be discussed in the next chapter). It seems 
evident that, as Mahon and Caramazza suggest, amodal theories of representation need 
do very little in order to incorporate the data which has been taken to support the 
embodied cognition hypothesis; they need only acknowledge that activation of (amodal) 
conceptual representations may result in activation spreading to the sensory-motor 
system. Work in Relevance Theory does not preclude the possibility that activation 
spreads from the conceptual system to the sensory and motor systems; however, 
relevance theorists have certainly not sought to actively incorporate such a notion or to 
discuss how such sensory-motor effects might enter into the interpretation of an 
utterance.  
One way for RT to do this would be to include affective, imagistic and kinesic 
content in the encyclopaedic entries associated with conceptual addresses. It would not 
follow that this sizeable body of information is inevitably accessed and deployed 
whenever we come into contact with a lexically encoded concept, but rather it would 
acknowledge that it is stored, and activated (to some degree) whenever the concept is 
accessed. Take the example sentence below: 
 
3. She wore a beautiful coat made of fox fur. 
 																																																								
84 Note that Zwaan has recently adopted a similar perspective to Mahon and Caramazza, arguing 
in favour of a ‘pluralist view of cognition’ (2014: 229), which makes use of both abstract (i.e. 
amodal) symbols and grounded (i.e. modal) symbols. 
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If sensory-motor information is available during utterance interpretation, it follows that, 
upon reading or hearing the above sentence, an interpreter would be able to activate 
detailed perceptual information associated with ‘fox fur’, for example. Therefore, one 
might have a sense of the texture of the coat in question, vaguely entertaining a sense of 
its softness and warmth, perhaps. This information is not necessarily essential to the 
recovery of the speaker’s communicative intention, but it may be automatically activated 
anyway and simply linger in the background of the interpreter’s mind.   
Such a proposal raises many important questions. For example, how is the 
encyclopaedic entry formatted? If it is to include sensory and motor information 
distributed across varied neural channels, then presumably, it cannot continue to be 
represented only in terms of an abstract set of assumptions. I initially conjectured that 
perhaps the encyclopaedic entry is simply the pattern of activation in the sensory and 
motor systems, situated in a different neural location from the lexical entries. However, 
this proposal neglected the fact that the encyclopaedic entry necessarily contains general 
knowledge in amodal conceptual format also. It is essential that both these types of 
information are stored – general knowledge pertaining to the concept and sensory-motor 
information associated with the concept. An alternative solution is for the encyclopaedic 
entry to be a set of assumptions about the denotation of the category, i.e. for the 
encyclopaedic entry to be formatted as RT suggests, and for sensory-motor information 
to also be represented as a set of assumptions. For example, the encyclopaedic entry for 
CAT would look something like the following, where ‘x’ is a sensory perceptual 
representation: 
 
CATS ARE FURRY 
CATS HAVE FOUR LEGS 
CATS FEEL LIKE x 
CATS SOUND LIKE x 
 
An alternative, seemingly viable, solution is for the encyclopaedic entry to contain a 
set of assumptions about the denotation of the category (as per RT), together with a link 
of sorts that connects the encyclopaedic entry located in the conceptual system to 
sensory-motor and affective experiences located in the perceptual system (experiences 
which have been recorded and stored as neural patterns of activation). Essentially, this 
proposal would entail that activation in the conceptual system spreads to the perceptual 
system, by way of the encyclopaedic entry. It was suggested in chapter 1, footnote 12, that 
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if encyclopaedic entries contained conceptual metaphors (or conceptual schemes as 
Carston (2002) called them), then it would be necessary for these schemes to be sealed off 
from encyclopaedic information somehow (since unlike encyclopaedic information, 
conceptual metaphors are patently false). It is interesting to consider how the ‘link’ in the 
encyclopaedic entry that provides access to associated perceptual information would, or 
indeed could, be formatted and stored. If the link is to be included in the encyclopaedic 
entry, either it has to be formatted in the same way as general knowledge (i.e. in an 
amodal conceptual format) or it has to be sealed off or metarepresented somehow. For 
now, I leave these alternative options open and merely commit myself to the idea that 
affective, imagistic and kinesic information is accessed via the encyclopaedic entry. How 
these different representational types interact with each other is evidently an important 
topic for further research.          
If we take the broad suggestion seriously, that the encyclopaedic entry includes or is 
somehow linked to affective, imagistic and kinesic content, what impact might this have 
on the ad hoc concept construction route of metaphor comprehension outlined in 
chapter 1? It holds that the lexically encoded concept, which may now include (or at least 
give access to) a range of sensory and motor information accessed via the encyclopaedic 
entry, will be replaced by the pragmatically derived ad hoc concept, which is rapidly 
constructed in on-line interpretation. Given this rapid construction, it is unlikely that any 
sensory and motor information will play a major role in the process of interpretation. 
Arguably, the addition of sensory and motor information into the encyclopaedic entry 
will have little impact on this component of the theory. However, for the more recent 
account of metaphor processing proposed by Carston (2010), and outlined in chapter 2, I 
believe that it may provide some interesting insight and a way of reframing the distinction 
between the two modes of metaphor processing proposed within RT. The chapter that 
follows, which looks at embodied accounts of metaphor processing, will delve deeper into 
this idea. Essentially, I suggest that perceptual information plays a more prominent role in 
the imaginary world interpretation process, as a result of the quality of attention given to 
the encyclopaedic information during this process, attention that occurs as a result of the 
interpreter slowing down (i.e. engaging in more reflective processing).  
 
6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that a purely embodied view of concepts, 
whilst interesting, is not justified by current empirical findings. Likewise, a purely amodal 
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view of concepts, which does not incorporate the notion of activation spreading from the 
conceptual system to sensory and motor systems, can no longer be taken seriously, given 
the mass of research findings which demonstrate activation in these areas during 
conceptual processing. I have suggested that Relevance Theory, which subscribes to an 
amodal view of concepts, is able to account for these findings either by broadening its 
notion of the encyclopaedic entry or by incorporating a more comprehensive account of 
spreading activation than it currently has.  
In the next chapter, I explore the embodied account of metaphor processing, which 
fits closely with the CMT view of Lakoff and others, that is, abstract concepts (e.g. life, 
love, psychological traits), which so often feature as the topic of metaphorical language 
use, are taken to be structured by conceptual metaphors. I set this embodied account of 
metaphor processing against Carston’s (2010) imaginary world account, which, being 
grounded in RT, is based on an amodal view of cognition, and does not support the 
notion of underlying metaphorical thought. Ultimately, I reject the embodied theory of 
metaphor processing and CMT’s claim that abstract concepts are structured 
metaphorically in cognition. Nevertheless, I try to hold onto the insights afforded by 
embodied theories of language comprehension and use them to explain the rich, imagistic 
and full-bodied effects that are derived on Carston’s (2010) imaginary world construction 
route.  
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Chapter 7 · Metaphor and embodied cognition 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Having explored two different approaches to utterance interpretation, embodied and 
amodal, I now consider how the embodied approach to meaning has been applied and 
developed within an account of figurative language processing. Most notable in this field 
is the account proposed by Bergen (2005), and endorsed by Gibbs (2006), developed in 
the framework of ‘simulation semantics’, which draws on Barsalou’s ideas about sensory-
motor simulation reviewed in the previous chapter. I begin this chapter with an outline of 
the simulation semantics approach, after which I consider the entailed theory of 
metaphor interpretation and, in section 7.3, the empirical research brought to bear on its 
hypotheses. To some extent, embodied theories of metaphor processing rely on 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (outlined in chapter 1). As a result, I once more return to 
CMT and re-evaluate the theory’s arguments concerning conceptual structure.  
Section 7.4 clarifies the parallels and differences between the embodied approach 
to metaphor interpretation and the approach of amodal theories to metaphor 
interpretation, both that of the standard relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account and 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world construction account. As suggested in the previous 
chapter, it is possible to modify the relevance-theoretic notion of a concept, either by 
enriching encyclopaedic entries with modality-specific components or by incorporating a 
more comprehensive notion of spreading activation (from amodal concepts to sensory-
motor information). With the idea of this ‘upgraded’ amodal concept in mind, section 7.5 
is dedicated to a more focused comparison of Bergen’s modal embodied simulation 
theory and Carston’s (2010) amodal imaginary world route of interpretation. I conclude 
this chapter by revisiting the role of metaphor in psychotherapy, discussed at length in 
chapter 4, and considering how the embodied approach to meaning and utterance 
interpretation is reflected in work in this field. 
 
7.2 A MULTIMODAL ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR INTERPRETATION: BERGEN’S 
SIMULATION SEMANTICS 
 
Bergen defines simulation semantics as, 
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The study of how different aspects of language contribute to the construction of 
mental imagery, and the corresponding theory of linguistic meaning as linguistic 
specifications of what and how to simulate in response to language.  
(Bergen, 2005: 262)  
 
While it might initially appear that this approach would amount to little more than 
Zwaan’s Immersed Experience Framework, it does, in fact, bring to light some subtle gaps 
in Zwaan’s theory. Simulation semantics is, furthermore, notable for Bergen’s explicit 
application of the framework to figurative language, which I shall present after a brief 
outline of the general theory. Like Zwaan’s IEF, the simulation semantics approach to 
meaning comprises three central processes: constructional analysis (which results in a 
semantic specification), simulation and inference propagation. While simulation is akin 
to Zwaan’s stage of construal, constructional analysis and inference propagation bear 
little resemblance to his stages of activation and integration.  
Bergen’s account of constructional analysis, which gives rise to semantic 
specifications of utterances (to be defined below), reveals his underlying theoretical 
commitment, which is to the broad linguistics framework of ‘construction grammar’ (see 
Goldberg, 1995). Construction grammar maintains that any grammatical construction 
(e.g. word, phrase, clause) is based on ‘form-meaning pairings’, and so linguistic 
knowledge is represented as constructions or form-meaning mappings (rather than as a 
‘generative’ grammar). The form aspect of a construction consists of its syntactic and 
phonetic aspects, while the meaning aspect of a construction covers its semantic and 
pragmatic content. These form-meaning pairings are referred to as schemas, ‘mental 
representations that generalise over instances’ (Butler & Gonzálvez-García, 2014: 97). For 
Bergen, who, together with computer scientist Nancy Chang, has proposed ‘Embodied 
Construction Grammar’ (henceforth ECG), constructions are considered as ‘pathways’ or 
‘pointers’ to detailed, modality-specific knowledge that is activated during language 
comprehension.85 
During constructional analysis, a ‘parameterized set of instructions for subsequent 
simulation’ is constructed on the basis of the words’ meaning parameters and constraints 
provided by the grammar of the utterance (Bergen, 2005: 262). It is at this stage that 
interpreters determine the relationships between words in an utterance, thereby building 
‘a set of instructions’ (a semantic specification) for simulation. Needless to say, nouns and 																																																								
85 For a detailed exposition of Embodied Construction Grammar see Bergen and Chang (2005) and 
Chang, (2008).  
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verbs (i.e. content words) contribute directly to the content of the simulation, as do some 
function words, such as prepositions, and phrasal patterns, such as the ditransitive, a 
clausal pattern with subject, verb and two objects. The preposition in ‘the ball rolled down 
the hill’, for example, indicates a path of motion, which is decoded during constructional 
analysis and thereby contributes to the simulated content; while the preposition in the 
sentence, ‘Annabel sat behind David on the flight’, conveys a spatial relation between two 
individuals, which likewise, is decoded and subsequently forms part of the embodied 
simulation.  
The constructional analysis stage is notably different from Zwaan’s activation stage 
during which functional webs (networks of neurons) are activated. What Bergen is 
suggesting is an intermediary stage, between hearing an utterance and activating the 
corresponding perceptual and motor content. According to Bergen, ‘linguistic units seem 
to encode only generalisations [also known as schematizations or parameterizations] over 
aspects of the perceptual and motor content they trigger in simulation’ (ibid: 264). For 
Bergen, these generalisations (which are tightly linked to the simulative details that they 
are schematised over) guarantee that comprehension is not an overly taxing task. Their 
existence ensures that interpreters do not need to access the detailed perceptual and 
motor content of each possible interpretation of an utterance. 
Simulation, the second component of language understanding, mirrors Barsalou’s 
notion of the same name and proceeds in much the same way as Zwaan’s (2004) construal 
stage. The hearer performs a dynamic mental simulation of the content of the utterance 
and, in so doing, imagines the scenarios described by the language.86 Since the content of 
the utterances consists of multimodal concepts, this simulation involves re-enacting the 
original perceptual, motor, social and affective stimuli through the activation of neural 
structures responsible for experiencing them in the first place.87 As Gibbs notes, ‘the main 
point of constructing an embodied simulation is to create a sense of what it must be like 
for others, such as speakers or writers, to have the specific thoughts they do during 
communication’ (2006: 442). Gibbs hereby implies that the purpose of simulation is for 																																																								
86 The use of the word ‘imagine’ here is not intended to suggest that simulation on Bergen’s 
account of interpretation is a conscious process. Although simulation may be conscious and 
deliberate, it may also be unconscious and automatic. 
87 Bergen states that a number of dimensions of experience may be utilised in the process of 
simulation construction, for example ‘affect, social interactions, subjective judgments’ (Bergen, 
2005: 261). As he notes ‘motor and perceptual experiences hold a privileged position in the study 
of mental simulation, only because their basic mechanisms and neural substrates are relatively well 
understood’ (idem). The interaction between these different dimensions of experience, how each is 
brought to bear on the comprehension process, is an interesting topic for future research with the 
potential to reveal significant differences between literal and figurative language processing.   
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the interpreter to enter into the mind frame of the speaker, whose utterance they are 
attempting to comprehend.  
The third component of Bergen’s approach to language understanding is inference 
propagation, which is the process of propagating the knowledge gained from the 
simulation process throughout the hearer’s wider system of knowledge and beliefs. The 
mental experiences gained from the utterance may be employed in a number of ways: 
‘according to what the understander believes he is supposed to do with them (examples 
might be enacting the content of the simulation, in the case of imperatives, storing the 
results for continued discourse, or updating beliefs about the speaker's (or someone else's) 
beliefs)’ (Bergen 2005: 262). Inference propagation appears to be an open-ended process, 
with no limit on the numbers of inferences that an interpreter can draw. As previously 
mentioned, simulations are run in order to derive a speaker’s intended meaning. 
However, Bergen does not distinguish between inferences that constitute a speaker’s 
intended meaning and those that go beyond the intended interpretation and fall outside 
pragmatics proper. For relevance theorists, updating beliefs occurs separate from, and 
subsequent to, comprehension (and is subserved by distinct mechanisms that assess the 
believability of the pragmatically derived content). It is not clear whether, on Bergen’s 
account, inference propagation is seen as part of the comprehension procedure per se or 
whether intended meaning is derived via simulation, with the inference propagation stage 
lying strictly outside utterance understanding.   
Although an interpreter’s goal is to recover the meaning intended by the speaker, a 
natural consequence of the simulations being re-enactments of our personal embodied 
experiences is that the simulations are based on our own bodies. Without incorporating 
pragmatic principles into the picture, it is difficult to see how speaker meaning is derived. 
Gibbs’ emphasis on imagining what it must be like to be the speaker is key, however, and 
ties in nicely with work on theory of mind, which confirms a key role for the ability to 
attribute mental states to others in language comprehension (see, e.g., Frith and Happé, 
1994). By running a simulation, which will include imagining what it must be like to be 
the speaker, we are more able to comprehend the speaker and so fulfil our role as 
hearers.88 
																																																								
88 It should be noted, however, that Griceans and relevance theorists would not find ‘imagining 
what it is like to be the speaker’ adequate to the task of recovering the meaning communicatively 
intended by a speaker. There are a number of complex technical issues here, but a first problem is 
simply that the speaker does not necessarily intend that a hearer should grasp anything about her 
sensory-motor experience.  
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Bergen suggests that figurative language comprehension employs the same set of 
comprehension mechanisms as literal language. For this to be possible, given that 
understanding figurative language so often involves abstract concepts, Bergen has to 
subscribe to a strong view of embodiment; namely, that sensory-motor systems play an 
integral role across all components of language comprehension (and are not limited to 
the interpretation of concepts which are unmistakably related to the perception of 
concrete objects/activities and physical action). In choosing to adopt this stronger view, 
that abstract concepts engage sensory-motor systems, Bergen adopts a notion of 
‘metaphorical extension’. That is to say, abstract concepts are rooted in perception to the 
same extent as concrete concepts, albeit less directly, because they are understood via 
conceptual mappings to/from concrete concepts (i.e. abstract concepts are understood 
metaphorically through concrete sensory-motor domains of the familiar sort: being 
physically upright or down, moving forward or backwards through space, visually 
perceiving objects, actions, events, etc.). In other words, Bergen endorses Lakoff and 
Johnson’s CMT (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).89 
As conceptual metaphor theorist Ray Gibbs points out, making the case for 
embodied metaphor is the necessary preliminary in arguing for a simulation semantics 
account of metaphorical language comprehension. The idea is that just as literal language 
and concrete concepts are rooted in ‘bodily processes’ (i.e. perceptual and motor 
processes), so too are metaphorical language and abstract concepts. Recall how, according 
to CMT, abstract concepts such as LOVE and WAR are structured by various patterns of 
our perceptual experiences. Repeated aspects of experience, for example experiences 
connected to embarking on journeys, give rise to ‘image schemas’ that become mapped 
onto different abstract domains (e.g. love relationships, careers, life) in order to establish 
concrete understanding of these abstract concepts. 
While Bergen concedes that the nature of the simulation in metaphorical language 
processing is ‘still very much at issue’, he puts forward an intuitive characterisation of 
how it might proceed. To use Bergen’s example, consider the sentence below: 
 
1. The judge put my rendition of Ave Maria under a microscope. 
 
It should be clear that this sentence is intended metaphorically: the speaker’s rendition is 
considered in great detail by the judge, but not put under a literal microscope. The author 																																																								
89 It is worth noting that Barsalou (1999: 600) does not subscribe to CMT. While he grants that 
metaphor may play a role in ‘elaborating and construing abstract concepts’ he maintains that ‘it is 
not sufficient for representing them.’ 
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describes this sentence as making use of the conventional conceptual metaphor 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). According to conceptual metaphor 
theorists, comprehension of this sentence entails constructing a simulation that calls on 
elements of the concrete source domain (visual inspection) and then maps this source 
domain to the target domain (assessing a musical performance). Bergen does not address 
the validity of this claim in great detail, except to mention that it has some standing 
empirically, being corroborated by work which demonstrates that thinking about target 
domain concepts involves activating source domain imagery (see Boroditsky, 2000 for 
further detail). In seeking to expound the role of source-domain simulation in a 
simulation semantics account of metaphor, Bergen leans on Fauconnier and Turner’s 
conceptual integration account (2002). It is there suggested that metaphorical simulation 
involves constructing a single ‘hyper-literal’ simulation, which incorporates features of 
both the source and target domains; so, for the above sentence, for example, what we 
imagine or simulate is a scenario in which ‘the judges are using a microscope to visually 
inspect something, which is a miniature me, performing my Ave Maria’ (Bergen, 2005: 
268). This idea has interesting resonances with the philosopher Donald Davidson’s 
position that what metaphor involves is ‘seeing as’, discussed briefly in chapter 2. It might 
be possible to view Bergen’s ‘hyper-literal’ simulation as a psychological implementation 
of Davidson’s idea, which in the example amounts to ‘seeing the singing judge as a 
scientist with a microscope’. For Davidson, this image would cause a number of further 
effects including further images (of details or flaws coming into view via the microscope) 
and perhaps thoughts about the intensity of the judge’s attention to the speaker’s singing 
and/or how it felt for him to be so forensically scrutinised.   
At this point, having outlined Bergen’s account of simulation semantics with 
respect to metaphor, we have an overview, albeit a somewhat sketchy one, of how an 
embodied, multimodal view of concepts can be incorporated into a comprehensive 
account of figurative language processing. As we have already seen in chapter 1, the 
legitimacy of the claims put forward is somewhat threatened by Bergen’s reliance on the 
existence of conceptual metaphors. Nevertheless, there exists an interesting, small but 
growing, body of empirical work cited in its favour, a review of which follows. Subsequent 
to an analysis of the embodied metaphor data, I shall re-consider the relevance-theoretic 
accounts of metaphor comprehension, which are grounded in a view of concepts that has 
not (yet) engaged with the embodiment literature.  
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7.3 EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR A MULTIMODAL ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR 
INTERPRETATION 
 
Research into embodied simulation during metaphor interpretation is limited, with just a 
handful of studies offering empirical research designed to corroborate claims. Since the 
embodied theory of metaphor processing relies on CMT, studies cited in favour of this 
theory tend also to be grounded in CMT and to advocate the existence of conceptual 
metaphors. This section reviews just two such studies, one psycholinguistic, one 
neurocognitive, and evaluates the extent to which they support the embodied simulation 
account of metaphor interpretation.  
In an endeavour to test people’s embodied understanding of metaphorical 
utterances, Gibbs (2013b) constructed a number of extended narratives, which were 
either described metaphorically (based on a conventional conceptual metaphor) or 
described literally. For example, a romantic relationship was either described as ‘moving 
along in a good direction’ (a metaphorical description, which makes use of the conceptual 
metaphor RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS), or it was described as being ‘very important’ (a 
literal description, which is not grounded in any cross-domain mappings). These 
narratives were, furthermore, constructed so as to either depict a successful relationship, 
or an unsuccessful relationship. After listening to one of these stories, participants were 
blindfolded and asked either to walk, or to imagine walking, to a marker that was 40 feet 
away (a marker which they had seen at the beginning of the experiment); participants 
were also instructed to think about the story that they had just heard whilst engaging in 
the walking exercise. When participants imagined walking to the marker, as opposed to 
actually walking, they pressed a stopwatch as soon as they imagined having reached the 
marker. After completing this task, participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, 
their mood and the extent to which they had been thinking about the story in question.   
Gibbs found that participants who had heard the story about the successful 
relationship ‘moving along in a good direction’ walked further than those who had heard 
the story about the unsuccessful relationship. Most importantly, this difference collapsed 
in the non-metaphorical condition, where the relationship (successful or unsuccessful) 
was not described using metaphorical language. In other words, when participants had 
not activated, and simulated, the conceptual metaphor RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS, no 
differences in walking (real or imagined) were found after reading stories about successful 
and unsuccessful relationships. Gibbs uses this result to suggest that comprehension of 
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metaphorical language involves simulating the embodied content of underlying 
conceptual metaphors, in this case of RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS.  
Gibbs conducted two additional studies that used metaphorical materials derived 
from two contrasting conceptual metaphors: RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS and 
RELATIONSHIPS ARE MANUFACTURED OBJECTS. Pairs of stories depicted a successful 
relationship and were exactly the same, save for the final statement, which in the case of 
the aforementioned conceptual metaphors was either, ‘you and your friend are moving 
along in a good direction’ or ‘you and your friend are building a solid foundation’ 
(motivated by the contrasting conceptual metaphors respectively). In the first experiment 
that used these materials, Gibbs was interested to see whether participants would draw 
different metaphorical inferences from these two contrasting statements. Participants, 
therefore, saw both endings and were subsequently asked: 
 
(i) Which relationship progressed further? 
(ii) Which relationship was progressing faster at the beginning?  
(iii) Which relationship is progressing faster at present? 
(iv) Which relationship progressed more along a straight line? 
(v) Which relationship were the individuals heading in the same direction? 
 
 Gibbs found that participants’ answers to these questions were significantly more likely 
to select the story that had ended with the metaphorical statement ‘you and your friend 
are moving along in a good direction’, as opposed to the story that had ended with the 
statement ‘you and your friend are building a solid foundation’. He interprets this finding 
as evidence that participants had activated the conceptual metaphor RELATIONSHIPS ARE 
JOURNEYS, given that their inferences (evidenced by their answers to the above questions) 
were all in line with this conceptual metaphor.  
In Gibbs’ second study, the same materials were used (i.e. stories whose final 
sentence was motivated by two contrasting conceptual metaphors) and participants once 
again engaged in a walking task (real and imagined) after listening to said stories. It was 
predicted that when participants had heard a story that ended with a metaphorical 
statement derived from the RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS conceptual metaphor, they 
would walk further than after having listened to a story whose final sentence was 
motivated by the conceptual metaphor RELATIONSHIPS ARE MANUFACTURED OBJECTS. 
Indeed, these predictions were borne out. The results, according to Gibbs, strengthen the 
claim that metaphorical language comprehension involves simulation of the movement 
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that is associated with the specific conceptual metaphor that motivates a particular 
metaphorical use of language. Even though relationships are not, in fact, physical entities 
that travel along paths, Gibbs’ findings are consistent with the claim that they are 
conceived as such and that comprehension of the linguistic manifestations of this 
conception involves engaging in congruent embodied simulations. The results are, 
therefore, in line with predictions made by the embodied simulation account of metaphor 
processing, and indicative that sensory-motor information plays an equally important 
role in metaphor interpretation as it does in literal language interpretation. 
Neural data, in the form of imaging studies and EEG analyses, have presented 
additional evidence in support of the claim that sensory and motor systems of the brain 
are activated during figurative language comprehension. Desai and colleagues conducted 
an fMRI study comparing neural responses across three conditions: literal action 
sentences, metaphorical action sentences and literal abstract sentences, all of varying 
familiarity. For an example of each, see below (Desai et al., 2011): 
 
1. The daughter grasped the flowers (literal action). 
2. The public grasped the idea (metaphorical action). 
3. The public understood the idea (abstract).   
 
The authors found that, in line with the embodied picture, understanding metaphorical 
action (e.g. grasping an idea) involves activation of sensory-motor systems indicative of 
simulating the (literal) physical action described (e.g. the action of grasping something 
with one’s hands). 
In a significant twist to the story, however, Desai and colleagues also discovered 
that the supposed simulation process decreased as a function of metaphorical familiarity. 
That is to say, more familiar metaphors gave rise to less detailed simulations and a 
decreased involvement of primary sensory-motor systems. These findings led to the 
conclusion that, although embodied simulations are an aspect of metaphor 
comprehension, the process is additionally reliant on abstract lexical-semantic codes. 
This conclusion, and in particular the authors’ apprehension with respect to the strong 
embodiment view of meaning, is representative of the cautious stance taken by many. 
Their results, therefore, support the position reached at the end of chapter 6: that amodal 
concepts are essential to cognition, but not independent from sensory-motor information 
(developed, in particular, by Mahon and Caramazza (2008)). 
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In the section that follows, I revisit the relevance-theoretic accounts of metaphor 
comprehension, the classic ad hoc concept account (Sperber & Wilson 1995, 2008) and 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world account, both of which are grounded in an amodal view 
of concepts. This section clarifies the role of sensory-motor information in disembodied 
amodal approaches to metaphor, which thereby paves the way for more detailed 
comparison between Bergen’s embodied account and Carston’s disembodied account.   
 
7.4 AMODAL APPROACHES TO UTTERANCE INTERPRETATION AND 
METAPHOR COMPREHENSION 
 
7.4.1 SPERBER AND WILSON’S RELEVANCE THEORY 
 
Given RT’s foundation in Fodor’s amodal view of concepts, affective, sensory and motor 
information does not explicitly feature in the construction of metaphorical meaning on 
the classic RT ad hoc concept construction account. The approach, therefore, stands in 
stark contrast to Bergen’s simulation semantics theory, in which embodied content plays 
a significant role in the interpretation of metaphorical language. For RT, there is no 
explicitly stated role for sensory and motor information in the process of utterance 
interpretation. The literal encoded meaning of the words in question quickly falls away 
and becomes replaced by ad hoc concepts. In fact, a fully-fledged proposition containing 
the encoded concept is never processed. The input to the utterance interpretation 
process is a set of logical forms decoded by the language processing system; these logical 
forms are ‘highly schematic conceptual structures, functioning as mere templates for the 
construction of fully propositional forms’ (Carston, 2002: 64). The output of the process 
consists of amodal conceptual representations, ‘a set of assumptions or propositional 
forms, explicatures, and implicatures, which constitute ‘what is communicated’ (idem). In 
fact, Sperber and Wilson (1995) are adamant that the output of even the most poetic 
metaphorical uses is to be thought of as a set of (weakly communicated) implicatures: 
‘What look like non-propositional effects associated with the expression of attitudes, 
feelings and states of mind can be approached in terms of weak implicature’ (ibid: 222), 
and ‘if you look at these apparently affective effects through the microscope of relevance 
theory, you see a wide array of minute cognitive effects’ (ibid: 224).     
In contrast, the inputs on Bergen’s account are multimodal, embodied concepts or 
embodied conceptual metaphors and the output, presumably, is something equally 
multimodal, perhaps imagistic in nature. While Carston’s account of metaphor 
	 229 
processing also relies on an amodal view of concepts, I shall argue that it is quite 
compatible with the embodied picture outlined in section 7.2 and that Carston herself 
paves the way for this development with her emphasis on the significance of imagery in 
her literal meaning/imaginary world account (Carston 2010).   
 
7.4.2  CARSTON’S IMAGINARY WORLD CONSTRUCTION ROUTE  
 
As already discussed in chapter 2, Carston’s account of metaphorical language 
interpretation is not intended to replace the ad hoc concept construction account. Rather, 
she puts forward the idea that an optional, alternative mode of metaphor processing is 
available to interpreters and exists alongside the lexical adjustment mode of the standard 
RT account.  
Carston’s suggestion of the imaginary world route, in which the literal meaning of 
the metaphorically used expression plays a greater role in the interpretation process, 
stemmed from a number of observations: firstly, that the folk intuition (endorsed by 
many metaphor theorists) of metaphor being special and distinct from other figurative 
uses of language remains widespread and, secondly, that the ad hoc concept account does 
not seem to fully capture the rich full-bodied effects that certain metaphors evoke, in 
particular extended and/or novel creative metaphors, typical of literary cases but not 
confined to that field.  Focusing her attention on these extended metaphors, Carston 
notes how the literally encoded meaning is often highly active, being played upon 
extensively in the metaphor itself.  
Consider once again the extract from Zoë Heller’s novel The Believers: 
 
2. Depression, in Karla’s experience, was a dull, inert thing – a toad that 
squatted wetly on your head until it finally gathered the energy to slither off. 
The unhappiness she had been living with for the last ten days was a quite 
different creature. It was frantic and aggressive. It had fists and fangs and 
hobnailed boots. It didn’t sit, it assailed. It hurt her. In the mornings, it 
slapped her so hard in the face that she reeled as she walked to the bathroom. 
(Zoe Heller, The Believers, p. 263. Cited in Carston, 2010: 309) 
 
The ad hoc concept account outlined in chapter 1 maintains that we replace each of the 
lexically encoded meanings of TOAD, CREATURE, FISTS, FANGS, etc. with pragmatically 
modulated ad hoc concepts, TOAD*, CREATURE*, FISTS*, FANGS*, etc., that is, more general 
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concepts which include the denotation of the lexical concepts but also go well beyond it, 
e.g. the denotation of TOAD* would include instances of psychological stasis or catatonia 
as well as the physical animals. Carston suggests, however, that such a process entails an 
excessive expenditure of cognitive effort, since the literal meanings of the metaphorically 
used expressions are so highly accessible (having been reinforced by forwards and 
backwards semantic priming). The ad hoc concept account fails to take into account the 
empirically supported fact that literal meaning in these cases is highly activated (see 
Giora, 1999). In addition, it cannot explain why such meaning remains active, even when 
the metaphorical interpretation has been derived (Rubio-Fernández, 2007).  
Carston thus proposes that hearers take the literal meaning as a whole and 
metarepresent it as descriptive of an imaginary world. This results in a representation of 
the literal interpretation of the entire passage, a representation which is initially 
entertained in a way that keeps it apart from factual belief representations but is 
ultimately subjected to inferential pragmatic processes, which may, however, be applied 
in a more reflective less automatic way than typical fast local on-line processing. Thus, 
from the patently false representations of depression as a sluggish toad and grief, in 
contrast, as a vicious animal, we derive implications that can be integrated with our 
existing beliefs about the kind of negative mental states that humans have. The outcome 
of this alternative processing route is an interpretation that consists of a dense array of 
weak implicatures concerning the emotional and physical pain that Karla is experiencing. 
However, as Carston points out towards the end of her paper, it may well be that the most 
memorable and striking effects of the metaphor are the details of the imaginary world 
(comprising literal meaning and accompanying imagery) rather than the meaning 
recovered as implicatures (amodal conceptual representations).   
It is useful to reiterate the differences between this imaginary world route and the 
ad hoc concept account. On the ad hoc concept account, the literal meaning of the 
metaphorical expression simply provides access to the materials for constructing the 
intended ad hoc concept. That is to say, it provides access to the logical and 
encyclopaedic information associated with that concept. However, the lexically encoded 
concept relatively quickly falls away, having been replaced by the ad hoc concept, which is 
rapidly formed in an on-line local process. The proposition explicitly communicated (the 
explicature) contains the ad hoc concept as a constituent, which has been semantically 
composed into the (truth-conditional) content of the utterance. On the alternative 
imaginary world account, there is no proposition explicitly communicated, since the 
speaker does not endorse the imaginary world as a description of the actual world. 
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Instead, the outcome of the interpretation process is an array of implicatures, which the 
speaker does endorse and which are to be integrated with the hearer/reader’s overall 
representation of the world. In addition, the literal meaning of the metaphorical 
expression and the imagery it evokes play a significantly more important role in the 
comprehension procedure on the imaginary world account; it is maintained, developed 
and represented as material for a reflective pragmatic process. This reflective pragmatic 
process scrutinises that literal meaning and extracts from it relevant implications that are 
taken to comprise the metaphor’s meaning. Having considered the linguistically encoded 
meaning en masse, the implicatures derived exhibit a richer, more profound quality than 
those derived on an ad hoc concept construction route.  
 
7.5 RELATING AMODAL AND MODAL ACCOUNTS OF METAPHOR PROCESSING 
 
I suggest that the process of constructing an imaginary, metaphoric world, of taking 
extended passages of ‘literal’ meaning as a whole, will inevitably include activation of 
more sensory and motor information. This, of course, is only made possible by upgrading 
the amodal concept, as was suggested in section 6.7 of the previous chapter, so that the 
concept includes such multimodal information, either contained within the concept’s 
encyclopaedic entry, or accessible through that entry, by spreading activation. The idea 
that imaginary world construction engages more sensory and motor information than ad 
hoc concept construction is in line with Desai and colleagues’ neural findings mentioned 
in section 7.3. These findings demonstrate that unfamiliar metaphors give rise to more 
detailed simulations and an increased involvement of primary sensory-motor systems 
compared to more familiar metaphors. Although Carston’s theory is not designed as an 
account of unfamiliar metaphors, it is to some extent proposed as an account of extended, 
creative and poetic uses of metaphor, which will often be less familiar and more novel. 
The ad hoc concept account, on the other hand, seems to be more suited to the 
understanding of simple, conventional metaphors (i.e. more familiar metaphors), so it 
follows from Desai’s results that comprehension of metaphors interpreted via this route 
would not involve so much activation of sensory-motor systems, although, as Zwaan et al. 
(2002) have shown, there may be some (automatic, unconscious) activation of sensory-
motor regions in language comprehension quite generally. 
Given the greater amount of time and attention paid to each individual lexical 
concept on the imaginary world route, it follows that a hearer will have access to a greater 
range of information associated with each concept, much of which may be affective and 
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imagistic. The nature of this attentive processing may be such that a threshold of 
awareness is reached which accounts for the conscious experience that readers often 
report of rich imagery and sensory effects. Recall that during ad hoc concept 
construction, the lexically encoded concept is quickly replaced by the ad hoc concept, so 
that interpreters have little time or opportunity to access and register the multimodal 
information associated with the concept (through its encyclopaedic entry or through 
spreading activation). The idea that imaginary world construction engages more sensory-
motor information has the advantage of explaining the intuition that metaphors, 
particularly the extended and creative kind, are often deeply moving and have the 
potential to give rise to more visual and kinesic effects.  
To reframe Carston’s proposal in Bergen’s terminology, one could say that taking 
the literal meanings as a whole is akin to running a simulation, or perhaps to running a 
simulation several times over before moving to the stage of inference propagation. As 
Carston has always argued, an important difference between the imaginary world account 
and the ad hoc concept route lies in our engagement with the literal meaning. This can be 
seen as a difference in the simulation process. It is possible that the rapid local process of 
constructing ad hoc concepts bypasses the simulation process altogether and skips ahead 
to inference propagation, while taking the encoded literal meaning of the extended 
metaphor as a whole involves staying longer in the simulation stage of interpretation, 
constructing more detailed simulations.  
A minor ambiguity of Bergen’s simulation semantics account pertains to the 
optionality of the simulation process. I have suggested that constructing ad hoc concepts 
is a procedure that calls on the simulation process to a much lesser extent. However, it is 
not clear if Bergen himself would endorse this idea. Although he writes, ‘inference 
propagation could in principle proceed without first engaging the simulation mechanism’ 
(Bergen, 2005: 266), his discussion of examples in which hearers may bypass the 
simulation process is limited to phrases such as ‘yeah’ and ‘sure’. Given their frequency of 
use, we have a clear understanding of these phrases and know to update our beliefs in a 
particular way, having learnt to do so through associative learning, so that there is ‘no 
need to wait for the simulation’. Therefore, it appears that for Bergen, we may only bypass 
the simulation process so long as it has been engaged in previously.  
It seems advantageous, however, to maintain that simulation is in fact an optional 
process or at least a ‘more or less’ process, given that there are many contexts in which it 
will not be necessary or appropriate to access the range of sensory and motor information 
of a concept that is potentially available to us and stored in memory. This idea mirrors 
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that of David Ritchie who, like Bowdle and Gentner (1999: 91) views metaphor as a 
‘pluralistic’ phenomenon, which engages different processes in different contexts. For 
Ritchie (2008), simulation is involved in comprehension to varying degrees. He suggests 
that while some metaphors will evoke full imaginative reconstructions of experience that 
call upon a range of perceptual simulators, other metaphors will trigger much more 
limited simulations, that perhaps barely register in the addressee’s consciousness. Ritchie 
claims that the intensity of a simulation is moderated not only by the linguistic 
expression, but also by the context in which that expression appears: e.g. the social and 
cultural function of the conversation, the level of intimacy between the speaker and 
hearer etc.90  
Ritchie’s suggestion that simulation is to some extent a more or less process 
resonates with Carston’s theory of imaginary world construction, which is set up as an 
optional processing route, designed to complement the existing ad hoc concept 
construction route. Carston believes that while the literal processing route is an 
important one, which is always available to us, there are some contexts in which it is more 
likely to be employed. For example, the imaginary world construction route may be more 
appropriate, or indeed appealing, in the interpretation of literary works: e.g. in reading 
certain genres of poetry, a reader expects to achieve a qualitatively different, richer and 
more insightful, interpretation than the quick-fire basic meaning expected for more 
utilitarian communication, and so is prepared to expend more effort and engage 
reflectively or imaginatively with the poetic ‘utterance’. Likewise, it may be a preferable 
mode of processing for more novel metaphors, which require additional processing effort 
to interpret. Since concepts on the simulation semantics account are always and only 
embodied and multimodal, it is difficult to posit activating these concepts without 
activating sensory and motor information and running a simulation. Herein lies an 
advantage of maintaining an amodal representation of knowledge, which is, nevertheless, 
neurally connected to sensory-motor representations. Doing so allows one to explain how 
conventional and familiar language may continue to be comprehensible, even when the 
sensory-motor system has not been engaged. 
A further advantage of Carston’s account of imaginary world construction is its 
independence from Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In chapter 1, RT was favoured over 
CMT as an account of metaphor comprehension largely on the basis that CMT’s account 
of metaphorical language interpretation was not sufficiently developed; in addition, it did 																																																								
90 For interesting discussion on how different metaphorical descriptions of pain elicit simulation 
see Semino (2010).  
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not appear to be adequately supported by empirical research. Framing CMT within the 
field of simulation semantics certainly provides the theory with a more comprehensive 
account of on-line language interpretation. However, there remain significant drawbacks 
with positing the existence of conceptual metaphors, in terms of the implications for 
conceptual structure.  
Nowhere are these drawbacks more definitively covered than in Murphy (1996, 
1997). A significant difficulty that arises from the assertion that abstract concepts are 
metaphorically structured is to be found in the problem of expounding exactly how 
conceptual metaphors are coordinated. As we have seen in this chapter, CMT suggests 
that multiple, sometimes conflicting, conceptual metaphors can structure the same target 
domain. Recall that relationships are conceptualised both in terms of journeys, and also in 
terms of manufactured objects (e.g. buildings). This immediately raises the question, how 
can one concept be both? That is, how can radically different conceptual metaphors 
structure the same concept? As Murphy points out, one would expect on this basis to find 
conflicting results within subjects in terms of entailments, and confusion with regard to 
categorisation of abstract concepts. One may not be able to explicate, in literal terms, 
exactly what LOVE is. However, one can surely make inferences indicative of some 
coherent structure for the abstract concept. Furthermore, it seems illogical to suppose 
that only certain concepts, usually abstract concepts, are metaphorically structured. This 
claim entails strict demarcation between abstract and concrete, which is not adequately 
motivated. CMT claims that only abstract concepts are metaphorically structured 
because we cannot understand them otherwise. But it takes only a few readily available 
examples for it to be immediately obvious that the topic (target domain) of a metaphor 
can be just as ‘concrete’ as the metaphor vehicle (source domain), e.g. ‘That surgeon is a 
butcher’, ‘That butcher is a surgeon’, ‘The actor spoke his lines with dexterous topspin’, 
‘The petals of the cyclamen are white moths, with wings lifted over dark water’ (adapted 
from R. S. Thomas’s poem ‘cyclamen’). 
Given the inherent difficulties of CMT, the embodied simulation account of 
metaphor processing, which relies on CMT’s notion of metaphorical cognition, is itself 
somewhat limited. Carston’s imaginary world account, in contrast, exhibits no obvious 
drawbacks and, with an updated view of RT’s amodal concepts as appropriately 
connected to relevant sensory-motor information, is equally able to account for the 
embodied data discussed in this chapter and in chapter 6.  
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7.6 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC USES OF METAPHOR AND THE ROLE OF 
EMBODIMENT 
 
Revising the relevance-theoretic notion of a concept so as to incorporate multimodal 
information, not only serves accounts of metaphor processing, but also, it informs the use 
of metaphor in psychotherapy. It was argued in chapter 4 that, for a multitude of reasons, 
intentional use of metaphorical language in psychotherapy may often benefit 
psychotherapeutic objectives: by fostering the therapeutic alliance, by helping clients 
reach insights about themselves, by increasing memory for discussed material, etc. The 
idea that extended and creative uses of metaphorical language engage sensory-motor 
systems to a greater extent than literal language or simple lexical metaphors, lends further 
support to therapists’ practice of elaborating and extending metaphors. As Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980: 53) claim ‘metaphor is one of our most important tools for trying to 
comprehend partially what cannot be comprehended totally: our feelings, aesthetic 
experiences, moral practices and spiritual awareness’. Metaphor may help clients to 
understand their feelings, since comprehension of such language involves accessing more 
affective, embodied content, which is inevitably deeply personal and gives rise to deeply 
felt cognitive and affective effects. As author and civil rights activist Maya Angelou said: 
 
I’ve learnt that people will forget what you said, people will forget what you did, but 
people will never forget how you made them feel. 
 
Metaphor, extended metaphor at least, makes people feel. It puts them in touch with their 
bodily senses, and in so doing, is more memorable and often more profound. In the 
context of psychotherapy, where the primary goal is to achieve beneficial insight and 
effects, metaphor is thus an invaluable resource for effecting long-lasting change. 
That extended metaphors give rise to deeply felt experiences appears to be a basic 
assumption of the psychotherapeutic practices discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4. I 
believe that this is clearly evidenced by the practices themselves, which show therapists 
inviting clients to access and work with the sensory content of figurative expressions. 
Recall the client who spoke of his wife as a rock (Cirillo & Crider, 1995). Initially, the 
client in this scenario viewed his wife as a rigid, inflexible and unyielding person. 
However, by scrutinising the image of a rock the client was able to transform this 
conception and shift his attention to the solid and enduring aspects of the rock (i.e. his 
wife). This shift in perspective is, in some sense, reliant on the client experiencing the 
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sensory-perceptual components of his use of language. It seems that one of the reasons 
why this metaphor was so productive is because the process of developing it activated 
sensory-motor content. In other words, the process of developing an imaginative 
metaphorical world, in which the conception of a person as a rock is embedded, 
encouraged the client to simulate affective sensory-perceptual details, which in turn lead 
to deeply felt therapeutic insight. Therapists who work with metaphor in this way seem to 
recognise that ‘the power of metaphor lies in its ability to touch an affective component of 
the individual’s experience’ (Marlatt & Fromme, 1987: 22); either consciously or 
unconsciously, these therapists use metaphor in their practice in order to exploit this 
power.   
To further illustrate, consider a client who is experiencing a lot of physical pain, 
particularly around his neck and shoulders. At the end of the client’s first session, the 
therapist tells the following story: 
 
Once upon a time, there was a traveller who had a long way to go. He was carrying 
a huge rucksack. As he travelled, the rucksack became heavier and heavier because 
he had the curious habit of putting a stone in his sack whenever he encountered 
any difficulty. The further he went, the more he felt the painful weight of the sack 
on his shoulders, and the sooner he became exhausted and had to rest. People who 
saw him stumbling commented on the heavy load he carried, but this only offended 
him. When he finally realized that resting did not mitigate his pain, he took off his 
rucksack. After much hesitation, he opened the sack and looked at everything he 
had collected. He removed the stones one by one, examined them and felt their 
weight in his hands. When all the stones were lying on the ground, he decided to 
build a statue as a memorial to all the difficulties he had encountered and survived 
on his journey. When he finished building the statue, he realized that it also 
symbolized his ability to continue on his travels in a much better and lighter 
manner than before. 
(Witztum, van der Hart & Friedman, 1988: 284) 
 
The stones in this metaphorically intended narrative clearly symbolise the emotions that 
the client is carrying around, emotions which the therapist assumes are causing the client 
physical pain. Again, the therapeutic impact of this metaphorical story is partly reliant on 
the client experiencing the embodied aspects of the story. Or at the very least, the impact 
of the story is heightened by the client’s ability to imaginatively simulate the burden of the 
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heavy rucksack and to experience the weightlessness and relief of pain that the character 
in the story experiences when he takes off the rucksack. The therapist’s use of this story 
can be seen as an invitation to engage in imaginary world construction and a request to 
simulate the sensory-perceptual elements of this world. The implicit assumption behind 
this practice being that doing so will inspire therapeutic insight, since it will result in 
deeply felt cognitive and affective effects. 
For Bryant and colleagues a ‘therapeutic metaphor’ is defined as ‘any verbal or 
concrete illustration, description or reference designed to bring about perceptual and/or 
behavioural change’ (Bryant et al., 1988: 113). This characterisation of metaphor ties into 
the idea that a key component of working with metaphor in psychotherapy involves 
engaging sensory-perceptual systems. Therapeutic practice, both observations of what 
therapists do and observations of what clients experience, thus meshes with the 
theoretical account developed in this thesis, which has advocated incorporating sensory-
perceptual content, and the embodiment view, into Relevance Theory.  
 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has looked at ways in which a multimodal view of concepts might bear on 
the interpretation of metaphor. In addition to an assessment of the very strong embodied 
view of Bergen, which is hampered by its dependence on Conceptual Metaphor Theory, I 
have followed through with the suggestion made in chapter 6 that the RT view of 
concepts be upgraded so as to incorporate sensory-motor components associated with 
concepts. I have argued that doing so reframes the distinction between the classical RT ad 
hoc concept account of metaphor understanding and Carston’s alternative route to 
metaphor comprehension: the latter involves more extensive (conscious) engagement 
with sensory-motor content, hence the more profound effects often derived from 
metaphors comprehended via the imaginary world route. A further advantage of adopting 
a view of concepts which more explicitly incorporates embodied information is the 
additional weight that this move gives to the use of metaphorical language in 
psychotherapy, particularly to the purposeful use of metaphor in psychotherapy to enable 
clients to reach beneficial insight into their condition. In the short chapter that follows, I 
briefly summarise the ideas developed in this thesis and suggest some avenues for further 
research.  
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Chapter 8 · Concluding remarks and future directions 
 
8.1 SUMMARY 
 
This thesis has explored various accounts of metaphor comprehension, in an effort to 
find a theory which may be applied to all instances of metaphorical expression. Chapter 1 
began by assessing two opposing theories: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980) and the relevance-theoretic ad hoc concept account (Sperber & Wilson, 
2008). It was noted that many psychotherapists working with metaphor have endorsed 
CMT; these therapists believe that the theory corroborates their assumption that 
attention to language has the power to reveal the underlying fabric of a speaker’s 
unconscious thoughts. However, after unpacking CMT’s theoretical underpinnings and 
implications, I showed that, in fact, CMT does not support therapeutic practice in the 
way that psychotherapists maintain. CMT was ultimately rejected in favour of RT, 
primarily on the basis of the lack of evidence in support of CMT’s claim that verbal 
metaphors originate in cognition (as opposed to communication). RT was subsequently 
applied to psychotherapy and the Cognitive Principle of Relevance used to explain why 
psychotherapists’ attention is often focused beyond communicatively intended meaning.   
In chapter 2, my focus shifted from relatively simple metaphors to more complex 
and creative uses of metaphorical language. It was suggested that extended metaphors, in 
particular, were ill suited to analysis via RT’s ad hoc concept theory, and that their effects 
are better explained by accounts of metaphor which ascribe a more prominent role to the 
literal meaning of metaphorical language during the interpretation process. On Carston’s 
(2010) imaginary world account of metaphor interpretation, the literal meaning of a 
metaphorical expression is metarepresented and subjected as a whole to more reflective 
inferential processes. Since a metaphor’s literal meaning and accompanying imagery is 
maintained and scrutinised on this account, the overall effect of interpretation is richer 
than that derived during local on-line ad hoc concept construction, where literal 
meanings are immediately adjusted and replaced with more abstract concepts. I 
concluded chapter 2 by suggesting that together the RT account of ad hoc concept 
construction and Carston’s imaginary world interpretation theory could account for the 
full range of effects achieved by metaphorical uses of language. 
Chapters 3 introduced the special communicative context that is psychotherapy 
and clarified how (and indeed why) psychotherapists’ definition of communication is 
distinct from (and much broader than) that of pragmaticists. In chapter 1, I had briefly 
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mentioned that psychotherapy engenders a unique style of discourse. I built on this idea 
in chapter 3 by investigating the distinct goals of psychotherapy and considering how 
those goals affect the dynamics of communication between clients and therapists. 
Chapter 4 explored the role of metaphorical language in psychotherapy. It was noted that 
metaphor can serve a number of functions in this context, contributing to therapeutic 
ends by: (i) combating client resistance, (ii) acting as a signal of empathy, (iii) serving as a 
shared shorthand between client and therapist (thereby, supporting the therapeutic 
relationship), (iv) making insights more memorable and (v) generating fresh perspectives. 
These functions, or if you like, these effects, of metaphor may be inspired by relatively 
simple, short metaphors; however, a number of therapy models advocate generating 
extended metaphors as a means of guaranteeing the aforementioned effects. Support for 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world processing route was found in such approaches to 
metaphor, which invite clients to sustain and develop the literal meaning of their 
metaphorical expressions, on the assumption that such practice may ultimately yield 
therapeutic insight. 
Chapter 5 sought empirical support for Carston’s alternative mode of metaphor 
interpretation and further explored the distinctive effects of extended metaphors. It was 
hypothesised, on the basis of memory questionnaire results, that the interpretation of 
extended metaphors might have more lasting impact than the interpretation of literal 
language and simple metaphors. Although the empirical validity of these questionnaires is 
limited, largely by the size of the population tested, the results, nonetheless, add some 
weight to the claim that metaphor is a fruitful tool in the context of psychotherapy in 
terms of boosting therapeutic impact and enacting long-lasting change.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, I returned to theories of cognition and communication, 
exploring the multimodal approach to concepts, which underpins current CMT and 
contrasts with the amodal stance adopted by both the ad hoc concept account of 
metaphor and Carston’s imaginary world theory. Chapter 6 laid the theoretical 
foundations for an embodied account of meaning, while chapter 7 explored how such an 
account might be fruitfully incorporated into the theory of metaphor comprehension. In 
chapter 6 I suggested that the relevance-theoretic view of concepts be enriched so as to 
more actively incorporate sensory-motor content. This move not only enables Relevance 
Theory to account for the mass of research findings that demonstrate activation of 
sensory-motor areas during conceptual processing (i.e. to account for the ‘embodiment 
data’), but it also it brings RT into further alignment with psychotherapeutic practice. As 
such practice takes for granted an individual’s ability to activate and play with the 
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associated sensory-motor content of language, it is essential that our model of cognition 
and communication recognises this content and allows it to be exploited during 
conceptual processing (and so during metaphorical language processing). 
 
8.2 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
8.2.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR RELEVANCE THEORY  
 
In chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, I highlighted the need for Relevance Theory to engage 
with the large body of work on embodied cognition. In so doing, I suggested that RT 
incorporate imagistic and affective effects that result from a great many metaphors (and 
utterances more generally) into its theoretical framework. The theoretical implications of 
such an undertaking are plentiful and mark an important topic for further research. For 
example, exactly how can imagistic and affective effects be built into RT?  What would 
such a move mean for RT’s existing definition of ‘cognitive effects’? Likewise, what would 
it mean for RT’s definition of ‘relevance’, which as Carston (2002: 44) notes is ‘a positive 
function of cognitive effects and a negative function of the processing effort expended in 
deriving those effects’?  
Recall that Relevance Theory defines cognitive effects as the result of a relevant 
interaction between new stimulus and existing assumptions. Such an interaction may lead 
either to existing assumptions being supported and thereby strengthened, or to existing 
assumptions being contradicted and thereby eliminated. In addition, it may lead to the 
derivation of contextual implications (i.e. new assumptions which are inferentially 
derived). It is interesting, and indeed pertinent, to consider whether and how imagistic 
and affective effects fit into this picture. Furthermore, there remains the question of 
whether embodied effects fall under the relevance-theoretic notion of a speaker’s 
‘communicative intention’. In other words, to what extent is the derivation of imagistic 
and affective effects a part of the intended meaning of an utterance, be it metaphorical or 
literal? This question harks back to Ritchie’s work on embodied simulation, which 
describes the simulation process as a ‘more or less’ phenomenon, thus implying that 
embodied effects lie outside the domain of communicatively intended meaning, at least in 
some contexts. As was mentioned in the preface to this thesis, setting up a dialogue 
between Relevance Theory and embodied cognition marks the first stage of a potentially 
important development for RT. The theoretical repercussions of this union, however, are 
yet to be fully realised. 
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More generally, this thesis reinforces the need for RT to engage with real-world 
instances of language use and to broaden the range of empirical data it considers when 
advancing accounts of metaphor comprehension. Future work in Relevance Theory ought 
to make use of corpora, rather than relying on made-up examples of language use. I 
believe that doing so might enable relevance theorists to better understand the effects of 
context on metaphor interpretation, and indeed utterance interpretation generally. In 
turn this understanding may foster an appreciation for metaphor as a ‘pluralist’ 
phenomenon that, as Bowdle and Gentner, Carston, Gibbs and Steen recognise, can be 
comprehended via a number of different processing routes.   
 
8.2.2 RELATED TROPES: SIMILE  
 
At various points throughout this thesis, I have touched on metaphor’s relation to other 
forms of figurative language, in particular simile. Recall that according to the relevance-
theoretic ad hoc concept account, metaphors and similes are distinct in terms of 
comprehension: metaphors are interpreted via ad hoc concept construction, while similes 
are interpreted literally with the key content recovered as implicatures (see chapter 1, 
section 1.4). Glucksberg and Haught’s (2006) psycholinguistic research supports RT’s 
distinctive treatment of metaphor and simile. These authors found that when interpreting 
categorical metaphors (e.g. ‘some ideas are diamonds’) participants tended to mention 
properties that were not typically true of the metaphor vehicle in isolation (e.g. 
‘insightful’, ‘creative’ and ‘unique’). In contrast, when interpreting corresponding similes 
(e.g. ‘some ideas are like diamonds’) participants were more likely to mention properties 
that were true of the metaphor vehicle in isolation (e.g. ‘rare’ and ‘valuable’). The 
distinctive effects of metaphor and simile have long supported the claim that the form of 
a figurative expression (categorical or comparison) affects an interpreter’s route of 
processing. 
Since similes give rise to fewer emergent properties than metaphors, the prevailing 
opinion amongst linguists is to see simile as the ‘poor sister of metaphor, who cannot 
have the same creative force of her more fashionable sibling’ (Bridgeman, 1996: 65). 
However, as O’Donoghue points out the ‘longer, less conventional and more poetic a 
metaphorical use becomes, the less appreciable the difference in effect between metaphor 
and [corresponding] simile’ (O'Donoghue, 2009: 135). This idea neatly coincides with 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world account, which, as noted in chapter 2, brings metaphor 
and simile closer together. On this account, the literal meaning of a metaphor plays a 
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more sustained role in the interpretation process, just as it does during simile 
interpretation. It is possible, therefore, that the aforementioned differences between 
metaphors and similes largely evaporate when metaphors (and similes) are sufficiently 
extended. It would be most interesting to conduct further empirical research into the 
relationship between metaphor and simile, and, more specifically, to test whether the 
attested differences between these uses of language prevail at the extended level.  
 
8.2.3 RELATED TROPES: ALLEGORY 
 
Carston’s (2010) imaginary world account has implications for allegory, also (as noted by 
Carston herself). Although some scholars view allegory as no more than a ‘super-
extended metaphor’ (Crisp, 2008: 291), the two are importantly distinct: only in extended 
metaphor is a figurative target explicitly mentioned. As Cohen (2008: 10) notes: 
 
In a metaphor A is said to be B […] In allegory typically only B is mentioned and it 
is left to the reader to understand that B stands for, or represents, or “allegorizes” 
A.  
 
Despite the fact that allegories are fully interpretable at the purely literal level (and this 
literal meaning may achieve a degree of relevance), it is intended that a reader will go 
beyond the literal meaning and derive the intended figurative sense of the allegory (that 
is, that he or she will derive ‘what B stands for’). Carston and Wearing (2011: 308) 
acknowledge that allegorical interpretation is likely to be ‘very similar’ to the imaginary 
world interpretation of extended metaphors: 
 
An account of how allegory is processed when it is fully understood will no doubt 
include a phase in which the literal meaning is metarepresented and a further 
interpretive process undertaken of deriving the parallel deeper meaning. 
(idem) 
 
However, the authors suspect that the interpretation of allegories and extended 
metaphors exhibits subtle differences due to the simultaneous presence in metaphor of 
literally intended meaning (the metaphor topic) and non-literally intended meaning (the 
metaphor vehicle).  
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Speculating on what these interpretive differences might be led me to consider how 
the implications derived from these different forms of expression might diverge. For 
example, does allegory give rise to more ‘big picture’ type reflections and implications, 
ones that bear little relation to the metarepresented content from which they are derived? 
Conversely, is the metarepresented literal meaning of an allegory maintained in parallel 
alongside the figurative meaning (unlike in extended metaphor, where the 
metarepresented content is ultimately replaced by a mass of weak implicatures)? In 
extended metaphors, properties of the literal content of a metaphor that are ultimately 
irrelevant to the figurative interpretation are expected to lose activation around 1000ms – 
is this the case with allegory also? Assuming that language comprehension may activate 
sensory-motor content, one might ask whether allegory would do so more or less than 
extended metaphor; to put it differently, does allegory give rise to more detailed 
embodied simulations than extended metaphors? Certainly, the relationship between 
allegory and extended metaphor remains a worthwhile topic for future research.  
Interestingly, storytelling is a popular and recognised tool in child psychotherapy 
(Burns, 2005; Golding, 2014) and, in effect, these therapeutic stories work like fables or 
allegories – they present a complete picture on a literal level, and a deeper meaning 
(usually in the form of a lesson) when one looks beyond the literal meaning. Therefore, 
just as psychotherapy was fertile ground for extended metaphor research, it might also be 
a relevant test-bed for allegory research.  
 
8.2.4 METAPHOR IN DIFFERENT DOMAINS  
 
During the course of this thesis, I have shown that metaphorical language is widespread 
in psychotherapy and suggested that this is due to the complex nature of people’s 
emotional experiences, which are often very difficult to express using literal language. 
Needless to say, however, psychotherapy is not the only domain in which metaphorical 
language is prevalent. Communication of scientific theories, like education in general, 
also gives rise to a rich number of figurative expressions. As Semino (2008: 131) notes, 
scientists use metaphor to explain ‘phenomena that are not just poorly (or partially) 
understood, but also complex and often inaccessible to the senses’. 
While there exists a wealth of research on metaphor in the context of science, such 
research has not yet been applied to Carston’s imaginary world account of metaphor 
interpretation. It’s possible that, like psychotherapy, the functions of metaphor in 
different domains such as scientific writing or teaching, may add further support to the 
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claim that ad hoc concept construction is not the only mechanism of metaphor 
interpretation.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Experiment 1 Materials 
 
 
Experimental Items (target sentence in bold) 
 
1. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Chris found everyday life hard to cope with and felt an overwhelming sense of 
emotional frailty. His psyche was an intricately complex crystal, a rare and fine 
mineral that needed to be handled with sensitivity and caution. Chris was all too 
aware of the shattering effect other people’s careless handling might have. And so, he 
decided to lock himself away for fear of breaking entirely. His soul was a brittle shard. 
Chris’ social life was non-existent. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Chris was a complicated and sensitive person. He often felt misunderstood by people 
who didn’t take the time to get to know him, people who didn’t understand his 
vulnerability. He feared coming into contact with these people, knowing how they 
could upset him. This fear led him to be careful about who he let into his life, as he 
felt almost on the brink of psychological collapse. His soul was a brittle shard. Chris’ 
social life was non-existent. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Chris was a complicated and sensitive person. He often felt misunderstood by people 
who didn’t take the time to get to know him, people who didn’t understand his 
vulnerability. He feared coming into contact with these people, knowing how they 
could upset him. This fear led him to be careful about who he let into his life, as he 
felt almost on the brink of psychological collapse, he was emotionally frail. Chris’ 
social life was non-existent.  
 
2. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Becky hated the pressure of exams and never seemed able to recall her revision. As 
soon as she entered the examination hall, she felt the contents of her mind turn into 
noodles. Every strand of consciousness, every piece of revision, was chaotically matted 
together in a thick dry clump. Her attempts to separate out a clean line of reasoning 
completely failed. Her thoughts were hopelessly knotted. Becky needed to see a 
tutor.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Becky was very hard working and put a lot of effort into her studies. Sadly, her grades 
did not reflect this. Though she always prepared extensively for any test, she struggled 
to stay calm under the pressure of exams. As soon as she opened up a question paper 
she became totally confused and was incapable of recalling her revision. Her thoughts 
were hopelessly knotted. Becky needed to see a tutor.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Becky was very hard working and put a lot of effort into her studies. Sadly, her grades 
did not reflect this. Though she always prepared extensively for any test, she struggled 
to stay calm under the pressure of exams. As soon as she opened up a question paper 
she became totally confused and was incapable of recalling her revision. She felt 
wholly incompetent. Becky needed to see a tutor.  
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3. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Hannah had become addicted to chocolate and was habitually over-eating. Her extra 
weight was an ugly blanket which shrouded her in heavy shame. When she first tried 
it on its warm thick fabric had seemed so comforting, but after a while its synthetic 
fibres began to irritate her. It was harder to tolerate, more and more uncomfortable, 
yet she wasn’t sure she could survive the cold without it. Obesity is an ungainly 
overcoat. Hannah tried to get more exercise.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
When Hannah and her ex broke up she started eating copious amounts of chocolate 
for comfort. Now she really regretted it. Initially, she had loved the sugar-y fix of 
calories, but soon the weight that she gained only made her feel worse. But by that 
point, she was addicted to over-eating. She had lost all her shape, and despised her 
appearance when she looked in the mirror. Obesity is an ungainly overcoat. Hannah 
tried to get more exercise. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
When Hannah and her ex broke up she started eating copious amounts of chocolate 
for comfort. Now, she really regretted it. Initially, she had loved the sugar-y fix of 
calories, but soon the weight that she gained only made her feel worse. But by that 
point, she was addicted to over-eating. She had lost all her shape, and despised her 
appearance when she looked in the mirror. She was diagnosed as obese. Hannah 
tried to get more exercise. 
 
4. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Mary found it impossible to get through the day without a drink and was completely 
dependent on alcohol. Her addiction was a demanding creature; he refused to be 
ignored and sapped all her strength with his unrelenting need for attention. Too weak 
to fight him off, she indulged his demands and in turn, he tore her limb from limb. 
Her dependency was a biting animal. Mary finally checked into rehab. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Mary was incapable of making it through the day without a drink and was wholly 
dependent on alcohol. The constant cravings she experienced were relentless and 
exhausting. Sadly, she could never find the strength of mind to suppress these desires. 
Nor was she capable of enjoying just one drink, a glass always turned into a bottle, 
and it always ended in misery. Her dependency was a biting animal. Mary finally 
checked into rehab.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Mary was incapable of making it through the day without a drink and was wholly 
dependent on alcohol. The constant cravings she experienced were relentless and 
exhausting. Sadly, she could never find the strength of mind to suppress these desires. 
Nor was she capable of enjoying just one drink, a glass always turned into a bottle, 
and it always ended in misery. Her dependency was incredibly draining. Mary finally 
checked into rehab.  
 
5. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Mike was overwhelmed with grief after the death of his daughter. Though family and 
friends had been supportive, he felt very distant from them. The world was now a 
play, one he had no interest in watching, let alone participating in. He had once been 
part of these scenes, but now he sat passively in the audience, watching every trivial 
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plot line in silence. His life was a closed down theatre. Mike couldn’t even speak to 
his wife.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Mike was inconsolable after the death of his daughter who had tragically died of 
leukaemia at a very young age. Despite the love and support from friends and family, 
he was finding it hard to cope. Everything seemed so futile and irrelevant; he couldn’t 
bear to take part in anything, and so instead he passively watched events unfold, 
interacting less and less. His life was a closed down theatre. Mike couldn’t even 
speak to his wife. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Mike was inconsolable after the death of his daughter who had tragically died of 
leukaemia at a very young age. Despite the love and support from friends and family, 
he was finding it hard to cope. Everything seemed so futile and irrelevant; he couldn’t 
bear to take part in anything, and so instead he passively watched events unfold, 
interacting less and less. His life felt empty and meaningless. Mike couldn’t even 
speak to his wife. 
 
6. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Nick had been struggling at work for some time, his boss was dragging him down into 
a suffocating sea of to-do lists. He wished someone would throw him a float so he 
could get to the surface and scream out for rescue. He felt himself sinking, deeper and 
deeper, unable to tread water, he was drowning. His job was a voyage to the bottom of 
the ocean. Nick prepared to resign. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Nick was not doing well at work. His boss was very demanding and gave Nick more 
work than he could manage. He felt totally overwhelmed and under immense 
pressure. He was unable to finish the tasks that had been set for him and had no 
opportunity to ask for help from anyone. The situation was getting worse and worse. 
His job was a voyage to the bottom of the ocean. Nick prepared to resign.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Nick was not doing well at work. His boss was very demanding and gave Nick more 
work than he could manage. He felt totally overwhelmed and under immense 
pressure. He was unable to finish the tasks that had been set for him and had no 
opportunity to ask for help from anyone. The situation was getting worse and worse. 
He was afraid of having a complete nervous collapse. Nick prepared to resign. 
 
7. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Their relationship was comfortable, but unexciting. It was a mug of watery fruit tea. 
Holding it tight in her hands Amy felt safe in its familiarity, reassured by its warmth. 
Yet, whenever she took a sip, a wave of disappointment washed over her and she 
registered its lack of real flavour. She craved a drink with a little more flavour. Her 
boyfriend was no espresso. Amy knew they had to break up.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Amy’s relationship was companionable but lacking some excitement. She had been 
with her partner for many years and he was a great support to her, calming her down 
when she needed it. People looked at them in admiration – they seemed so well 
adjusted and stable. But she wanted something more, someone new and challenging, 
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someone who would stimulate her mind. Her boyfriend was no espresso. Amy knew 
they had to break up.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Amy’s relationship was companionable but lacking some excitement. She had been 
with her partner for many years and he was a great support to her, calming her down 
when she needed it. People looked at them in admiration – they seemed so well 
adjusted and stable. But she wanted something more, someone new and challenging, 
someone who would stimulate her mind. Her boyfriend was a bit boring. Amy knew 
they had to break up.  
 
8. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Emma had never had any luck making friends. She was a forgotten football left on the 
side-lines, waiting to be picked up and put back into play. But having been battered by 
frost and storms, there was now no air left within her. She was useless and no one 
could be bothered to pump her back up again. She lay, neglected on the ground 
without purpose, abandoned and untouched. Her heart was punctured beyond repair. 
Emma joined the local church. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Emma’s feelings of loneliness were awful. She longed to make some new friends, or at 
least be reunited with her old friends and family. They had given up on her years ago 
when, in a fragile state, she had been unable to take part in their lives. It seemed that 
society had forgotten about her, as if no one would notice whether she was dead or 
alive. Her heart was punctured beyond repair. Emma joined the local church.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Emma’s feelings of loneliness were awful. She longed to make some new friends, or at 
least be reunited with her old friends and family. They had given up on her years ago 
when, in a fragile state, she had been unable to take part in their lives. It seemed that 
society had forgotten about her, as if no one would notice whether she was dead or 
alive. She was completely isolated in life. Emma joined the local church.  
 
9. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Alex had been determined to succeed at any cost. His ambition was a soaring tower, 
reaching high above all the other buildings around him with their more modest three 
or four levels. He was indifferent to the bleak shadow it cast over the lowly masses in 
its proximity. Yet, standing on its roof, peering down at the world below, its creator 
suddenly felt a desperate need to tear down the ugly edifice. His success was a vacant 
skyscraper. Alex signed up for charity work.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Alex was very ambitious, an attitude which had enabled him to accomplish a great 
deal. But he was also very ruthless. When he started his company he cared only about 
himself and was not affected by thoughts of the people he’d put out of business. Yet, 
later on in his career, he started to feel guilty about his behaviour; he considered 
quitting his job and trying to restore small businesses. His success was a vacant 
skyscraper. Alex signed up for charity work.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Alex was very ambitious, an attitude which had enabled him to accomplish a great 
deal. But he was also very ruthless. When he started his company he cared only about 
himself and was not affected by thoughts of the people he’d put out of business. Yet, 
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later on in his career, he started to feel guilty about his behaviour; he considered 
quitting his job and trying to restore small businesses. He was full of regret. Alex 
signed up for charity work.  
 
10. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Emily’s infidelity was an awful sin against her marriage. With great pain, she carried 
her guilt about with her, chaining shackles around her ankles. These cold metal 
fastenings enslaved her to the past and imprisoned her heart. Yet with the help of a 
therapist, she finally broke free. Releasing the cruel irons of self-loathing she ran back 
towards her life. Forgiveness was the key that unlocked her. Emily began to love 
herself again.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Emily was experiencing overwhelming guilt and regret having been unfaithful to her 
husband of many years. She found it very hard to think of anything except her 
infidelity and hated herself for what she had done to their relationship. As she started 
seeing a therapist, however, things slowly began to change. She started to accept what 
had happened. Forgiveness was the key that unlocked her. Emily began to love 
herself again.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Emily was experiencing overwhelming guilt and regret having been unfaithful to her 
husband of many years. She found it very hard to think of anything except her 
infidelity and hated herself for what she had done to their relationship. As she started 
seeing a therapist, however, things slowly began to change. She started to accept what 
had happened, which gave her a great sense of relief. Emily began to love herself 
again. 
 
11. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Shirley’s cancer had broken into her life and stolen all her hopes for the future. Her 
sickness was a fierce dictator. She longed to emigrate and escape his clutches, but he 
had closed all the borders. As she plotted their reopening, determined to overthrow 
his controlling regime, he violently trampled on her soul, suffocating her beneath his 
heavyweight boots. This illness was a merciless tyrant. Shirley considered her 
funeral arrangements.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Shirley had been unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer six months ago and told that 
her chances of recovery were very low. She was determined not to die and was 
desperate to get well again by any methods. As she researched alternative treatments, 
the sickness continued, making her feel weak and disheartened, both her energy and 
hope diminished. This illness was a merciless tyrant. Shirley considered her funeral 
arrangements.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Shirley had been unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer six months ago and told that 
her chances of recovery were very low. She was determined not to die and was 
desperate to get well again by any methods. As she researched alternative treatments, 
the sickness continued, making her feel weak and disheartened, both her energy and 
hope diminished. The illness appeared to be incurable. Shirley considered her 
funeral arrangements. 
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12. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
So often Louise felt her spirits soaring. Her happiness was a helium balloon lifting up, 
rising far above the earth. She let go, allowing it to fly free. But as it reached dizzying 
heights, the elements always worked to untie the knot she had so carefully tied at its 
base so every time it would plummet down to earth, deflated. Her joy was gone, a 
burst bubble. Louise’s parents found her behaviour unpredictable.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Louise tried to regulate her moods and maintain a healthy balance of emotions. 
Recently, however, she had become deliriously happy and had lost that sense of being 
in control of her mental state. She became more and more elated, full of excited plans 
and bordering on mania. Then suddenly Louise’s mood changed totally and 
depression took over. Her joy was gone, a burst bubble. Louise’s parents found her 
behaviour unpredictable.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Louise tried to regulate her moods and maintain a healthy balance of emotions. 
Recently, however, she had become deliriously happy and had lost that sense of being 
in control of her mental state. She became more and more elated, full of excited plans 
and bordering on mania. Then suddenly Louise’s mood changed totally and 
depression took over. Her state of mind was not stable. Louise’s parents found her 
behaviour unpredictable.  
 
13. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
In our pressured modern lives it is hard to take a few minutes just for oneself. When 
we do manage to find time to pause and reflect, it is the taste of vintage red wine. 
Those fortunate enough to have drunk this soothing substance will know that it is a 
liquor to be savoured and appreciated, the elixir of life. Spare time is the nectar of the 
Gods. Meditation holidays are becoming increasingly popular.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Modern life is so busy and pressured that we rarely have a moment to reflect on 
ourselves. We spend our lives rushing about and even when a spare minute comes our 
way, though we might recognise its value, we do not enjoy it as we should; indeed we 
often opt to save it for another occasion. Spare time is the nectar of the Gods. 
Meditation holidays are becoming increasingly popular.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Modern life is so busy and pressured that we rarely have a moment to reflect on 
ourselves. We spend our lives rushing about and even when a spare minute comes our 
way, though we might recognise its value, we do not enjoy it as we should; indeed we 
often opt to save it for another occasion. This approach to life, and to time, seems 
foolish. Meditation holidays are becoming increasingly popular.  
 
14. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Dan tried everything he could to be optimistic, reciting positive mantras and forcing a 
smile. Yet, his bleak outlook remained, pessimism continued to invade his mind and 
body. No emotional antibiotics were strong enough to control the violence and 
strength of this poison that tormented him day and night. Hoping to prevent its 
toxicity from spreading to those around him, Dan shut himself away from the world. 
His negativity was a rampant infection. Dan was forever complaining.  
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Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Dan was always in a bad mood and appeared to be incapable of seeing the good in 
anything or anyone. Though he tried to be more positive, his bleak outlook on life 
remained. No amount of forced smiling helped. He knew that other people could 
sense his pessimism and worried about making them feel bad through his behaviour. 
This fear led Dan to isolate himself. His negativity was a rampant infection. Dan was 
forever complaining.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Dan was always in a bad mood and appeared to be incapable of seeing the good in 
anything or anyone. Though he tried to be more positive, his bleak outlook on life 
remained. No amount of forced smiling helped. He knew that other people could 
sense his pessimism and worried about making them feel bad through his behaviour. 
This fear led Dan to isolate himself. He hated his negative attitude. Dan was forever 
complaining. 
 
15. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Melanie felt that her PhD dissertation was taking up too many years of her life and 
too much of her energy. It was an arduous trek to Everest, the steep daily trudge too 
painful to bear. Then, at the last stage, eager for it to be over, she rushed ahead, 
risking collapse and, sadly, missing the beauty of the terrain she was travelling 
through. Writing the concluding chapter was the final ascent to the mighty summit. 
Melanie was dreading the examiners’ report.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Melanie was finding her degree extremely difficult. Although she was quite close to 
finishing it, she considered giving it up. She couldn’t stop thinking about finally 
completing her studies, so much so that she failed to enjoy the interesting theories 
she was learning about.  She began to rush her work, eager for it to be over. If she 
wasn’t careful, she was going to burn out. Writing the concluding chapter was the 
final ascent to the mighty summit. Melanie was dreading the examiners’ report.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Melanie was finding her degree extremely difficult. Although she was quite close to 
finishing it, she considered giving it up. She couldn’t stop thinking about finally 
completing her studies, so much so that she failed to enjoy the interesting theories 
she was learning about.  She began to rush her work, eager for it to be over. If she 
wasn’t careful, she was going to burn out. Her dissertation would be a great 
achievement. Melanie was dreading the examiners’ report.  
 
16. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
As he grew older Alan knew it was only a matter of time until death came barging 
into his home, uninvited, of course. Every day he listened closely for the loud sound of 
knuckles rapping callously against the door. He wished someone could bail him out, 
but death accepted no bribes. The grave, God’s bankruptcy court, would clear him of 
his debts. Dying is the final tax paid to the world. Alan was 90 years old. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
With every year that passed, Alan became increasingly aware that his time on earth 
was limited. Despite being healthy and in good condition for his age, he was still 
expecting to die soon. His fear of death stopped him from leaving the house and 
enjoying his life. Desperately he wished for immortality, though he knew no such 
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thing would be possible. Dying is the final tax paid to the world. Alan was 90 years 
old. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
With every year that passed, Alan became increasingly aware that his time on earth 
was limited. Despite being healthy and in good condition for his age, he was still 
expecting to die soon. His fear of death stopped him from leaving the house and 
enjoying his life. Desperately he wished for immortality, though he knew no such 
thing would be possible. Dying is an inevitable part of life. Alan was 90 years old.  
 
17. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Rob found himself getting increasingly frustrated with the stupidity of everyone 
around him. His anger was a dormant volcano, which could erupt at any moment. He 
sensed the hot magma bubbling beneath his scalp, and felt the pressure building up 
inside of him. He knew it was only a matter of time before he burst, pouring out red-
hot lava, viciously burning those around him. His temper was a blistering fire. Rob 
tried to take deep breaths.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
From Rob’s behaviour one would judge him to be an easy-going contented sort of guy. 
However, his outward conduct did not reflect how he felt. He was constantly annoyed 
and frustrated with people. Somehow he managed to conceal his anger, but this 
repression of his feelings only made matters worse. He knew he wouldn’t be able to 
hide his irritation forever. His temper was a blistering fire. Rob tried to take deep 
breaths.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
From Rob’s behaviour one would judge him to be an easy-going contented sort of guy. 
However, his outward conduct did not reflect how he felt. He was constantly annoyed 
and frustrated with people. Somehow he managed to conceal his anger, but this 
repression of his feelings only made matters worse. He knew he wouldn’t be able to 
hide his irritation forever, but he didn’t want to upset his friends. Rob tried to take 
deep breaths.  
 
18. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Whenever Laura spoke on a topic, her friend Tom was struck by her remarkable 
insight. Her remarks were rough cut diamonds. They may not have had the polished 
shine of stones exhibited in fancy jewellery shops, but they held a precious element 
within them, a hidden gem of beauty. With proper care and the knowledge of skilled 
cutting techniques, this sparkling brilliance might one day be visible to all. Her ideas 
were valuable jewels. Laura was studying philosophy at university.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Whenever Laura spoke, those who were smart listened intently. Her friend Tom for 
example always paid close attention to what she said. Though the way she put 
forward and constructed her arguments was not fully expert, the content of what she 
said was truly insightful, she had a unique vision and intellect. With the right training 
and supervision she might one day become a distinguished thinker, whom many 
would admire. Her ideas were valuable jewels. Laura was studying philosophy at 
university. 
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Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Whenever Laura spoke, those who were smart listened intently. Her friend Tom for 
example always paid close attention to what she said. Though the way she put 
forward and constructed her arguments was not fully expert, the content of what she 
said was truly insightful, she had a unique vision and intellect. With the right training 
and supervision she might one day become a distinguished thinker, whom many 
would admire. Her words were worthy of appreciation. Laura was studying 
philosophy at university.  
 
19. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Although they were very independent people, Nicola dearly missed Jane, her oldest 
acquaintance, when they were parted. For her, Jane was a bunch of sunny daffodils in 
constant bloom, impervious to the seasons. Whenever the darkness was setting in, 
Nicola sought out these vividly coloured blossoms of springtime to brighten her life. 
A best friend is a beautiful bouquet of flowers. Nicola spoke to Jane as often as 
possible.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Nicola and Jane had known each other since childhood, despite leading fairly separate 
lives they had somehow managed to stay close all throughout their adult life. 
Whenever Nicola felt upset, she would turn to Jane, who was always positive and able 
to give her a sense of hope for the future. A best friend is a beautiful bouquet of 
flowers. Nicola spoke to Jane as often as possible.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Nicola and Jane had known each other since childhood, despite leading fairly separate 
lives they had somehow managed to stay close all throughout their adult life. 
Whenever Nicola felt upset, she would turn to Jane, who was always positive and able 
to give her a sense of hope for the future. A best friend makes daily life easier to bear. 
Nicola spoke to Jane as often as possible.  
 
20. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
After being alone for many years, Liz was finally rescued from perpetual singledom by 
Tom. She had been tossed about for so long on the cold ocean praying for that saving 
torch to find her. At long last she spotted it from afar and swam desperately towards 
it, until eventually she was within its warm beacon of light and was dragged safely to 
shore. His love was a lighthouse. Liz and Tom quickly got engaged. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Liz had been single for many years and was desperate to find a boyfriend. She never 
seemed to meet anyone, let alone connect with anyone. She felt totally alone. But 
finally when she met Tom, she instantly knew that he could save her from her lonely 
life. He was the kindest, most generous man. He looked after her so well and made 
her feel completely safe. His love was a lighthouse. Liz and Tom quickly got 
engaged.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Liz had been single for many years and was desperate to find a boyfriend. She never 
seemed to meet anyone, let alone connect with anyone. She felt totally alone. But 
finally when she met Tom, she instantly knew that he could save her from her lonely 
life. He was the kindest, most generous man. He looked after her so well and made 
her feel completely safe. His love made her very happy. Liz and Tom quickly got 
engaged.  
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21. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Isabelle never failed to spend the holidays with her family – the excitement of their 
crazy amusement park was simply too hard to resist. On her way home, she always 
felt a sense of anticipation – she was a child again, eagerly awaiting entry to a fun-
filled playground. There would be soaring highs and dangerous dives, but she couldn’t 
wait. Christmas dinner was a rollercoaster ride. Isabelle had lots of siblings. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Isabelle loved going back to her home town during the holidays. It was always so 
much fun seeing all her family and returning to the house she grew up in. Though she 
was now thirty years old, she felt herself instantly regressing to her childhood. She 
anticipated numerous arguments, but with these came equally happy times. 
Christmas dinner was a rollercoaster ride. Isabelle had lots of siblings.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Isabelle loved going back to her home town during the holidays. It was always so 
much fun seeing all her family and returning to the house she grew up in. Though she 
was now thirty years old, she felt herself instantly regressing to her childhood. She 
anticipated numerous arguments, but with these came equally happy times. 
Christmas dinner was a series of highs and lows. Isabelle had lots of siblings.  
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APPENDIX II 
 
Experiment 2 Materials 
 
 
Experimental Items (target sentence in bold) 
 
1. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Chris found everyday life hard to cope with and felt an overwhelming sense of 
emotional frailty. His psyche was an intricately complex crystal, a rare and fine 
mineral that needed to be handled with sensitivity and caution. Chris was all too 
aware of the shattering effect other people’s careless handling might have. And so, he 
decided to lock himself away for fear of breaking entirely. His soul was a brittle shard. 
Chris’ social life was non-existent. His parents couldn’t understand where it had all 
gone wrong. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Chris was a complicated and sensitive person. He often felt misunderstood by 
peoplewho didn’t take the time to get to know him, people who didn’t understand his 
vulnerability. He feared coming into contact with these people, knowing how they 
could upset him. This fear led him to be careful about who he let into his life, as he 
felt almost on the brink of psychological collapse. His soul was a brittle shard. Chris’ 
social life was non-existent. His parents couldn’t understand where it had all gone 
wrong. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Chris was a complicated and sensitive person. He often felt misunderstood by people 
who didn’t take the time to get to know him, people who didn’t understand his 
vulnerability. He feared coming into contact with these people, knowing how they 
could upset him. This fear led him to be careful about who he let into his life, as he 
felt almost on the brink of psychological collapse. He was emotionally frail. Chris’ 
social life was non-existent. His parents couldn’t understand where it had all gone 
wrong. 
 
Question: Chris had too many friends. 
Answer: False 
 
2. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Becky hated the pressure of exams and never seemed able to recall her revision. As 
soon as she entered the examination hall, she felt the contents of her mind turn into 
noodles. Every strand of consciousness, every piece of revision, was chaotically matted 
together in a thick dry clump. Her attempts to separate out a clean line of reasoning 
completely failed. Her thoughts were hopelessly knotted. Becky needed to see a 
tutor. Luckily her school offered discounted private tuition. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Becky was very hard working and put a lot of effort into her studies. Sadly, her grades 
did not reflect this. Though she always prepared extensively for any test, she struggled 
to stay calm under the pressure of exams. As soon as she opened up a question paper 
she became totally confused and was incapable of recalling her revision. Her thoughts 
were hopelessly knotted. Becky needed to see a tutor. Luckily her school offered 
discounted private tuition. 
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Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Becky was very hard working and put a lot of effort into her studies. Sadly, her grades 
did not reflect this. Though she always prepared extensively for any test, she struggled 
to stay calm under the pressure of exams. As soon as she opened up a question paper 
she became totally confused and was incapable of recalling her revision. She felt 
wholly incompetent. Becky needed to see a tutor. Luckily her school offered 
discounted private tuition. 
 
Question: Becky found school difficult. 
Answer: True 
 
3. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Hannah had become addicted to chocolate and was habitually over-eating. Her extra 
weight was an ugly blanket which shrouded her in heavy shame. When she first tried 
it on its warm thick fabric had seemed so comforting, but after a while its synthetic 
fibres began to irritate her. It was harder to tolerate, more and more uncomfortable, 
yet she wasn’t sure she could survive the cold without it. Obesity is an ungainly 
overcoat. Hannah tried to get more exercise. She preferred exercise classes like 
aerobics to the gym. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
When Hannah and her ex broke up she started eating copious amounts of chocolate 
for comfort. Now she really regretted it. Initially, she had loved the sugar-y fix of 
calories, but soon the weight that she gained only made her feel worse. But by that 
point, she was addicted to over-eating. She had lost all her shape, and despised her 
appearance when she looked in the mirror. Obesity is an ungainly overcoat. Hannah 
tried to get more exercise. She preferred exercise classes like aerobics to the gym. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
When Hannah and her ex broke up she started eating copious amounts of chocolate 
for comfort. Now, she really regretted it. Initially, she had loved the sugar-y fix of 
calories, but soon the weight that she gained only made her feel worse. But by that 
point, she was addicted to over-eating. She had lost all her shape, and despised her 
appearance when she looked in the mirror. She was diagnosed as obese. Hannah 
tried to get more exercise. She preferred exercise classes like aerobics to the gym. 
 
Question: Hannah was underweight. 
Answer: False 
 
4. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Mary found it impossible to get through the day without a drink and was completely 
dependent on alcohol. Her addiction was a demanding creature; he refused to be 
ignored and sapped all her strength with his unrelenting need for attention. Too weak 
to fight him off, she indulged his demands and in turn, he tore her limb from limb. 
Her dependency was a biting animal. Mary finally checked into rehab. She would 
have to stay for at least a month. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Mary was incapable of making it through the day without a drink and was wholly 
dependent on alcohol. The constant cravings she experienced were relentless and 
exhausting. Sadly, she could never find the strength of mind to suppress these desires. 
Nor was she capable of enjoying just one drink, a glass always turned into a bottle, 
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and it always ended in misery. Her dependency was a biting animal. Mary finally 
checked into rehab. She would have to stay for at least a month.  
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Mary was incapable of making it through the day without a drink and was wholly 
dependent on alcohol. The constant cravings she experienced were relentless and 
exhausting. Sadly, she could never find the strength of mind to suppress these desires. 
Nor was she capable of enjoying just one drink, a glass always turned into a bottle, 
and it always ended in misery. Her dependency was incredibly draining. Mary finally 
checked into rehab. She would have to stay for at least a month.  
 
Question: Mary was an alcoholic. 
Answer: True 
 
5. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
James was overwhelmed with grief after the death of his daughter. Though family and 
friends had been supportive, he felt very distant from them. The world was now a 
play, one he had no interest in watching, let alone participating in. He had once been 
part of these scenes, but now he sat passively in the audience, watching every trivial 
plot line in silence. His life was a closed down theatre. James couldn’t even speak to 
his wife. Their daughter had always looked so much like her. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
James was inconsolable after the death of his daughter who had tragically died of 
leukaemia at a very young age. Despite the love and support from friends and family, 
he was finding it hard to cope. Everything seemed so futile and irrelevant; he couldn’t 
bear to take part in anything, and so instead he passively watched events unfold, 
interacting less and less. His life was a closed down theatre. James couldn’t even 
speak to his wife. Their daughter had always looked so much like her. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
James was inconsolable after the death of his daughter who had tragically died of 
leukaemia at a very young age. Despite the love and support from friends and family, 
he was finding it hard to cope. Everything seemed so futile and irrelevant; he couldn’t 
bear to take part in anything, and so instead he passively watched events unfold, 
interacting less and less. His life felt empty and meaningless. James couldn’t even 
speak to his wife. Their daughter had always looked so much like her. 
 
Question: James was always jolly. 
Answer: False 
 
6. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Nick had been struggling at work for some time, his boss was dragging him down into 
a suffocating sea of to-do lists. He wished someone would throw him a float so he 
could get to the surface and scream out for rescue. He felt himself sinking, deeper and 
deeper, unable to tread water, he was drowning. His job was a voyage to the bottom of 
the ocean. Nick prepared to resign. He might have to sign on for a while. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Nick was not doing well at work. His boss was very demanding and gave Nick more 
work than he could manage. He felt totally overwhelmed and under immense 
pressure. He was unable to finish the tasks that had been set for him and had no 
opportunity to ask for help from anyone. The situation was getting worse and worse. 
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His job was a voyage to the bottom of the ocean. Nick prepared to resign. He might 
have to sign on for a while. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Nick was not doing well at work. His boss was very demanding and gave Nick more 
work than he could manage. He felt totally overwhelmed and under immense 
pressure. He was unable to finish the tasks that had been set for him and had no 
opportunity to ask for help from anyone. The situation was getting worse and worse. 
He was afraid of having a complete nervous collapse. Nick prepared to resign. He 
might have to sign on for a while. 
 
Question: Nick was not likely to get promoted. 
Answer: True 
 
7. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Their relationship was comfortable, but unexciting. It was a mug of watery fruit tea. 
Holding it tight in her hands Amy felt safe in its familiarity, reassured by its warmth. 
Yet, whenever she took a sip, a wave of disappointment washed over her and she 
registered its lack of real flavour. She craved a drink with a little more flavour. Her 
boyfriend was no espresso. Amy knew they had to break up. She hated the idea of 
hurting him. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Amy’s relationship was companionable but lacking some excitement. She had been 
with her partner for many years and he was a great support to her, calming her down 
when she needed it. People looked at them in admiration – they seemed so well 
adjusted and stable. But she wanted something more, someone new and challenging, 
someone who would stimulate her mind. Her boyfriend was no espresso. Amy knew 
they had to break up. She hated the idea of hurting him. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Amy’s relationship was companionable but lacking some excitement. She had been 
with her partner for many years and he was a great support to her, calming her down 
when she needed it. People looked at them in admiration – they seemed so well 
adjusted and stable. But she wanted something more, someone new and challenging, 
someone who would stimulate her mind. Her boyfriend was a bit boring. Amy knew 
they had to break up. She hated the idea of hurting him. 
 
Question: Amy was content. 
Answer: False 
 
8. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Emma had never had any luck making friends. She was a forgotten football left on the 
side-lines, waiting to be picked up and put back into play. But having been battered by 
frost and storms, there was now no air left within her. She was useless and no one 
could be bothered to pump her back up again. She lay, neglected on the ground 
without purpose, abandoned and untouched. Her heart was punctured beyond repair. 
Emma joined the local church. Though she wasn’t sure she believed in God. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Emma’s feelings of loneliness were awful. She longed to make some new friends, or at 
least be reunited with her old friends and family. They had given up on her years ago 
when, in a fragile state, she had been unable to take part in their lives. It seemed that 
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society had forgotten about her, as if no one would notice whether she was dead or 
alive. Her heart was punctured beyond repair. Emma joined the local church. 
Though she wasn’t sure she believed in God. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Emma’s feelings of loneliness were awful. She longed to make some new friends, or at 
least be reunited with her old friends and family. They had given up on her years ago 
when, in a fragile state, she had been unable to take part in their lives. It seemed that 
society had forgotten about her, as if no one would notice whether she was dead or 
alive. She was completely isolated in life. Emma joined the local church. Though she 
wasn’t sure she believed in God. 
 
Question: Emma hoped to build some relationships. 
Answer: True 
 
9. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Alex had been determined to succeed at any cost. His ambition was a soaring tower, 
reaching high above all the other buildings around him with their more modest three 
or four levels. He was indifferent to the bleak shadow it cast over the lowly masses in 
its proximity. Yet, standing on its roof, peering down at the world below, its creator 
suddenly felt a desperate need to tear down the ugly edifice. His success was a vacant 
skyscraper. Alex signed up for charity work. He needed to redeem his soul some 
way. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Alex was very ambitious, an attitude which had enabled him to accomplish a great 
deal. But he was also very ruthless. When he started his company he cared only about 
himself and was not affected by thoughts of the people he’d put out of business. Yet, 
later on in his career, he started to feel guilty about his behaviour; he considered 
quitting his job and trying to restore small businesses. His success was a vacant 
skyscraper. Alex signed up for charity work. He needed to redeem his soul some 
way. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Alex was very ambitious, an attitude which had enabled him to accomplish a great 
deal. But he was also very ruthless. When he started his company he cared only about 
himself and was not affected by thoughts of the people he’d put out of business. Yet, 
later on in his career, he started to feel guilty about his behaviour; he considered 
quitting his job and trying to restore small businesses. He was full of regret. Alex 
signed up for charity work. He needed to redeem his soul some way. 
 
Question: Alex had never had a job. 
Answer: False 
 
10. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Emily’s infidelity was an awful sin against her marriage. With great pain, she carried 
her guilt about with her, chaining shackles around her ankles. These cold metal 
fastenings enslaved her to the past and imprisoned her heart. Yet with the help of a 
therapist, she finally broke free. Releasing the cruel irons of self-loathing she ran back 
towards her life. Forgiveness was the key that unlocked her. Emily began to love 
herself again. She resolved to never cheat again. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
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Emily was experiencing overwhelming guilt and regret having been unfaithful to her 
husband of many years. She found it very hard to think of anything except her 
infidelity and hated herself for what she had done to their relationship. As she started 
seeing a therapist, however, things slowly began to change. She started to accept what 
had happened. Forgiveness was the key that unlocked her. Emily began to love 
herself again. She resolved to never cheat again. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Emily was experiencing overwhelming guilt and regret having been unfaithful to her 
husband of many years. She found it very hard to think of anything except her 
infidelity and hated herself for what she had done to their relationship. As she started 
seeing a therapist, however, things slowly began to change. She started to accept what 
had happened. Acceptance gave her a sense of relief. Emily began to love herself 
again. She resolved to never cheat again. 
 
Question: Emily had cheated on her husband. 
Answer: True 
 
11. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Felicity’s cancer had broken into her life and stolen all her hopes for the future. Her 
sickness was a fierce dictator. She longed to emigrate and escape his clutches, but he 
had closed all the borders. As she plotted their reopening, determined to overthrow 
his controlling regime, he violently trampled on her soul, suffocating her beneath his 
heavyweight boots. This illness was a merciless tyrant. Felicity considered her 
funeral arrangements. She decided to be cremated rather than buried. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Felicity had been unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer six months ago and told that 
her chances of recovery were very low. She was determined not to die and was 
desperate to get well again by any methods. As she researched alternative treatments, 
the sickness continued, making her feel weak and disheartened, both her energy and 
hope diminished. This illness was a merciless tyrant. Felicity considered her funeral 
arrangements. She decided to be cremated rather than buried. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Felicity had been unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer six months ago and told that 
her chances of recovery were very low. She was determined not to die and was 
desperate to get well again by any methods. As she researched alternative treatments, 
the sickness continued, making her feel weak and disheartened, both her energy and 
hope diminished. The illness appeared to be incurable. Felicity considered her 
funeral arrangements. She decided to be cremated rather than buried. 
 
Question: Felicity was in impeccable health. 
Answer: False 
 
12. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
So often Alice felt her spirits soaring. Her happiness was a helium balloon lifting up, 
rising far above the earth. She let go, allowing it to fly free. But as it reached dizzying 
heights, the elements always worked to untie the knot she had so carefully tied at its 
base so every time it would plummet down to earth, deflated. Her joy was gone, a 
burst bubble. Alice’s parents found her behaviour unpredictable. They wondered if 
she might have bipolar disorder. 
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Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Alice tried to regulate her moods and maintain a healthy balance of emotions. 
Recently, however, she had become deliriously happy and had lost that sense of being 
in control of her mental state. She became more and more elated, full of excited plans 
and bordering on mania. Then suddenly Alice’s mood changed totally and depression 
took over. Her joy was gone, a burst bubble. Alice’s parents found her behaviour 
unpredictable. They wondered if she might have bipolar disorder. 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Alice tried to regulate her moods and maintain a healthy balance of emotions. 
Recently, however, she had become deliriously happy and had lost that sense of being 
in control of her mental state. She became more and more elated, full of excited plans 
and bordering on mania. Then suddenly Alice’s mood changed totally and depression 
took over. Her state of mind was not stable. Alice’s parents found her behaviour 
unpredictable. They wondered if she might have bipolar disorder. 
 
Question: Alice’s moods were up and down. 
Answer: True 
 
13. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
In our pressured modern lives it is hard to take a few minutes just for oneself. When 
we do manage to find time to pause and reflect, it is the taste of vintage red wine. 
Those fortunate enough to have drunk this soothing substance will know that it is a 
liquor to be savoured and appreciated, the elixir of life. Spare time is the nectar of the 
Gods. Meditation holidays are becoming increasingly popular. Often these involve 
taking a vow of silence. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Modern life is so busy and pressured that we rarely have a moment to reflect on 
ourselves. We spend our lives rushing about and even when a spare minute comes our 
way, though we might recognise its value, we do not enjoy it as we should. Indeed we 
often opt to save it for another occasion. Spare time is the nectar of the Gods. 
Meditation holidays are becoming increasingly popular. Often these involve 
taking a vow of silence. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Modern life is so busy and pressured that we rarely have a moment to reflect on 
ourselves. We spend our lives rushing about and even when a spare minute comes our 
way, though we might recognise its value, we do not enjoy it as we should. Indeed we 
often opt to save it for another occasion. This approach to life, and to time, seems 
foolish. Meditation holidays are becoming increasingly popular. Often these 
involve taking a vow of silence. 
 
Question: People have too much free time. 
Answer: False 
 
14. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Dan tried everything he could to be optimistic, reciting positive mantras and forcing a 
smile. Yet, his bleak outlook remained, pessimism continued to invade his mind and 
body. No emotional antibiotics were strong enough to control the violence and 
strength of this poison that tormented him day and night. Hoping to prevent its 
toxicity from spreading to those around him, Dan shut himself away from the world. 
His negativity was a rampant infection. Dan was forever complaining. He didn’t 
know how to change and be happy.  
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Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Dan was always in a bad mood and appeared to be incapable of seeing the good in 
anything or anyone. Though he tried to be more positive, his bleak outlook on life 
remained. No amount of forced smiling helped. He knew that other people could 
sense his pessimism and worried about making them feel bad through his behaviour. 
This fear led Dan to isolate himself. His negativity was a rampant infection. Dan was 
forever complaining. He didn’t know how to change and be happy.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Dan was always in a bad mood and appeared to be incapable of seeing the good in 
anything or anyone. Though he tried to be more positive, his bleak outlook on life 
remained. No amount of forced smiling helped. He knew that other people could 
sense his pessimism and worried about making them feel bad through his behaviour. 
This fear led Dan to isolate himself. He hated his negative attitude. Dan was forever 
complaining. He didn’t know how to change and be happy.  
 
Question: Dan was unable to be optimistic. 
Answer: True 
 
15. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Melanie felt that her PhD dissertation was taking up too many years of her life and 
too much of her energy. It was an arduous trek to Everest, the steep daily trudge too 
painful to bear. Then, at the last stage, eager for it to be over, she rushed ahead, 
risking collapse and, sadly, missing the beauty of the terrain she was travelling 
through. Writing the concluding chapter was the final ascent to the mighty summit. 
Melanie was dreading the examiners’ report. She couldn’t wait for the viva to be 
over.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Melanie was finding her degree extremely difficult. Although she was quite close to 
finishing it, she considered giving it up. She couldn’t stop thinking about finally 
completing her studies, so much so that she failed to enjoy the interesting theories 
she was learning about.  She began to rush her work, eager for it to be over. If she 
wasn’t careful, she was going to burn out. Writing the concluding chapter was the 
final ascent to the mighty summit. Melanie was dreading the examiners’ report. 
She couldn’t wait for the viva to be over. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Melanie was finding her degree extremely difficult. Although she was quite close to 
finishing it, she considered giving it up. She couldn’t stop thinking about finally 
completing her studies, so much so that she failed to enjoy the interesting theories 
she was learning about.  She began to rush her work, eager for it to be over. If she 
wasn’t careful, she was going to burn out. Writing the concluding chapter of her 
dissertation would be a great achievement. Melanie was dreading the examiners’ 
report. She couldn’t wait for the viva to be over.  
 
Question: Melanie was uneducated. 
Answer: False 
 
16. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
As he grew older Richard knew it was only a matter of time until death came barging 
into his home, uninvited, of course. Every day he listened closely for the loud sound of 
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knuckles rapping callously against the door. He wished someone could bail him out, 
but death accepted no bribes. The grave, God’s bankruptcy court, would clear him of 
his debts. Dying is the final tax paid to the world. Richard was 90 years old. He had 
seen a lot in his time. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
With every year that passed, Richard became increasingly aware that his time on 
earth was limited. Despite being healthy and in good condition for his age, he was still 
expecting to die soon. His fear of death stopped him from leaving the house and 
enjoying his life. Desperately he wished for immortality, though he knew no such 
thing would be possible. Dying is the final tax paid to the world. Richard was 90 
years old. He had seen a lot in his time. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
With every year that passed, Richard became increasingly aware that his time on 
earth was limited. Despite being healthy and in good condition for his age, he was still 
expecting to die soon. His fear of death stopped him from leaving the house and 
enjoying his life. Desperately he wished for immortality, though he knew no such 
thing would be possible. Dying is an inevitable part of life. Richard was 90 years old. 
He had seen a lot in his time. 
 
Question: Richard was near the end of his life. 
Answer: True 
 
17. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Rob found himself getting increasingly frustrated with the stupidity of everyone 
around him. His anger was a dormant volcano, which could erupt at any moment. He 
sensed the hot magma bubbling beneath his scalp, and felt the pressure building up 
inside of him. He knew it was only a matter of time before he burst, pouring out red-
hot lava, viciously burning those around him. His temper was a blistering fire. Rob 
tried to take deep breaths. ‘In through the nose, out through the mouth’, he recited. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
From Rob’s behaviour one would judge him to be an easy-going contented sort of guy. 
However, his outward conduct did not reflect how he felt. He was constantly annoyed 
and frustrated with people. Somehow he managed to conceal his anger, but this 
repression of his feelings only made matters worse. He knew he wouldn’t be able to 
hide his irritation forever. His temper was a blistering fire. Rob tried to take deep 
breaths. ‘In through the nose, out through the mouth’, he recited. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
From Rob’s behaviour one would judge him to be an easy-going contented sort of guy. 
However, his outward conduct did not reflect how he felt. He was constantly annoyed 
and frustrated with people. Somehow he managed to conceal his anger, but this 
repression of his feelings only made matters worse. He knew he wouldn’t be able to 
hide his irritation forever. He was anxious about upsetting his friends. Rob tried to 
take deep breaths. ‘In through the nose, out through the mouth’, he recited. 
 
Question: Rob was very chilled out. 
Answer: False 
 
18. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
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Whenever Laura spoke on a topic, her friend Tom was struck by her remarkable 
insight. Her remarks were rough cut diamonds. They may not have had the polished 
shine of stones exhibited in fancy jewellery shops, but they held a precious element 
within them, a hidden gem of beauty. With proper care and the knowledge of skilled 
cutting techniques, this sparkling brilliance might one day be visible to all. Her ideas 
were valuable jewels. Laura was studying philosophy at university. She loved to 
write in her spare time. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Whenever Laura spoke, those who were smart listened intently. Her friend Tom for 
example always paid close attention to what she said. Though the way she put 
forward and constructed her arguments was not fully expert, the content of what she 
said was truly insightful. She had a unique vision and intellect. With the right training 
and supervision she might one day become a distinguished thinker, whom many 
would admire. Her ideas were valuable jewels. Laura was studying philosophy at 
university. She loved to write in her spare time. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Whenever Laura spoke, those who were smart listened intently. Her friend Tom for 
example always paid close attention to what she said. Though the way she put 
forward and constructed her arguments was not fully expert, the content of what she 
said was truly insightful. She had a unique vision and intellect. With the right training 
and supervision she might one day become a distinguished thinker, whom many 
would admire. Her words were worthy of appreciation. Laura was studying 
philosophy at university. She loved to write in her spare time. 
 
Question: Laura was wise. 
Answer: True 
 
19. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Although they were very independent people, Nicola dearly missed Jane, her oldest 
acquaintance, when they were parted. For her, Jane was a bunch of sunny daffodils in 
constant bloom, impervious to the seasons. Whenever the darkness was setting in, 
Nicola sought out these vividly coloured blossoms of springtime to brighten her life. 
A best friend is a beautiful bouquet of flowers. Nicola spoke to Jane as often as 
possible. They had seen each other through so much.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Nicola and Jane had known each other since childhood, despite leading fairly separate 
lives they had somehow managed to stay close all throughout their adult life. 
Whenever Nicola felt upset, she would turn to Jane, who was always positive and able 
to give her a sense of hope for the future. A best friend is a beautiful bouquet of 
flowers. Nicola spoke to Jane as often as possible. They had seen each other 
through so much.  
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Nicola and Jane had known each other since childhood, despite leading fairly separate 
lives they had somehow managed to stay close all throughout their adult life. 
Whenever Nicola felt upset, she would turn to Jane, who was always positive and able 
to give her a sense of hope for the future. A best friend makes daily life easier to bear. 
Nicola spoke to Jane as often as possible. They had seen each other through so 
much.  
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Question: Nicola hated Jane. 
Answer: False 
 
20. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
After being alone for many years, Liz was finally rescued from perpetual singledom by 
Tom. She had been tossed about for so long on the cold ocean praying for that saving 
torch to find her. At long last she spotted it from afar and swam desperately towards 
it, until eventually she was within its warm beacon of light and was dragged safely to 
shore. His love was a lighthouse. Liz and Tom quickly got engaged. She swiftly 
began planning their wedding.  
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Liz had been single for many years and was desperate to find a boyfriend. She never 
seemed to meet anyone, let alone connect with anyone. She felt totally alone. But 
finally when she met Tom, she instantly knew that he could save her from her lonely 
life. He was the kindest, most generous man. He looked after her so well and made 
her feel completely safe. His love was a lighthouse. Liz and Tom quickly got 
engaged. She swiftly began planning their wedding. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Liz had been single for many years and was desperate to find a boyfriend. She never 
seemed to meet anyone, let alone connect with anyone. She felt totally alone. But 
finally when she met Tom, she instantly knew that he could save her from her lonely 
life. He was the kindest, most generous man. He looked after her so well and made 
her feel completely safe. His love made her very happy. Liz and Tom quickly got 
engaged. She swiftly began planning their wedding. 
 
Question: Liz had been single for a long time before meeting Tom. 
Answer: True 
 
21. Condition A (Extended metaphorical passage) 
Isabelle never failed to spend the holidays with her family – the excitement of their 
crazy amusement park was simply too hard to resist. On her way home, she always 
felt a sense of anticipation – she was a child again, eagerly awaiting entry to a fun-
filled playground. There would be soaring highs and dangerous dives, but she couldn’t 
wait. Christmas dinner was a rollercoaster ride. Isabelle had lots of siblings. They 
were all incredibly close to each other. 
 
Condition B (Extended literal passage with phrasal metaphor) 
Isabelle loved going back to her home town during the holidays. It was always so 
much fun seeing all her family and returning to the house she grew up in. Though she 
was now thirty years old, she felt herself instantly regressing to her childhood. She 
anticipated numerous arguments, but with these came equally happy times. 
Christmas dinner was a rollercoaster ride. Isabelle had lots of siblings. They were all 
incredibly close to each other. 
 
Condition C (Extended literal passage) 
Isabelle loved going back to her home town during the holidays. It was always so 
much fun seeing all her family and returning to the house she grew up in. Though she 
was now thirty years old, she felt herself instantly regressing to her childhood. She 
anticipated numerous arguments, but with these came equally happy times. 
Christmas was a series of highs and lows. Isabelle had lots of siblings. They were all 
incredibly close to each other. 
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Question: Isabelle was lonely. 
Answer: False 
 
 
Filler Items 
 
1. Pete and Margaret rehearsed their life every day. Their daily routines were so 
predictable their footprints could have been numbered in a chart of dance steps. Early 
in the morning they would do a quiet waltz around the house, then a foxtrot to work. 
Their jobs never required them to improvise a quickstep or a swing and the long 
hours had the rhythm of a lullaby. Back home the evenings were always the same paso 
doble. 
 
Question: Pete and Margaret led stable lives. 
Answer: True 
 
2. When Gina’s employees were cooperative, they could achieve great things together. 
They were a choir in perfect harmony, the delicate notes of the sopranos blending 
perfectly with the powerful rumble of the basses. After the performance, Gina had 
merely to pick up the bouquets thrown onto the stage. But when they were 
uncooperative, the resulting cacophony assailed the senses, their tempo totally off.  
 
Question: Gina’s employees always worked well together. 
Answer: False 
 
3. The pupils in inner-city schools are notoriously unruly. The places are zoos. New 
keepers are generally assigned to the safer animals: the placid giraffes, the comical 
penguins and the half-domesticated goats. Those animals you could handle without 
protective gloves. It was both the more intelligent and the more aggressive animals 
that required extra safety measures, the foxes and lions who did not take kindly to any 
man-handling.  
 
Question: School children can be difficult to manage. 
Answer: True 
 
4. Dave had been leading his company in their negotiations with their rivals for months 
now. It was a boxing match, and both competitors were bloodied, bruised, and 
starting to let their guard down. But Dave was a chess player. He would wait patiently 
for the exact moment to strike, and then he would make a decisive attack, leading his 
opponent into an inescapable checkmate.  
 
Question: Dave was unemployed. 
Answer: False 
 
5. Harry and Tom’s sibling relationship varied enormously across time. It was a 
complicated weather system. Some days, there wasn’t a cloud in the sky and the sun 
shone brightly. Other days the sun barely rose and a chill breeze lowered the 
temperature. Just occasionally, lightning bolts scarred the ground. But the storm 
usually passed quickly, the fierce wind having cleared the air.  
 
Question: The brothers did not always get on perfectly. 
Answer: True 
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6. Andrew felt his memory deteriorating; what had once been a sponge was now a sieve. 
He quite enjoyed filtering out what was of little use to his brain, things that previously 
he’d absorbed automatically. But then he found himself forgetting the things he 
wanted, and needed, to remember. Somehow the mesh of the sieve had got snagged, 
the holes were too big, allowing everything to pass through.  
Question: Andrew had a photographic memory. 
Answer: False 
 
7. Gemma had risen to stardom at a young age, having acted in a number of feature 
films. She found fame increasingly hard to deal with. The paparazzi were hyenas, 
lurking around every corner. Even when she thought she was free of them, somehow 
they would chase her down. She hated the way they hunted in packs and she couldn't 
understand how anyone could put up with their relentless scavenging behaviour. 
 
Question: Gemma was famous. 
Answer: True 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Experiment 2 Memory Questionnaire 
 
 
Please fill out the blank spaces in the table below, counting 
backwards in 3s.  
 
 
For example: 
 
75 72 69 66 63 60 57 
 
 
 
 
30       
96       
44       
51       
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Please answer the following questions related to the experiment 
just completed on the computer. 
 
1. What was the most memorable story that you read during this experiment? 
Please try to remember specific details, exact words, phrases or sentences.  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Why do you remember this story? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. What was the next most memorable story? Again, please try to recall specific 
details, exact words, phrases or sentences. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Why do you remember this story? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
